People v. Davis CA4/3

CourtListener 10736037Calctapp13.11.2025

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Filed 11/13/25 P. v. Davis CA4/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G064875

v. (Super. Ct. No. 20NF0691)

ISAIAH TYZHE DAVIS, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Lewis W. Clapp, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Kristen Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Tyler L. Krentz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
Isaiah Tyzhe Davis appeals from his convictions for stalking and
attempting to make criminal threats against M.C. We conclude there was
substantial evidence supporting these convictions, and there was no
prejudicial error.
Davis also challenges his sentence on the ground it violates Penal
Code1 section 654. We agree that the course of criminal conduct in two of the
counts was indivisible, and the trial court should have stayed execution of the
sentence on one of them. We will remand the matter to the trial court to
correct the sentence. In all other respects, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Davis and M.C. began dating in March 2018; he was 20 and she
was 19. Their relationship soon became strained, as Davis was unfaithful,
manipulative, jealous, and angry. He would have “tantrums” where he broke
or threw items, especially when he was drinking. M.C. felt pressured to stay
in the relationship due to Davis’s threats of suicide or self-harm.
When M.C. tried to end the relationship in December 2018, Davis
blackmailed her into staying with him by threatening to tell her parents she
was drinking, partying, and smoking marijuana. In January 2019, during an
argument, Davis became physically violent. Although M.C. wanted to end the
relationship, she was afraid Davis would blackmail her.
In March 2019, M.C. broke up with Davis. Soon thereafter, M.C.
learned that intimate photos of her had been posted on social media. Only she

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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and Davis were in possession of these photos. M.C. obtained a temporary
restraining order against Davis. When it expired six months later, she did not
request an extension because she believed Davis “had learned his lesson and
he would leave [her] alone.”
In November 2019, Davis’s mother contacted M.C. to say Davis
was suicidal; she asked M.C. to speak with Davis. The couple resumed dating
soon thereafter, but M.C. hid the relationship from her family. As before, the
relationship continued although M.C. wanted to end it because Davis
threatened to reveal private information to her parents and she felt
“obligated to be there for him.”
On the evening of March 5, 2020, Davis and M.C. got into an
argument, and she told him she was ending the relationship. Davis
threatened to beat up M.C.’s dad and kill her family by shooting them. M.C.
was “angry and scared.” Although she told Davis she did not believe him, she
was actually concerned that he might follow through with his threats.
At about 3:00 a.m. on March 6, Davis began banging on the
sliding glass door of M.C.’s family home and tried to enter the back door.
M.C. and her parents were terrified and called the police. Davis left before
the police arrived.
At about 11:00 p.m. that evening, M.C.’s father picked her up
from work. As they were driving home, M.C. received a message from a
coworker that Davis was at her workplace asking whether M.C. was there.
Davis’s car then appeared behind them driving aggressively. They ran into
the house and M.C. called the police. As M.C.’s father locked a door in the
back of the house, he saw Davis outside; Davis hit and kicked the door for
several minutes, breaking parts of the door frame. During this incident, M.C.

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was overwhelmed by fear and anxiety, and thought Davis was going to kill
her and her parents. Davis was again gone before the police arrived.
Sometime before 2:00 p.m. on March 7, M.C. was alone in a music
practice room at school. Davis appeared and blocked the door to the room.
M.C. believed he was going to hurt her and complied with his demands out of
fear. Davis said, “he ruined everything and that this was the end,” and again
threatened to kill himself. M.C. continued trying to deescalate the situation.
When her parents arrived to pick her up, she walked outside with Davis,
feeling she was in “survival mode.” Her parents were with campus security.
Her father saw that M.C. was pale, frightened, and nervous. He believed
Davis wanted to harm their family. M.C. refused her parents’ suggestion that
they call the police because she did not want to escalate the situation. M.C.’s
family later called Davis and asked him to leave them alone and not to hurt
himself.
The next day, March 8, 2020, M.C. and her parents met in person
with Davis at a restaurant before she went to work. M.C.’s parents told Davis
if he left the family alone, they would not press charges against him. Davis
continued to threaten to harm himself; he seemed “confused,” “sad, tired, and
very, very serious.”
About 8:00 p.m. that evening, Davis showed up at the hotel
where M.C. worked. M.C. told her supervisor, J.C., that she was taking a
break to speak with Davis. M.C. tried to convince Davis to leave. She was
anxious and scared and believed Davis would kill her and her family.
About 10 minutes later, J.C. also asked Davis to leave. Davis
agreed to leave but said he would return for M.C. later. M.C. was back in
survival mode; she continued to be afraid Davis would follow through on his
threats against her and her family.

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Davis returned to M.C.’s workplace at 10:20 p.m. M.C. refused
multiple demands from Davis to leave with him. J.C. intervened, telling
Davis, “She doesn’t want to talk to you,” and “I’m her supervisor, and so I’m
saying that you have to leave.” J.C. told Davis he would call the police and
reached for the phone. Before he could finish making the call, Davis ordered
him to put the phone down, told him to “shut the fuck up,” and threatened to
shoot and kill him. Davis lifted his shirt and gestured to his waistband, and
J.C. thought he saw the black metal grip end of a gun. J.C. hung up the
phone and tried to be friendly to Davis in the hope he would leave. J.C. was
fearful that Davis would shoot him.
M.C. tried to defuse the situation by talking to Davis. She
believed she needed to leave with Davis to protect J.C. and prevent the
situation from getting worse. M.C. was terrified and overwhelmed and was
afraid Davis would shoot her or J.C. After hanging around the hotel lobby for
about an hour, Davis told M.C. he would drag her out if she refused to leave
with him. M.C. was afraid he was going to take her somewhere and assault or
kill her. She was scared and angry as he grabbed her arm while leaving the
lobby. Immediately after Davis and M.C. left, J.C. called the police.
As Davis and M.C. were leaving the hotel, her parents arrived to
pick her up. Davis said he wanted to take M.C. with him, but her father
refused, seeing that she was shaking. M.C.’s father suggested they meet at a
nearby restaurant to continue talking. During their ride to the restaurant,
M.C. told her parents what had happened at the hotel; her father became
very worried and fearful for his family’s safety. Police officers were in the
parking lot of the restaurant when they arrived. M.C. and her family hid
inside the restaurant while Davis remained in the parking lot.

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The police searched Davis’s car and found two pellet guns; these
guns looked to the police like genuine firearms and did not have orange tips
(which would signify they were not real firearms). The police also spoke with
M.C., who appeared afraid and was “visibly bothered by the events that had
transpired.” M.C.’s mother and father also appeared to the police to be afraid.
The District Attorney charged Davis in an information with
stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (a); count 1); making criminal threats (§ 422,
subd. (a); count 2 against M.C., and count 4 against J.C.); dissuading a
witness by force or threat (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1); count 3); and brandishing an
imitation firearm (§ 417.4; count 5). The information also alleged Davis
committed the offenses while he was released from custody on bail on a
primary felony, under section 12022.1, subdivision (b).
At trial, Davis did not testify in his own defense. His mother
testified Davis was depressed and had struggled with deaths in their family
during the time in question. Davis had also suffered physical injuries while
training with the Marines.
As to count 2, the jury acquitted Davis of making a criminal
threat against M.C. but convicted him of attempting to make a criminal
threat, a lesser included offense. The jury convicted Davis on all other counts.
In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the on-bail sentencing
enhancement allegation.
The trial court sentenced Davis to a total of two years in state
prison: the midterm of two years on count 1, with concurrent terms on
counts 2, 3, and 4. The court stayed imposition of sentence on count 5 and
struck the on-bail enhancement.
Davis filed a timely notice of appeal.

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DISCUSSION
I.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE FOR STALKING
Davis contends there was insufficient evidence to support the
guilty verdict on count 1 for stalking.
The standard of review for assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is “highly deferential.” (People v.
Lochtefeld (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 533, 538.) Our task is to review the record
in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt. (People v. Alexander (2010)
49 Cal.4th 846, 917.) Although the evidence must be reasonable, credible, and
of solid value, we do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate the credibility of
the witnesses who testified at trial; rather, “‘[w]e presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from
the evidence. [Citation.] [¶] . . . “[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the
[trier of fact’s] findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.”’”
(Ibid.) “The conviction shall stand ‘unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [it].”’” (People v.
Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508.)
A conviction for stalking requires proof that the defendant
(1) intentionally and willfully (2) harassed or repeatedly followed the victim
and (3) made a credible threat (4) with the intent to place the victim in
reasonable fear for their own or their family’s safety. (§ 646.9; CALCRIM
No. 1301.) On appeal, Davis challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of
M.C.’s reasonable fear. Davis points to M.C.’s “voluntary contact” with Davis
during the three-day period in March. M.C. testified about multiple contacts

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with Davis during that time that were not voluntary, including Davis’s
aggressive driving behind M.C. and her father; two separate occasions on
which Davis pounded on and kicked the door of M.C.’s family home; Davis’s
uninvited appearance at M.C.’s music practice where he physically blocked
her exit; and his multiple uninvited appearances at her workplace. M.C.
explained that every time she had voluntary contact with Davis, it was for
the purpose of deescalating his threatening conduct, and she testified she was
afraid that Davis would kill her or her family if she did not appease him.
Finally, numerous other witnesses testified to M.C.’s fear.
In People v. Carvalho (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 482, 483, on which
Davis relies, the defendant was convicted of kidnapping his estranged wife
while armed. The appellate court reversed the conviction because the victim’s
testimony was “fantastic.” (Id. at p. 489.) The court noted that the victim had
multiple opportunities to escape from the defendant during the roughly
11 hours the incident lasted, she cooked for him, helped him bathe, and had
sex with him during that time, and she failed to report the incident for a
month. (Id. at p. 490.) Whether the appellate court was correct in discounting
the victim’s testimony,2 the case is not on point. M.C. did not wait a month
before contacting the police regarding Davis’s stalking and threatening
behavior. She and other members of her family called the police multiple
times during the key March period. She did not take any actions toward
Davis such as engaging in sexual relations or bathing him or cooking for him.
Every time she engaged with Davis it was for the purpose of deescalating the

2 The Attorney General notes that the case is almost 75 years
old, and it reflects an outdated view of spousal abuse. While we agree, the
case is otherwise distinguishable, so we need not analyze whether its holding
must be discounted as anachronistic.

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situation, preventing him from hurting himself, her, or her family, or
attempting to talk him into leaving her and her family alone.
II.
INSTRUCTION ON ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL THREATS
Davis argues, and the Attorney General concedes, the trial court
erred by failing to properly instruct the jury with respect to the lesser
included offense of attempting to make a criminal threat in count 2.
Therefore, our analysis will be limited to whether the error was prejudicial.
The trial court correctly instructed the jury with CALCRIM
No. 1300 regarding the elements of the crime of making a criminal threat.
The court also instructed the jury regarding the lesser included offense of
attempting to make a criminal threat with CALCRIM No. 460, the general
instruction regarding attempts. In relevant part, this instruction provides:
“To prove that the defendant is guilty, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The
defendant took a direct but ineffective step toward making a criminal threat;
[¶] AND [¶] 2. The defendant intended to make a criminal threat. [¶] . . . [¶]
To decide whether the defendant intended to make a criminal threat, please
refer to the separate instructions that I have given you on that crime.”
However, the crime of attempting to make a criminal threat
includes an element that is not present in the crime of making a criminal
threat: “that the intended threat under the circumstances was sufficient to
cause a reasonable person to be in sustained fear.” (People v. Chandler (2014)
60 Cal.4th 508, 525 (Chandler); see use notes for CALCRIM No. 460.)
In Chandler, the California Supreme Court held that, in order to
avoid criminalizing free speech, an objective element must be read into the
elements of attempting to make a criminal threat. (Chandler, supra,
60 Cal.4th at p. 525.) While the Supreme Court concluded the trial court in

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that case had erred by failing to include an objective element in its
instructions, it further concluded there was no prejudice to the defendant
because “defendant’s threats were sufficient under the circumstances to cause
a reasonable person to be in sustained fear—indeed, defendant did not argue
otherwise at trial—and no reasonable juror could have concluded otherwise.”
(Id. at pp. 525–526.) In that case, the defendant, a neighbor of the victims,
made explicit, face-to-face threats to kill the victims while holding a golf club.
(Id. at p. 526.)
The Supreme Court distinguished People v. Jackson (2009)
178 Cal.App.4th 590, on which Davis relies, on the ground the facts in
Jackson did not support a finding of an objective, sustained fear by the
victims. (Chandler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 526.) In Jackson, the Court of
Appeal reversed the defendant’s conviction for attempting to make a criminal
threat because “the jury might have concluded, since [the victims] were safely
inside the house with a telephone to call the police while defendant sat out
front, or since defendant’s threats were so outlandish, that defendant’s
statements could not reasonably have caused the victims to suffer sustained
fear.” (Jackson, supra, at p. 600.)
Here, Davis’s threats to M.C. and her family were “sufficient
under the circumstances to cause a reasonable person to be in sustained
fear . . . and no reasonable juror could have concluded otherwise.” (Chandler,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 526.) Since the beginning of their relationship, Davis
had been aggressive, angry, and pressured M.C. to stay in the relationship
through threats of suicide, self-harm, and blackmail. When M.C. did break up
with Davis for a period of time, he posted (or allowed someone else to post)
intimate photos of her online.

10
After M.C. told Davis she wanted to break up in March 2020, his
actions would “cause a reasonable person to be in sustained fear.” (Chandler,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 525.) For example, he threatened to shoot her family
and beat up her dad. Then Davis appeared at her family’s home in the middle
of the night, banging on and trying to enter through the back door. Late in
the evening of that day, Davis drove his vehicle aggressively behind the car
in which M.C. was riding with her father. M.C. and her father ran into their
house and locked the doors. Davis again banged on and kicked the door in the
back of the house, breaking parts of the frame.
The next day, Davis blocked M.C. from leaving a practice room at
school, threatening to kill himself. Throughout this period, M.C. feared for
her own life and the lives of her family members and continually tried to
deescalate the situation when Davis’s behavior escalated.
The following day, Davis showed up at M.C.’s place of
employment twice, and threatened to kill M.C.’s supervisor. M.C. believed
she needed to placate Davis to prevent him from shooting her or her
supervisor. Davis demanded M.C. leave with him, threatened to drag her out,
and grabbed her arm as she left with him.
Given Davis’s history of threats, violence, and appearing at
M.C.’s home, school, and place of employment uninvited, a reasonable person
would have been in sustained fear based on Davis’s actions and statements,
and no reasonable juror could have found otherwise. Therefore, Davis
suffered no prejudice from the trial court’s instructional error.
III.
UNANIMITY INSTRUCTION
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3500, as
follows: “The defendant is charged with violations of [Penal Code section] 422

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Criminal Threats in Counts 2 & 4 sometime during the period of March 5,
2020 to March 8, 2020. [¶] The People have presented evidence of more than
one act to prove that the defendant committed these offenses. You must not
find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved
that the defendant committed at least one of these acts and you all agree on
which act he committed.” Davis argues a juror could have understood the
unanimity instruction to mean that if all 12 jurors unanimously agreed as to
count 4 that Davis threatened to kill J.C., then the jury could convict Davis
on count 2 of threatening M.C. if only 7 out of 12 jurors believed he had done
so, thereby violating his constitutional right to be convicted by a unanimous
jury.3
The Attorney General contends Davis forfeited this argument by
failing to object to the language of the instruction in the trial court. Because
the court instructed the jury with the appropriate CALCRIM instruction,
Davis was required to make a timely objection or request the court modify or
clarify the instruction, which he did not do. (See People v. Hillhouse (2002)
27 Cal.4th 469, 503.) Therefore, any argument was forfeited. However, to
forestall the inevitable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we will
address the issue on its merits. (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83,
146.)
“We review a claim of instructional error de novo. [Citation.] The
challenged instruction is considered ‘in the context of the instructions as a
whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable

3 Davis does not argue the court erred by failing to instruct the
jury it must unanimously agree on which of the threats made to M.C.
constituted the attempt to make a criminal threat in count 2.

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likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326.) Jurors are presumed
to understand and follow the instructions. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th
1067, 1148; People v. Holt (1977) 15 Cal.4th 619, 662.)
During closing arguments, the prosecutor referenced threats
made to M.C. on March 5 (“I’m going to kill you and your family”; “I’m going
to shoot you”; “I am going to beat up your dad”) and on March 8 (“I am going
to drag your ass to the car”).
The court correctly instructed the jury with the elements of the
crime of making a criminal threat using CALCRIM No. 1300. (See § 422.) The
court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3515: “Each of the counts
charged in this case is a separate crime. You must consider each count
separately and return a separate verdict for each one.”
In light of the entirety of the instructions, we do not believe it is
reasonably possible any juror could have understood the unanimity
instruction to mean that, if the jury unanimously agreed that Davis
threatened J.C., then it could convict Davis of threatening M.C. without a
unanimous verdict. “We presume that jurors are intelligent and capable of
correctly understanding, correlating, applying, and following the court’s
instructions.” (People v. Acosta (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 108, 119.)
IV.
THE SENTENCE ON EITHER COUNT 3 OR COUNT 4 MUST BE STAYED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 654
Davis argues, and the Attorney General agrees, that the trial
court must stay the execution of sentence on either count 3 or count 4,
because the course of criminal conduct in those two counts was indivisible.

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When a defendant’s single course of conduct violates two criminal
statutes, the defendant may be convicted of both crimes, but may only be
sentenced on one. (§ 654; People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 358–359.)
Here, Davis’s threat to kill J.C. while he was trying to call the police was both
an act dissuading a witness by force or threat (count 3) and a criminal threat
(count 4).
On remand, the trial court shall stay the sentence on either
count 3 or count 4.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
for resentencing. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of
judgment and to forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation.

BANCROFT, J.*

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

GOODING, J.

* Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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