People v. Eriz CA4/3

CourtListener 10736051Calctapp13.11.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 11/13/25 P. v. Eriz CA4/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G064049

v. (Super. Ct. No. 21CF1703)

MARCUS ANTHONY ERIZ, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Richard M. King, Judge. Affirmed.
William Paul Melcher, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal and Arlyn Escalante, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
Defendant Marcus Anthony Eriz shot at another car on the
freeway after a dispute with the driver. The shot entered through the trunk
of the other car, killing Aiden Leos in the backseat. Eriz was convicted of
second degree murder based on a theory of implied malice. On appeal, Eriz
argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of implied
malice murder; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that
the actus reus of implied malice murder must involve a “high degree of
probability that it will result in death.” We disagree and affirm the judgment.
FACTS
On the morning of May 21, 2021, Joanna C. was driving
northbound on the 55 freeway to take her six-year-old son Aiden to school.
Aiden was in the backseat of the car in a child safety seat. Driving in the
carpool lane, Joanna C. saw a white Volkswagen approaching very quickly
from behind. The white car swerved out of the carpool lane, abruptly drove
back into the carpool lane in front of Joanna C.’s car and braked. Joanna C.
was scared and concerned because of the white car’s sudden movement.
Joanna C. observed that a woman was driving the car, and a man was in the
front passenger seat.
As Joanna C. merged out of the carpool lane, she drove next to
the Volkswagen. Joanna C. gestured to the driver with her middle finger as
she continued to merge into the right lanes of the freeway. The male
passenger smiled.
A moment later, Joanna C. heard a loud noise, which sounded
like a “big rock” had hit her car. Aiden said, “Ow.” Joanna C. looked to the
rear seat and saw Aiden’s head hanging down. She immediately pulled over
to the side of the freeway and attempted to get her son out of his car seat.

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Raul A. was also driving northbound on the 55 freeway and
witnessed an interaction between the two cars in front of him. Raul A. saw
the driver of a white car “cut off” Joanna C. and then apply the brakes in
front of her. Raul A. then saw Joanna C. drive next to the white car, roll
down her window, and give the “middle finger” to the driver of the white car.
As Joanna C. merged to the right lane, Raul A. saw the male passenger in the
white car pull out a gun and fire a single shot at Joanna C.’s car. Raul A. took
a photo of the white car. He followed the white car but lost sight of it as it
sped off. After he arrived at work, a coworker called 911.
An off-duty police officer stopped to assist Joanna C. and Aiden.
The officer noticed blood on Aiden’s shirt and observed what appeared to be a
gunshot wound. He performed CPR, but Aiden was already dead. Joanna C.’s
911 call was played for the jury.
California Highway Patrol Investigator Kevin Futrell arrived at
the scene. Futrell closed the 55 freeway south of where the shooting occurred,
and he and other officers walked the freeway for evidence. No bullet casing or
projectile was found. Futrell interviewed Raul A., who provided the photo of
the white Volkswagen. However, the photo did not show the license plate of
the car. Futrell also interviewed Joanna C., who, with the help of the Orange
County Sheriff’s Department, produced a sketch of the two people in the
Volkswagen.
Futrell created a police bulletin with a picture and description of
the Volkswagen. Citizens created a banner and website asking “‘Who Shot
Aiden?’” Futrell and another investigator canvassed the area for security
camera footage and obtained a video of a 2019 Volkswagen Golf SportWagen,
which they believed was the vehicle involved in Aiden’s shooting.

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Futrell determined that Wynne Lee, Eriz’s live-in girlfriend, was
the registered owner of the car seen in the security video. Lee and Eriz were
both arrested. The Volkswagen was found in Eriz’s grandmother’s garage.
Futrell separately interviewed Lee and Eriz at the police station.
Eriz admitted to committing the shooting. He always had his gun with him
because he felt that people had become more hostile on the road. He was not
“mad” when he fired the gun, and when asked whether he aimed at Joanna
C.’s car, he replied, “‘I didn’t even take a second to aim.’” The gun was
already loaded but he had to rack it and roll down the window before
shooting. Eriz admitted that he pointed the gun at the car “and popped it off.”
He took a gun safety test as part of the registration requirement for his gun
and stated he had also fired a rifle in the past. He knew there was a high
likelihood that pointing the gun at a car could kill someone, but he still shot
at Joanna C.’s car.
Police recovered Eriz’s gun, a Glock 17 pistol, from a toolbox at
his place of work. The gun had a 10-round magazine, which was loaded with
nine-millimeter rounds. The gun had aftermarket modifications to the grip
and magazine release pin.
A forensic expert who analyzed Joanna C.’s car observed an
apparent bullet hole in the trunk lid with corresponding bullet holes in the
interior of the trunk and through the right rear passenger seat. Trajectory
rods were used to trace the path of the bullet. The expert testified the bullet
entered from the left side exterior of the trunk through to the right rear
passenger seat. Police did not recover any bullets from inside the car or from
Aiden’s body.

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A jury found Eriz guilty of second degree murder (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd. (a))1 and shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246). The jury also
found true the allegation that, in the commission of the murder, Eriz used a
firearm causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial
court sentenced Eriz to a term of 40 years to life in state prison.
DISCUSSION
I.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Eriz argues the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to
support his conviction for second degree implied malice murder. We find the
evidence sufficient and affirm the judgment.
A. Legal Standard
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must “‘review the
whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine
whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Wolfe
(2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 673, 681.) “It is the jury, not an appellate court that
must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.)
“The appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury or
reverse the judgment merely because the evidence might also support a
contrary finding.” (Ibid.)
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice
aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) When a person commits a murder without
premeditation and deliberation, it is of the second degree. (§ 189.) In a second

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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degree murder, the “malice may be express or implied.” (§ 188.) “The primary
difference between express malice and implied malice is that the former
requires an intent to kill but the latter does not.” (People v. Soto (2018)
4 Cal.5th 968, 976.) Implied malice murder requires the killing be
proximately caused by an act, “‘“‘the natural consequences of which are
dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who
knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with
conscious disregard for life.’”’” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.)
The defendant’s conduct before and after an attack may be considered in
determining whether the requirements have been satisfied. (People v.
Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 511.) Implied malice may be proven by
circumstantial evidence. (People v. Superior Court (Valenzuela) (2021)
73 Cal.App.5th 485, 502.)
B. Analysis
The evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to convict Eriz of
second degree implied malice murder. The “natural consequence” of shooting
a gun at an occupied car is that a bullet may strike someone inside. Eriz
admitted during his police interview that he knew there was a high
probability that shooting out of the window at another car on the freeway
would lead to the death of someone in that car, yet he did so anyway.
Additionally, Eriz’s actions after the shooting, including fleeing the scene of
the crime and hiding the car in his grandmother’s garage, are further
evidence that he knew there was a high probability someone had been
injured or killed. (See People v. Paysinger (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 26, 29,
quoting CALCRIM No. 372 [‘“If the defendant fled or tried to flee
immediately after the crime was committed, that conduct may show that he
was aware of his guilt”’].)

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Eriz argues he should not have been convicted of second degree
implied malice murder because he did not know Aiden was in the car nor did
he intend to kill him. However, Eriz knew Joanna C. was driving the car and
that she likely had at least one passenger because she had been driving in
the carpool lane right before the shooting. By shooting a gun at Joanna C.’s
car, Eriz acted with conscious disregard for her life, as well as the lives of any
of her passengers, like Aiden.
II.
INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR
Eriz argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury
that, to find him guilty of implied malice murder, the natural and probable
consequences of his action must involve “a high degree of probability that it
will result in death.” Eriz also contends this alleged failure to properly
instruct the jury violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due
process and a fair trial. We conclude that the trial court properly instructed
the jury, and Eriz’s due process rights were not violated.
A. Factual Background
The prosecutor argued in closing that “[t]he People have to prove
that the natural and probable consequences of pointing a loaded gun at
someone and pulling the trigger is dangerous to human life.” The prosecutor
later told the jury, “[i]t’s for you to decide if a loaded Glock 17 pointed and
fired at a little boy is dangerous to human life.” The prosecutor asked, “who
doesn’t know firing a gun at someone is deadly?” The prosecutor argued to
the jury Eriz “was aware of the danger because of what he knows about the
firearm. Did he disregard it? He ignored it. He knew and understood the
danger and he did it anyway. That’s what the People have to prove.”

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The trial court instructed the jury with former CALCRIM No. 520
regarding second degree murder with malice aforethought:
“The defendant is charged in Count one with murder in violation
of Penal Code section 187. [¶] To prove that the defendant is guilty of this
crime, the People must prove that: [¶] [1.] The defendant committed an act
that caused the death of another person; [¶] AND [¶] 2. When the defendant
acted, he had a state of mind called malice aforethought. [¶] There are two
kinds of malice aforethought, express malice and implied malice. Proof of
either is sufficient to establish the state of mind required for murder. [¶] The
defendant had express malice if he unlawfully intended to kill. [¶] The
defendant had implied malice if: [¶] 1. He intentionally committed the act; [¶]
[2.] The natural and probable consequences of the act were dangerous to
human life; [¶] 3. At the time he acted, he knew his act was dangerous to
human life; [¶] AND [¶] 4. He deliberately acted with conscious disregard for
human life. [¶] Malice aforethought does not require hatred or ill will toward
the victim. It is a mental state that must be formed before the act that causes
death is committed. It does not require deliberation or the passage of any
particular period of time. [¶] If you find the defendant guilty of murder, it is
murder of the second degree.”
The jury was also instructed with CALCRIM No. 580 regarding
the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter:
“When a person commits an unlawful killing but does not intend
to kill and does not act with conscious disregard of human life, then the crime
is involuntary manslaughter. [¶] The difference between other homicide
offenses and involuntary manslaughter depends on whether the person was
aware of the risk to life that his or her actions created and consciously
disregarded that risk. An unlawful killing caused by a willful act done with

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full knowledge and awareness that the person is endangering the life of
another, and done in conscious disregard of that risk, is voluntary
manslaughter or murder. An unlawful killing resulting from a willful act
committed without intent to kill and without conscious disregard of the risk
to human life is involuntary manslaughter.”
B. Legal Standard
We review claims of instructional error de novo. (People v. Cole
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1210.) “‘Instructions should be interpreted, if
possible, so as to support the judgment rather than defeat it if they are
reasonably susceptible to such interpretation.’” (People v. Martin (2000)
78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1112.) “‘“[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be
determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of
parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.”” (People v.
Musselwhite (1998)17 Cal.4th 1216, 1248.) “‘“The absence of an essential
element in one instruction may be supplied by another or cured in light of the
instructions as a whole.”’” (People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016.)
In determining whether an instruction is ambiguous or
misleading, the court considers “the specific language challenged, the
instructions as a whole and the jury’s findings,” as well as counsel’s closing
arguments to determine whether the instructional error “would have misled a
reasonable jury.” (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 36, 37.).
Reversal is not required unless it is reasonably likely the jury
misunderstood and misapplied the court’s instructions to the defendant’s
detriment. (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 963–964.) A trial court’s
failure to instruct the jury on all elements of an offense is a constitutional
error “subject to harmless error analysis under both the California and
United States Constitutions.” (People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 475.)

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C. Analysis
Eriz contends the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the
jury that implied malice murder requires that the actus reus of the crime
involves a high degree of probability of death, relying on People v. Reyes
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 989 (Reyes).
Our Supreme Court rejected this argument in People v. Nieto
Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 110–111 (Nieto Benitez) and People v. Knoller
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 157 (Knoller). The defendant in Nieto Benitez argued
that CALJIC No. 8.31, a pattern jury instruction predating CALCRIM No.
520, “misstate[d] the law because the instruction omit[ted] a requirement
that defendant commit the act with a high probability that death will result.”
(Nieto Benitez, supra, at p. 111.) The Supreme Court disagreed, noting it had
previously concluded in People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 300 “that the
two linguistic formulations—‘an act, the natural consequences of which are
dangerous to life’ and ‘an act [committed] with a high probability that it will
result in death’ are equivalent and are intended to embody the same
standard.” (Nieto Benitez, at p. 111.)
In Knoller, the trial court granted a new trial to a defendant
convicted of second degree implied malice murder, finding the evidence was
insufficient to show the defendant subjectively knew her conduct involved a
high probability of death. (Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 142.) The Supreme
Court disagreed, holding that the correct standard for implied malice murder
“requires proof that a defendant acted with conscious disregard of the danger
to human life.” (Id. at p. 156.)
In relying upon Reyes to argue that the jury should have been
instructed that the act must involve a high degree of probability of death,
Eriz seems to argue that Reyes overruled Nieto Benitez and Knoller. We

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disagree. In Reyes, the court was reviewing a trial court’s denial of a petition
for resentencing under section 1172.6. The Supreme Court concluded there
was insufficient evidence to support a theory that the defendant was guilty of
murder as a direct perpetrator who harbored implied malice. (Reyes, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 989.) The court based its decision primarily on the lack of
substantial evidence of proximate cause, but it also disagreed with the trial
court’s conclusion that the defendant’s conduct was dangerous to human life.
As our Supreme Court explained: “To suffice for implied malice murder, the
defendant’s act must not merely be dangerous to life in some vague or
speculative sense; it must ‘“involve[ ] a high degree of probability that it will
result in death.”’” (Ibid.) The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s act of
traveling to rival gang territory with other gang members did “not by itself
give rise to a high degree of probability that death will result.” (Ibid.)
Reyes did not involve an alleged erroneous jury instruction, and
the court did not suggest either Nieto Benitez or Knoller was wrongly decided.
The Reyes court’s reference to the “high probability of death” standard in
deciding a sufficiency of the evidence question under section 1172.6 does not
mean trial courts must include such language in the jury instructions
defining implied malice. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 989–990.) Nor did
Reyes call into question the Supreme Court’s own prior holdings that the
“high probability” and “natural consequences” standards of implied malice
are the same, or that instruction solely on the “natural consequences”
standard is sufficient. (Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 111.) Because the
Supreme Court in Reyes did not decide this issue and did not overrule or
otherwise disapprove of its own precedent, we remain bound by the decisions
in Nieto Benitez and Knoller. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)

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The fact that the Judicial Council Advisory Committee revised
CALCRIM No. 520 in March 2024, after Eriz’s trial, to include the “high
degree of probability” definition in the objective component element of
implied malice does not affect our determination the jury instruction was
proper as given. Pattern jury instructions “are not themselves the law, and
are not authority to establish legal propositions or precedent.” (People v.
Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 48, fn. 7.) Here, the court appropriately used
the jury instructions available at the time of trial, which contained a correct
statement of the definition of implied malice. As noted, nothing in Reyes
suggests the Supreme Court intended to overturn precedent which
established that the “high probability” and “natural consequences” standards
are equivalent.
Eriz also contends CALCRIM No. 520 violated his state and
federal rights to due process because it did not define the necessary actus
reus as requiring a “high degree of probability that it would result in death.”
We disagree. An alleged “ambiguity, inconsistency or deficiency in a jury
instruction” does not “rise[] to the level of a due process violation” unless the
“‘“ailing instruction . . . so infected the entire trial that the resulting
conviction violates due process.”’” (People v. Adams (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th
946, 953.) Here, instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 520, which properly
stated the legal standard for second degree implied malice murder, did not
“so infect[] the entire trial” as to violate Eriz’s due process rights. Nor did the
jury instruction, when considered in the context of the trial record as a whole,
render Eriz’s trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate his right to due
process. (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1335 [in determining
whether a jury instruction violated a defendant’s right to due process, the
“‘instruction “may not be judged in artificial isolation,” but must be

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considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record’”];
Salas v. Cortez (1979) 24 Cal.3d 22, 27 [“The touchstone of due process is
fundamental fairness”].)
Nor, as Eriz claims, did CALCRIM No. 520 lessen the
prosecution’s burden to demonstrate his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The
jury was instructed that it had to find “the natural and probable
consequences of the act were dangerous to human life.” Thus, the prosecution
still had to meet its burden of proof to demonstrate that the natural and
probable consequences of Eriz’s shooting at Joanna C.’s car were dangerous
to human life.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

BANCROFT, J.*

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

GOODING, J.

*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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