In re J.L. CA2/7

CourtListener 10737557Calctapp17.11.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 11/17/25 In re J.L. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re J.L., a Person Coming Under B341676
the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County Super.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Ct. No. 24CCJP02850A)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

F.Z.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Juan M. Valles, Juvenile Court Referee.
Dismissed.
Mary Carmel Manuel, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Office of the County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, County
Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Jacklyn K.
Louie, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
_____________________
F.Z. (Mother) appeals from an order asserting dependency
jurisdiction over her daughter, J.L., arguing there was
insufficient evidence showing J.L. was at risk of harm at the time
of the jurisdiction hearing. Although the juvenile court sustained
the dependency petition under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300,1 it did not declare J.L. a dependent of the court and
instead ordered six months of informal supervision under section
360, subdivision (b). While this appeal was pending, the
supervision period ended without further court involvement.
Thus, the juvenile court no longer has jurisdiction over J.L., and
there is no relief we can grant Mother. Accordingly, we dismiss
her appeal as moot.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

J.L. was born to Mother in January 2024. J.L.’s presumed
father, Je. L. (Father), is not a party to this appeal.
In September 2024, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (Department) filed a dependency
petition under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), alleging the parents
had placed then seven-month-old J.L. in danger of harm by
bringing her to Father’s home where law enforcement had found,
unsecured, a loaded firearm, multiple rounds of ammunition,
marijuana, and drug paraphernalia, and where residents were
members of a violent street gang. Law enforcement and the
Department discovered these conditions as part of a search
warrant operation responding to an increase in gang-related
shootings in the area. Mother, Father, and J.L. were present in

1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless indicated otherwise.

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the home when the search warrant was executed. Mother and
Father were also present a year earlier—before J.L.’s birth—
when law enforcement seized a loaded firearm in the residence.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, Mother asked
for the petition to be dismissed in light of the parents’ denial of
knowledge of any firearm, drug use, or gang activity in the home.
The juvenile court, however, sustained the petition as to both
parents, finding J.L. to be a person described by section 300,
subdivision (b). As for disposition, the court followed the
Department’s unopposed recommendation for J.L. to be released
to her parents under informal supervision for six months
pursuant to section 360, subdivision (b).
Mother timely appealed.2 While this appeal was pending,
the six-month period of informal supervision ended without the
Department filing a new petition pursuant to section 360,
subdivision (c).3

DISCUSSION

The Department argues Mother’s appeal is moot and
should be dismissed. We agree and decline Mother’s request that
we undertake a discretionary review of the merits of her moot
appeal.

2 An order for informal supervision under section 360,
subdivision (b), is appealable. (See In re Adam D. (2010)
183 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1261.)
3 We grant the Department’s request for judicial notice of the
juvenile court’s register of actions, which shows the Department
did not file a new petition during the informal supervision period.
(Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d) [court may take judicial notice of
court records]).

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A. Mootness Doctrine and Dependency Appeals
“A court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and
not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it.” ’ ” (In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 276; see In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484,
1490.) “A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[ ] it
impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of [the
appellant], to grant him any effect[ive] relief.” ’ ” (D.P., at p. 276.)
Relief is “effective” where a party complains of “ongoing harm”
that is “redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome
the [party] seeks.” (Ibid.; see I.A., at p. 1490 [effective relief is
that which provides “the prospect of a remedy that can have a
practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal
status”].) “A reviewing court must ‘ “decide on a case-by-case
basis whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter
make a case moot and whether [its] decision would affect the
outcome in a subsequent proceeding.” ’ ” (D.P., at p. 276.)

B. Mother’s Appeal Is Moot
Mother’s appeal is moot for multiple reasons. The first is
that the juvenile court’s finding that jurisdiction was properly
asserted over J.L. would remain even if we determined Mother’s
appeal was meritorious, because Father did not appeal the
jurisdiction finding against him. In other words, even if we
reversed the jurisdiction finding against Mother, the finding as to
Father would stand, and the juvenile court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over J.L. would not be disturbed. (See In re D.P.,

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supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 283-284; In re M.C. (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 137, 150-151; In re Briana V. (2015)
236 Cal.App.4th 297, 308.)
The second reason is that the family is no longer subject to
Department supervision or juvenile court jurisdiction. After
asserting jurisdiction, the juvenile court ordered the family to
participate in informal supervision for six months pursuant to
section 360, subdivision (b). Under that statute, the court “may,
without adjudicating the child a dependent child of the court,
order that services be provided to keep the family together and
place the child and the child’s parent or guardian under the
supervision of the social worker for a time period consistent with
Section 301.” (§ 360, subd. (b).) Family maintenance services are
“limited to six months and may be extended in periods of six-
month increments if it can be shown that the objectives of the
service plan can be achieved within the extended time periods.”
(§ 16506; see also § 301, subd. (a).) An order for informal
supervision “deprives the court of authority to take any further
action unless the matter is brought back before the court
pursuant to section 360, subdivision (c), via a new petition.” (In
re Emily L. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 1, 14; accord, In re Adam D.
(2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1259-1260.)
The Department did not file a new petition during the six
months of informal supervision, and the supervision period was
not extended. As a result, the family is no longer subject to
Department or juvenile court supervision, and we could not grant
effective relief to Mother even if we determined her challenge to
the jurisdiction finding had merit. (See In re D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 277 [“to show a need for effective relief, the
plaintiff must first demonstrate that he or she has suffered from

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a change in legal status”]; In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th
156, 163 [“An order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction
generally renders an appeal from an earlier order moot.”].)
We are not persuaded by Mother’s arguments that we
should exercise our discretion to address the merits of her moot
appeal. “A reviewing court must decide on a case-by-case basis
whether it is appropriate to exercise discretionary review to reach
the merits of a moot appeal.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 287.) Among the factors reviewing courts may consider is
whether a challenged jurisdiction finding could affect current or
future dependency proceedings, for example, by influencing the
Department’s decision to file a new dependency petition or a
juvenile court’s determination about further reunification
services or the child’s placement. (Id. at p. 285.) Also pertinent
is “whether the jurisdictional finding is based on particularly
pernicious or stigmatizing conduct”: “The more egregious the
findings against the parent, the greater the parent’s interest in
challenging such findings.” (Id. at pp. 285-286.) Courts may also
consider “why the appeal became moot.” (Id. at p. 286.) For
example, “[p]rinciples of fairness” may favor discretionary review
of a case rendered moot “by the prompt compliance or otherwise
laudable behavior of the parent challenging the jurisdictional
finding on appeal.” (Ibid.)
While Mother asserts the jurisdiction finding “create[s] the
possibility of prejudice . . . in subsequent family law or
dependency proceedings,” her concerns are vague and
speculative. (See In re Rashad D., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at
p. 164, fn. 5 [argument that jurisdiction finding might influence
the Department’s decision to file a new dependency petition at
some point in the future deemed “too speculative to justify

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appellate review of an otherwise moot case”].) The ultimate
inquiry in any future dependency proceeding would be whether
the child is at current risk of harm based on present conditions
and not solely past jurisdiction findings. (See In re I.A., supra,
201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1495 [deeming “speculative” the prospect
that jurisdiction finding would affect future dependency
proceeding because any dependency orders adverse to parent
“would require evidence of present detriment, based on the then
prevailing circumstances of parent and child”].) Moreover, while
the facts leading to the sustained jurisdiction finding here would
be available in future dependency proceedings, so too would the
facts that J.L. remained in Mother’s care throughout these
proceedings and that Mother apparently cooperated with the
Department’s informal supervision. (See In re N.S. (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 53, 63 [facts that mother “took prompt and
positive steps to reunite” with and quickly regained custody of
her child would be available in any future dependency
proceedings].)
Nor is the jurisdiction finding against Mother based on
“particularly pernicious or stigmatizing conduct.” (In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 285-286.) Dependency jurisdiction under
section 300, subdivision (b), necessarily involves conduct that is
harmful to the child. But our assessment of the perniciousness or
stigmatizing nature of any harm is relative. The finding that
Mother endangered J.L. by bringing the child to a home where a
firearm, drugs, and gang members were present does not rank
among the type of allegations that are so stigmatizing as to
warrant our discretionary review. (Cf. In re M.W. (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452 [reaching merits where jurisdiction

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findings based on mother’s failure to protect children from sexual
abuse were particularly stigmatizing].)
Mother also asserts “she should not be penalized” by being
subjected to a finding that her appeal is moot “because the
Department did not find enough of a risk to recommend
maintaining jurisdiction over this family ” and instead
recommended informal supervision under section 360,
subdivision (b), with which she promptly complied. Although
there is no evidence in the record about Mother’s level of
compliance during the six-month informal supervision period,
apparently she sufficiently fulfilled the Department’s
requirements such that the Department determined there was no
need to file a new petition. Mother has a point in arguing that
cases like hers with successful dispositions under section 360,
subdivision (b), may frequently evade review under mootness
principles due to parents’ compliance before their appeals are
heard. However, we decline to exercise our discretion to hear this
moot appeal based solely on the fact that Mother may have
promptly complied, given that her appeal is moot not only
because of her prompt compliance but also because Father did
not appeal, and because the other factors here do not weigh in
favor of exercising discretion to hear this appeal. (See In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286 [“no single factor is necessarily
dispositive of whether a court should exercise discretionary
review of a moot appeal”].)

///

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DISPOSITION

Mother’s appeal is dismissed as moot.

STONE, J.
We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

FEUER, J.

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