CourtListener 10735015•People v. Alhasan CA4/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 11/12/25 P. v. Alhasan CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063365
v. (Super. Ct. No. 18NF3018)
AMER SALEH ALHASAN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Kimberly Menninger, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with directions.
Joanna McKim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and James H. Flaherty III, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Amer Saleh Alhasan of first degree murder. We
conclude the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of his prior
uncharged acts of domestic violence, and substantial evidence supports the
jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation. We therefore affirm the
judgment but remand the matter so the court may correct a clerical error in
the abstract of judgment.
FACTS
I.
THE KILLING
Alhasan began dating Tiyanie “Pip” Ly, a single mother of three
young children, in summer 2018. They argued often, and Pip suspected
Alhasan was cheating on her. As it turns out, Alhasan was engaged to marry
another woman in Jordan. That woman did not know about Pip.
Alhasan was low on funds and having trouble paying his bills, so
he moved into his friend Steven’s apartment in July 2018. Pip sometimes
helped Alhasan with his expenses, but they often fought about money.
Late one Saturday night in October 2018, Pip visited Alhasan at
Steven’s apartment and told him she was pregnant with twins. The couple
woke up Steven to get his advice. Steven told them Alhasan would have a
hard time supporting children given his financial troubles, but it was Pip’s
decision about whether to keep the babies. Steven then went back to sleep.
Either later that night or the following night, at about 3:00 a.m.,
Alhasan pounded on Steven’s door and told him she “decided to keep them.”
Alhasan was sobbing and sounded “loud” and “scary.” Steven told him to
“man up” and went back to sleep.
Early Monday morning, at about 6:00 a.m., Steven peeked into
Alhasan’s room before leaving for work to see how he was doing. He saw
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Alhasan sleeping on the floor next to three large duffel bags. Pip was not
there.
Cell phone records show that less than an hour later, at about
6:45 a.m., Alhasan called Pip from nearby her home, and they spoke for about
40 minutes. At about 8:00 a.m., Alhasan used his phone to look up the “cost
[o]f abortion for twins.”
Alhasan strangled Pip to death later that morning, but the
evidence is conflicting as to the circumstances of her death.
According to Alhasan, after his call with Pip, he took some Xanax
and went to sleep. When he woke up, Pip was in his bedroom, and they began
to argue. Alhasan told her to leave, but Pip grabbed his testicles and penis
tightly and refused to let go. Thinking she might kill him, Alhasan reached
up, grabbed her around the neck with both hands, and strangled her until
she became unresponsive and slumped over. Alhasan panicked and tried to
administer CPR without success; he insists her subsequent death was an
accident.
By contrast, medical evidence indicates Pip died due to ligature
strangulation, likely from a belt.1 Further, her injuries suggest she was
strangled from behind, with the ligature pulled slightly upward.
A pathologist testified the strangling likely lasted at least two to
three minutes in order to be lethal. Alhasan admits he was aware from his
training as a surgical assistant that strangling a person for two to three
minutes would cause death.
1 A pathologist testified that because Pip’s hyoid bone was still
intact, her killer likely did not kill her by strangling her with his hands. Also,
two horizontal lines on her neck appeared consistent with a belt.
3
At about 8:50 a.m. that morning, Alhasan used his cell phone to
search, “Is fleeing the country the best way to get away with murder” and
“how long does it take till someone is considered missing.” He also Googled
“dumping a dead body” and then accessed a website entitled “Ten Ways to
Dispose of a Dead Body if You Really Need To.” That afternoon, he went to a
travel agency and used cash to buy a one-way flight to Jordan.
According to Alhasan, he returned home that evening, covered
Pip’s body in a blanket, and put it in his car. Later that night, he drove to an
alley, put Pip’s body inside a duffel bag, and dumped the bag in a dumpster.
He also abandoned Pip’s minivan (which had been parked outside Steven’s
apartment) in a Walmart parking lot.
Shortly after midnight, a homeless man found Pip’s body in the
dumpster, and his friend called 911. Authorities later arrested Alhasan in the
international terminal at Los Angeles International Airport.
II.
THE TRIAL
Alhasan was charged with first degree murder and related
aggravating factors. He pleaded not guilty.
The defense moved in limine to preclude the admission of
evidence concerning prior acts of domestic violence under Evidence Code2
section 1109. The prosecutor explained she wished to call Alhasan’s ex-
girlfriend N.D. to testify about an incident in which Alhasan forcibly raped
and choked her by pulling on her necklace. The trial court found any
testimony about the rape would be “extremely prejudicial,” but decided N.D.
could testify about the rest following a section 402 hearing.
2 All further undesignated statutory references are to this code.
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Before N.D.’s testimony, the trial court read CALCRIM 852A to
the jury, advising that they may, but are not required to, conclude from
evidence of uncharged domestic violence that the defendant was disposed or
inclined to commit domestic violence and thus was likely to commit an
offense charged in this case.
N.D. testified that she dated Alhasan on and off from about 2012
to 2014, she was fearful of him throughout their relationship, and he became
aggressive whenever she tried to break up with him. After one such
attempted breakup, Alhasan appeared in her workplace parking lot as she
was leaving work, pushed her into the car’s passenger seat, demanded to
know why she wanted to break up, and drove them on the freeway. He then
cursed at her in Arabic and repeatedly spit on her. They stopped at a
restaurant, and N.D. tried to walk away. Alhasan grabbed N.D. by the
necklace, placing his fist tightly against her neck and under her chin, which
restricted her airflow for a minute or two. He then let go and ran off.
N.D. also testified about another incident in which Alhasan
shoved her shoulders to stop her from getting in a car, causing her to fall to
the ground. He then picked her up and carried her to her parents’ car against
her will.
The jury found Alhasan guilty of first degree murder and found
the aggravating factors true. The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life
in state prison and ordered him to pay $670 in various fees and fines.3 The
court then vacated those fees and fines based on Alhasan’s inability to pay.
3 Specifically, the trial court ordered a $30 criminal conviction
assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), a $40 court operations assessment (Pen.
Code, § 1465.8), a $300 restitution fine (id., § 1202.4), and a $300 parole
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DISCUSSION
I.
THE TRIAL COURT PERMISSIBLY ADMITTED N.D.’S TESTIMONY
We see no error in the trial court’s decision to admit N.D.’s
testimony about Alhasan’s prior domestic violence against her. This is “a
criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving
domestic violence,” so propensity evidence of prior domestic violence is
admissible “if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.” (§
1109, subd. (a)(1).) “Section 1109 . . . supplants the usual rule of evidence
that evidence of past conduct is not admissible to prove a defendant’s conduct
on a specified occasion.” (People v. Hoover (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1026.)
“We review a challenge to a trial court’s decision to admit such evidence for
abuse of discretion.” (People v. Johnson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 520, 531.)
Alhasan asserts N.D.’s testimony about his pattern of aggressive
behavior went beyond the scope of the trial court’s evidentiary ruling. We
read the record differently. The court ordered that N.D. could testify to
everything except the rape, which it found would be “extremely prejudicial,”
and N.D. did just that.
In any event, N.D.’s testimony is admissible under sections 1109
and 352. Evidence that Alhasan abducted his ex-girlfriend and strangled her
with her necklace during an argument was highly probative because this case
also involved a strangling, with Alhasan claiming the death was some sort of
accident. The probative value of this evidence was not “substantially
outweighed” by any “substantial danger of undue prejudice.” (§ 352.) The trial
revocation restitution fine (id., § 1202.45), all of which it then vacated due to
Alhasan’s inability to pay.
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court adequately sanitized the evidence by precluding N.D. from testifying
that Alhasan raped her.
Finally, any error was harmless: the testimony took up a
relatively small portion of a lengthy trial, the prosecution’s case against
Alhasan was exceptionally strong, and the court gave a limiting instruction,
which the jury is presumed to have followed.
II.
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE JURY’S FINDING OF
PREMEDITATION AND DELIBERATION
Alhasan next claims the evidence was insufficient to support the
jury’s finding that he acted with premeditation and deliberation. (See Pen.
Code, § 189, subd. (a) [first degree murder includes any killing that is
“willful, deliberate, and premeditated”].) Again, we are not persuaded.
“‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial
evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—
from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. [Citation.] . . . We presume in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer from the
evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s
findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’”
(People v. D’Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 293.)
“‘In the context of first degree murder, “‘premeditated’ means
‘considered beforehand,’ and ‘deliberate’ means ‘formed or arrived at or
determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of
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considerations for and against the proposed course of action.’”’” (People v.
Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1216.) The key question is not the duration
but rather the extent of the defendant’s reflection. (Ibid.) In other words, does
the evidence support an inference that the killing was the result of
preexisting reflection, rather than unconsidered or rash impulse? (Ibid.)
“We normally consider three kinds of evidence to determine
whether a finding of premeditation and deliberation is adequately
supported—preexisting motive, planning activity, and manner of killing—but
‘[t]hese factors need not be present in any particular combination to find
substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation.’” (People v. Jennings
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 645.)
Applying those standards here, we conclude there is substantial
evidence Alhasan killed Pip with premeditation and deliberation.
First, Alhasan had a demonstrable motive to kill Pip: he had
significant money problems, she told him she was pregnant with twins, he
was upset she decided not to have an abortion, and he was engaged to a
woman in Jordan who did not know about Pip.
Second, there was evidence of planning. Medical evidence
suggested Alhasan strangled Pip with a belt or other ligature. His selection
and procurement of a murder weapon supports an inference of planning (see
People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 471), and the jury was entitled to draw
the reasonable inference that he grabbed a belt for the specific purpose of
choking Pip to death.
Third, the manner of killing supports premeditation and
deliberation. Medical evidence indicates Alhasan strangled Pip from behind;
8
he was nearly twice her size4 and was physically positioned to take advantage
of that size disparity. He admittedly knew he needed to strangle her for at
least two to three minutes to cause permanent brain damage and death.
Collectively, this evidence suggests this was not an excited, rushed, or
thoughtless act, but rather that Alhasan had ample time to consider his
actions before Pip died.
III.
THE ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT MUST BE CORRECTED
Alhasan’s final argument concerns the abstract of judgment,
which he asserts does not reflect the trial court’s orders at sentencing. As
noted, the court imposed $670 in fees and fines against Alhasan, which it
then “vacated finding no ability to pay.” The abstract of judgment, however,
imposes those vacated fees and fines.
The Attorney General has no objection to modifying the abstract
of judgment to reflect that the fees and fines are vacated. We therefore
remand the matter so that the modification can be made. (See People v. Baker
(2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1109 [court has inherent power to correct clerical
errors in abstract of judgment].)
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to allow the trial court to amend the
abstract of judgment to reflect that the $30 criminal conviction assessment
(Gov. Code, § 70373), the $40 court operations assessment (Pen. Code, §
1465.8), the $300 restitution fine (id., § 1202.4), and the $300 parole
revocation restitution fine (id., § 1202.45), were vacated. The court is directed
4 Alhasan was 6’1” tall and about 220 pounds, whereas Pip was
5’4” tall and 126 pounds.
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to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.
SCOTT, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
GOODING, J.
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