CourtListener 10738375•People v. Ortiz CA2/8
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 11/18/25 P. v. Ortiz CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B337320
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA114200)
v.
JASON ORTIZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Michael Villalobos, Judge. Affirmed.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Chelsea Zaragoza,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Jason Ortiz appeals from his judgment of conviction of one
count of petty theft (Pen. Code,1 § 484, subd. (a)). On appeal,
Ortiz argues: (1) the trial court erred in allowing two police
officers to identify Ortiz as the perpetrator in surveillance video
of the theft; (2) the trial court erred in excluding evidence of
misconduct by the investigating officer in a prior unrelated case;
and (3) there was cumulative error. We conclude the trial court
did not err in admitting the officers’ identification testimony
because it reasonably could find that such testimony was based
on the officers’ personal knowledge and helpful to the jury. We
also conclude the trial court did not err in excluding the proffered
impeachment evidence because it reasonably could find that the
probative value of such evidence was substantially outweighed by
the possible prejudicial effects. Because Ortiz has failed to show
error in the trial court’s rulings, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Evidence at trial
On February 19, 2023, Jia Li parked her car on the street
in front of her business in Alhambra, California. She did not lock
her car because she believed the auto-lock feature was on. Li left
her limited-edition Gucci purse on the front passenger seat of her
car and headed into her business. Inside her purse, Li had a
Burberry wallet and $9,000 in cash in $100 denominations.
When Li returned to her car about 10 minutes later, her
purse was missing. Li then reviewed her business’s surveillance
video footage. The surveillance video showed a blue Chevy truck
1 Unless otherwise stated, all further undesignated statutory
references are to the Penal Code.
2
parked near Li’s car. It also showed a man get into Li’s car and
take her purse. Li promptly reported the theft to the police.
The surveillance video was played for the jury at trial.
The Alhambra Police Department sergeant David Munson
was the lead investigator on the case. He reviewed the
surveillance video footage provided by Li and saw that the license
plate on the blue Chevy truck was visible. Ortiz was not the
registered owner of the Chevy truck. However, approximately
five months earlier, on September 4, 2022, Ortiz was inside that
vehicle when another officer made contact with him. On that
occasion, a police corporal Michael Hennes responded to a call
regarding a suspicious person and saw the Chevy truck parked
outside a residence. When Corporal Hennes approached, Ortiz
exited from the driver’s seat of the vehicle. Corporal Hennes
spoke with Ortiz for 10 to 15 minutes, and observed that Ortiz
was about five feet nine inches tall, weighed between 170 and 190
pounds, and was unshaven. Corporal Hennes’s interaction with
Ortiz was recorded on the officer’s body-worn camera, which was
played for the jury. Ortiz was not arrested in connection with
that incident.
In investigating the theft of Li’s purse, Sergeant Munson
compared the man in the surveillance video with Ortiz’s driver’s
license photo and believed that Ortiz looked like the perpetrator.
On March 8, 2023, Sergeant Munson and his team conducted
surveillance of the residential address where the Chevy truck
was registered. The truck was parked in the driveway. That
same day, Ortiz, a woman, and a young child left the residence
and drove away in the truck. The officers followed the truck to
an elementary school, where the child exited. The officers then
stopped the truck and arrested Ortiz, who was in the rear
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passenger seat. During a search of Ortiz, Sergeant Munson
recovered $6,000 in $100 denominations from his person. The
arrest and search of Ortiz was recorded on Sergeant Munson’s
body-worn camera, which also was played for the jury.
At trial, Corporal Hennes was shown the surveillance video
of the theft. He testified that he recognized the blue Chevy truck
in the video as the same one that Ortiz exited during their
September 2022 contact. He also testified that he recognized the
man in the video as Ortiz. Corporal Hennes based his opinion on
Ortiz’s physical features, including his height, weight, goatee,
eyebrows, and hairline. In particular, Corporal Hennes testified
that, like Ortiz, the man in the video had eyebrows that were
“very peaked at the temple,” and a hairline that was “very
squared.” In forming his opinion, Corporal Hennes also
considered that on both occasions, Ortiz was driving the same
vehicle, which had the same object hanging from the rear view
mirror.
Sergeant Munson testified that the man in the surveillance
video was Hispanic and had a goatee, “bushy eyebrows,” and a
“pretty unique hairline in the front” with a “little point on the
middle of forehead where his hairline goes down.” Sergeant
Munson further testified that the man in the video and Ortiz
shared similar features, including the hairline, eyebrows, goatee,
height, and build.
2. Jury verdict and sentencing
The jury found Ortiz not guilty of grand theft (§ 487,
subd. (a)), but guilty of misdemeanor petty theft (§ 484, subd. (a)).
In a bifurcated proceeding, Ortiz admitted he had served a prior
prison term (§ 1170, subd. (h)). The trial court sentenced Ortiz to
4
180 days in county jail, and ordered him to pay $6,000 in
restitution to Li (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)).
Ortiz filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
1. Admission of lay opinion testimony
Ortiz argues the trial court abused its discretion in
allowing Corporal Hennes and Sergeant Munson to provide lay
opinion testimony that Ortiz was the person in the surveillance
video footage of the theft. Ortiz also asserts the admission of the
testimony deprived him of his constitutional right to due process
and a fair trial. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion or violate due process in admitting the testimony.
1.1 Relevant background
Prior to trial, Ortiz moved to exclude any lay opinion
testimony of police officers as to the identity of the individual
seen in the surveillance video of the theft. Ortiz contended the
officers’ opinion would not aid the jury because the surveillance
video showed an unobstructed view of the suspect, and Ortiz’s
appearance had not changed since the crime occurred.
At a pretrial hearing on the matter, the prosecutor stated
that she intended to ask the officers to opine as to whether Ortiz
was the individual in the surveillance video based on his physical
features. The prosecutor also explained that one of the officers,
Corporal Hennes, interacted with Ortiz five months before the
theft, and that he would base his opinion on his familiarity with
Ortiz from that earlier incident.
The trial court ruled that the proffered opinion testimony of
the officers was admissible.
1.2 Governing law
A lay witness may offer opinion testimony if it is rationally
based on the perception of the witness and is helpful to a clear
5
understanding of his or her testimony. (Evid. Code, § 800.)
As our Supreme Court has observed, “ ‘[t]he identity of a person
is a proper subject of nonexpert opinion.’ ” (People v. Leon (2015)
61 Cal.4th 569, 601 (Leon).) We review the admission of lay
witness identification testimony for abuse of discretion. (Id. at
p. 600.) Under this standard, the trial court’s ruling “ ‘ “will not
be disturbed unless there is a showing that [it] acted in an
arbitrary, capricious, or absurd manner resulting in a
miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 905,
931.)
California courts have long upheld the admission of lay
witness testimony identifying the defendant as the person seen in
a surveillance video or photograph. (Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 601; People v. Mixon (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 118, 131 (Mixon);
People v. Perry (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 608, 613 (Perry).) In Perry,
for instance, the court held that a police officer’s identification of
the defendant as one of the robbers in a surveillance film of the
crime was admissible as lay opinion testimony because the officer
was acquainted with defendant’s physical appearance from their
numerous contacts over the previous five years. (Perry, at
pp. 610, 613.) Similarly, in Mixon, the court held that two police
officers could provide lay opinion testimony that the defendant
was the person depicted in surveillance photos taken during the
commission of a robbery because the officers had a number of
prior contacts with the defendant and were familiar with his
physical features. (Mixon, at pp. 131–132.) In both cases, the
identifications were based on the officers’ personal knowledge of
the defendants from contacts that preceded the charged crime,
which could aid the jury because the defendant had altered his
appearance before trial. (Perry, at p. 613; Mixon, at p. 131.)
6
In Leon, the California Supreme Court extended the
reasoning in Perry and Mixon to hold that a police officer could
offer a lay opinion identifying the defendant as the person seen in
surveillance footage of two robberies based on contacts that took
place after the crimes were committed. (Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th
at pp. 600–601.) The officer in Leon first saw the defendant when
he was arrested for the charged crimes, and thereafter spent
about two hours with him over several occasions. (Id. at p. 600.)
In rejecting the argument that the officer’s identification was
precluded by his lack of contact with the defendant prior to the
charged crimes, the Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]his is a
distinction without a difference” because the officer “was familiar
with defendant’s appearance around the time of the crimes,” and
“[q]uestions about the extent of [his] familiarity . . . went to the
weight, not the admissibility, of his testimony.” (Id. at p. 601.)
The court further noted that the officer’s identification could aid
the jury because “[o]ther eyewitness testimony indicated that
defendant had changed his appearance after the crimes.” (Ibid.)
In addition, because the surveillance video was played for the
jury at trial, the “jurors could make up their own minds about
whether the person shown was defendant.” (Ibid.)
1.3 The trial court did not err in admitting the
challenged lay opinion testimony
In this case, the trial court acted within its discretion in
admitting the officers’ lay opinion testimony identifying Ortiz as
the individual seen in the surveillance video of the theft. Both
Corporal Hennes and Sergeant Munson based their identification
on their personal knowledge of Ortiz and familiarity with his
appearance around the time of the February 2023 crime. The
officers’ testimony was relevant because it aided the jury in
7
determining whether Ortiz was the person in the surveillance
video, and the admission of the testimony did not create a
substantial risk of undue prejudice.
Corporal Hennes was familiar with Ortiz and his vehicle
from their September 2022 contact, which occurred five months
before the theft. Based on that interaction, Corporal Hennes
opined that Ortiz was the person seen taking the purse in the
surveillance video because both Ortiz and the perpetrator had
similar distinctive characteristics, including eyebrows that were
“very peaked at the temple” and a hairline that was “very
squared.” Corporal Hennes also recognized the Chevy truck in
the surveillance video from his prior contact with Ortiz because
both vehicles had the same license plate number and the same
object hanging from the rear view mirror.
Sergeant Munson became familiar with Ortiz during his
investigation of the theft. He first identified Ortiz as a potential
suspect based on Ortiz’s connection to the Chevy truck that
appeared in the surveillance video. Then, after comparing the
person seen taking the purse in the surveillance video with
Ortiz’s driver’s license photo, Sergeant Munson determined that
Ortiz looked like the perpetrator. Sergeant Munson also made
in-person contact with Ortiz at the time of his March 2023 arrest.
Sergeant Munson searched Ortiz before he was placed inside the
patrol car, and again at the police station. Based on his
familiarity with Ortiz, Sergeant Munson opined that Ortiz shared
certain physical features with the man in the surveillance video,
including a goatee, “bushy eyebrows,” and a “pretty unique
hairline” that extended to the middle of his forehead.
In challenging the admission of the officers’ identification
testimony, Ortiz contends their opinions were not helpful to the
8
jury because Ortiz’s appearance did not materially change from
the time of the theft until trial. However, none of the cases
discussed above held that a lay opinion identification is only
admissible where the defendant altered his or her appearance
after the crime. Rather, the admissibility of the identification
depends on whether it is based on the witness’s “relevant
personal knowledge and aided the jury.” (Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th
at p. 601; see also Mixon, supra, 129 Cal.App.3d at pp. 131–132;
Perry, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at pp. 614–615.) Here, the lay
opinions of Corporal Hennes and Sergeant Munson aided the jury
because the officers described distinct physical features that
Ortiz shared with the individual seen in the surveillance video.
This helped draw the jurors’ attention to certain details in the
video that may not have been readily apparent, which could
assist them in determining the identity of the perpetrator. As in
Leon, the video itself was played for the jurors so that they “could
make up their own minds about whether the person shown was
[the] defendant.” (Leon, at p. 601.) Under these circumstances,
any questions about the extent of each officer’s familiarity with
Ortiz, including the timing and nature of their prior contacts with
him, “went to the weight, not the admissibility, of [their]
testimony.” (Ibid.)
Ortiz also argues the officers’ identification testimony was
inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1523 because neither
Corporal Hennes nor Sergeant Munson personally witnessed the
events shown in the surveillance video. That statute provides
that “oral testimony is not admissible to prove the content of a
writing.” (Id., subd. (a).) The “writing” in this case was the
surveillance video of the theft. (Evid. Code, § 250.) However,
the video itself was admitted into evidence, and the officers’
9
identification testimony was not offered to prove the content of
the video, but rather to aid the jury in evaluating whether the
person in the video was Ortiz. (See People v. Son (2020)
56 Cal.App.5th 689, 696 [Evidence Code section 1523 did not
preclude officer’s testimony describing events in surveillance
video because it was not offered “to ‘prove the content’ of the
video, but instead to highlight important details in the video”].)
The admission of the officers’ testimony therefore did not violate
Evidence Code section 1523.
Ortiz further asserts the officers’ testimony should have
been excluded under section 352 because the prejudicial effect of
the evidence substantially outweighed any probative value.
We disagree. Evidence is unduly prejudicial when it “ ‘uniquely
tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an
individual,’ ” while having only slight probative value with regard
to the issues. (People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 587.) Here,
the officers’ testimony describing their prior contacts with Ortiz
was not uniquely likely to evoke an emotional bias against him.
Corporal Hennes testified that his only contact with Ortiz was in
response to a suspicious person report and did not result in an
arrest. Sergeant Munson testified that he made contact with
Ortiz during the arrest in this case, which took place without
incident after the police initiated a traffic stop. The jury was
shown the body-worn camera footage of each officer’s contact with
Ortiz, along with the surveillance video of the theft. The jury
also was instructed with CALCRIM No. 333 that it was “not
required to accept” the opinions of a lay witness “as true or
correct,” and that it could “give the opinions whatever weight you
think appropriate.” We presume the jury understood and
10
followed this instruction in evaluating the officers’ testimony.
(People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 399.)
We likewise reject Ortiz’s claim that the admission of the
officers’ identification testimony violated his constitutional right
to due process and a fair trial. The “ ‘[a]pplication of the ordinary
rules of evidence generally does not impermissibly infringe on a
[defendant’s] constitutional rights.’ ” (People v. Lindberg (2008)
45 Cal.4th 1, 26.) “ ‘The admission of relevant evidence will not
offend due process unless the evidence is so prejudicial as to
render the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.’ ” (People v.
Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 949.) In this case, the trial court
reasonably determined that the proffered opinion testimony was
relevant to the charged crime and was not unduly prejudicial.
Ortiz accordingly has failed to show an abuse of discretion or
violation of due process in the admission of such evidence.
2. Exclusion of impeachment evidence
Ortiz contends the trial court erred in excluding evidence of
misconduct committed by Sergeant Munson in a prior unrelated
case. Ortiz also claims the exclusion of the evidence violated his
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. We conclude the trial
court did not err in excluding the proffered evidence.
2.1 Relevant background
During trial, Ortiz sought to introduce evidence of a 2012
incident of alleged misconduct involving Sergeant Munson. In
objecting to the introduction of such evidence, the prosecutor
described the incident as follows: “[Sergeant Munson] was in a
DUI investigation and he stated on the police report that he saw
the defendant driving the vehicle when, in fact, he didn’t
personally s[ee] the driving of the defendant. What happened
was there was another officer who was there before he got there,
11
and the other officer saw the driving and informed Sergeant
Munson that the defendant drove. [¶] Instead of writing that
accurately, Sergeant Munson in the police report indicated that
he personally saw the driving. Later on at the DMV hearing, he
stated that that’s a mistake and what had really happened is
another officer observed the driving.” The case against the driver
was dismissed.
Following an investigation, the district attorney’s office
declined to file criminal charges against Sergeant Munson.
According to the prosecutor, the investigation revealed that
Sergeant Munson’s report “accurately portrayed the [e]ffects of
the crime” as set forth in the other officer’s supplemental report.
It also showed that Sergeant Munson “did not alter the facts of
the [officer’s] observation” or attempt to “embellish his report in
order to strengthen a criminal case against that defendant.”
The prosecutor asked the trial court to exclude the evidence
of Sergeant Munson’s alleged misconduct under Evidence Code
section 352. Defense counsel argued the evidence was admissible
for impeachment purposes because Sergeant Munson “did submit
a police report under penalty of perjury that was false,” and
“credibility is always an issue.”
The trial court excluded the evidence, stating in relevant
part: “I’m not even sure I can make a finding that there was a
misconduct here because it’s not clear just based on the facts as
stated whether it was . . . intentional. Now, there’s an inference
that it was intentional because . . . he said that the watch
commander may have advised him to write that he was the one
who . . . observed the driving. So there’s an inference there, but
I think it would need further clarification as to whether that was,
in fact, what happened and whether the supervisor . . . would
12
verify that. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . And so without that, I’m not even sure
I can find misconduct. But even assuming there is misconduct
here as to this particular incident involving driving [under] the
influence, I don’t find it relevant to this proceeding and to the
officer[’]s credibility. The officer is not testifying as to the
substantive theft. All he’s testifying to is to his investigation and
possible identification of the perpetrator from the video.”
2.2 Governing law
In determining the credibility of a witness, the trier of fact
“may consider . . . any matter that has any tendency in reason to
prove or disprove the truthfulness of his [or her] testimony,”
including the witness’s “character for honesty or veracity or their
opposites.” (Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (e).) In general, “[a] witness
may be impeached with evidence of a prior conviction or other
conduct involving dishonesty or otherwise demonstrating moral
turpitude, subject to the trial court’s exercise of discretion under
Evidence Code section 352.” (People v. Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th
874, 912.) Evidence Code section 352 “permits courts to limit
such evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the probability that it will consume undue time or create a
substantial danger of undue prejudice, confusing the issues, or
misleading the jury.” (People v. Wilson, at p. 912.)
As our Supreme Court has explained, “[w]hen determining
whether to admit a prior conviction for impeachment purposes,
the court should consider, among other factors, whether it reflects
on the witness’s honesty or veracity, [and] whether it is near or
remote in time . . . . [Citations.] Additional considerations apply
when the proffered impeachment evidence is misconduct other
than a prior conviction. This is because such misconduct
generally is less probative of immoral character or dishonesty
13
and may involve problems involving proof, unfair surprise, and
the evaluation of moral turpitude.” (People v. Clark (2011)
52 Cal.4th 856, 931–932.) Accordingly, “ ‘courts may and should
consider with particular care whether the admission of such
evidence might involve undue time, confusion, or prejudice
which outweighs its probative value.’ ” (Id. at p. 932.)
“A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude impeachment
evidence under Evidence Code section 352 is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.” (People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 734,
766.) Because the court’s discretion in ruling on the admissibility
of such evidence “ ‘is as broad as necessary to deal with the great
variety of factual situations in which the issue arises’ [citation],
a reviewing court ordinarily will uphold the trial court’s exercise
of discretion.” (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 932.)
2.3 The trial court did not err in excluding the
proffered impeachment evidence
In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the evidence of Sergeant Munson’s alleged misconduct
in an unrelated drunk driving case. The court reasonably could
find that the proffered evidence had minimal probative value
given that the conduct was 12 years old, no criminal charges were
filed, and Sergeant Munson admitted the error when he testified
at the hearing in the prior case. As the trial court also observed,
Sergeant Munson was not called as a witness to the “substantive
theft” at issue in this case. Rather, he was called to testify about
the course of his investigation of the theft and to offer an opinion
on the identity of the person in the surveillance video based on
his contact with Ortiz during Ortiz’s arrest. That contact was
recorded on Sergeant Munson’s body-worn camera and shown to
the jury, and there was no allegation of misconduct in connection
14
with Ortiz’s search or arrest. The trial court also reasonably
could find that attempting to impeach Sergeant Munson on a
collateral credibility issue likely would involve problems of proof
and an undue consumption of time, which outweighed the low
probative value of such evidence. (See People v. Contreras (2013)
58 Cal.4th 123, 152 [“[a] fact may bear on the credibility of a
witness and still be collateral to the case”].)
We further conclude that exclusion of the evidence did not
violate Ortiz’s constitutional right of confrontation. “Although
the right of confrontation includes the right to cross-examine
adverse witnesses on matters reflecting on their credibility, ‘trial
judges retain wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable limits on
such cross-examination’ ” on the grounds set forth in Evidence
Code section 352. (People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600,
623; accord, People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1089–
1090.) “ ‘ “[U]nless the defendant can show that the prohibited
cross-examination would have produced ‘a significantly different
impression of [the witness’s] credibility’ [citation], the trial court’s
exercise of its discretion in this regard does not violate the Sixth
Amendment.” ’ ” (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 455–
456.) Here, Ortiz cannot show that allowing the defense to cross-
examine Sergeant Munson about this collateral issue would have
produced a significantly different impression of the officer’s
credibility given that it involved an allegation of misconduct that
was remote in time, and Sergeant Munson’s credibility was not
central to his testimony as the jurors could themselves view the
surveillance video and the body-worn camera video. On this
record, we find no abuse of discretion in excluding the proffered
impeachment evidence.
15
3. Cumulative error
Ortiz asserts the cumulative effect of the claimed errors
deprived him of due process of law and a fair trial. “Cumulative
error is present when the combined effect of the trial court’s
errors is prejudicial or harmful to the defendant. [Citations.]
Although a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, he or she is not
entitled to ‘a perfect one.’ ” (People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th
989, 1017.) Here, Ortiz received a fair trial and has failed to
show any cumulative error requiring reversal of his conviction.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
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