CourtListener 10734167•People v. Cabrera CA5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 11/7/25 P. v. Cabrera CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F088474
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. VCF260829A)
v.
ADRIAN ESPINOZA CABRERA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Nathan G.
Leedy, Judge.
Cynthia L. Barnes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill, and
John W. Powell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Franson, Acting P. J., Snauffer, J. and Fain, J.†
† Judge of the Fresno Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Defendant Adrian Espinoza Cabrera appeals from the denial of his motion under
Penal Code1 sections 1018 and 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) to vacate his 2014 plea of no
contest to dissuading a witness, loansharking, extortion, inducing a minor to commit a
felony, and misdemeanor making criminal threats. Cabrera’s motion asserted his plea
was “legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging [his] ability to meaningfully
understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse
immigration consequences of [the] conviction or sentence.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).)
The trial court denied the motion, concluding Cabrera failed to prove that he did
not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his plea. Cabrera’s
uncorroborated declaration about his lack of understanding is directly contradicted by the
record of his change of plea hearing. Cabrera’s attorney informed the court that he had
explained to Cabrera “that some of his charges will result in deportation proceedings
being initiated and removal from the U.S.” Shortly thereafter, Cabrera acknowledged his
understanding of the consequences after being given a section 1016.5 advisement that, if
he was not a citizen, his “plea of guilty or no contest will result in [his] being deported
from the United States.” His attorney later confirmed he had sufficient time to discuss
the case and its ramifications with Cabrera and they “had many discussions on the
options available and the potential consequences, and he’s fully aware of all that.”
As required by decisions of our Supreme Court, we have conducted an
independent review to determine whether Cabrera established the requisite error in his
understanding and prejudice from that error. (People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311,
319–320 (Espinoza); People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 526 (Vivar).) Based on that
independent review of the totality of the circumstances presented in the cold record, we
find Cabrera’s assertion that he “did not understand the immigration consequences of
[his] plea would be deportation” is not credible. Accordingly, we conclude Cabrera has
1 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2.
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not meaningfully
understand the adverse immigration consequences of his plea. (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).)
We therefore affirm the order denying Cabrera’s motion to withdraw his plea.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Personal Details
Cabrera was born in Mexico in March 1973. He is a Mexican citizen and, at the
time of his offense and sentencing, was a lawful permanent resident of the United States.
His wife (Sandra) and a younger brother (Gustavo) were codefendants in his criminal
case. The record also shows he had a son who was 14 years old in October 2011.
Cabrera’s May 2024 declaration in support of his motion to withdraw his plea
provides few personal details regarding his family and nothing about his ties to the
community. The declaration asserted: “I understood there was a possible deportation but
that it was not certain that I would be removed because I was a lawful permanent
resident, and I was here with my family and children, and since I had been here a long
time, I could stay.” The declaration did not identify his family members, did not state
how long he had been in the United States, and did not state when he became a lawful
permanent resident.
Cabrera’s motion included factual details that were not supported by the record.
For example, the motion asserted he immigrated to the United States in 1991, “grew up
picking crops in the fields from a very young age and has little to no education.” His
motion also referred to the defendants in People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998
(Camacho) and People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859 and stated that “both had
been here a long time, just like I had been living here in the United States since 1972
(over 50 years).” This factual assertion is obviously false because Cabrera was born in
Mexico in 1973 and could not have been living in the United States since 1972.
Moreover, we cannot rely on these statements because “factual assertions made by an
3.
attorney in a [motion or] reply are not evidence.” (People v. Carrillo (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 1, 7 (Carrillo).)2
The Criminal Charges
In 2016, we filed an opinion affirming the judgment against Cabrera. (People v.
Adrian Espinoza Cabrera (May 16, 2016, F069701) [nonpub. opn.] (Cabrera).)
Background information about the criminal charges against him is provided by the
following quote from that opinion:
“Case No. VCF247612
“On the evening of November 14, 2010, Cabrera and two armed
suspects knocked on the door of the house where J.H. and B.T. lived and
called out the name ‘Pedro.’ When J.H. pulled back the curtain on a
window to look outside, Cabrera struck him on the forehead with the butt of
a shotgun through the window screen. Cabrera then told J.H., ‘Come out.
I’m go[ing to] kill you and your whole family.’ While J.H. ran to the
kitchen to get a knife, Cabrera broke open the front door. B.T. told
Cabrera, ‘Please[,] I have my babies.’ The two other suspects then broke
the front window and Cabrera fled with them in a car.
“Cabrera was arrested on November 15, 2010.
“On July 15, 2011, J.H. was in custody on an unrelated matter when
he testified at Cabrera’s preliminary hearing. As J.H. was being transported
back to jail in the same van as Cabrera, Cabrera told J.H. that he was going
to have J.H.’s wife raped and his family killed if J.H. continued with his
testimony. Cabrera then sat down with two subjects and told them in
Spanish that he would pay them to harm J.H.
2 In March 2024, two months before Cabrera filed his declaration, this court
published Carrillo, which stated the “Supreme Court has advised that ‘[t]he more robust
and inclusive a record, the greater the opportunity for effective persuasion and
meaningful judicial review’ of a section 1473.7 motion.” (Carrillo, supra, 101
Cal.App.5th at p. 7, fn. 2.) Carrillo provided guidance to practitioners preparing
declarations and superior courts evaluating those declarations by setting forth a
nonexclusive list of 16 types of personal details that a robust declaration would include.
(Ibid.) Cabrera’s declaration ignored that guidance.
4.
“On December 19, 2011, the district attorney filed a first amended
information in case No. VCF247612, charging Cabrera with two counts of
dissuading a witness (counts 1, 2/§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1)); threatening a
witness (counts 3, 4/§[]140, subd. (a)); making criminal threats (counts 5,
6/§ 422); misdemeanor vandalism (count 7/§ 594, subd. (a)); misdemeanor
cruelty to a child (counts 8, 9/§ 273a, subd. (b)); and battery (count 10/
§ 242).
“Case No. VCF260829A
“In 2009, Cabrera lent Leonel Herrera $4,000 to open a business and
charged him 10 percent interest per month, which translated to a monthly
interest-only payment of $400. The loan did not have an end date and
required a monthly interest payment until Herrera was able to pay off the
$4,000 principal in one lump sum.
“Around October 15, 2011, after having paid Cabrera approximately
$10,000 on the loan, Herrera stopped making the payments. Herrera and
his family then began receiving calls from Cabrera’s wife Sandra Cisneros,
his brother Gustavo Cabrera (Gustavo), and Cabrera’s fourteen-year-old
son demanding payment of the interest on the loan. Herrera took the calls
as threats because the callers were angry, he had seen Cabrera physically
assault people, and Cabrera knew Herrera’s family.
“On November 7 or 8, 2011, Herrera paid the $4,000 principal
amount to Cabrera’s son.
“Ramon and Elida Rodriguez obtained a $2,000 business loan from
Cabrera in September 2010, and also took over a $3,000 loan Cabrera had
made to one of their sons in June 2010. They paid Cabrera a total of $1,100
a month in interest on both loans. Ramon estimated that he had paid
$17,400 in interest on the loans.
“Cabrera also lent $3,000 to Juan Soriano in July 2006, at a rate that
began at seven percent interest per month and increased with time. In
February 2011, Cabrera threatened to kill Soriano after he stopped paying
interest on the loan.
“In March 2010, Cabrera lent Soriano’s son $3,000 at 12 percent
interest per month.
“In July 2007, Cabrera lent Alberto Soriano $2,000 at a monthly
interest rate of 12 percent. In January 2011, Cabrera lent Alberto an
additional $1,000 at 12 percent interest per month.
5.
“On January 2, 2014, the district attorney filed a first amended
information charging Cabrera with five counts of loansharking (counts 1, 2,
6, 8, 10/Civ. Code, § 1916-3, subd. (b)); four counts of extortion (counts 3,
4, 7, 12/§ 520); and one count of inducing a minor to commit a felony
(count 5/§ 653j, subd. (a)).
“Change of Plea and Sentencing
“On January 13, 2014, after the prosecutor amended count 5 in case
No. VCF247612 to allege a misdemeanor charge of making criminal
threats, Cabrera entered his no contest plea in both cases in exchange for a
stipulated five-year prison term, the dismissal of the remaining counts, and
the dismissal of an unrelated case.
“On March 25, 2014, the court granted Cabrera’s request to
substitute retained counsel.
“Around April 21, 2014, Cabrera’s new defense counsel filed a
motion to withdraw Cabrera’s plea, alleging the trial court failed to
‘properly obtain and find’ a factual basis for Cabrera’s pleas and that he
was not given adequate time to consider the plea offer.
“On May 13, 2014, the court denied Cabrera’s motion.
“On May 21, 2014, the court sentenced Cabrera to: the midterm of
five years on his inducing a minor to commit a felony conviction,
concurrent terms on his remaining felony convictions, and no time on his
misdemeanor convictions for making criminal threats and cruelty to a child.
“Cabrera’s appellate counsel … filed a brief which summarize[d] the
facts, with citations to the record, raise[d] no issues, and ask[ed] this court
to independently review the record. (People v. Wende [(1979)] 25 Cal.3d
436.) Cabrera [did not respond] to this court’s invitation to submit
additional briefing.” (Cabrera, supra, F069701.)
Outcome of Appeal
In Cabrera’s appeal of his conviction, we conducted an independent review of the
record and found no reasonably arguable factual or legal issues existed. (Cabrera, supra,
F069701.) As a result, we affirmed the judgment.
6.
The Plea Hearing
At the January 13, 2014 change of plea hearing, Cabrera was represented by
Gilbert Zavala, an attorney from Fresno, while Sandra and Gustavo were represented by
attorneys from Visalia. Deputy district attorney Sean Sangree represented the People.
The minute order from the hearing identifies Jose Torres was Cabrera’s Spanish language
interpreter.
At that hearing, the trial court, Zavala, and Sangree discussed the terms of the plea
bargain offered to Cabrera. The court summarized the sentence it intended to impose by
stating: “For purposes of today’s proceedings, [Cabrera] should know that his overall
commitment to prison would be five years.” The following exchange occurred:
“[SANGREE]: That’s correct.
“THE COURT: Anything else on [Cabrera]?
“[ZAVALA]: Your Honor, I have explained to [Cabrera] the
potential consequences—
“THE COURT: I will take a change of plea and advise him of his
consequences.
“[ZAVALA]: I would like to say this now so there won’t be any
issues tomorrow, that some of his charges will result in deportation
proceedings being initiated and removal from the U.S.
“THE COURT: Thank you. I appreciate that.”
During the trial court’s advisement to Cabrera of the consequences of the proposed
plea, the following exchange occurred:
“THE COURT: [Cabrera], if you are not a citizen of the United
States, your plea of guilty or no contest will result in your being deported
from the United States, excluded from admission to the United States, or
denied naturalization as a United States citizen. [¶] Do you understand
that?
“[CABRERA]: Yes.
7.
“THE COURT: [Zavala], although you recited for the record your
advisement to him, I’d like for you to affirm that you advised your client of
the immigration consequences of his change of plea.
“[ZAVALA]: I have, your Honor.”
After the trial court obtained Cabrera’s waiver of various rights, the court asked
Zavala if he “had sufficient time to discuss these cases and all their ramifications with
your client?” Zavala answered, “Yes, your Honor.”
“THE COURT: Have you discussed with [Cabrera] his rights,
defenses, and the possible consequences of his change of plea?
“[ZAVALA]: Yes, your Honor, at length. We’ve had many
discussions on the options available and the potential consequences, and
he’s fully aware of all that.
“THE COURT: Do you represent that in your judgment, your client
understands his rights?
“[ZAVALA]: Yes, he does.
“THE COURT: Do you consent to the change of plea and all
representations made here in open court by your client?
“[ZAVALA]: Yes, your Honor.”
The trial court proceeded to find a sufficient factual basis for the pleas and took
Cabrera’s no contest pleas. Specifically, in case No. VCF247612, Cabrera pleaded no
contest to dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1)) and misdemeanor making criminal
threats (§ 422). In case No. VCF260829A, he pleaded no contest to loansharking (Civ.
Code, § 1916-3, subd. (b)), extortion (§ 520), and inducing a minor to commit a felony
(§ 653j, subd. (a)).
In March 2014, the trial court received the report and recommendation of a
probation officer. On May 21, 2014, Cabrera was sentenced to five years in state prison
and given a total of 844 days of credit for actual time served and conduct credits.
8.
2024 Motion to Withdraw Plea
In March 2024, Cabrera filed a motion to withdraw his plea pursuant to
sections 1018 and 1473.7. The motion was supported by a declaration signed by Cabrera
on February 26, 2024 at McFarland, California.3 In April 2024, the trial court continued
the hearing to May 8, 2024.
The district attorney’s office filed an opposition to Cabrera’s motion on the day of
the hearing. The opposition argued “Cabrera’s declaration was self-serving and was not
credible, as he was advised he would be deported by the court and by his counsel.” The
motion was taken off calendar.
On May 13, 2024, Cabrera’s counsel refiled the motion to withdraw along with a
declaration signed by Cabrera that day at McFarland. The conclusions in the original and
refiled motions asked the trial court to find a prejudicial misunderstanding and to find the
“plea is legally invalid due to ineffective assistance of counsel.” The clerk’s transcript
does not contain a proof of service for the refiled motion or for the original motion.
Consequently, the record does not show the moving papers were served on Zavala,
Cabrera’s plea counsel, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 416.90.4
At the June 3, 2024 hearing on the motion, the trial court informed the attorneys
that it had read the motion, the opposition, and the appellate opinion affirming the
conviction. The court asked the attorney appearing on behalf of Cabrera if he had other
evidence or argument to present on the motion. The attorney replied, “No, submit on the
3 The Golden State Annex, a medium-security immigration detention facility, is
located in McFarland.
4 Subdivision (g) of section 1473.7 provides: “A court may only issue a specific
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of a motion brought under
paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) if the attorney found to be ineffective was given timely
advance notice of the motion hearing by the moving party or the prosecutor, pursuant to
[s]ection 416.90 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”
9.
pleadings, your Honor.” The deputy district attorney stated that, if there was no other
evidence, he did not see how the motion could be granted.
The trial court then described the admonishment given to Cabrera at the plea
hearing pursuant to section 1016.5 and stated it was “mindful that a [section] 1016.5
admonishment by the court is not a substitute for case-specific advice from counsel to a
defendant regarding immigration consequences, but this particular advisement from the
court is a little bit different than the typical [section] 1016.5 admonishment in that the
deportation consequence was framed as not just a possibility but a certainty.” The court
stated the law required that it be persuaded there was a genuine error and the only
evidence, Cabrera’s declaration, did not appear to be credible given the contrary evidence
in the record. The court mentioned the statements by Zavala on the record and the fact
Cabrera’s 2014 motion to withdraw his plea did not mention some of the claims raised in
the current declaration, such as not being able to understand his interpreter. The court
concluded the hearing by stating: “I don’t find that there is evidence amounting to a
preponderance standard that justifies granting this motion so the motion is respectfully
denied.” In August 2024, Cabrera appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
In 2016, the Legislature enacted section 1473.7 to make relief available “to certain
immigrants who accepted pleas without understanding the immigration-related
consequences of such decisions.” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 523, 528.)
Section 1473.7 provides in relevant part:
“(a) A person who is no longer in criminal custody may file a
motion to vacate a conviction or sentence [if]: [¶] (1) The conviction or
sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving
party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly
accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a
conviction or sentence. A finding of legal invalidity may, but need not,
include a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.”
10.
A. Eligibility Requirements
To be eligible to seek relief from a “legally invalid” conviction under
section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), a defendant must satisfy three statutory requirements.
First, a defendant must show he “is no longer in criminal custody” for the challenged
conviction. (§ 1473.7, subd. (a).) We find Cabrera has met this requirement because
more than a decade has passed since he was sentenced to a five-year prison term and
given credits totaling approximately two years and three months.
Second, a defendant must “establish that the conviction or sentence being
challenged is currently causing or has the potential to cause removal” or other adverse
immigration consequences. (§ 1473.7, subd. (e)(1); see People v. Gregor (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 147, 158.) Because Cabrera’s May 2024 declaration states he was not “put
into removal proceedings until recently” and was signed by him at McFarland, we find
his conviction has the potential of causing removal. Therefore, the second requirement
has been met.
Third, the motion must be timely under provisions of subdivision (b) of
section 1473.7. (See People v. Perez (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1008, 1016.)5 Based on
Cabrera’s statement that he had not been put into removal proceedings until recently and
the fact he was still at McFarland, we infer that, at the time his motion was filed, there
had been no “[n]otice that a final removal order has been issued against [him].”
(§ 1473.7, subd. (b)(2)(B).) Because both of the statute’s triggering events had not
5 Before January 1, 2019, it was accurate to state that a motion must be filed with
reasonable diligence once both of the two triggering events had occurred. (See People v.
Tapia (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 942, 949; People v. Morales (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 502,
505.) As explained in Perez, that standard was abrogated by the 2018 amendment of the
statute’s timeliness provision. (People v. Perez, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1013–1014;
see Stats. 2018, ch. 825, § 2.) Currently, a motion can be deemed untimely if and only if
the following conditions are satisfied: (1) both triggering events have occurred; (2) the
trial court finds the motion was not brought with reasonable diligence; and (3) the court
then affirmatively exercises its discretion and, based on the totality of the circumstances,
determines the motion was untimely.
11.
occurred, his motion must be deemed timely pursuant to section 1473.7,
subdivision (b)(1).
In summary, we conclude Cabrera has satisfied the eligibility requirements.
Therefore, he is entitled to have a court reach the merits of his motion and determine
whether his “conviction or sentence is legally invalid” pursuant to section 1473.7,
subdivision (a)(1).
B. Substantive Grounds for Relief
To obtain relief, an eligible “defendant must first show that he did not
meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his plea.” (Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 319.) The key to this element is “the mindset of the defendant and what
he or she understood—or didn’t understand—at the time the plea was taken.” (People v.
Mejia, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 866.) “[T]he inquiry into a defendant’s state of mind
may often involve the weighing of credibility and circumstantial evidence.” (Espinoza, at
p. 325.)
Second, “the defendant must show that his misunderstanding constituted
prejudicial error.” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319.) In this context, prejudice
means “a reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the
defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.”
(Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.) A reasonable probability is merely a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome; it does not mean more likely than not.
(People v. Rodriguez (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 301, 324.)
C. Standard of Review
Appellate courts conduct an independent review when assessing whether a
defendant has demonstrated the requisite misunderstanding and prejudice. (Espinoza,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319; Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 526.) When, as here, a trial
court’s factual findings are derived entirely from documents (i.e., a cold record), the trial
12.
court and appellate courts are in the same position and deference to the trial court’s
findings is unwarranted. (Vivar, at p. 528.) In such cases, the appellate court must
decide, based on its independent judgment, whether the facts establish the two elements
required by section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1). (See Espinoza, at p. 320.) The existence
of grounds for relief must be established “by a preponderance of the evidence.”
(§ 1473.7, subd. (e)(1); Vivar, at p. 517.)
II. CABRERA DID NOT PROVE AN ERROR IN HIS UNDERSTANDING
A fundamental question in this appeal is the credibility of the factual assertions in
Cabrera’s May 2024 declaration about his state of mind when he entered his plea. That
declaration described his state of mind by asserting (1) “I was never told I would be
deported”; (2) “I did not know that I was going to be removed from the United States
after I served my time in detention”; (3) “I understood that there was a possible
deportation but that it was not certain that I would be removed because I was lawful
permanent resident, and I was here with my family and children, and since I had been
here a long time, I could stay”; and (4) “I did not understand that the immigration
consequences of my plea would be deportation.” (Italics added.)
His declaration explained his misunderstanding by asserting he was pressured into
entering the plea; he was given only 15 minutes to enter the plea; Zavala, his plea
counsel, told him he was getting time served and to answer “yes” whenever Zavala
nodded his head; he could not understand his interpreter and only said “yes” when Zavala
nodded his head; and he “was not guilty of the things they said [he] was guilty [of].” The
declaration also asserted: “I have been translated this declaration from English to
Spanish and know the content thereof.”
Our analysis of credibility addresses particular statements, rather than the
credibility of the declaration as a whole. The first statement we consider is Cabrera’s
claim that he did not understand his interpreter. The trial court was unconvinced by that
13.
claim, in part, because it was not raised in Cabrera’s April 2014 motion to withdraw his
plea. The record in this appeal does not contain the April 2014 motion and the
supporting declarations. As a result, Cabrera has not shown the trial court erred in stating
Cabrera had not raised the claim about the interpreter in his original motion.
Consequently, we accept the court’s statement as an accurate description of the
April 2014 motion. Exercising our independent judgment as to the credibility of
Cabrera’s claim he did not understand his interpreter, we find that particular claim is not
credible under the totality of the circumstances.
This lack of credibility provides some support for the inference that other factual
assertions by Cabrera lack credibility, including his claim that “I was never told I would
be deported.” Our further evaluation of the credibility of this assertion, and the broader
question of whether Cabrera understood the immigration consequences of his plea,
considers the trial court’s statement to Cabrera that his plea of “no contest will result in
your being deported from the United States, excluded from admission to the United
States, or denied naturalization as a United States citizen.” (Italics added.) This oral
advisement satisfied the court’s obligation under section 1016.5, subdivision (a), which
provides: “Prior to acceptance of a plea of guilty … to any offense punishable as a crime
under state law, … the court shall administer the following advisement on the record to
the defendant: [¶] If you are not a citizen, you are hereby advised that conviction of the
offense for which you have been charged may have the consequences of deportation,
exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the
laws of the United States.” (Italics added.)
The weight we give this advisement is necessarily guided by the “well established
[principle] that the standard immigration advisement under section 1016.5 … does not
replace the case-specific advice of counsel.” (People v. Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th
950, 962, quoting Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 320 [“ ‘general advisement under
14.
section 1016.5’ does not establish meaningful understanding of immigration
consequences”]; see People v Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 896.)
Here, the trial court modified the standard advisement to state the plea “will result
in your being deported,” which informed Cabrera of mandatory consequences. We
recognize this more strongly worded advisement does not bar a defendant from proving
that he or she did not meaningfully understand the consequences of a plea. The
underlying rationale is that even strongly worded advisements do “not absolve defense
counsel of the duty to advise of immigration consequences.” (People v. Manzanilla
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 891, 906.) Consequently, “[e]ven where the [Tahl6] form says
that the defendant ‘will’ be deported, it does not substitute for the advice of counsel, and
it is not a categorical bar to relief.” (Ibid.; see People v. Rodriguez (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 995, 1003–1004 [defendant did not meaningfully understand immigration
consequences despite signing form that stated “ ‘this plea … will result in my
removal/deportation’ ”].) The same holds true when the advisement that deportation will
result is oral and when both a written and an oral advisement are given. (People v. Lopez
(2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 561, 577–578 [strongly worded Tahl form and oral advisement];
see Camacho, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1011, fn. 8 [even though defendant “was
advised that his plea ‘will result’ … in adverse immigration consequences,” he presented
sufficient evidence of his lack of understanding to warrant section 1473.7 relief].)
Based on the foregoing principles about advisements and the totality of the
circumstances test, we next consider the case-specific advice Cabrera received from
counsel. The transcript from the change of plea hearing shows that, before the trial court
gave Cabrera the modified section 1016.5 advisement, Zavala stated on the record that he
had advised Cabrera he would be deported from the United States. This statement and
6 In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, overruled on other grounds in Mills v. Mun. Court
for the San Diego Judicial Dist. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 291, 307.
15.
Zavala’s other statements about discussing the consequences of the plea with Cabrera are
credible because they are consistent with applicable law at that time. In Padilla v.
Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, the United States Supreme Court concluded the
Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to provide affirmative and competent advice
to noncitizen defendants regarding the potential immigration consequences of their
criminal cases. (Carrillo, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 17–18.) Before Padilla, the
Sixth Amendment had not been interpreted to impose an obligation on defense counsel to
affirmatively advise a defendant of the immigration consequences of a conviction.
(Carrillo, at p. 17.) Therefore, Zavala’s statement that he had explained to Cabrera “that
some of his charges will result in deportation proceedings being initiated and removal
from the U.S.” is credible because (1) it is consistent with the obligations imposed by
Padilla on defense counsel and (2) those obligations had been in place for nearly
four years at the time of the change of plea hearing.
Based on our independent evaluation of Cabrera’s credibility and the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude Cabrera has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence
that he failed to meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his
2014 no-contest plea. Accordingly, he has not established his conviction was “legally
invalid” under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) and his motion must be denied. It
follows that we need not address whether Cabrera demonstrated the requisite prejudice.
In closing, we note our evaluation of the totality of the circumstances considered
the absence of certain types of evidence, yet recognized that a defendant “seeking relief
under section 1473.7 is not required to provide the declaration of plea counsel” or
“submit contemporaneous documentation from the time of the plea.” (Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 325 [inclusion of counsel’s declaration in Vivar did not suggest a
minimum requirement for establishing prejudicial error].) Instead, a court’s
consideration of the totality of the circumstances involves a case-by-case evaluation of
the record. (Espinoza, at p. 325.) Here, Cabrera attempted to carry his burden of proof
16.
based primarily on his own declaration that directly contradicted statements Zavala made
on the record. His moving papers did not assert Zavala was unavailable or otherwise
explain why he was not called as a witness or did not provide a declaration. While these
omissions are far from decisive, they distinguish this case from those in which plea
counsel testified or submitted a declaration. (See People v. Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th
at p. 578 [“most important fact about the immigration paragraph in the Tahl form is that
both trial counsel and [the defendant] agree there was no discussion of it”]; Camacho,
supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 1009 [defendant’s former attorney testified “he told defendant
only that the charge could subject him to deportation and that ‘we’re going to get it down
to a misdemeanor and expunged early and maybe that will help’ ”].) Stated from another
perspective, Cabrera did not present evidence corroborating the assertion in his
declaration that he did not understand the immigration consequences of his plea. (See
generally, Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 316 [use of objective evidence to corroborate
defendant’s assertions]; Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530 [defendant asserting an
inadequate advisement of immigration consequences required to corroborate such
assertions with objective evidence].)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Cabrera’s section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) motion is affirmed.
17.
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