In re V.A. CA4/3

CourtListener 10738957Calctapp19.11.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 11/19/25 In re V.A. CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re V.A., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
G065408
ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL
SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. Nos. 22DP0995,
22DP0995A)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
OPINION
v.

V.A. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Julie Anne Swain, Judge. Reversed and remanded, with directions. Request
for judicial notice granted.
Elizabeth Klippi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant V.A.
Sarah Vaona, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant V.A.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Debbie Torrez and Deborah B.
Morse, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for the Minor.
The parents of minor V.A. appeal from an order terminating their
1
parental rights and placing V.A. for adoption. The parents contend that
(1) the juvenile court wrongly rejected the parental-benefit exception; and
2
(2) an insufficient inquiry was made into V.A.’s Indian ancestry. We reject
their inquiry contention but agree the exception should have been applied.
We therefore reverse and remand.
FACTS
We have encountered this family before, recently holding the
parents established the parental-benefit exception as to V.A.’s older twin
sisters. (In re J.A. (May 27, 2025, G064724) [nonpub. opn.].)3 It was
undisputed the sisters “would benefit by continuing their contact with their
parents.” (Id. at p. 15.) Moreover, “the evidence pointed consistently toward
harm” that outweighed “the modest benefits to be gained through adoption
over guardianship in [that] case.” (Id. at p. 21.)
As for V.A., he lived with the parents for his first 11 months. He
first came to the juvenile court’s attention the month he was born, based on
allegations of substance abuse and domestic violence. The court declined to
issue a protective custody warrant. Later, the court found a prima facie

1
The parents share the same initials as V.A. so we refer to them
as Mother and Father.

2
“[W]e use the term ‘Indian’ throughout to reflect the statutory
language” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125, fn. 1 (Dezi C.)) used by
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; ICWA) and
the corresponding California Indian Child Welfare Act (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 224 et seq.; Cal-ICWA), though many reasonably prefer other terms.

3
We grant Mother’s unopposed request for judicial notice of our
prior opinion.

2
showing of failure to protect but allowed V.A. to conditionally remain with his
parents. The court ultimately declared V.A. a dependent, vested custody with
the parents, and afforded family maintenance services.
At a contested six-month review hearing, the court rejected the
Orange County Social Services Agency’s recommendation to terminate
jurisdiction and ordered maintenance services to continue. The family moved
to a new home “assessed to be safe” in July 2023. The Agency supplemented
its petition, alleging the parents had “unresolved substance abuse
problem[s].” The court issued a protective custody warrant (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 340)4 and placed V.A. with his sisters in the care of Father’s cousin.
The court “defer[ed] any findings [on ICWA] and order[ed] the Agency to
conduct further inquiries and then present that information to the court in
subsequent reports.”
Mother consistently visited V.A. after he was detained. The
Agency reported she “ha[d] not missed any visits,” which “appear[ed] to be
going well [with] no real concerns.” Mother “attend[ed] conjoint counseling”
with Father and reportedly “enroll[ed] in [an] anger management” program.
Leading up to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction hearing, the Agency
recommended continued family reunification services for Mother, who
entered a “negotiated disposition” to schedule a selection and implementation
hearing (§ 366.26) while continuing to receive services. The court sustained
the Agency’s supplemental petition allegations and found there were no
reasonable means to protect V.A. without removing him from his parents’
care. The court ordered continued services for Mother, based on the

4
All undesignated statutory references are to this code.

3
negotiated disposition, and authorized 15 hours per week of supervised visits.
At a contested review hearing, the court found returning V.A. to Mother and
Father “would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection
or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” The court found Mother had
made “moderate” progress in her case plan, terminated her family
reunification services, and scheduled a selection and implementation hearing
(§ 366.26).
The court denied the Agency’s petition to reduce Mother’s
visitation with V.A. The court found the Agency had not shown new evidence
or changed circumstances justifying the reduction. Mother continued to
steadfastly visit V.A.—spending all of her authorized time with him from
October 2024 through January 2025. Father was incarcerated in November
2024.5
After a prima facie hearing, the court scheduled an evidentiary
hearing on Mother’s request to return V.A. to her custody (§ 388), to coincide
with the scheduled selection and implementation hearing (§ 366.26).
At the combined hearing in April 2025, nearly 300 pages of
“visitation logs” were admitted as evidence. The court nonetheless denied
Mother’s request to return V.A. to her custody, finding she had not shown it
would “promote the best interests of the child.” The court moved on to the
selection and implementation hearing.
The parents asserted the parental-benefit exception. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The court agreed with them that their visitation had been

5
We do not consider Father’s authorized eight hours of weekly
visitation because his appeal relies on Mother’s claim concerning the
parental-benefit exception. (See Cal. Rules of Court (CRC), rule 5.725(a)(1) &
(f).)

4
“regular and consistent” and “the child had a substantial positive emotional
attachment to the parent.” But it also found the attachment “was not the
kind . . . that demonstrates . . . the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship” and the parents had not “met their burden” to show “that
terminating the attachment would be detrimental to the child.”
The court found V.A. to be adoptable and terminated Mother and
Father’s parental rights. The court also concluded that ICWA does not apply,
finding a “proper, adequate, and duly diligent” Indian ancestry inquiry had
been conducted.
DISCUSSION
I.
THE PARENTS ESTABLISHED THE PARENTAL-BENEFIT EXCEPTION
The parental-benefit exception authorizes a court to select a
permanency plan other than adoption when a parent shows three things:
(1) “regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into account the
extent of visitation permitted”; (2) “the child has a substantial, positive,
emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that
the child would benefit from continuing the relationship”; and (3) “that
terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when
balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636 (Caden C.).)
First, it is undisputed that “each parent” engaged in “regular
visitation and contact” with V.A., visiting him consistently. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.)
Second, on the requirement that “the child has a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment to the parent,” Mother and Father contend
the juvenile court wrongly found V.A.’s attachment to Mother was

5
insufficient to show he “would benefit from continuing the relationship.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.)
We agree with the parents. As they assert, the record shows V.A.
had a “far greater connection with [Mother] than simply pleasant visits, or
frequent and loving contact,” which approximated “two days a week of
concentrated bonding time with her son.”
The strength of V.A.’s connection with his parents is perhaps best
illustrated by his distress when they had to leave visits. For example, an
October 2024 visit summary showed that “[a]s [a] visit came to an end,
[Mother] and [Father] told [V.A.] transportation was going to take him back
and [V.A.] began to cry. [Mother] and [Father] soothed [V.A.] by telling [the
child], ‘don’t cry, it’s okay. I love you.’” In November 2024, V.A. was observed
running “to [Mother] shouting ‘Mom’” and, at the end of other visits, “not
want[ing] to leave by continuously saying ‘No,’” and “cr[ying] holding on to
[Mother].” In December 2024, V.A. was again observed not wanting to let go
of Mother; he cried at the end of a visit in January 2025; and in February
2025, a “visit ended with [Mother] carrying [V.A.] to the door as [the child]
began to cry and scream. [Mother] hugged and kissed [the child] goodbye as
[Mother] said, ‘It’s okay, it’s okay.’”
The social worker’s testimony was consistent with the parents’
position. She agreed their visits with V.A. were “positive” and that V.A. was
able to verbalize that he enjoyed them. The social worker confirmed that even
days before her testimony, V.A. had been “affectionate towards” Mother and
no concerns were noted.
We reject the Agency’s characterization that V.A. “rarely
exhibited distress” and “the instances during which the child exhibited any
reluctance leaving visits were limited.” While it is true not every visit ended

6
in tears, that does not impeach the enduring nature of the parent-child
relationship. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [“it is not necessary
. . . to calibrate a precise ‘quantitative measurement’” of the relationship].)
Third, we conclude Mother met her burden to show “that
terminating [V.A.’s] attachment would be detrimental to the child even when
balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) “In appropriate cases, the strength of the
relationship alone can support a finding that its termination would have a
‘destabilizing’ effect on the child.” (In re Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
803, 820.) This case presents “‘exceptional circumstances’” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 631) because the strength of V.A.’s bond to Mother is coupled
with the social worker’s undisputed testimony that even if legal guardianship
had been selected as the permanent plan for V.A., he would have still stayed
with his sisters and still “have [had the] stable home” provided by his
prospective adoptive parents, who indicated a willingness to “keep [V.A.] in
their care” through guardianship.
Based on this record, “the harm from severing the child’s
relationship with” Mother and Father “outweigh[ed] the benefit to the child of
placement in a new adoptive home” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632)
and the court should have applied the parental-benefit exception. Given the
merit of Mother’s appeal, the order to terminate Father’s parental rights
should also be reversed. (See CRC, rule 5.725(a)(1) & (f).)
On remand, the court should conduct a new permanency plan
hearing. Unless circumstances have materially changed, the court should
order guardianship as the permanent plan.

7
II.
THE ICWA INQUIRY WAS ADEQUATE
Finally, we reject the parents’ contention that the Agency did not
complete its duties of inquiry under ICWA and Cal-ICWA by failing to
interview V.A.’s extended family members.
“If a child is . . . initially taken into protective custody pursuant
to a warrant described in Section 340, the county welfare department . . . has
a duty to inquire whether that child is an Indian child. Inquiry includes, but
is not limited to, asking the child, parents, . . . [and] extended family
members . . . whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (b)(2).) The term “‘extended family member’” includes an adult
“grandparent, aunt [and] uncle.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); accord, § 224.1,
subd. (c)(1).) “If the court [or] social worker . . . has reason to believe that an
Indian child is involved in a proceeding, but does not have sufficient
information to determine that there is reason to know that the child is an
Indian child, the court [or] social worker . . . shall make further inquiry
regarding the possible Indian status of the child, and shall make that inquiry
as soon as practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).)
Given the “‘“well-developed record”’” on ICWA, “‘“the court ha[d]
relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was
proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.”’” (Dezi
C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) The record presented had documented
ICWA inquiries with no less than five extended family members of V.A. who
repeatedly disclaimed Indian ancestry and affirmed Mexican heritage, in
addition to at least two who did not return the Agency’s calls. This was in the
context of successive ICWA-020 forms filed by the parents—between the
court’s protective order for V.A., in July 2023, and the court’s termination of

8
Mother’s family reunification services in October 2024—that disclaimed
6
Indian ancestry.
The parents contend “[t]he social worker should have at least
attempted to contact the paternal grandfather and the paternal aunts and
uncles, which did not occur here, based on the record.” But again, “‘“the court
ha[d] relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry
was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.”’”
(Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) The multiple extended family
members interviewed by the Agency included Y.A., “the sibling of [V.A.]’s late
paternal grandmother,” who also happened to be married to Mother’s uncle.
In her interview, Y.A. “affirmed that she kn[ew] both sides of the family
well.” She specifically “reported that both the child’s maternal and paternal
grandparents, as well as great-grandparents, were born in Mexico and . . .
that none had Native American ancestry.”
We reject the parents’ assertion that error occurred because
“there were numerous extended family members known or available” who
were not questioned. The “court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry
[wa]s adequate, proper, and duly diligent [wa]s ‘a quintessentially
discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a deferential standard of review.”
(Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141; accord, § 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) The
parents’ record citations show the Agency pursued and obtained consistent

6
After the selection and implementation hearing was scheduled,
Mother filed a November 2024 ICWA-020 form that, in her words, “indicated
possible Indian ancestry through an unknown tribe.” The “‘“well-developed
record”’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141) shows the Agency discussed
Mother’s claim in a meeting with her that same month, and Mother did not
provide any further information. She does not raise any issue on appeal
based on the form.

9
information from multiple extended family members, over a span of years,
supporting the absence of a “reason to believe” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2)) “further
inquiry [wa]s necessary” (id, subd. (e)(2)).
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s April 3, 2025 order is reversed and this
matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

SCOTT, J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

BANCROFT, J.*

*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

10

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.