CourtListener 10738330•Mora v. C.E. Enterprises
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 10/21/25; certified for publication 11/18/25 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
GUSTAVO MORA, et al., 2d Civ. No. B337830
(Super. Ct. No. 56-2018-
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 00521275-CU-OE-VTA)
(Ventura County)
v.
C.E. ENTERPRISES, INC.,
et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
Appellants Gustavo Mora and Mohammad Hanif were
formerly employed as service technicians by respondent C.E.
Enterprises, Inc., a Simi Valley auto dealership doing business as
First Honda, First Auto Group, and First Automotive Group
(First Honda). Appellants sued First Honda1 for alleged
Appellants’ complaint also named respondents Ed Estey
1
(the president and owner of First Honda) and Darrell Coletto (the
former co-owner of First Honda) as individual defendants.
Because the claims against Estey and Coletto derive solely from
violations of the Labor Code2 and the Unfair Competition Law
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200), and also asserted a claim on behalf
of themselves and other First Honda employees under the
Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) (§ 2698 et seq.).3 The trial
court entered judgment in First Honda’s favor on all claims
following a bench trial.
Appellants contend the court erred in finding they failed to
prove that First Honda’s compensation plan for service
technicians violates the “no borrowing rule” as provided in
Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 36
(Gonzalez), or otherwise fails to comply with section 226.2.
Appellants also contend they presented substantial and
undisputed evidence that they were not fully compensated for all
hours worked, and that the court erred in entering judgment in
First Honda’s favor on their PAGA claim. We affirm.
First Honda’s Hourly Pay Plan For Service Technicians
Appellant Mora was employed by First Honda from in or
around January 2011 until August 26, 2021, first as a lube
technician and later (and at all relevant times) as a service
technician. Appellant Hanif was employed by First Honda as a
service technician from July 25, 2014, until October 2019.
their status as owners and agents of First Honda, we collectively
refer to all three respondents as First Honda.
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Labor
Code.
PAGA was substantially amended effective July 1, 2024.
3
All references to PAGA refer to the prior version of the statute in
effect when appellants filed their amended complaint.
2
Effective December 1, 2014, First Honda adopted an hourly
pay plan for service technicians (the hourly pay plan or First
Honda’s hourly pay plan) that pays the technicians at least the
applicable minimum and overtime wages for all hours recorded
on the timekeeping system. Because service technicians are
required to use their own tools, they are paid double the
minimum wage for all hours recorded on the biometric clock.
Prior to First Honda’s adoption of the hourly pay plan,
service technicians were paid on a piece-rate basis based on the
“flag” hours they recorded for completing service orders. “[A]
piece rate basis . . . differs from an hourly rate method in that
technicians are paid primarily on the basis of repair tasks
completed.” (Gonzalez, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 41.) Flag
hours are fixed amounts of time assigned for completing service
tasks “and are intended to correspond to the actual amount of
time a technician would need to perform the task.” (Ibid.) The
hourly pay plan was adopted with guidance from the California
New Car Dealers Association, after the piece-rate pay plan was
deemed invalid under Gonzalez. (See post, pp. 15-16.)
Under First Honda’s hourly pay plan, service technicians
have the opportunity to take a one-hour meal period. They are
also given the opportunity to take rest periods for which they do
not clock out for and for which they are compensated at their
hourly rates of pay, i.e., double the minimum wage. Employee
timecards from the biometric timekeeping system reflect all
hours worked and show when the employee clocks in and out at
the beginning and end of the day and for their meal period.
Employees are allowed to make any necessary corrections to their
timecards on timecard correction forms.
3
In addition to paying double the minimum wage for all
hours recorded on the biometric clock, First Honda’s hourly pay
plan also provides service technicians the opportunity to earn
“flag bonus pay” if the flag hours they separately record,
multiplied by the dollar amount of their assigned flag rate,
exceeds their regular and overtime hourly earnings. All service
technicians are assigned a flag rate in their individual hourly pay
plans and the rate can vary among technicians. The hourly plan
states that “[f]lag hour earnings represent compensation for work
above and beyond a median, expected level of performance of
repair jobs and non-repair activity/duties applying to [the]
Employee.”4
On November 19, 2014, Mora and Hanif met with their
supervisor, who explained the hourly pay plan to them, and they
signed their acknowledgments of that plan. Appellants’
subsequent monthly pay statements included the total flag hours
they accrued and any resulting bonus paid, and expressly
identified each of these items as “flag hours” and “bonus.”
Appellants’ Complaint, PAGA Notice, And Amended Complaint
In December 2018, appellants filed a complaint against
First Honda alleging counts for (1) failing to pay overtime wages,
in violation of sections 510 and 1194 and Wage Order No. 4-2001
(Wage Order 4); (2) failing to pay minimum wage, in violation of
section 1182 and Wage Order 4; (3) failing to provide meal and
4 Other job positions at First Honda are compensated
differently. For example, lube technicians are not paid double
the minimum wage and do not typically flag enough hours to
earn a bonus. Car salespeople and service writers work under
commission-based payment plans.
4
rest periods, in violation of sections 226.7 and 512 and Wage
Order 4; (4) failing to reimburse employee expenses, in violation
of section 2802; (5) failure to provide accurate wage statements,
in violation of section 226; (6) failing to make available personnel
and payroll files, in violation of sections 226 and 1198.5; and (7)
retaliating against them for exercising their rights, in violation of
section 98.6. The complaint also included a claim for unlawful
business practices in violation of the Unfair Competition Law.
Appellants subsequently filed an amended complaint
adding a PAGA claim of behalf of appellants and “other
employees of” First Honda. The PAGA claim reiterated the
allegations in counts 1 through 5, and further alleged that First
Honda had failed to pay full wages when due in violation of
section 204. Appellants also alleged they had “provided written
notice to the LWDA [Labor and Workforce Development Agency]
and [First Honda] of the specific provisions of the Labor Code
they contend were violated, and the theories supporting their
contentions,” and attached a copy of their written PAGA notice as
an exhibit.
Appellants identify themselves in the PAGA notice as
“‘Service Technicians’” who “perform automotive diagnostic,
repair, and maintenance tasks for First Honda” and seek relief on
behalf of themselves “and all others similarly situated[.]” The
notice asserted among other things that First Honda required
appellants and other aggrieved employees to work overtime hours
“‘off the clock’, but failed to pay them one-and-one-half times
their regular rate of pay for all overtime hours worked. In fact,
because California does not allow wage averaging to satisfy
minimum wage standards, no sums whatsoever were paid for
these hours worked ‘off the clock.’ . . . Also, because [First
5
Honda] failed to include commission wages in calculating the
regular rates of pay for overtime purposes, even the overtime
wages that were paid to [appellants] and similarly Aggrieved
Employees were less than one-and-one-half their actual regular
rates of pay.”
Summary Adjudication Motions
The court initially ordered the parties to arbitrate the case
pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, but subsequently withdrew
the matter from arbitration at appellants’ request after First
Honda failed to timely pay its arbitration fees. In January 2023,
appellants filed a motion requesting that the court summarily
adjudicate (1) whether First Honda’s hourly pay plan violates the
“no borrowing rule” set forth in Gonzalez; (2) whether the hourly
pay plan violates section 226.2; and (3) whether First Honda’s
monthly pay statements comply with sections 226 and 226.2. The
motion asserted that “[w]hile there are many issues of triable
facts related to damages that would preclude summary
adjudication as to any complete cause of action, resolving the
legal disputes outlined herein will assist in narrowing the issues
and amount of evidence to be presented at trial, and will likely
facilitate settlement. Plaintiffs believe that there is no triable
issue of fact regarding the facts relevant to the legal issues being
addressed herein.” First Honda also filed a summary
adjudication motion based on the same issues, but asserted that
the resolution of the issues warranted a grant of summary
adjudication in their favor on count 2 of the amended complaint,
i.e., the failure to pay minimum wage.
In denying First Honda’s motion, the court reasoned:
“[T]he main dispute between the parties is as to whether First
Honda’s Pay Plan . . . was lawful or unlawful under California
6
law, and substantial portions of the parties’ Briefs are devoted to
arguing this issue. However, for purposes of the Defendants’
present motion, the Court need not resolve the question of the
lawfulness of the Pay Plan - even assuming arguendo that
Defendants’ Pay Plan was lawful - there is a triable issue of fact
as to whether Defendants consistently paid Plaintiffs in
conformity with their timekeeping policies and Pay Plan because
there is a triable issue of fact as to whether First Honda required
its technicians to work ‘off the clock.’”
In its subsequent order denying appellants’ motion for
summary adjudication, the court first noted that the referenced
issues were not summarily adjudicable because their resolution
would not completely dispose of any cause of action, affirmative
defense, claim for damages, or issue of duty. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) “In an effort to be helpful,” the court
nevertheless went on to find that “First Honda’s Pay Plan does
not violate the ‘no borrowing’ rule regarding minimum wage
requirements . . . because a [service] technician’s ‘regular
compensation’ under the Plan – which the technician always
received – is based on an hourly rate equal to or greater than
twice the minimum wage times all hours actually worked. ”
The court also found that First Honda’s hourly pay plan
does not violate section 226.2. The court reasoned: “Assuming
arguendo that section 226.2(a) applies to First Honda’s [service]
technicians, section 226.2(a)(7) also applies: namely, because the
Pay Plan expressly provides that First Honda ‘Pays an hourly
rate of at least the applicable minimum wage for all hours
worked’ in addition to any flag hour bonus, and therefore
complies with section 226.2, subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(4).
Plaintiffs’ only argument as to why First Honda is not entitled to
7
invoke section 226.2(a)(7) is that First Honda’s Pay Plan
improperly ‘borrows’ from technicians’ flag pay to cover minimum
wage. [Citation.] However, the Court has rejected Plaintiffs’
‘borrowing’ argument for the reasons previously stated.” The
court added that it could not grant appellants’ request to
summarily adjudicate whether First Honda’s pay statements
complied with sections 226 and 226.2 because the request “fails to
specify both (1) which paystubs are at issue; and (2) what
deficiencies Plaintiffs are seeking to have summarily
adjudicated.”
Trial, Statement Of Decision, And Judgment
Appellants testified at trial on their own behalf and also
presented the testimony of First Honda’s controller; First
Honda’s former warranty administrator; Estey; and Peter Rodby,
a clerk at the law firm of appellants’ counsel.
Rodby testified that he had reviewed thousands of pay
statements for various First Honda employees, all of which were
eventually admitted at trial pursuant to the parties’ stipulation.
Those statements included 441 pay statements for employees of
First Honda’s sales department. Of the 396 pay statements for
sales employees that included payments identified as
commission, 126 did not include any pay for rest periods. In
addition, 386 of the pay statements for sales employees indicated
that the employee worked either more than 8 hours in a day or 40
hours in a week, but did not reflect any payment of overtime
wages, i.e., one-and-half times their normal rate of hourly pay.
However, Rodby did not have any knowledge of the pay plan for
commissioned sales employees or review any of the employees’
biometric time entries to determine if they were eligible for rest
periods. Moreover, he did not know whether sales employees
8
received an additional document with their pay statements that
included other information regarding their pay. First Honda’s
controller testified that sales employees always receive a
“supplemental sheet” along with their pay statement that
provides “the commission, hours, rest breaks, the number of
them, all of that.”
Accordingly, Rodby agreed with defense counsel’s
assessment that he was “unable to testify with personal
knowledge as to whether the sales employees at First Honda
were paid accurately pursuant to their pay plans with the
company[.]” Although he also found numerous instances in pay
statements of service technicians (including appellants) where
the listed hourly overtime rate did not match up with the listed
overtime compensation, he did not perform any calculations to
determine if any of the employees had actually been paid more
than that to which they were entitled.
The defense case primarily consisted of the expert
testimony of Dr. Jospeh Krock, Ph.D. Dr. Krock reviewed a
sampling of time and pay records and concluded that (1) First
Honda’s service technicians receive a bonus when the value of
their flag hours exceeds their regular and overtime hourly wages;
(2) the service technicians are paid double the minimum wage
and overtime wages for all hours recorded on the biometric time
clock; (3) First Honda’s hourly pay plan does not include a piece
rate; and (4) the hourly pay plan never “borrows” from a flag
bonus to supplement the technicians’ hourly earnings.
Following lengthy closing arguments that are not included
in the record on appeal, the court took the matter under
submission. On September 11, 2023, the court issued a
statement of intended decision in favor of First Honda on all
9
claims. The court also stated that “[t]his Statement of Intended
Decision will become the Court’s Statement of Decision unless
objections are received within the statutory time” and that “[a]ny
party filing objections is directed to concurrently file findings on
any issue to which an objection is taken.” On October 2, 2023,
appellants filed objections to the statement of intended decision
along with a proposed statement of decision.
On October 25, 2023, the court issued its statement of
decision. After noting that appellants’ objections and proposed
findings were untimely,5 the court stated in pertinent part:
“The pay plan as introduced by First Honda on December 1,
2014 was not fully understood by either of the Plaintiffs. They
each testified that they thought that flag hours were a bonus, and
that their efforts to get an explanation from management were
not successful. Plaintiffs were paid twice a month, and testified
that their pay stubs lacked clarity as to how their pay was being
calculated.
“The defendants’ pay records of the Plaintiffs and other
employees are massive.
“They comprise several thousand pages, and the parties
have stipulated [to] their receipt into evidence. The Court,
however, cautioned the parties that explanation of their contents
would be necessary if they were to have any evidentiary value.
Stipulated receipt into evidence satisfies the foundation
requirements as exists for any document. It does not, however,
5 Rule 3.1590(g) provides that any objections to a proposed
statement of decision must be served and filed within 15 days
after the proposed statement of decision has been served.
Appellants do not dispute the court’s finding that their objections
and proposed findings were not timely filed pursuant to this rule.
10
make the document(s) persuasive of any issue they may be
related to.
“Plaintiffs’ proof consisted of testimony from Mr. Peter
Rodby, a law clerk in the offices of The Green Law Group
(Plaintiffs’ counsel.) The substance of Mr. Rodby’s testimony was
that he had reviewed all of the 5,200 pay stubs, the 2,100 time
sheets, and the 14,000 flag sheets, and that he found deficiencies
in the calculation of wages owed. . . . There were, however, no
examples displayed or explained . . . to illustrate the conclusions
which Mr. Rodby had reached regarding the deficiencies in these
records. He was, in effect, asking the Court to take his word for
it. . . . This is an insufficient basis for Plaintiffs to satisfy their
burden of proof. With the virtually universal availability of
virtual display equipment used on document intensive cases, this
is perplexing. Use of an Excel sheet did not solve this aspect of
Plaintiffs’ proof.”
The court went on to find that “Plaintiffs have not
sustained their burden of proof to demonstrate the essential
elements of their various claims” and that a judgment would be
entered in favor of First Honda. Judgment was accordingly
entered on November 21, 2023, and appellants timely appealed.
The Hourly Pay Plan Does Not Violate The No Borrowing Rule
Appellants first contend the trial court erred in finding that
First Honda’s pay plan does not violate the “no borrowing rule” as
provided in Gonzalez, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th 36. We conclude
otherwise.
The facts regarding First Honda’s pay plan are undisputed,
and the application of law to undisputed facts in this context
presents a question of law which we review de novo. (Boling v.
Public Employment Relations Board (2018) 5 Cal.5th 898, 912;
11
Vasquero v. Stoneledge Furniture, LLC (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 98,
108.)
California wage and hour claims are governed by the Labor
Code and a series of wage orders adopted by the Industrial
Welfare Commission (IWC). (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v.
Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1026.) These wage orders
set forth California’s minimum wage requirements. (Nisei
Farmers League v. Labor & Workforce Development Agency (2019)
30 Cal.App.5th 997, 1004, fn. 3 (Nisei).)
The controlling order here is Wage Order 4, which provides
in relevant part that “[e]very employer shall pay to each
employee, on the established payday for the period involved, not
less than the applicable minimum wage for all hours worked in
the payroll period, whether the remuneration is measured by
time, piece, commission, or otherwise.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §
11140, subd. (4)(B).) Order 4 defines “‘hours worked’” as “the
time during which an employee is subject to the control of an
employer, and includes all the time the employee is suffered or
permitted to work, whether or not required to do so.” (Id., subd.
(2)(G).) Because First Honda’s service technicians provide their
own tools and equipment, they must be paid at least two times
the applicable minimum wage. (Id., subd. (9)(B).)
For guidance on the interpretation of Order 4, we look to
the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE)
Policies and Interpretations Manual (DLSE Manual). (DLSE,
The 2002 Update of the DLSE Enforcement Policies and
Interpretations Manual (Revised) (August 2019); Alvarado v.
Dart Container Corp. of California (2018) 4 Cal.5th 542, 554-555.)
“The appellate courts considers the DLSE Manual ‘to the extent
12
we find it persuasive.’” (Lemm v. Ecolab, Inc. (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 159, 170, quoting Alvarado, supra, at p. 567.)
Citing Labor Code section 200, the DLSE Manual provides
that the amount of money received as wages can be “a fixed sum,
or it may be ascertained or determined by standard of time, task,
piece, commission or by other method of calculation.” (DLSE
Manual, supra, at p. 2-2, § 2.4.2.) “Piece rate” or “‘piece work’” is
defined as “‘Work paid for according to the number of units
turned out.’ [Citation.] Consequently, a piece rate must be based
upon an ascertainable figure paid for completing a particular
task or making a particular piece of goods.” (Id at p. 2-2, § 2.5.1.)
“Under a piece-rate system, employees are not paid by the
hour, but rather are compensated based on activities, tasks, or
units of production completed [citations], such as the quantity of
produce picked, the number of yards of carpet installed, or the
number of miles driven.” (Nisei, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p.
1003.) By comparison, “A bonus is money promised to an
employee in addition to the monthly salary, hourly wage,
commission or piece rate usually due as compensation. The word
has been defined as: ‘An addition to salary or wages normally
paid for extraordinary work. An inducement to employees to
procure efficient and faithful service.’ [Citation.]” (DLSE
Manual, supra, at p. 2-3, § 2.5.5; see also id. at p. 2-3, § 2.5.5.2
[“Bonuses are in addition to any other remuneration rate and are
predicated on performance over and above that which is paid for
hours worked, pieces made or sales completed. A bonus is paid
over and above wages earned for extraordinary work performance
or as an inducement to employees to remain in the employ of the
employer”].)
13
Effective January 1, 2016, the Legislature adopted section
226.2, which specifically governs employees “compensated on a
piece-rate basis for any work performed during a pay period.”
(Ibid.) The statute codifies the requirement, as developed in
caselaw, that employers must compensate employees at a rate no
less than the applicable minimum wage, for “rest and recovery
periods and other nonproductive time separate from any piece-
rate compensation.” (Id., subds. (a)(1), (3)(A); Nisei, supra, 30
Cal.App.5th at p. 1006.) Prior to 2013, employers in various
industries used averaging to ensure employees working under a
non-hourly compensation system, such as a piece-rate system,
were being paid at least minimum wage for every hour worked in
a given pay period. (See Bluford v. Safeway Inc. (2013) 216
Cal.App.4th 864; Gonzalez, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th 36.) Bluford
and Gonzalez recognized that employees must be separately
compensated for rest periods and other nonproductive times at
the legal minimum wage or contractual hourly rate, and that a
system wherein the employer meets the minimum wage
requirement by averaging hourly compensation does not comply
with the law. (Bluford, supra, at p. 872; Gonzalez, supra, at pp.
48-49.)
In Gonzalez, the court held that an employer’s piece-rate
system of paying automotive service technicians more than
minimum wage for designated flag hours, but not making
separate payments for non-flag hours, violated the minimum
wage requirements, even though the technicians earned at least
minimum wage when the employer averaged the flag and non-
flag hours; the employer would supplement the technicians’ pay if
the flag hour pay fell short of the “minimum wage floor.”
(Gonzalez, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at pp. 41-42, 48-49.) In
14
reaching this conclusion the court adopted the reasoning
of Armenta v. Osmose, Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 314, in which
this court held that hourly employees must be paid the minimum
wage for each hour worked, such that an employer violates the
minimum wage law if it averages employees’ hours in a given pay
period to compute its minimum wage obligation. (Gonzalez, at
pp. 48-49, citing Armenta, at p. 324.)
Our holding in Armenta on this point established “the no-
borrowing rule[.]” (Oman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th
762, 781 (Oman).) That rule provides that “[w]hatever the task
or period promised as a basis for compensation . . . , an employer
must pay no less than the minimum wage for all hours
worked. [Citation.] The employer must satisfy this obligation
while still keeping any promises it has made to provide particular
amounts of compensation for particular tasks or periods of
work. [Citation.] For all hours worked, employees are entitled to
the greater of the (1) amount guaranteed by contract for the
specified task or period, or (2) the amount guaranteed by the
minimum wage. Whether a particular compensation scheme
complies with these [Labor Code] obligations may be thought of
as involving two separate inquiries. First, for each task or period
covered by the contract, is the employee paid at or above the
minimum wage? Second, are there other tasks or periods not
covered by the contract, but within the definition of hours
worked, for which at least the minimum wage should have been
paid?” (Id. at p. 782.)
The trial court correctly found that First Honda’s hourly
pay plan does not violate the no borrowing rule. The hourly pay
plan is plainly distinguishable from the compensation plan
in Gonzalez, in which the employer averaged the piece-rate
15
payments made to their employees in an effort to meet the
minimum wage requirements. (Gonzalez, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 48-49.) Unlike the pay plan in Gonzalez, the hourly pay
plan actually pays each employee for every hour recorded on the
biometric time clock and merely provides the opportunity to earn
“flag bonus pay” as a reward for efficiency. The Ninth Circuit
recently (and correctly) recognized that a similar pay plan did not
run afoul of Gonzalez. (Williams v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. (9th
Cir. 2025) 151 F.4th 1020 [pay plan did not violate Gonzalez’s no
borrowing rule because the employer “always paid hourly wages,
and then paid any piece-rate-based bonus pay on top of that pay.
The hourly pay never changed; only the bonus pay did”].)
Appellants’ attempts to characterize First Honda’s hourly
pay plan as unlawful are unavailing. Under First Honda’s hourly
pay plan, service technicians are paid at least double the
minimum wage for every hour “on the clock,” which includes any
unproductive time when they are not actually performing any
service work-related tasks. It is of no moment that the employees
do not accrue any flag hours for their unproductive time because
those hours only accrue for flagged tasks that are work-related as
a means of providing a bonus for productivity and efficiency.
Moreover, appellants do not aid their position by offering
hypothetical scenarios in which their total compensation under
the hourly pay plan would have been the same under the former
piece-rate plan it replaced. As First Honda aptly puts it, “[t]hat
the total compensation paid could remain the same” under the
provided hypothetical scenarios “is not indicative of a legal
violation.” As relevant here, it only matters whether First
Honda’s hourly pay plan “borrows” from any bonus an employee
might earn for flag hours to cover the hourly rate (i.e., double the
16
minimum wage) to which the employee is entitled for for all
hours on-the-clock. It clearly does not do so. Appellants’ claim
that the hourly pay plan violates the no borrowing rule
accordingly fails.
The Hourly Pay Plan Does Not Violate § 226.2
Appellants fare no better in contending that First Honda’s
hourly pay plan violates section 226.2. Even assuming that the
hourly pay plan’s “flag bonus pay” amounts to piece-rate
compensation, appellants’ claim under section 226.2 is based
solely on their erroneous assertions that the plan does not
compensate employees for rest periods or pay at least twice the
minimum wage for all hours recorded on the biometric time clock.
Appellants rely on the same erroneous assertion in
claiming they presented substantial and undisputed evidence
that they each “worked thousands of hours of unproductive time
for which no compensation was paid.” (Bold and capitalization
omitted.) They merely complain that they “had unproductive
time when they were not working on cars, and therefore could not
flag any hours.” They offer no evidence, however, that they were
ever paid less than double the minimum wage or any overtime
wages for all the time recorded on their biometric time cards,
which includes any and all “unproductive time when they were
not working on cars[.]” Nor do they provide any evidence that
they (or any other service technicians) were ever deprived of any
flag bonus pay to which they were entitled under the hourly pay
plan. Accordingly, judgment was properly entered in First
Honda’s favor on this issue.
17
Judgment Was Properly Entered In First Honda’s Favor On
Appellants’ PAGA Claim
Finally, appellants contend the trial court erred in entering
judgment in First Honda’s favor on their PAGA claim. In their
opening brief, appellants claim they presented substantial and
undisputed evidence that First Honda committed various Labor
Code violations by (1) failing to to pay First Honda ‘s
commissioned sales associates for rest periods and failing to pay
them overtime wages; and (2) failing to pay First Honda lube
technicians who have a “blended” rate of hourly pay sufficient
wages for overtime and rest periods. In their reply brief,
appellants make additional arguments and offer additional
evidence in support of their PAGA claim.
The arguments raised for the first time in the reply brief
are forfeited and accordingly we do not consider them. (Golden
Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50
Cal.App.5th 467, 518, quoting Doe v. California Dept. of Justice
(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1115, internal quotation marks
omitted [“‘“‘Obvious considerations of fairness in argument
demand that the appellant present all of his points in the opening
brief. To withhold a point until the closing brief would deprive
the respondent of his opportunity to answer it or require the
effort and delay of an additional brief by permission.’”’”].)
Moreover, appellants have failed to provide an adequate
record for us to review their contentions regarding their PAGA
claim. A “fundamental principle of appellate procedure [is] that a
trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the
burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the
record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.
18
[Citations.] . . . . ‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the
record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action will be
made by the appellate court. . . .” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5
Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) “‘“A necessary corollary to this rule is that
if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant
defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.”’
[Citation.] ‘Consequently, [the appellant] has the burden of
providing an adequate record. . . . Failure to provide an adequate
record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the
appellant].’” (Id. at p. 609.)
The bench trial in this case took place over several days.
The final day of trial (August 17, 2023) was devoted entirely to
the closing arguments, and the parties spent the better part of
that day presenting those arguments. Appellants, however, did
not include the reporter’s transcript of that final day of trial in
their designation of the record on appeal, nor did they include
any trial briefs in their appendix. We thus have no record of the
arguments appellants made in support of their PAGA claim or
the specific damages they urged the court to award them.
Moreover, the one-and-a-half-page statement of facts in
appellants’ opening brief makes no mention of the evidence upon
which the PAGA claim is based. (See Cal. Rules of Court, use
8.204(a)(2)(C) [appellant’s opening brief must include “a
summary for the significant facts”]; see also Nwosu v. Uba (2004)
22 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247 [appellant waived claim of
insufficient evidence by failing to provide a proper statement of
facts in his opening brief].)
Appellants also failed to include First Honda’s PAGA brief
in their appendix. Although the court’s statement of decision
makes no reference to that brief, First Honda’s counsel referred
19
to the brief during trial and asserted in his opening statement
that appellants’ PAGA claim was invalid for, among other things,
failure to exhaust administrative remedies because their PAGA
notice did not sufficiently set forth the facts and theories upon
which their claims were based. First Honda has reiterated this
claim on appeal and we conclude it has merit with regard to the
PAGA violations alleged in appellants’ opening brief. We must
affirm the judgment if it is correct for any reason, even if the trial
court did not rely upon that reason in issuing its ruling. (Orange
Catholic Foundation v. Arvizu (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 283, 297, fn.
8.)
As a condition for bringing a PAGA claim, “an aggrieved
employee acting on behalf of the state and other current or
former employees must provide notice to the employer and the
responsible state agency ‘of the specific provisions of [the Labor
Code] alleged to have been violated, including the facts and
theories to support the alleged violation.’” (Williams v. Superior
Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 545.) Appellants’ PAGA notice does
not set forth the specific theories of liability they assert in their
opening brief with regard to First Honda’s sales associates and
lube technicians, much less state any facts in support of those
theories.
In any event, the evidence in the record does not compel a
finding that First Honda committed the alleged PAGA violations.
“‘In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision
following a bench trial,’ we ‘apply a substantial evidence standard
of review to the trial court’s finding of fact.’ [Citation.]” (Symons
Emergency Specialties v. City of Riverside (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
583, 596.) “‘The substantial evidence standard of review takes on
a unique formulation where, as here, “the trier fact has expressly
20
or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof
did not carry the burden and that party appeals.”’ [Citation.]
Under these circumstances ‘“‘“the question for a reviewing court
becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the
appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the
question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1)
‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character
and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that
it was insufficient to support a finding.’”’”’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p.
597.)
Appellants fail to make such a showing here. They
presented the judge with voluminous exhibits, had a law clerk
testify that those exhibits contained evidence of various
deficiencies, and then “ask[ed] the Court to take his word for it.”
The court correctly recognized that “[t]his [was] an insufficient
basis for [appellants] to satisfy their burden of proof.” As First
Honda notes, appellants also made no effort to reconcile the
referenced pay statements with the employees’ biometric time
cards—or review (or even seek discovery of) the lube technicians
and sales employees’ individual pay plans—to determine whether
the alleged deficiencies reflected in the pay statements
constituted actual evidence of Labor Code violations. (See Oman,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 781, citing Civ. Code, § 1636 [recognizing
that “[t]he compensation owed employees is a matter determined
primarily by contract” and that “[c]onsistent with general
contract interpretation principles, the unit for which pay is
promised should be determined based on the ‘mutual intention of
the parties as it existed at the time of contracting”].) Appellants
also failed to obtain discovery of the supplemental sheets that
First Honda’s sales employees received in addition to the pay
21
statements that were admitted into evidence. Substantial
evidence thus supports the judgment in First Honda’s favor on
appellants’ PAGA claim.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover costs
on appeal.
YEGAN, Acting P.J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
22
Henry J. Walsh, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
The Green Law Group and Matthew T. Bechtel, for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Thompson Coburn and Arthur F. Silbergeld, Keith J.
Rasher, Cara A. Strike, for Defendants and Respondents C.E.
Enterprises, Inc., and Ed Estey.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent Darrell
Coletto.
Filed 11/18/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
GUSTAVO MORA et al., 2d Civ. No. B337830
(Super. Ct. No. 56-2018-
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 00521275-CU-OE-VTA)
(Ventura County)
v.
ORDER CERTIFYING
C.E. ENTERPRISES, INC., OPINION FOR PUBLICATION
et al., [NO CHANGE IN
JUDGMENT]
Defendants and
Respondents.
THE COURT:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on October
21, 2025, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports.
For good cause, it now appears that the opinion should be
published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.
YEGAN, A.P.J. BALTODANO, J. CODY, J.
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