People v. Picazo CA6

CourtListener 10735069Calctapp12.11.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 11/12/25 P. v. Picazo CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H053161
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 24CR006481)

v.

ALEJANDRO PACHECO PICAZO,

Defendant and Appellant.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant Alejandro Pacheco Picazo pleaded no
contest to vandalism and violating a criminal protective order. The trial court sentenced
Picazo to 16 months in county jail and imposed various fines and fees.
On appeal, Picazo’s appointed counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) that states the case and facts but raises no issues.
This court notified Picazo of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf
within 30 days. Picazo responded with a short handwritten note asking that his sentence
be reduced.
Pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th
106 (Kelly), we have carefully reviewed the entire record and have determined that there
are no arguable issues on appeal that would result in a disposition more favorable to
Picazo. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment with one modification ordered to
correct a clerical error.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
According to a probation officer’s presentence report, Picazo struck the garage
door at his parents’ home several times with a tire iron, causing damage. Days later,
police arrested Picazo at his parents’ house after responding to a reported battery. At the
time of the latter incident, Picazo was subject to a court order to stay away from his
sister, who was present at the home.
The prosecution charged Picazo by complaint with two counts: felony vandalism
of property worth more than $400 (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1))1; and misdemeanor
violation of a criminal protective order (§ 166, subd. (c)(1)). Picazo was initially found
incompetent to stand trial before his competency was declared restored and proceedings
were reinstated. Picazo pleaded no contest to both counts pursuant to a plea agreement,
along with pleading no contest to misdemeanor violating a domestic violence protective
order (§ 166, subd. (c)(4)) in another case. As part of the plea agreement, Picazo agreed
to waive “the right to appeal my conviction, the judgment, and any other orders
previously issued by this court.” Picazo confirmed this waiver in a colloquy with the trial
court.
The trial court sentenced Picazo to the negotiated term of 16 months in addition to
imposing various fines and fees. Picazo timely appealed; however, he did not obtain a
certificate of probable cause from the trial court.
II. DISCUSSION
Picazo waived his right to appeal from the judgment. “It is well settled that an
express waiver of the right to appeal in a negotiated plea agreement is valid and
enforceable, provided that the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. [Citations.]”
(People v. Orellana (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 319, 325.) In addition, Picazo did not obtain
a certificate of probable cause from the trial court. Section 1237.5 states that “[n]o

1
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere” except where the defendant has filed a statement with the trial
court “showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the
legality of the proceedings” and “[t]he trial court has executed and filed a certificate of
probable cause for such appeal with the clerk of the court.”
In People v. Becerra (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 178 (Becerra), this court dismissed an
appeal based on a substantively identical waiver to that in the instant case. The defendant
in Becerra pleaded no contest to two offenses pursuant to a plea agreement and expressly
waived his appellate rights. (Id. at pp. 181, 183.) Although he did not obtain a certificate
of probable cause, Becerra appealed. He contended that the trial court erred in
calculating his custody credits. (Id. at p. 182.) This court noted that the waiver
“expressly encompasses an appeal from the ‘judgment’ or any collateral attack on the
‘sentence,’ ” as well as “ ‘all rights regarding state and federal writs and appeals.’ ” (Id.
at p. 189.) This court held Becerra’s claim was barred because it fell within the scope of
this appellate waiver, rejecting Becerra’s argument that the claim was cognizable because
he could not knowingly and intelligently waive an alleged error that had not yet occurred.
(Id. at p. 191.) This court then concluded that because the appellate waiver was
contained in Becerra’s plea agreement, “his contention concerning the enforceability of
the appellate waiver constitutes an attack on the plea’s validity” that required a certificate
of probable cause. (Id. at p. 192.)
In the instant case, this court ordered Picazo to show cause why the appeal should
not be dismissed. In response, Picazo acknowledges that he did not obtain a certificate of
probable cause and that “it appears that [his] waiver of his statutory and constitutional
rights and entry of his no contest pleas . . . were knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and
that he knowingly waived his right to appeal from his stipulated sentence and any orders
made by the court through . . . the date when the waiver was executed.” However, Picazo
asserts that this waiver should not be interpreted to encompass any sentencing errors

3
occurring after his waiver was executed. If the waiver is interpreted to cover such
sentencing errors, he contends this term is unenforceable as unconscionable. He thus
urges this court to conduct an “extremely limited” review of the record to determine if
any sentencing errors occurred of which Picazo was unaware when he executed his
waiver of appellate rights.
Pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, and Kelly, supra, 40 Cal.4th 106, we
have carefully reviewed the entire record. As in Becerra, Picazo waived “all rights
regarding state and federal writs and appeals,” including “the right to appeal my
conviction, the judgment, and any other orders previously issued by this court.” Without
a certificate of probable cause, we cannot review challenges to the validity of the plea,
including the enforceability of the appellate waiver. (§ 1237.5; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.304(b); Becerra, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 192; but see § 1016.8, subd. (a)(4)
[“A plea bargain that requires a defendant to generally waive unknown future benefits of
legislative enactments, initiatives, appellate decisions, or other changes in the law that
may occur after the date of the plea is not knowing and intelligent”].)
Neither the waiver nor the omission of a certificate of probable cause, however,
wholly forecloses Picazo’s right to our independent review of the record under Wende. A
certificate of probable cause is not required to appeal “after a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere . . . on grounds that do not affect the validity of the plea or admission . . . .”
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(2).) Thus, “a certificate of probable cause is not
required for the issue of whether the defendant’s appellate claim falls within the scope of
an appellate waiver.” (Becerra, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 188.) We have reviewed the
record for arguable issues that would exceed the scope of the waiver and therefore would
be cognizable despite the waiver. (Ibid.)
We have identified one issue. Government Code section 70373 requires an
assessment of $30 to be imposed for each misdemeanor or felony conviction. Pursuant to
this statute, the trial court ordered Picazo to pay a $60 assessment based on his plea to

4
two offenses. A minute order from the sentencing hearing correctly reflects the $60
assessment, but the abstract of judgment mistakenly lists the amount of this assessment as
$80. Because this matter involves a clerical error, we deem it reviewable and correctable
on appeal, as courts may correct clerical errors at any time. (See People v. Mitchell
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) We will order this error in the abstract of judgment
corrected. Otherwise, we conclude that there is no arguable issue that would exceed the
scope of the waiver and therefore would be cognizable despite the waiver.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is ordered modified to reflect that Picazo’s Government Code
section 70373 assessment is in the amount of $60. The trial court is directed to prepare
an amended abstract of judgment reflecting the judgment as modified. The amended
abstract of judgment shall be forwarded to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

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_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

________________________________
Danner, J.

________________________________
Bromberg, J.

H053161 People v. Picazo

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