CourtListener 10732101•People v. Brashear CA2/4
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 11/6/25 P. v. Brashear CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B334538
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.) MA075514
v.
DEMETRIUS KING
BRASHEAR,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lisa Strassner, Judge. Affirmed.
Elizabeth Richardson-Royer, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
While incarcerated, appellant Demetrius Brashear stabbed
correctional officer Daniel M.1 in the head multiple times with an
inmate-manufactured weapon. Prior to trial of the resultant
charges, Brashear requested and received discovery of certain
confidential personnel records pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior
Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). The trial court denied
Brashear’s motion in limine to admit expert testimony regarding
his diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
Partway through trial, Brashear physically attacked his
appointed counsel in front of the jury. After trial later resumed
with replacement counsel, who requested a longer continuance
than was granted, the jury found Brashear guilty of most of the
charges and found true all aggravating circumstances.
Brashear contends his convictions must be reversed
because the trial court erred by excluding his expert testimony
and by denying a longer continuance. He also requests that we
independently review the Pitchess hearing materials. We grant
the unopposed request and find no abuse of discretion in the
court’s Pitchess rulings. We likewise find no abuse of discretion
in the challenged evidentiary and continuance rulings, or any
cumulative error. Accordingly, we affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
An amended information filed March 17, 2023 charged
Brashear with the willful, deliberate, and premeditated
attempted murder of custodial officer Daniel M. (Pen. Code,
1 We refer to victims by their first names and last initials to
protect their privacy. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)
2
§§ 187, subd. (a), 664)2; assault with a deadly weapon upon a
custodial officer (§ 245, subd. (c)); assault by a life prisoner
(§ 4500); aggravated battery (§ 4501.1, subd. (a)); and custodial
possession of a weapon (§ 4502, subd. (a)). The information
further alleged that Brashear suffered two prior serious felony
convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)) and two prior strike convictions
(§§ 667, subd. (b)-(j), 1170.12). It also alleged several
circumstances in aggravation (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421).
A jury found Brashear guilty of all charges except the
aggravated battery charge, which concerned spitting on
correctional officer Yodany S. The jury found not true the
allegation that the attempted murder was committed willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation. It found the priors and all
aggravating circumstances true.
At sentencing, the court granted Brashear’s Romero3
motion to strike his strikes as to the weapon possession count,
but denied it as to the other offenses. The court sentenced
Brashear to 27 years to life for the assault by a life prisoner,
which it designated as the base count, and ordered the sentence
to run consecutive to the sentences Brashear was already
serving. The court sentenced Brashear to a concurrent term of
four years for the weapon possession and imposed and stayed (§
654) sentences of 25 years to life for the attempted murder and
assault on a correctional officer. It struck the prior conviction
enhancements in the interest of justice and ordered Brashear to
pay various fines and fees.
Brashear timely appealed.
2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
3 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
3
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. Prosecution Evidence
The California State Prison, Los Angeles County (the
prison) is a maximum security prison that houses approximately
3,200 inmates. The prison consists of four “yards” with housing
units and other facilities connected by outdoor roadways. Each
two-tier housing unit contains 100 two-person cells, a central day
room, and a “control booth” from which a correctional officer
remotely controls the doors in the unit. Two or three other
correctional officers armed with batons, pepper spray, and a
pepper spray grenade patrol each housing unit. Both the officers
and the inmates are aware that the latter vastly outnumber the
former. At the time of the events in this case, the housing units
only had surveillance cameras in the visiting areas, and
correctional officers were not equipped with body-worn cameras.
In 2017, Lorissa Sanchez was a correctional officer at the
prison. On October 20, 2017, she was working as a floor officer
when she saw Brashear standing inside the perforated door to his
cell, openly masturbating. Sanchez ordered him to stop, but he
continued. When she made the order a second time, Brashear
turned off the lights inside his cell.
Indecent exposure by inmates is a violation of prison rules
and is supposed to be reported to supervisors. After an indecent
exposure incident, the inmate is supposed to be removed from his
cell, escorted to the medical unit for an evaluation, and then
placed in administrative segregation. Inmates are generally
aware of these procedures.
Sanchez reported the masturbation incident to her
supervisor. She then asked Daniel M. to escort Brashear to the
medical unit. Daniel M. testified that the day room was loud and
4
filled with inmates returning from recreational time. He
accordingly did not hear the reason for the medical evaluation
and did not know that Brashear would be going to administrative
segregation. If Daniel M. had known these things, he would have
handcuffed Brashear through the food port in his door before
opening it.
Instead, Daniel M. testified, he approached Brashear’s cell
and asked the control booth officer to open the door. Daniel M.
testified that Brashear was standing just inside the threshold of
the door with his hands behind his back. As the door opened,
Daniel M. told Brashear they were going for a medical
evaluation. Brashear stared blankly at Daniel M. and did not
respond, which Daniel M. found “strange.” Brashear then
“dropped his left hand down to his side and then immediately,
without warning, he jumped up” at Daniel M. Daniel M. noticed
a weapon in Brashear’s hand and raised his arms to protect his
face and neck.
Daniel M. testified that he felt “puncture strikes to the top
and the side of my head” and began bleeding “profusely.” Daniel
M. grabbed Brashear “by the upper torso and took him to the
floor.” Brashear was on his stomach, and Daniel M. “straddled
the back half” of Brashear in an effort to get the weapon and
handcuff him. After Brashear refused orders to drop the weapon,
Daniel M. pepper sprayed him.
By this point, Daniel M. testified, someone had sounded the
housing unit alarm, and other correctional officers including
Sanchez responded to the scene. Some of the officers helped
Daniel M. up, applied pressure to his wounds, and escorted him
to the medical unit for treatment. Photographs of Daniel M.’s
injuries were shown to the jury and admitted into evidence.
5
Multiple correctional officers testified that they witnessed
the incident and came to Daniel M.’s aid. Sanchez and Victor
Alvarado both testified that they saw Brashear “lunge out” of his
cell and attack Daniel M. in a stabbing motion. Sanchez sounded
her personal alarm and made a radio call of “officer assault”
before running to Daniel M.’s aid. Alvarado saw Daniel M. take
Brashear to the ground and ran over to help keep him there.
Another correctional officer, Teresita Chavez, testified that she
saw Brashear “striking” Daniel M. “in his facial area” before she
ran to the scene. All three testified that they saw Daniel M.
bleeding, and either heard or personally yelled “weapon.” Yodany
S. testified that he responded to an alarm, saw “a lot of blood
everywhere,” and “kept hearing things like weapon, weapon,
weapon.”
Alvarado removed the weapon from Brashear’s hand. He
described the weapon, which was admitted into evidence, as a
“metal rod, approximately two inches, with one end sharpened to
a point, blood on it,” with a “makeshift handle” made of a rubber
band, “paper towels and latex gloves.” Chavez focused on putting
pressure on Daniel M.’s wounds and escorted him to the medical
unit. Yodany S. assisted in handcuffing Brashear, helped him to
his feet, and escorted him to the gymnasium for medical
assistance. Yodany S. testified that Brashear was “still resistive”
and “spat in my face” and “lower torso” on the way to the
gymnasium, at which point he knocked Brashear to the ground.
Yodany S. “relinquished custody” of Brashear to other officers so
he could seek medical attention for the spitting.
The prosecution played a video recording of an interview
Brashear had with a prison lieutenant the day of the incident. In
that interview, Brashear stated that Sanchez falsely accused him
6
of indecent exposure, “and that’s pretty much where it stem from
. . . one of the other officers came to extract me from the cell and I
refused and it went from there man.” When asked to explain,
Brashear stated, “He wanted me to cuff up and he open the door
and wanted me to cuff up and I refused.” Later, Brashear
reiterated, “[a]fter I refused he attempted to mace me, and we
went from there, you know what I’m saying? We went from
there.”
II. Defense Evidence
Carmelo Haynes testified that on October 20, 2017, he was
serving time at the prison for attempted murder. Haynes was in
his cell when he saw Daniel M. “tap on the door” to Brashear’s
cell, “go slightly in, and that’s when the struggle ensued and all
sorts of other stuff like that happened.” Haynes could not see
into Brashear’s cell, which was about 20-30 feet away from his
own, but he was able to see “wrestling” before other correctional
officers arrived. Brashear “was sprayed. Thrown to the ground
and cuffed. . . . [R]oughed up and kicked and hit around a little
bit, and things like that.” On cross-examination, Haynes said he
was “too far away” to see if Daniel M. was injured, and he did not
remember seeing blood or pepper spray. Haynes reiterated that
the incident began inside the cell, and clarified that he did not
know whether Daniel M. or Brashear started it.
Brashear testified that he was convicted of murder in 1989
and had been incarcerated since. He had been transferred to the
prison a few months before the incident. Brashear had heard
rumors from other inmates that Daniel M. was “bad business,”
had a temper, and had assaulted inmates in the past.
On October 20, 2017, Brashear was resting or sleeping in
his darkened cell when he heard Daniel M. tell the control booth
7
to open the door. Brashear “jumped up” and got an “inmate
manufactured weapon” out of his pocket as Daniel M. “came in
fast speed.” Because it was “not proper protocol for officers to
come in while inmates is in the cell,” and he had heard rumors
about Daniel M., Brashear “felt fear for my life.” As Daniel M.
advanced toward Brashear, he sprayed Brashear in the face with
pepper spray, obscuring his vision. Daniel M.’s other hand was
clenched in a fist, and Brashear thought Daniel M. was going to
hurt him “real bad,” “if not kill me.” Brashear accordingly
started “swinging back,” with the weapon in his hand.
At that point, the altercation moved outside the cell.
Daniel M. “bear hugged” and continued to pepper spray
Brashear, who testified that he “probably hit him a couple more
times while he’s more or less holding me.” Brashear was trying
to get Daniel M. off of him, not kill him. Several correctional
officers ran to the scene, the alarm sounded, and “like 20 officers
come running in there within 15 seconds.” Once the officers
realized that Daniel M. was bleeding, they “went to work on me
assaulting me and kicking me and all that.” Brashear was
already on the ground and handcuffed at that point, and he was
not resisting the officers.
After a few minutes, Brashear heard a sergeant tell the
officers to pick him up. Still “blinded” from the pepper spray,
Brashear could not tell who escorted him out of the housing unit,
but he believed it was Yodany S. Brashear was handcuffed and
had difficulty walking because his ankle was injured. He did not
spit on Yodany S. and “couldn’t possibly spit on anyone” due to
the position in which he was handcuffed. Brashear was treated
at the medical unit and was later transported to the hospital,
8
where he was treated for a broken ankle, “fractured ribs and
fractured head.”
Correctional counselor David Pixley testified about a
separate incident involving Daniel M. On December 16, 2016, he
heard a “commotion” outside his prison office. He saw inmate
Felipe Diaz “advancing towards three officers,” including Daniel
M., who were standing in the middle of the day room. After Diaz
refused orders to get down, Daniel M. sprayed him twice with
pepper spray. Diaz got down on the ground, and Pixley thought
“the situation was handled.” But Daniel M. walked over to Diaz
and kicked him on “the base of the neck and shoulder area.”
Pixley yelled Daniel M.’s name because it “looked like excessive
force or unnecessary force.” Daniel M. kicked Diaz once more
before stopping. Pixley subsequently talked to Daniel M. about
the incident, and Daniel M. told him, “I fucked up.” Pixley did
not know if Diaz was injured during the incident; he testified that
he “saw him walking out” without “limping or blood or injuries.”
Diaz testified that he was incarcerated at the prison on
December 16, 2016. Daniel M. responded sarcastically when
Diaz asked him about the status of some of Diaz’s personal
property. Daniel M. later opened Diaz’s cell door, against policy,
and Diaz exited the cell and approached Daniel M. and other
officers. Diaz asked Daniel M. about the property again, and
added that he had come out of his cell “to show you what I’m
about.” Daniel M. responded by telling Diaz to turn around and
cuff up; Diaz refused. Daniel M. and the other officers pepper
sprayed Diaz with “like four bottles of spray” and kicked him
after he went down to the ground. Daniel M. continued kicking
Diaz in the head until he lost consciousness. At the time of trial,
Diaz had a $500,000 lawsuit pending against Daniel M.
9
When recalled by the defense, Daniel M. admitted pepper
spraying Diaz and “utiliz[ing] physical force to take him to the
ground.” Daniel M. testified that he did not kick Diaz, but rather
“used the sole of my foot to push him over to the side” because he
was “actively resisting.” Daniel M. did not recall talking with
Pixley about the incident, but testified that it would be “normal”
for one officer to “advise” another about reporting use of force.
DISCUSSION
I. PTSD Evidence
A. Background
Prior to trial, Brashear’s counsel filed a motion in limine to
admit the expert testimony of psychologist Dr. Harry Goldberg,
Ph.D. The motion explained:
“Dr. Goldberg is expected to testify that he evaluated
Brashear and diagnosed him with PTSD. Dr. Goldberg has the
background and experience to explain to the jury what PTSD is
and to describe the symptoms associated with the mental
illness.…
“Furthermore, Dr. Goldberg can note the symptoms present
at the time of the incident, such as his believe [sic] that the COs
are manipulating him to engage in negative behavior, ongoing
nightmares of childhood abuse, and hearing voices of his
stepfathers. The voices tell Brashear ‘they’re coming after you.’
“At the time of the incident, Brashear was convinced that
he was being escorted out of his cell because he had falsely been
accused of Indecent Exposure and was going to face severe
consequences. He also believed that the COs were manipulating
him to prevent him from getting released from his long prison
sentence. As a result, he took a defensive posture, believing he
had to defend himself and use a handmade device to protect
10
himself. Brashear felt he was going to be severely beaten and
killed during this incident.
“Brashear’s PTSD negates a specific intent to kill and
willful, deliberate, premeditation. . . . Brashear’s PTSD shows
that he was paranoid and after that [sic] COs were coming after
him and threatening his life. Because he feared for his life,
Brashear acted in self-defense. Brashear did not intend to kill
any CO, but rather to deter the CO from attacking him via
injury.”
The prosecution filed a written opposition. Acknowledging
that a defendant may “introduce PTSD evidence to negate
specific intent,” the prosecution argued that Dr. Goldberg instead
improperly opined “on defendant’s subjective beliefs at the time
he ‘defended himself. . . .’ It’s a self-defense opinion, not a specific
intent opinion. The problem is that an opinion about defendant’s
subject [sic] state of mind when he acted in self-defense is not
admissible. . . . [N]either he, nor Dr. Goldberg, may tell the jury
that defendant believed self-defense was necessary because of his
PTSD. That is an impermissible ‘subjective reason.’ It violates
the rule that the jury only consider what an objective and
reasonable person would do in defendant’s position.”
At the pretrial hearing on the motion, defense counsel
asserted that Dr. Goldberg “could testify to the symptoms that
Mr. Brashear was experiencing at the time of the incident.”
Counsel argued, “if you take on his PTSD, the reason why he had
the knife was because . . . he was paranoid. He was afraid that,
either of an inmate, or that the CO’s [sic] were out to get him. So
he got the knife to protect himself. . . . [I]t goes towards his
specific intent – whether he had the intent to kill or not, I believe
that negates that specific intent.” The prosecution objected that
11
Dr. Goldberg’s report did not actually opine that PTSD negates
specific intent. The prosecution argued that Dr. Goldberg instead
opined that Brashear “believed he had to defend himself because
of PTSD. And that’s exactly the kind of thing that the objective
standard prohibits.”
Defense counsel responded that he was “not going to offer it
for self-defense” and “only wanted to introduce his diagnosis of
PTSD and what symptoms he observed.” Counsel added that
“[t]he problem is” that Brashear’s previous counsel “only got the
competency evaluation” and “did not get a second doctor to
address the specific intent issues. . . . So that’s why I had to get
the doctor that was already appointed, who was Dr. Goldberg, to
address the specific intent issue.” The court responded, “Which
he did not do.” Defense counsel agreed, “Right.” The court
further stated, “He’s talking about it in the self-defense sense. He
took a defensive posture. He did this to defend himself because he
has PTSD. . . . But no one has any documentation to support his
mental state at the time – and whether PTSD is even relevant to
his mental state with regard to counts 1 and 3 [attempted
murder and assault by a life prisoner].”
The court ruled that Dr. Goldberg’s opinion was not
admissible: “I don’t see how Dr. Goldberg addresses his mental
disorder of PTSD and how that would be applicable to his mental
state at the time, other than how he addresses it in a self-defense
situation, which by all accounts everyone is agreeing is not
relevant to this case.”
B. Analysis
Brashear argues that the trial court erred in excluding Dr.
Goldberg’s testimony. He contends the testimony was “highly
relevant” to the issue of imperfect self-defense, could have
12
assisted the jury in assessing his mental state at the time of the
crime, and “would have given context, depth, and credibility to
Appellant’s claim that he believed [Daniel M.] would harm him,
and that he acted in order to prevent what he believed was
impending harm.” He also argues the exclusion of the testimony
deprived him of his federal constitutional right to present a
complete defense.
“‘The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to
admit or exclude expert testimony [citation], and its decision as
to whether expert testimony meets the standard for admissibility
is subject to review for abuse of discretion.’” (People v. Duong
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 60.) We conclude Brashear has not
demonstrated an abuse of discretion here.
Evidence Code section 354, subdivision (a) provides that a
judgment will not be reversed based on the erroneous exclusion of
evidence unless “[t]he substance, purpose, and relevance of the
excluded evidence was made known to the court by the questions
asked, an offer of proof, or by any other means” a miscarriage of
justice is shown. Thus, as a general rule, “trial counsel’s failure
to object to claimed evidentiary error on the same ground
asserted on appeal results in a forfeiture of the issue on appeal.”
(People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 741, 756.)
Trial counsel specifically stated that he was not going to
offer Dr. Goldberg’s testimony in support of self-defense.
Brashear currently argues, however, that the evidence was
“highly relevant” to a theory of imperfect self-defense “such that
the attempted killing charged in Count 1 would have been
reduced to an attempted voluntary manslaughter,” and the trial
court “much too narrowly construed the potential impact of the
13
proposed defense.” These arguments were not raised below and
cannot be raised now.
Similarly, counsel conceded below that Dr. Goldberg’s
report did not connect the diagnosis of PTSD to specific intent,
and that deficiency in the report posed a “problem.” We agree.
The offer of proof did not, by counsel’s own admission, include the
opinions that Brashear now argues should have been admitted
under authorities such as People v. Cortes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th
873 and People v. Herrera (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 467. Because
the desired opinions were not proffered, the court could not fully
consider the complex issue of their admissibility under sections
28 and 29.4 This was not an abuse of the court’s discretion, nor is
it an issue appropriate for us to visit in the first instance.
II. Continuance
A. Background
The incident at the prison occurred on October 20, 2017.
The case was initiated in January 2019, and Brashear appeared
4 Section 28 provides in relevant part that evidence of a
mental disease, defect, or disorder “is admissible solely on the
issue of whether or not the accused actually formed a required
specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice
aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged. (§ 28,
subd. (a).) It “shall not be admitted to show or negate the
capacity to form any mental state.” (Ibid.) Section 29 provides,
in its entirety, “In the guilt phase of a criminal action, any expert
testifying about a defendant’s mental illness, mental disorder, or
mental defect shall not testify as to whether the defendant had or
did not have the required mental states, which include, but are
not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, or malice
aforethought, for the crimes charged. The question as to whether
the defendant had or did not have the required mental states
shall be decided by the trier of fact.”
14
with his first appointed deputy public defender (DPD) in
February 2019. The initial DPD remained on the case until
February 2022, when he was replaced by a second DPD. On
March 7, 2023, the court ruled, apparently for the first time, that
no further continuances would be granted in the matter. The
court reiterated its ruling regarding continuances on March 30,
2023.
On May 19, 2023, the court was informed that Brashear’s
second DPD was being replaced and a third DPD would be ready
for trial by July 10, 2023. The court continued the matter to
June 20, 2023.
On June 23, 2023, Brashear’s new DPD, Maceo Lewis, filed
a motion to continue. DPD Lewis cited his unfamiliarity with
Brashear, whom he met for the first time on June 20, 2023, as
well as his unfamiliarity with the “disorganized and unscanned”
discovery, his need to interview witnesses, and Brashear’s desire
to seek mental health diversion. The court heard and denied the
motion for continuance (and request for mental health diversion)
on June 27, 2023. The court noted that the case had been
pending for over four years and it had “ordered a long time ago no
further continuances.” It concluded that it was “reasonable” for
counsel “to get ready in the time frame that we’re dealing with.”
The court trailed the case “within the period” and set the next
hearing for July 6, 2023, “with the understanding that it will be
sent to [the trial courtroom] for the trial date on the 10th.” The
court reiterated in its minute order that no further continuances
would be granted.
Jury selection began on July 12, 2023. Before bringing the
prospective jurors into the courtroom, the court advised Brashear
that “behaving in court is extremely important” and that trial
15
would proceed in his absence if he did not behave properly. Jury
selection proceeded without incident, and the parties delivered
their opening statements on July 14, 2023. The prosecution
called six witnesses, including Daniel M. and Yodany S.
When trial resumed on July 17, 2023, there was “a
disruption in the proceedings” as the prosecution’s seventh
witness took the stand. According to the trial court’s summary,
“Mr. Brashear was brought out, he was unhandcuffed. He was
not acting up at the moment. We – I indicated to the People to
call their next witness. [The prosecutor] indicated who their next
witness was and . . . after the witness was indicated to
everybody, the court and all, Mr. Brashear lunged out of his chair
and lunged to his left all the way across, injuring his attorney,
Mr. Lewis, who was bleeding[. Brashear] had to be restrained
and taken down after a large struggle right behind the People’s
table – the prosecution’s table. . . . So Mr. Lewis is on his way to
the hospital having been injured and bleeding.”5 After the court
apologized to, admonished, and excused the jurors, one
prosecutor added that “while the incident was going on, the
defendant was saying ‘we’re not going to do this Jim Crow trial.’”
The other said she recalled him saying, “‘I want a fair trial.’”
On July 24, 2023, Brashear appeared with his fourth DPD,
John Henderson. Henderson informed the court that the public
defender’s office sought to declare a conflict, “not based solely on
the battery in court.” Noting there had been no basis for a
5 Brashear notes in his opening brief that criminal charges
were filed in connection with the incident and remained pending
at the time of briefing. He accordingly “in no way concedes the
truth, accuracy, or reliability” of the court’s or prosecution’s
summary of the incident.
16
conflict during the preceding six years, the court invited
Henderson to disclose further information in camera. Henderson
declined and submitted. The court observed that Brashear
“brought this upon himself as a delay tactic to get a mistrial” and
reasoned that he could not “profit from his own misconduct.” The
court denied the request to declare a conflict. It nevertheless
exercised its discretion to relieve DPD Lewis from representing
Brashear. It provided Henderson with reporter’s transcripts of
the witness testimony and ordered trial to resume on July 31,
2023.
Henderson filed a motion to continue on July 27, 2023. At
the July 28, 2023 hearing on that motion, Henderson argued that
he needed a continuance because he was “just not ready” for
trial.6 He stated that there was “significant discovery,” including
“a terabyte USB” of photos and videos, that he needed to review,
that he did not have a transcript of the hearing resolving motions
in limine, and that an expert witness he wanted to call was not
available when trial was set to resume. Henderson asserted he
would “be ineffective if we start back on Monday” and requested
that the court continue the matter to August 9, 2023.7
The court denied the continuance, finding that Henderson
had “worked extremely diligently” and “gone at the speed of light
to get ready for trial.” It also noted that he had the weekend and
Monday morning to prepare.
6 He also advised the trial court that this court had denied
writ relief on the conflict issue without prejudice.
7 He also stated, “it would be difficult to get through
everything and actually be competent in a year, much less in a
couple weeks.”
17
Henderson sought writ relief in this court. After we issued
a temporary stay, the trial court continued the trial to August 9,
2023, the date Henderson had requested.
On August 7, 2023, Henderson filed a motion to continue
the matter “about 30 days out.” He also filed a motion for
mistrial on the grounds that “no lawyer handling a trial where
that lawyer did not see prosecution witnesses testify could
competently argue the credibility of those witnesses.” The court
heard both motions on August 9, 2023. Henderson asserted that
he had found “approximately 5,000 pages” of additional records
on an internal public defender system but had only been able to
get through 700 pages, and had only reviewed the photos on the
USB drive. He further sought to “readdress some 402 issues,”
noting that “Mr. Lewis’s defense is not what I plan on offering.”
The court denied the motion as unsupported by good cause.
It explained, “in summation, the defendant, Mr. Brashear created
this issue with his own behavior. The PD’s have never been
relieved from this case. They’ve had this case six years and
prepped it for trial. Mr. Lewis stepped into this and was ready in
three weeks. And we are in the middle of trial, about to finish
the prosecution’s case-in-chief tomorrow. The defendant doesn’t
get to benefit from relitigating the issues already litigated and
receive a continuance with a fresh set of eyes.”
Trial resumed August 10, 2023.
B. Analysis
Brashear contends the trial court abused its discretion by
denying a further continuance because Henderson “did not have
sufficient time to prepare between July 24, 2023, when he first
appeared in court as a representative of the public defender’s
office, and August 10, 2023, when trial resumed.” We disagree.
18
Section 1050, subdivision (e) provides that continuances
“shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause.” The
decision whether to grant a continuance lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court. (People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th
907, 920.) There is no mechanical test for determining whether
that discretion has been abused. Rather, we consider the totality
of the circumstances in the case to determine whether the denial
of a continuance was so arbitrary as to deny due process. (Id. at
pp. 920-921.) “The party challenging a ruling on a continuance
bears the burden of establishing an abuse of discretion, and an
order denying a continuance is seldom successfully attacked.”
(Id. at p. 920.)
This case is no exception. The court indicated several times
before the courtroom incident that no further continuances would
be granted due to the age of the case. It was not an abuse of the
court’s discretion to stand by those rulings, “particularly when
the defendant engages in improper conduct in court. As a matter
of policy, a defendant is not permitted to profit from his own
misconduct.” (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1127, 1156.)
Here, “[t]he court had reason to suspect defendant was effectively
seeking an indefinite continuance, and it was not required to
oblige.” (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 255.)
After the incident, Henderson requested, and after
appellate court intervention received, continuance of the trial to
August 9, 2023. That continuance afforded Henderson roughly
the same amount of time to get up to speed and prepare for trial
that his predecessor Lewis had—and Lewis also filed and
litigated motions in limine within that timeframe. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying an additional continuance,
particularly where the jury had already heard the bulk of the
19
prosecution case and was standing ready to return and resolve
the matter.
Brashear suggests “it is hard to imagine” that Henderson
“had any kind of defense planned.” This suggestion is belied by
Henderson’s representation to the court that he had assessed and
disagreed with Lewis’s planned approach and his expressed
desire to relitigate certain rulings. It is also belied by
Henderson’s conduct when trial resumed. Henderson cross-
examined the remaining prosecution witnesses, called and
examined several defense witnesses, and delivered a closing
argument.
Brashear contends he was prejudiced in large part because
Henderson “missed the trial testimony of the prosecution’s key
witnesses” and “was not present at voir dire, so he did not know
the jurors, was unaware of how they had been questioned, and
felt himself to be at a disadvantage as a result.” It is unclear how
a continuance of any duration could remedy these concerns;
Henderson or any other replacement counsel could not go back in
time to the first day of trial. The only practical way to address
these concerns would be a mistrial, and Brashear does not argue
that his motion for mistrial was improperly denied.
For all these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err
in denying the motion for continuance.
III. Pitchess
Brashear requests that we independently review the
Pitchess hearings. The Attorney General does not oppose this
request. “Pitchess rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion.”
(People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 424.)
“When a defendant shows good cause for the discovery of
information in an officer’s personnel records, the trial court must
20
examine the records in camera to determine if any information
should be disclosed.” (People v. Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p.
424.) At the in camera hearing, “[t]he trial court should . . . make
a record of what documents it examined before ruling on the
Pitchess motion. . . . [T]he court can . . . state for the record what
documents it examined.” (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216,
1229.) An appellate court independently examines the record
made by the trial court “to determine whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denying a defendant’s motion for
disclosure of police personnel records.” (People v. Prince (2007)
40 Cal.4th 1179, 1285.)
We have reviewed the sealed transcripts of the in camera
hearings. We conclude that the court complied with the
procedural requirements of a Pitchess hearing, including
providing an adequate description of the documents it reviewed.
Brashear asks that we also perform an independent review
of the Pitchess materials themselves to determine whether any
disclosures should have been made to the defense. Additional
review is not required here. In the transcript of the in camera
hearing, the court provided clear, thorough descriptions of each
document it reviewed. Where “the court ‘state[d] for the record
what documents it examined,’” the transcript alone “is adequate
for purposes of conducting a meaningful appellate review.”
(People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1209.) No additional
review is necessary, and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion.
IV. Cumulative Error
Brashear argues that the cumulative effect of the errors
asserted in this appeal deprived him of his rights to due process
and a fair trial. Having concluded that his contentions
21
challenging his convictions are without merit, however, we
necessarily reject this claim of resultant cumulative error. There
was no prejudicial error to accumulate. (People v. Hensley (2014)
59 Cal.4th 788, 818.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
MORI, J.
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