People v. Holston CA3

CourtListener 10729799Calctapp03.11.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 11/3/25 P. v. Holston CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(El Dorado)
----

THE PEOPLE, C102062

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 24CR0785)

v.

THERON KENNETH HOLSTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

The trial court placed defendant Theron Kenneth Holston on probation after he
pled no contest to possession of a controlled substance with a prior and failure to register
as a sex offender. Seven weeks later, the court added an electronic monitoring condition.
Holston contends the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by adding an electronic
monitoring condition without changed circumstances justifying the modification.
Accordingly, he requests we strike the electronic monitoring condition.

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We asked the parties to file supplemental briefing addressing whether Holston’s
original sentence was unauthorized given the state of the record. Having reviewed this
briefing, we conclude Holston’s original sentence was unauthorized, and thus the trial
court had jurisdiction to later impose an electronic monitoring condition that was
mandatory absent specified findings not made in this case. Accordingly, we will affirm.
BACKGROUND
On April 3, 2024, Officer Robert Frank saw Holston, whom he recognized,
walking on Placerville Drive. A records check confirmed Holston had not registered
monthly as required of a transient sex offender registrant. Officer Frank placed Holston
under arrest, and during the search incident to arrest that followed, found a baggie of
methamphetamine and glass pipes in Holston’s pockets.
Following a preliminary hearing, the People filed an information charging Holston
with possession of a controlled substance with a specified prior conviction (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 1); failure to register as a sex offender (Pen. Code,
§ 290.011, subd. (a); count 2),1 and possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11364, subd. (a); count 3). The information further alleged several factors in
aggravation.
On July 12, 2024, Holston resolved the case by pleading no contest to counts 1
and 2 and admitting the aggravating factor that he had performed unsatisfactorily on
probation. In exchange, Holston would receive two years of formal probation with a
suspended sentence. Whether Holston would be subject to electronic monitoring does
not appear on the plea waiver form or in the reporter’s transcript of Holston’s change of
plea. The remaining count and aggravating factors were dismissed in light of Holston’s
plea. The parties stipulated the factual basis for the plea would be the preliminary

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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hearing transcript and a police report. The trial court granted Holston’s request to be
sentenced the following week.
On July 15, 2024, the trial court sentenced Holston in accordance with this plea
and without the benefit of a probation report. The court also imposed various terms and
conditions of probation, which did not include electronic monitoring, although the
possibility of such condition was acknowledged. Specifically, Holston “wanted to make
sure that there was no electronic monitoring being specifically ordered” and the court
responded, “That is not a request that has been made, but depending on what Probation
orders, since he is a 290, that may be a reasonable term that is related to probation. . . .
[¶] . . . [¶] The Court has not ordered it as of this time.” Holston then inquired
concerning “what the Court would need to find that electronic monitoring is
unnecessary,” and the court responded, “The Court is not going to give any indication on
that because that’s a question that is likely to come before this Court, so I’m not going to
prejudge that matter. If it comes before this Court, the Court will make the appropriate
determination based on what I have before me at that time.”
On July 30, 2024, the probation department wrote the trial court recommending
the modification of Holston’s probation terms to include an electronic monitoring
condition. Holston’s 2019 risk assessment (Static-99R) by the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation (CDCR) placed him at above average risk level, under section 1202.8,
subdivision (b), required an electronic monitoring condition unless the court determined
such condition was unnecessary for that individual. The court ordered the probation
department to notify Holston of this request and upcoming hearing.
On August 30, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on probation’s section 1202.8
request. Holston’s attorney was present but informed the court that “[m]y part was
closed.” When asked if probation wanted to offer more information, the probation
department stated: “Just to refer the Court to Mr. Holston’s previous performance on
supervision, and the numerous violations that he incurred, you know, last time he was on

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supervision through Parole. And then we also conducted a Static Risk Assessment on Mr.
Holston that also came back as high risk to re-offend—other than the Static-99 score that
CDCR also performed.” Holston asked for a hearing under section 1202.8, subdivision
(b), to establish that electronic monitoring was unnecessary, which the trial court denied.
The court stated it was granting probation’s request to modify the conditions to include
electronic monitoring. The court informed Holston he could accept probation under the
modified terms or the court could sentence him to the maximum term of three years. The
court confirmed Holston could not withdraw his plea and would be allowed to appeal the
modification order. Holston accepted the modified terms subject to appeal and timely
appealed the court’s order. The trial court did not rule on his request for a certificate of
probable cause.
DISCUSSION
Holston contends the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction when it modified
his probation mere weeks after sentencing to include an electronic monitoring condition
without a change of circumstances. For the reasons we shall explain, we disagree.
“At any time during the probationary period, a trial court has the authority to
modify the terms of probation. (§ 1203.3, subd. (a).) However, ‘[a] change in
circumstances is required before a court has jurisdiction to . . . modify probation.’
(People v. Cookson (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1091, 1095.) As the Supreme Court held in In re
Clark (1959) 51 Cal.2d 838, ‘[a]n order modifying the terms of probation based upon the
same facts as the original order granting probation is in excess of the jurisdiction of the
court, for the reason that there is no factual basis to support it.’ (Id. at p. 840, italics
added; see People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 505.) In this context, a ‘change in
circumstance’ requires ‘a fact “not available at the time of the original order.” ’
(Cookson, supra, at p. 1095.) Thus, a modification order based upon the same facts as
the original order is improper because ‘the court [has] reached a different conclusion
based upon the same facts.’ ” (People v. Rogers (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 88, 92-93.)

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Here, the trial court imposed the additional condition of probation approximately
seven weeks after it placed Holston on probation. As justification for the modification,
the probation department referenced the CDCR Static-99R assessment, Holston’s poor
performance on previous supervision, and an unspecified static risk assessment
performed by the probation department. The People rely on the probation department’s
static risk assessment to argue changed circumstances justified the trial court’s
modification order. However, the probation department’s amorphous statement did not
disclose which static risk assessment was performed or when. The only static risk
assessment contained in the appellate record was a “VPRAI assessment” mentioned in
Holston’s pretrial services report. This assessment thus predated his original sentencing.
Nonetheless, we find Holston’s jurisdictional challenge fails for a different reason.
Given Holston’s score on the CDCR Static-99R assessment, the trial court was required
to impose an electronic monitoring condition absent specified findings not made.
(§ 1202.8, subd. (b).) Section 1202.8, subdivision (b) states in pertinent part: “[E]very
person who has been assessed with the State Authorized Risk Assessment Tool for Sex
Offenders (SARATSO) pursuant to Sections 290.04 to 290.06, inclusive, and who has a
SARATSO risk level of high shall be continuously electronically monitored while on
probation, unless the court determines that such monitoring is unnecessary for a
particular person.”
Contrary to Holston’s suggestion otherwise, the trial court’s statements at the
original sentencing do not support an implied finding that electronic monitoring was
unnecessary. Rather, the court specifically responded to Holston’s inquiry concerning
electronic monitoring by stating: “That is not a request that has been made, but
depending on what Probation orders, since he is a 290, that may be a reasonable term that
is related to probation. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] The Court has not ordered it as of this time.”
Further, the court declined to comment on what would be required to show that electronic
monitoring was unnecessary, stating: “The Court is not going to give any indication on

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that because that’s a question that is likely to come before this Court, so I’m not going to
prejudge that matter. If it comes before this Court, the Court will make the appropriate
determination based on what I have before me at that time.” It is therefore clear the trial
court did not decide this issue.
Moreover, the trial court’s refusal at the original sentencing to determine whether
electronic monitoring was unnecessary, and its attendant failure to impose this mandatory
term in the absence of such finding, resulted in a legally unauthorized sentence. (People
v. Cates (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 545, 552.) The trial court was therefore obligated to
correct the sentence by adding the mandated probation term when the unauthorized
nature of the sentence came to light. (Ibid.) “An unauthorized sentence is ‘ “subject to
judicial correction when it ultimately [comes] to the attention of the trial court or
[reviewing] court” ’ ” and therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to modify Holston’s
sentence to include the electronic monitoring condition regardless of whether there was
new information supporting that modification. (Ibid.) Thus, this court has jurisdiction to
consider the propriety of that decision. (§ 1237, subd. (b).)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

/s/
MAURO, Acting P. J.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

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