CourtListener 10735079•Lin v. A-Z Essential Pharmaceutical CA2/7
Lin v. A-Z Essential Pharmaceutical CA2/7
CourtListener 10735079Calctapp12.11.2025
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 11/12/25 Lin v. A-Z Essential Pharmaceutical CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
BRUCE Y. LIN et al., B344056
Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV20812)
v.
A-Z ESSENTIAL
PHARMACEUTICAL INC., et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Maureen Duffy-Lewis, Judge. Reversed
with directions.
Jung Law and Karen E. Jung for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Bruce Y. Lin and Po-Chia “Rebecca” Lin appeal from a
postjudgment order denying their motion for contractual attorney
fees and costs. The Lins sued A-Z Essentials Pharmaceutical
Inc., Essential Pharmaceutical Corp., and Mohamad Moussaoui
(collectively, A-Z) in connection with the sale of their business to
A-Z. The parties settled on the day of trial. We conclude the Lins
are entitled to recover their attorney fees and costs as the
prevailing parties because they obtained a net monetary recovery
under the parties’ stipulated judgment, and the stipulated
judgment’s silence on the issue of attorney fees and costs does not
preclude such an award.1 Accordingly, we reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2021, the Lins sold their pharmaceutical manufacturing
business and related real property to A-Z. The parties entered
into two agreements, one of which contained an attorney fees
provision. The Agreement of Purchase and Sale of Real Property
(the Real Property Agreement) stated: “In the event of the
bringing of any action or suit by Seller, and/or Buyer against
another party hereunder by reason of any breach of any of the
covenants, agreements or provisions on the part of the other
party arising out of this Agreement, then in that event the
prevailing party shall be entitled to have and recover from the
other party all costs and expenses of the action or suit, including
1 A-Z did not file a brief. We thus decide this appeal “on the
record, the opening brief, and any oral argument by the
appellant.” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2).)
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reasonable out of-pocket attorneys’ fees. Any such attorneys’ fees
and other expenses incurred by either party in enforcing a
judgment in its favor under this Agreement shall be recoverable
separately from and in addition to any other amount included in
such judgment, and such attorneys’ fees obligation is intended to
be severable from the other provisions of this Agreement and to
survive and not be merged into any such judgment.” The second
agreement, the Stock Purchase Agreement, did not contain an
attorney fees provision.
In 2022, the Lins sued A-Z for breach of contract, quantum
meruit, open book account, account stated, intentional
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, concealment,
conversion, unjust enrichment, and financial elder abuse. The
Lins alleged A-Z failed to pay the purchase price in full and failed
to compensate the Lins for training A-Z’s new team to run the
business. In their prayer for relief, the Lins sought attorney fees
and costs of suit.
A-Z filed a cross-complaint. The operative cross-complaint
alleged breach of both contracts, breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, specific performance, fraud, and
declaratory relief. The cross-complaint further alleged A-Z was
entitled to attorney fees pursuant to the Real Property
Agreement and prayed for “all costs of suit incurred herein.”
The parties settled on the first day of trial. The resulting
stipulated judgment “in favor of Plaintiffs and against
Defendants” stated the Lins “shall recover the total sum of
$500,000.00” and A-Z “shall take nothing.” The judgment was
silent on the issue of attorney fees or costs.
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The Lins thereafter filed a memorandum of costs and
sought $163,609.35 in attorney fees. The Lins explained the Real
Property Agreement’s attorney fees provision governed the entire
transaction because the Real Property Agreement stated it was
contingent on the sale of the business pursuant to the Stock
Purchase Agreement. The Lins argued, citing California
Supreme Court authority, that they could recover contractual
attorney fees and costs where a settlement agreement or
stipulated judgment is silent on the issue and there is no express
or implied waiver of fees and costs. The Lins stated they sought
90 percent of the total fees incurred because that is the portion of
fees related to asserting and defending against the breach of
contract claims. The Lins attributed the remaining attorney time
to the conversion, financial elder abuse, and fraud causes of
action.
A-Z opposed, asserting the memorandum of costs should be
stricken in its entirety on the ground there was no prevailing
party pursuant to the stipulated judgment. A-Z also argued the
Lins’ motion for attorney fees should be denied because “the case
was settled in its entirety.” A-Z further stated it should be
awarded attorney fees and costs since it filed a cross-complaint
against the Lins and fees should not be awarded “unilaterally.”
A-Z did not dispute that the Lins would be entitled to fees under
the Real Property Agreement, or that it governed the whole
transaction. Nor did A-Z challenge the amount of fees the Lins
sought to recover or their apportionment of 90 percent of their
attorney fees to the breach of contract causes of action.
The court denied the motion for attorney fees and costs. It
did not address the Lins’ case law authority, and instead it ruled
that, “Usually where there is a judgment in the case, after the
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amount of the judgment, there appears the words ‘plus fees and
costs’ with a blank space for the amount to be entered after
motions. [¶] Without the words ‘fees and costs’ in the stipulated
judgment, ‘fees and costs’ are not part of the stipulated
judgment.”
The Lins timely appealed from the post-judgment order.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review and Governing Law
“[W]e review the determination of the legal basis for an
award of attorney fees de novo as a question of law.”
(Blackburn v. Charnley (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 758, 767; accord,
Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC (2017)
3 Cal.5th 744, 751.)
“Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a
prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in
any action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b).)
Attorney fees when authorized by contract may be recovered as
an item of cost. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(A).)
“‘Prevailing party’ includes the party with a net monetary
recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a
defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any
relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not
recover any relief against that defendant. If any party recovers
other than monetary relief and in situations other than as
specified, the ‘prevailing party’ shall be as determined by the
court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion,
may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs
between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to
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rules adopted under Section 1034.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032,
subdivision (a)(4).)
The California Supreme Court in DeSaulles v. Community
Hospital of Monterey Peninsula (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1140, 1144
(DeSaulles) held that when a defendant pays money to a plaintiff
in order to settle a case, the plaintiff obtains a “net monetary
recovery” pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 1032,
subdivision (a)(4), and a dismissal pursuant to such a settlement
is not a dismissal in the defendant’s favor for purposes of a
prevailing party determination. Thus, “‘[a]s between the parties
thereto and for purposes of enforcement of settlement
agreements, a compromise agreement contemplating payment by
defendant and dismissal of the action by plaintiff is the legal
equivalent of a judgment in plaintiff’s favor.’” (DeSaulles, at
p. 1155, quoting Goodstein v. Bank of San Pedro (1994)
27 Cal.App.4th 899, 907.)
DeSaulles cited Rapp v. Spring Valley Gold Co. (1888)
74 Cal. 532 (Rapp), a case where a judgment was entered in favor
of plaintiffs pursuant to stipulation. The stipulation was silent
as to statutory attorney fees. The defendants argued that based
on the stipulation, which merely set forth amounts due to the
plaintiffs from defendants, “judgment should be entered for the
amount due to the plaintiffs, and by implication for nothing else,
and that the attorney’s fee was not a part of the amount due to
the plaintiffs.” (Rapp, at p. 533.) Rapp rejected the defendants’
argument: “This argument proves too much. It would exclude a
judgment for costs as well as for attorney’s fees. Costs are not a
part of the amount due to the plaintiffs; but it is not disputed by
appellants that the judgment for costs was proper. The
attorney’s fee in this kind of case is not, strictly speaking, part of
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the costs. . . . But it was properly allowed for the same reason
that costs were allowed, viz., that it was a necessary incident of
the judgment stipulated for, and was not expressly, or by
necessary implication, excluded by the stipulation.” (Ibid.)
Similarly, the high court held in Folsom v. Butte County
Assn. of Governments (1982) 32 Cal.3d 668, 671 (Folsom) that a
settlement agreement that was silent as to costs and attorney
fees “does not create a bar to either a cost bill or a motion
pursuant to [Code Civ. Proc.,] section 1021.5.”2 (Id. at p. 671.)
Folsom reasoned: “Compromise agreements are, of course,
‘governed by the legal principles applicable to contracts
generally.’ [Citation.] They ‘regulate and settle only such
matters and differences as appear clearly to be comprehended in
them by the intention of the parties and the necessary
consequences thereof, and do not extend to matters which the
parties never intended to include therein, although existing at
the time.’ [Citations.] Thus they ordinarily conclude all matters
put in issue by the pleadings—that is, questions that otherwise
would have been resolved at trial. [Citation.] They do not,
however (absent affirmative agreement of the parties), conclude
matters incident to the judgment that were no part of the cause
of the action.” (Id. at p. 677.) Folsom held the right to costs was
statutory, and costs were allowed “‘solely as an incident of the
judgment’” and “‘constitute no part of a judgment at the moment
of its rendition.’” (Ibid.) Citing Rapp, the Folsom court applied
the same reasoning “to attorney fees that are authorized solely by
2 Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 authorizes the
award of attorney fees to a prevailing party “in any action which
has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting
the public interest.”
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statute and hence are not a part of the cause of action. They are
incidents to the cause, properly awarded after entry of a
stipulated judgment, unless expressly or by necessary implication
excluded by the stipulation.” (Id. at p. 678.)
Lanyi v. Goldblum (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 181, 187 (Lanyi)
extended the Folsom analysis, which addressed attorney fees
allowed by statute, to contractual attorney fees authorized under
Civil Code section 1717 because those fees “could be said to derive
from the underlying contract as well as from statute, since it
takes a contractual attorney fee provision to invoke the
section 1717 right.”3 (Lanyi, at p. 187.) Just as the statutory fee
provisions discussed in Folsom were incident to the judgment,
Lanyi explained contractual attorney fees were likewise not a
part of the cause of action: “An action on a contract with an
attorney fee provision, though frequently including a pleaded
request for reasonable attorney fees as provided for in the
contract itself, has not been treated by the courts as an action
where the fees must be pleaded and proved at trial. Rather, the
plaintiff may elect to have the court determine the fees under
section 1717 as costs.” (Ibid.)
3 Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (a), provides: “In any
action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that
attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that
contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the
prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the
party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party
specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable
attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.”
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Subsequent cases confirm a prevailing party may seek
attorney fees or costs after a settlement agreement or stipulated
judgment is entered that is silent on the issue. (See DeSaulles,
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1154; Engle v. Copenbarger &
Copenbarger, LLP (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 165, 170 [a prevailing
party is entitled to costs and, if authorized by statute or contract,
attorney fees where she accepted a § 998 offer that was silent on
costs and fees]; On-Line Power, Inc. v. Mazur (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1084 [“when a section 998 offer is silent
about attorney’s fees and costs, it cannot reasonably be
interpreted to exclude their recovery and the prevailing party
may seek them”]; Ritzenthaler v. Fireside Thrift Co. (2001)
93 Cal.App.4th 986, 991 [“A compromise agreement that
expressly settles ‘all damages and injunctive claims,’ but nothing
more, cannot reasonably be interpreted as including a settlement
of the plaintiffs’ right to recover attorney fees under Civil Code
section 1717.”].)
B. The Lins Were Entitled to Attorney Fees and Costs
The Lins request reversal of the trial court’s order denying
their motion for attorney fees and costs. They argue they were
the prevailing parties within the meaning of Code of Civil
Procedure section 1032 and Civil Code section 1717 and that they
are entitled to attorney fees and costs. We agree.
First, the Lins were entitled to seek attorney fees and costs
after entry of the stipulated judgment in their favor. The trial
court ruled that the Lins could not seek attorney fees and costs if
the stipulated judgment did not expressly provide for fees and
costs. The California Supreme Court has rejected this argument.
In Rapp, it held attorney fees were proper under a stipulation
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that was silent on the issue of attorney fees, and did not
expressly, or by necessary implication, exclude fees. In Folsom, it
similarly held a settlement agreement silent as to attorney fees
and costs “does not create a bar” to a statutory fee motion or a
memorandum of costs. (Folsom, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 671.)
Lanyi applied Folsom’s holding to fee motions based on contract,
such as in this case. (See Lanyi, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at p. 187.)
Just as in Rapp, Folsom and Lanyi, the stipulated judgment
between the Lins and A-Z was silent as to costs and fees. But
under the reasoning of those cases, that silence does not bar the
Lins from seeking attorney fees and costs after entry of the
stipulated judgment.4
Second, DeSaulles, supra, 62 Cal.4th at page 1144,
confirms the Lins are the prevailing party under Code of Civil
Procedure, section 1032, subdivision (a)(4), and are entitled to
reasonable attorney fees and costs. The Lins clearly obtained a
net monetary recovery under the parties’ stipulated judgment “in
favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants,” which awarded them
$500,000.00 while providing that A-Z “shall take nothing.”
Because the amount of the fees to be awarded to the Lins
should be decided by the trial court in the first instance, we
reverse and remand for that purpose.
4 Rapp, Folsom, and Lanyi did not address a stipulated
judgment like the one entered in this case, but these cases and
their reasoning remain persuasive. (Cf. DeSaulles, supra,
62 Cal.4th at p. 1154 [“The cases make clear that if a settlement
agreement, compromise offer pursuant to [Code of Civil
Procedure] section 998, or stipulated judgment is silent on the
matter of costs, the plaintiff is not barred from seeking costs.”].)
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DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying the Lins’ motion for
attorney fees and costs is reversed. The matter is remanded to
the trial court with directions to vacate its order denying the
Lins’ motion and enter a new order granting the motion in which
the court shall determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees
and costs to be awarded to the Lins based upon the evidence
before the court and after hearing from the parties. The Lins
may recover their costs on appeal.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J. FEUER, J.
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