CourtListener 10715621•People v. Vargastavera CA2/7
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 10/31/25 P. v. Vargastavera CA2/7
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B336548
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA129666)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING
VICTOR ADRIAN OPINION
VARGASTAVERA, [There is no change in
appellate judgment]
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on October 13,
2025, be modified as follows:
On page 12, line 4, the citation “People v. Lopez (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 569, 579” should be deleted and replaced with
“People v. Lopez (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 561, 579.”
There is no change in appellate judgment.
____________________________________________________________
MARTINEZ, P. J. SEGAL, J. STONE, J.
Filed 10/13/25 P. v. Vargastavera CA2/7 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B336548
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA129666)
v.
VICTOR ADRIAN
VARGASTAVERA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Juan Carlos Dominguez, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Christopher Lionel Haberman, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven D. Matthews, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________
Victor Adrian Vargastavera appeals the denial of his
motion under Penal Code section 1473.7 to vacate his 2022
conviction by a no-contest plea.1 He contends he was unable to
defend against and meaningfully understand the adverse
immigration consequences of his conviction because of his defense
counsel’s prejudicial errors. We conclude Vargastavera has met
his burden of establishing error under section 1473.7: His
counsel’s attempts to negotiate an immigration-safe plea were
insufficient. Counsel proposed a plea that was unlikely to be
accepted by the People, instead of a plea to an alternative,
immigration-safe offense that was comparable to the People’s
offer. Vargastavera also established by a preponderance of the
evidence that, but for his counsel’s error, he would not have
entered a plea. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of his motion
and direct the superior court to vacate his conviction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Underlying Facts and Plea Proceedings
Vargastavera was born in Mexico in 1992. When he was
five years old, he and his family entered the United States
unlawfully, without inspection or admission by an immigration
officer. Vargastavera remained in the United States for the next
25 years, married a United States citizen, and had two children.
According to the probation report in this case, on
February 25, 2022, at 3:00 a.m., Vargastavera was driving a
stolen vehicle when police officers attempted to pull him over for
traffic violations. Vargastavera failed to stop, drove on the wrong
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
side of the road, ran stop signs, and sped up to 60 miles per hour
in a 35-miles-per-hour zone. Police officers eventually
apprehended Vargastavera after he got out of the stolen vehicle
and fled on foot. A search of the stolen vehicle revealed two
shotgun shells. Vargastavera admitted that he possessed the
shotgun shells and knew the vehicle had been stolen.
The People charged Vargastavera with fleeing a pursing
police officer while driving against traffic (Veh. Code, § 2800.4;
count 1), unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon (Pen.
Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 2), and driving or taking a
vehicle without the owner’s consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd.
(a); count 3). The People further alleged that Vargastavera had
two prior felony convictions, including second-degree burglary
(Pen. Code, § 459) from December 13, 2021 (case No.
FWV210041), and carrying a concealed weapon (Pen. Code,
§ 25400, subd. (a)(2)) from December 20, 2021 (case No.
KA128053).
In March 2022 Vargastavera pleaded no contest to count 1,
fleeing a pursuing police officer while driving against traffic, and
count 3, driving a vehicle without consent. As we discuss below,
count 1 carried immigration consequences. During the plea
hearing, defense counsel stated: “For the record, I spoke with
[the prosecutor] and requested an immigration neutral
disposition in this matter. That request was denied.” The
prosecutor added: “And the reason for that is that he is currently
on two grants of probation.”
The court accepted Vargastavera’s plea and sentenced him
to 16 months in prison for fleeing a pursuing officer while driving
against traffic and a concurrent term of 16 months for driving or
taking a vehicle without consent. The court dismissed the
3
remaining count 2. The court also found that Vargastavera
violated the terms of his probation in case No. KA128053
(carrying a concealed weapon) and sentenced him to a concurrent
term of 16 months.
B. Section 1473.7 Proceedings
1. Motion to vacate convictions
On September 13, 2023, Vargastavera filed a motion to
vacate his conviction under section 1473.7, alleging he was
unable to understand, defend against, and knowingly accept the
immigration consequences of his plea due to prejudicial error.
Vargastavera submitted a declaration stating he is a citizen
of Mexico and has been in the United States since 1997, when he
was five years old. He claimed that, before he pleaded no contest,
his public defender “was not specific in his immigration advice,”
“did not consult with an immigration attorney to verify that [his]
conviction [would] affect” him, and “merely asked the District
Attorney for an immigration safe plea.”
He described that, at the time of his plea, his wife was a
United States citizen, and they had two children, ages nine and
five. Additionally, “all [his] siblings and extended family
members lived in the United States.” He further said that “[i]f
the public defender had explained that [his conviction would]
affect [his] immigration status [he] would have never agreed” to
plead no contest. He “would have done everything [he] could to
fight and make sure that [he] could stay [in the United States]
with his family.” Specifically, he stated he “would have opted for
immigration safe options” or “would have asked [his] public
defender to fight [his] case in trial.” He “had no intention of
abandoning [his] family.”
4
He also stated he was in Immigration and Customs
Enforcement detention facing removal from the United States.
He claimed he was ineligible for relief from removal in the form
of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), because his
Vehicle Code section 2800.4 conviction rendered him statutorily
ineligible.
In addition to his declaration, Vargastavera submitted a
“Notice to Appear” from the Department of Homeland Security,
dated April 17, 2023, notifying him to appear before an
immigration judge to show why he should not be removed from
the United States. The notice states Vargastavera is subject to
removal from the United States because he is “an alien present in
the United States without being admitted or paroled.”
2. Hearing
At a hearing on January 9, 2024, at which Vargastavera
was not present,2 Vargastavera’s former defense attorney who
represented him during the 2022 plea, Walter Munoz, testified.
Munoz testified that prior to the plea, he reached out to the
prosecutor to negotiate an “immigration safe plea.” Munoz first
proposed Vargastavera could plead to an unspecified
misdemeanor, which the prosecutor rejected, and then Munoz
proposed a sentence of less than a year in custody, which the
prosecutor also rejected.
According to Munoz, he offered those terms because he
believed a misdemeanor was not a crime of moral turpitude for
immigration purposes and a sentence of less than a year “t[ook]
the offense out of an aggravated felony status.” After those two
offers, he did not make any others because, as he explained, “the
2 Vargastavera was in immigration custody.
5
discussion was more or less this is what I was seeking.” Also, the
prosecutor “indicated to [him] that she was not interested in
making any other further concessions” given Munoz “had two
grants of probation.”
Munoz testified that it was his practice as a public defender
to “go over” the plea form with defendants. It was also his
practice to determine whether defendants are citizens of the
United States, advise them of immigration consequences, and
advise them “that they have an absolute right to fight their case
and [have] a jury trial.” In Vargastavera’s case, Munoz
determined Vargastavera was not a United States citizen and
“advised him that he would be deported, denied reentry, and
excluded as a result of this conviction.”
The prosecutor who handled Vargastavera’s case at the
time of his plea was present at the hearing and represented to
the court3 that “the 16-month offer” was “the best offer
[Vargastavera] was going to get” because he “was on probation in
two different counties on two different felonies.” Although she
was authorized to “find alternative dispositions,” she said she
“was not willing to negotiate for any alternative because of
[Vargastavera’s record,] . . . the fact that he kept this revolving
door with the criminal justice system[,] and he was aware of the
possible consequences.” She added, “I could say with a degree of
certainty I wouldn’t have budged on this case.”
The court denied Vargastavera’s motion to vacate his plea.
The court reasoned that Vargastavera “was well aware of his
immigration consequences” and Munoz “did everything that he
3 The prosecutor did not testify under oath. Vargastavera
did not object during the hearing and does not raise the issue on
appeal.
6
could to alleviate any immigration collateral consequences.” The
court also did not find credible Vargastavera’s declaration that he
would have rejected the plea and taken the case to trial.
Vargastavera timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
As relevant here, section 1473.7 provides: “A person who is
no longer in criminal custody may file a motion to vacate a
conviction or sentence” if “[t]he conviction or sentence is legally
invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s
ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly
accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences
of a conviction or sentence.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) “The court
shall grant the motion to vacate the conviction or sentence if the
moving party establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
existence of . . . [such] grounds for relief.” (Id., subd. (e)(1).) The
moving party must “also establish that the conviction or sentence
being challenged is currently causing or has the potential to
cause removal or the denial of an application for an immigration
benefit, lawful status, or naturalization.” (Ibid.)
To prevail under section 1473.7, a petitioner must first
show that an error occurred—specifically, that he or she was
unable to either meaningfully understand, defend against, or
knowingly accept the immigration consequences of his conviction.
(See § 1473.7, subd. (a)(1); People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th
311, 319 (Espinoza); People v. Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th
950, 958 (Padron).) “The focus of this showing is ‘the “defendant’s
own error.” ’ ” (Padron, at pp. 958-959.) To establish error, a
petitioner “may, but need not,” prove he received ineffective
7
assistance from his counsel. (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1); see Padron,
at p. 959.) “ ‘[E]ven if the motion is based upon errors by counsel,
the moving party need not also establish a Sixth Amendment
violation as by demonstrating that “counsel’s representation ‘fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness’ ” . . . “ ‘under
prevailing professional norms.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Benitez-Torres
(2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1268 (Benitez-Torres).)
Next, a section 1473.7 petitioner must demonstrate that
the error was “prejudicial.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1); see People v.
Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 528 (Vivar).) In the context of a
conviction by plea, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable
probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the
defendant had correctly understood or adequately defended
against its actual or potential immigration consequences. (See
Vivar, at p. 529; People v. Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 565
(Martinez) [defendant can show prejudice by “convinc[ing] the
court [that he] would have chosen to lose the benefits of the plea
bargain despite the possibility or probability deportation would
nonetheless follow”].) “A reasonable probability does not mean
more likely than not. [Citation.] Instead, it means merely a
reasonable chance, which is more than an abstract possibility.”
(People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 19 (Carrillo).)
We independently review the denial of a section 1473.7
motion. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319.) Under this
standard, we exercise our “ ‘ “independent judgment to determine
whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 319-320;
see Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 527.) We “must give deference
to the trial court’s factual determinations if they are based on
‘ “ ‘the credibility of witnesses the [superior court] heard and
observed.’ ” ’ ” (Espinoza, at p. 320; see Vivar, at p. 527.) Where
8
the trial court’s findings “ ‘derive entirely from written
declarations and other documents,’ the trial court and the
reviewing court ‘ “are in the same position,” ’ and no deference is
owed.” (Espinoza, at p. 320; see Vivar, at p. 528.)
B. Vargastavera Established Error Affecting His Ability To
Defend Against the Immigration Consequences of His Plea
1. Vargastavera’s conviction caused actual immigration
consequences
At the time of Vargastavera’s plea he was facing three
felony charges, and the immigration consequences of each charge
were different.
Count 1, fleeing a pursing officer while driving against
traffic, constitutes a “crime of moral turpitude” for immigration
purposes. (Moran v. Barr (9th Cir. 2020) 960 F.3d 1158, 1162
(Moran).) Subject to exceptions not applicable here, “a noncitizen
without lawful status who is convicted of a crime of moral
turpitude is ineligible for . . . cancellation of removal.” (People v.
Curiel (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1174 (Curiel); see 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1229b(b)(1)(C); Lemus-Escobar v. Bondi
(9th Cir. 2025) 140 F.4th 1079, 1093.) Cancellation of removal is
a discretionary form of relief that allows the government to
“cancel removal in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or
deportable from the United States if the alien” meets specific
criteria.4 (8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1); see People v. Villalba (2023)
4 “The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and adjust to
the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence,
an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States
if the alien—[¶] (A) has been physically present in the United
9
89 Cal.App.5th 659, 666.) Vargastavera was charged as
removable for being present in the United States without
inspection or admission. (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).) Once
Vargastavera was placed in removal proceedings, his conviction
for fleeing a pursing officer while driving against traffic, a crime
of moral turpitude, rendered him statutorily ineligible for
cancellation of removal. (See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C);
Wilkinson v. Garland (2024) 601 U.S. 209, 213.)
Count 2, possession of ammunition by a felon, constitutes
an “aggravated felony” for immigration purposes. (See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii) [an offense described in 18 U.S.C. section
922(g)(1) is an aggravated felony]; 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) [it is
unlawful for any person who had been convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding a year to
possess any ammunition]; Oppedisano v. Holder (2d Cir. 2014)
769 F.3d 147, 149 [unlawful possession of ammunition by a felon
qualifies as an aggravated felony].) “A noncitizen who is
convicted of an aggravated felony is subject to mandatory
deportation and permanent exclusion from the United States.”
(Curiel, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1174.) “An aggravated felony
conviction also renders a noncitizen ineligible for certain types of
discretionary relief from deportation, such as asylum and
States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years
immediately preceding the date of such application; [¶] (B) has
been a person of good moral character during such period; [¶]
(C) has not been convicted of an offense under section [1182(a)(2),
1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3) of this title,] subject to paragraph (5);
and [¶] (D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or
child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence.” (8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).)
10
cancellation of removal.” (Ibid.; accord, People v. Manzanilla
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 891, 904 (Manzanilla).) Vargastavera did
not plead to this count, and it was dismissed pursuant to the plea
agreement.
Count 3, driving or taking a vehicle without consent, is
neither a crime involving moral turpitude nor an aggravated
felony for immigration purposes. (See Lopez-Marroquin v.
Garland (9th Cir. 2021) 9 F.4th 1067, 1069 [not an aggravated
felony]; Almanza-Arenas v. Lynch (9th Cir. 2016) 815 F.3d 469,
473 [not a crime against moral turpitude].) Vargastavera’s plea
to this count thus had no automatic effect on his immigration
status.
2. Defense counsel did not adequately defend against the
immigration consequences of his plea
Vargastavera contends he was unable to defend against the
immigration consequences of his plea because Munoz did not
“investigat[e] alternative pleas that would result in an
immigration neutral disposition . . . and negotiat[e] for them.”
We agree.
In Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356 (Padilla), the
United States Supreme Court acknowledged that a defendant’s
legal counsel has a duty to “plea bargain creatively with the
prosecutor in order to craft a conviction and sentence that
reduce[s] the likelihood of deportation, as by avoiding a
conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the removal
consequence.” (Id. at p. 373.) California subsequently codified
this holding in 2015 (§ 1016.2) and added to the Penal Code a
specific duty of counsel to “provide accurate and affirmative
advice about the immigration consequences of a proposed
disposition, and . . . defend against those consequences.”
11
(§ 1016.3, subd. (a); see Benitez-Torres, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1262.)
Munoz’s testimony demonstrates he failed to bargain
creatively with the prosecutor to reduce the likelihood of
immigration consequences. Making “some effort at negotiating
an immigration-neutral disposition,” as Munoz did here by
proposing a plea to a misdemeanor or to a sentence of less than a
year,5 does not necessarily satisfy counsel’s duty to defend
against immigration consequences. (People v. Lopez (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 569, 579 (Lopez) [defense counsel failed to
adequately defend against defendant’s felony charge of possession
of a controlled substance for sale despite counsel’s “attempt to
negotiate” a plea to a misdemeanor count of simple possession];
see Manzanilla, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 907-908 [defense
counsel’s attempt to “[s]imply request[] jail terms of six and nine
months” for a felony count of domestic violence that carried a
maximum sentence of four years in prison “was insufficient” and
did “not absolve her of her failure to defend”].)
Munoz’s proposed plea to a sentence of less than one year
was insufficient. It was not likely to be accepted by the
prosecutor. Munoz was facing three felonies and was on
5 Munoz testified that he proposed a plea agreement to a
sentence of less than one year in custody because he believed it
“t[ook] the offense out of an aggravated felony status.” This was
incorrect. Indeed, count 2, possession of ammunition by a felon,
is an aggravated felony regardless of the sentence imposed.
(8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); see also
Benitez-Torres, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 1263 [“long-standing
federal ‘precedents hold that whether a state classifies an offense
as a ‘misdemeanor’ is irrelevant to determining whether it is an
‘aggravated felony’ for purposes of federal law’ ”].)
12
probation for two additional felonies. (See Manzanilla, supra, 80
Cal.App.5th at pp. 898, 907-908 [defense counsel failed to make a
counteroffer of 364 days to prosecution’s initial offer of 365 days,
“which was more likely to be accepted by the prosecution than the
more significant sentence reductions she sought of six or nine
months”]; Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at pp. 579-580 [“It is
hardly surprising . . . that the prosecutor refused an offer to plead
to one misdemeanor when three felonies were charged.”].)
Instead, as Vargastavera argues, Munoz could have tried to
negotiate a plea to a felony violation of Vehicle Code section
2800.2, which is comparable to count 1 (Vehicle Code section
2800.4) but immigration neutral. (See Ramirez-Contreras v.
Sessions (9th Cir. 2017) 858 F.3d 1298, 1301-1302 [Vehicle Code
section 2800.2 is not a crime of moral turpitude].) First, the
offenses are similar enough that Vargastavera’s conduct is
captured by both. Vehicle Code section 2800.2 penalizes a person
who “flees or attempts to elude a pursuing peace officer” and
drives “in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons
or property.” (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a).) Vehicle Code
section 2800.4 penalizes a person who “willfully flees or attempts
to elude a pursuing peace officer” and “willfully drives that
vehicle on a highway in a direction opposite to that in which the
traffic lawfully moves upon that highway.” (Veh. Code, § 2800.4.)
Second, the available sentences for the offenses are the same,
carrying the same felony sentencing range of 16 months, or two
or three years in state prison. (Pen. Code, § 18, subd. (a); Veh.
Code, §§ 2800.2, 2800.4.)
The fact that Vehicle Code section 2800.2 is comparable to
the Vehicle Code section 2800.4 offense charged in count 1
demonstrates the strength of a proposed plea to this offense. Yet,
13
Munoz testified that he stopped negotiating after his two
proposals because, as he stated, “the discussion was more or less
this is what I was seeking.” This defense strategy was
insufficient. Considering the People were willing to offer a plea
to Vehicle Code section 2800.4 with a sentence of 16 months in
prison, Munoz could have proposed not only an equivalent
offense, but also a greater sentence. (See Manzanilla, supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 902 [counsel’s defense was insufficient
because he failed to counter the prosecution’s initial offer of 365
days’ jail with “a more reasonable offer”].) A greater sentence
would not have resulted in automatic adverse immigration
consequences.6 Thus, because Munoz failed to adequately
“defend against” immigration consequences, Vargastavera has
6 An individual is ineligible for cancellation of removal if he
or she is “convicted of [two] or more offenses (other than purely
political offenses), regardless of whether the conviction was in a
single trial or whether the offenses arose from a single scheme of
misconduct and regardless of whether the offenses involved moral
turpitude, for which the aggregate sentences to confinement were
[five] years or more.” (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B); see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(C); Ramirez-Medina v. Garland (9th Cir. 2021)
21 F.4th 586, 558-589.) Based on the probation report,
Vargastavera was sentenced for his prior convictions to a total
aggregate term of roughly two years 10 months, consisting of 364
days in jail (for carrying a firearm) plus 16 months in prison (for
violating probation) and 180 days in jail (for second degree
burglary). Thus, in the instant case, he could have negotiated a
total maximum sentence of about two years one month without
becoming statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal under
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C).
14
established error under section 1473.7.7 (See Lopez, supra,
66 Cal.App.5th at pp. 579-580 [counsel’s lack of understanding of
the relevant law impeded his ability to defend against
immigration consequences].)
C. Vargastavera Has Established Prejudice
Vargastavera has also established a reasonable probability
that he would have rejected the plea deal had he adequately
defended against the immigration consequences.
“The prejudice inquiry turns on ‘the totality of the
circumstances,’ including ‘the defendant’s ties to the United
States, the importance the defendant placed on avoiding
deportation, the defendant’s priorities in seeking a plea bargain,
and whether the defendant had reason to believe an immigration-
neutral negotiated disposition was possible.’ ” (Padron, supra,
109 Cal.App.5th at p. 959, quoting Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 529-530.) “These factors are not exhaustive, and no single
type of evidence is a prerequisite to relief.” (Espinoza, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 321.)
Several factors weigh in favor of finding Vargastavera was
prejudiced. First, Vargastavera demonstrated significant ties to
the United States. “Ties to the United States are an important
factor in evaluating prejudicial error under section 1473.7
because they shed light on a defendant’s immigration priorities.
. . . Depending on the strength of a defendant’s community ties,
7 Because we conclude defense counsel did not adequately
defend Vargas against immigration consequences, we need not
address his second contention that defense counsel did not
specifically advise him of the immigration consequences of his
plea.
15
‘the prospect of deportation’ may be . . . ‘ “the most important
part” ’ of the defendant’s ‘calculus in responding to certain
criminal charges.’ ” (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321.) Such
“ties may be established by length of residence; immigration
status; lack of connection to the country of origin; connections to
family, friends, or the community; work history or financial ties;
or other forms of attachment.” (Ibid.)
Vargastavera’s declaration establishes that he came to the
United States from Mexico as a very young child, and at the time
of his plea in 2022, he had lived in the United States for about 25
years. He was married to a United States citizen and had two
young United States citizen children. He “had no family in
Mexico”—all his siblings and extended family lived in the United
States. Vargastavera asserted he “would have done everything
[he] could to fight and make sure that [he] could stay [in the
United States] with [his] family.” Vargastavera’s “deep and long-
standing ties . . . weigh in favor of finding that he would have
considered immigration consequences to be of paramount concern
in deciding whether to accept a plea agreement.” (Espinoza,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 322 [prejudice established where
defendant spent most of his life in the United States, his wife and
five children were United States citizens, and his parents and
siblings lived in the United States]; Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 530 [same where defendant’s declaration showed he “had
virtually no ties to Mexico”]; People v. Lopez (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 698, 708 [same where defendant moved to the
United States at 13 years old, his entire family lived there, and
he lacked meaningful ties to his country of origin].)
The trial court found that Vargastavera’s assertion in his
declaration that he “would have done everything [he] could to
16
fight” his case was not credible. The People argue we must give
deference to the court’s finding and reject Vargastavera’s “self-
serving” declaration. The People are mistaken in asserting the
trial court’s finding must be accorded deference on independent
review. Vargastavera was not present at the evidentiary hearing
to provide any live testimony, and the trial court based its finding
entirely on Vargastavera’s written declaration. While Munoz
testified, he addressed only his efforts as a defense attorney, not
Vargastavera’s personal priorities in his case. Where, as here, a
finding is based on a cold record, we review such a finding
independently. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 319-320 [“no
deference is owed” when findings derive entirely from written
declarations]; Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 533 [“the Court of
Appeal was mistaken in believing the trial court’s factual
findings, which were based entirely on a cold record, ‘must be
accorded deference’ ”].)
Reviewing Vargastavera’s declaration under that standard,
we do not defer to the trial court’s finding. Vargastavera’s strong
ties to the United States, as evidenced in his declaration,
“constitute contemporaneous objective facts that corroborate [his]
concern about the immigration consequences of his plea options.”
(Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530; accord, Espinoza, at p. 321.)
Second, in addition to establishing strong ties to the United
States and concern about avoiding immigration consequences,
Vargastavera established that he “ ‘had reason to believe an
immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was possible.’ ”
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 323.) “Factors relevant to this
inquiry include the defendant’s criminal record, the strength of
the prosecution’s case, the seriousness of the charges or whether
the crimes involved sophistication, the district attorney’s
17
charging policies with respect to immigration consequences, and
the existence of comparable offenses without immigration
consequences.” (Ibid.) At the heart of this inquiry is not whether
“the prosecution would have offered a different bargain,” but
rather whether there is “evidence that would have caused the
defendant to expect or hope a different bargain would or could
have been negotiated.” (Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 567,
italics added; see Espinoza, at p. 324 [“a relevant consideration is
the probability of obtaining a more favorable outcome” and that
question “is informed by whether the defendant would have had
reason ‘to expect or hope’ that a plea deal without immigration
consequences ‘would or could have been negotiated’ ”]; Vivar,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529 [when a court weighs whether a
defendant would have expected to negotiate a different bargain,
“it need not decide whether the prosecution would actually ‘have
offered a different bargain’ ”].)
Vargastavera concedes that “he had two prior felony
convictions for which he was on probation at the time he
committed this offense.” (See Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 324 [“a defendant without an extensive criminal record may
persuasively contend that the prosecutor might have been willing
to offer an alternative plea without immigration consequences”].)
He also concedes the prosecution’s case “appears . . . strong.”
However, we agree with Vargastavera there are other factors
that indicate he would have had reason to hope for a different
bargain. (See Padron, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at pp. 964-965
[defendant established prejudice even though he had a criminal
record and “the evidence against him presented ‘a strong case’ ”].)
For instance, Vargastavera pleaded no contest at his very
first court appearance, after spending only five days in custody
18
and waiving a preliminary hearing. Had he been aware of the
specific immigration consequences and the existence of
alternative immigration-safe pleas, he could have “tested the
prosecution’s resolve” and devoted more time to negotiating. (See
Padron, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at pp. 955, 965 [reasonable
probability defendant would have had reason to hope for a better
bargain where defendant pleaded before the preliminary hearing
and “[a]fter meeting with his public defender twice”]; People v.
Rodriguez (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 301, 326 [same where defendant
“hardly negotiated” and thus “never tested the prosecution’s
resolve”].)
Further, as discussed, Vargastavera’s case presented
strong negotiating opportunities and alternatives to a plea to
Vehicle Code section 2800.4 that were never explored. That
Vargastavera could have offered to plead to the comparable but
immigration neutral offense of violating Vehicle Code section
2800.2, with an agreement to serve a lengthier prison sentence,
supports Vargastavera’s assertion that he had reason to expect or
hope for a plea bargain without immigration consequences.
The People point to the prosecutor’s statement at the
evidentiary hearing that “the 16-month offer” was “the best offer
[Vargastavera] was going to get.” Based on this fact, the People
argue “there is nothing, other than [Vargastavera’s] pure
speculation, to support . . . that . . . an alternative immigration-
neutral plea . . . would have been offered and accepted.” But, as
noted, the test for prejudice is not whether the prosecutor would
have actually offered and accepted the plea. (Vivar, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 529.) Rather, the focus is on what the defendant
would have done. (Ibid.) Considering Vargastavera never tested
the prosecution’s resolve, the charges were not “serious” within
19
the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(1), and the
alternative immigration-safe plea could have involved a lengthier
prison sentence than what the prosecution initially offered, he
raised more than an abstract possibility that he reasonably could
have hoped for a better deal. (See Padron, supra,
109 Cal.App.5th at pp. 964-965 [defendant “may have reasonably
hoped to secure a[n immigration-safe] plea” despite evidence the
prosecution would not extend such a plea offer]; Curiel, supra,
92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1180 [rejecting People’s argument “that the
record fails to demonstrate that any of these proposed plea deals
would have been offered by the prosecutor or accepted by the
court”]; People v. Lopez, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 719 [“the
Attorney General places far more weight on whether an
immigration-neutral disposition would have been offered by the
prosecutor and accepted by the trial court than this factor
deserves in the court’s consideration of the ‘totality of
circumstances’ ”]; Manzanilla, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 913
[defendant “had reason to believe an immigration-neutral
disposition was possible, because all he needed was a one-day
reduction in jail time” from the sentence the prosecution had
offered].)
Additionally, the probability of obtaining a more favorable
outcome is “only one factor for the trial court to consider when
assessing the credibility of a defendant’s claim that he or she
would have rejected the plea bargain if properly advised.”
(Martinez, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 564; see Padron, supra,
109 Cal.App.5th at p. 964 [whether the defendant “could have
secured a more favorable plea deal or prevailed at trial does not
conclusively determine whether he established prejudice under
section 1473.7”].) “ ‘The decision whether to plead guilty also
20
involves assessing the respective consequences of a conviction.’ ”
(People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 872.) As discussed,
Vargastavera had been in this country for almost his whole life
and had no ties to Mexico, and he asserts he would have gone to
trial to avoid abandoning his family. Based on these facts, we
conclude that, even if the deck was stacked against him during
plea negotiations, his immigration status was demonstrably so
important to him “that he would have gone to trial if that was his
only hope of avoiding” immigration consequences. (Lopez, supra,
66 Cal.App.5th at p. 581; see Martinez, at p. 564 [“a defendant
might decline to accept an offer if there is little to lose by
rejecting it, particularly if acceptance would have significant
adverse consequences”]; Mejia, at p. 871 [prejudice occurs when
there is a reasonable probability that the person “would have
risked going to trial (even if only to figuratively throw a ‘Hail
Mary’)—had the person known that the guilty plea would result
in mandatory and dire immigration consequences”].)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Vargastavera’s section 1473.7 motion is
reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to grant the
motion, vacate the conviction, and permit Vargastavera to
withdraw his plea.
STONE, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J. SEGAL, J.
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