CourtListener 10714966•People v. Jack CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 10/30/25 P. v. Jack CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C100841
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 21FE007741)
v.
JEREMY MICHAEL JACK,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Jeremy Michael Jack was convicted of committing a lewd or lascivious
act on a child under the age of 14. The trial court imposed a five-year term of probation
with conditions requiring Jack to consent to warrantless searches of his electronic storage
devices and internet accounts and prohibiting his unchaperoned association with minors
other than his son. On appeal, Jack contends that the electronics search conditions should
be stricken as unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) or, at a
minimum, modified as unconstitutionally overbroad. He also maintains that the
association condition should be modified due to its overbreadth. We find the electronics
search conditions reasonable under Lent, but we accept the People’s concession that they
1
are unconstitutionally overbroad. We see no constitutional infirmity in the association
condition. We therefore remand the matter to the trial court to strike or modify the
electronics search condition.
BACKGROUND
I.
In May 2021, police were dispatched to Jack’s residence after his older son
reported that Jack had molested the victim, Jack’s younger son, who was then 13 years
old. When police arrived, Jack acknowledged having “slightly molested” the victim by
touching his buttocks while cuddling him in bed. The victim told the police that he
quickly got out of the bed and that, later that evening, Jack apologized and admitted
having wanted to have sex with him at the time.
An amended information charged Jack with one count of committing a lewd or
lascivious act on a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)).1 It further alleged as
an aggravating factor that Jack took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to
commit the offense.
At trial, the jury heard evidence that Jack had been drinking alcohol continuously
for at least one week leading up to the incident and was intoxicated and experiencing
alcohol withdrawals when he originally spoke with police. Jack testified that he was “a
binge drinker” and that he had no memory of his actions that night or of his original
police interviews because he was “in a blackout state.” He further testified that during
binges he would sometimes try to talk with people through dating applications on his
smartphone to try to distract himself enough to taper off drinking. Jack stated that he
vaguely recalled using an app called Grindr on the night of the incident. Although he
was aware that this app was commonly used for arranging sexual encounters, he would
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
use it for the purpose of nonsexual conversation with other users. Jack testified that, on
the night of the incident, he was conversing with someone on Grindr, and when the
conversation turned sexual, he ended it and returned to drinking. He then went into his
bedroom to rest, not knowing the victim was asleep in the bed. Jack told the jury that he
was not having sexual feelings following his Grindr conversation. The jury also heard
Jack’s recorded statements to police that he had touched the victim “[b]ecause [he] was
sexually excited at the time,” explaining that he was “sexually aroused” but his arousal
was not directed toward the victim.
At trial, the victim, then age 15, denied that Jack had ever touched him
inappropriately, stating that it was all a misunderstanding. Both the victim and his older
brother, who was age 18 at the time of trial, testified that they had very good relationships
with Jack. The victim stated that he wished to return to living primarily with Jack, as he
had since his parents separated except for a few months after Jack’s arrest and a short
time preceding the trial.
Jack was convicted as charged, and the trial court found true the aggravating factor
that he abused a position of trust in committing the offense.
II.
Before sentencing, the trial court ordered a psychological evaluation of Jack
pursuant to section 288.1. In February 2024, the psychologist submitted a report opining
that Jack was not predisposed to commit sexual offenses, would not pose an elevated risk
of danger to others, and was not unsuitable for probation because of mental health issues.
The report included Jack’s own narrative of the offense, in which he described turning to
Grindr to find someone to talk to when his siblings were not available. Jack was quoted
as stating: “I only wanted to chat to distract myself from drinking but people just want to
have sex on those apps, but it had distracted me for about four or five hours from
drinking. I thought maybe I can lie down and get some sleep. I was having a
conversation with a guy on Grindr and he was being sexual so I was aroused.” Jack then
3
described leaving the app, finding the victim asleep in Jack’s room, and feeling the need
to hold him for comfort. The psychologist opined that Jack’s offense “was an impulsive
act while acutely intoxicated by alcohol within the backdrop of his lacking a healthy
intimate partnership and being primed for sexual arousal due to the sexual nature of the
online chat with which he had been engaged immediately preceding the offense.” She
concluded that, if Jack were to reoffend, it would most likely occur “within the context of
acute alcohol intoxication in combination with lack of an appropriate intimate partnership
and spontaneous, or unplanned, contact with a victim.” The probation department
prepared a presentence report recommending that Jack be granted probation, subject to
various conditions.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court deemed Jack suitable for probation,
finding that he was “not a danger to reoffend.” The court found that Jack was not a
danger to either the community or his family. The court allowed Jack peaceful contact
with his sons, over the People’s request for a criminal protective order. The court
suspended imposition of a prison sentence and placed Jack on a five-year term of
probation with 270 days in county jail.
The trial court imposed most of the probation conditions recommended in the
presentence report, striking certain conditions, modifying others following discussion
with the parties, and adding certain conditions. As relevant here, the court imposed the
following conditions of probation:
Condition 3 required Jack to submit his “person, property and automobile and any
object under [his] control to search and seizure” with or without a warrant at any time.
At defense counsel’s request, the trial court limited this condition to searches for alcohol
and drugs and for whether any minor was present with Jack. The court declined the
People’s request to add to that list searches for any illegal sexual material, noting its
concern about a “lack of nexus.”
4
Condition 5 stated: “Defendant shall not associate with any minor under the age
of eighteen (18) without an adult being present who has been approved by the Court.
Defendant shall not knowingly communicate, either in writing or electronically with any
minor under the age of eighteen (18) without the prior approval of the Court.” At defense
counsel’s request, the trial court modified this condition to permit Jack’s unsupervised
association with the victim, who was then (as now) still under age 18. The prosecutor
asked whether he was correct in understanding that this meant the victim could be in
Jack’s presence alone but “all other minors still need approval from the Court, or
probation.” The court and defense counsel confirmed that was their understanding.
Condition 9 stated: “Defendant shall disclose all e-mail accounts, all Internet
accounts, and any other means of access to any computer or computer network, all
passwords and access codes. Defendant shall consent to the search of such e-mail and
Internet accounts at any time and the seizure of any information or data contained therein
without a search warrant or probable cause.” The trial court stated that this condition was
being imposed “as part of [Jack’s] sex offender management program,” which he was
required to complete as another condition of probation.
Condition 13 prohibited Jack from “knowingly engag[ing] in volunteer work
involving minors without the permission of the probation officer or Court.”
Finally, condition 16 required Jack to submit his “person, place, property,
automobile, electronic storage devices, and any object under his[] control, including but
not limited to cell phones and computers, to search and seizure by any law enforcement
officer or probation officer, any time of the day or night, with or without a warrant, with
or without his[] presence or further consent.” This condition further stated that, by
accepting probation, Jack “specifically consented to searches of his[] electronic storage
devices” and was required to “provide access to any electronic storage devices and data
contained therein, including disclosing and providing any and all information necessary
to conduct a search.”
5
Jack timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Jack contends that the electronics search conditions contained in conditions 9 and
16 should be stricken because they are unreasonable under Lent or, at a minimum,
modified as unconstitutionally overbroad. He also claims that condition 5, limiting his
association with minors, should be modified due to its unconstitutional overbreadth.
Jack failed to object to, or request modification of, any of these conditions on the
grounds now raised on appeal. He argues that his constitutional claims are nevertheless
preserved for our review because they present pure questions of law; and to the extent
objections were required, he asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
request to strike or modify the challenged conditions. The People state that they are not
invoking forfeiture as to either set of claims so as to avoid Jack’s alternative claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
The failure to object to a probation condition as unreasonable under Lent generally
forfeits the contention on appeal. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234-235, 237;
In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 294.) And only facial constitutional challenges
to a probation condition that are “capable of correction without reference to the particular
sentencing record” are exempt from the general forfeiture rule. (In re Sheena K. (2007)
40 Cal.4th 875, 887; see id. at p. 885.) While Jack’s constitutional claims do not fit that
description, we nevertheless exercise our discretion to consider the merits of both his
Lent and constitutional claims in light of the People’s concession and Jack’s alternative
contention that his trial counsel’s failure to make an adequate objection constituted
ineffective assistance. (See People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 854 [considering
issues not raised in trial court to forestall later claim of constitutionally inadequate
representation]; People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [appellate courts
may reach unpreserved questions].)
6
I.
We first address Jack’s challenges to the electronics search requirements contained
in conditions 9 and 16.
A trial court may impose any “reasonable conditions [of probation], as it may
determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be
made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting
from that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of
the probationer . . . .” (§ 1203.1, subd. (j).) In People v. Lent, our state high court
determined that a condition of probation “will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no
relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct
which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably
related to future criminality . . . .’ ” (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) “This test is
conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a
probation term.” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) In applying the Lent
test, we review the conditions imposed for abuse of discretion. (In re Ricardo P. (2019)
7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118; People v. Salvador (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 57, 62, 64.)
We find dispositive the first element of Lent’s test, which “asks whether the
probation condition has no relationship to the conviction.” (People v. Patton (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 934, 945; see Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) Here, the record supports
an implied finding that there was a relationship between the offense and Jack’s use of an
electronic device and the internet. Both the evidence at trial and the section 288.1 report
reflect that Jack used his smartphone to engage in a conversation with someone on the
Grindr application before entering his bedroom and lying down with the victim. Jack
testified that, on previous occasions, he had turned to social media applications like
Grindr to help him end periods of binge drinking. Jack’s psychological evaluation and
police interviews reflect that, on the night of the offense, Jack’s Grindr conversation
turned sexual and caused him to feel sexually aroused at the time he began holding the
7
victim. Notably, the section 288.1 report found that Jack’s offense was an impulsive act
committed “within the backdrop of . . . being primed for sexual arousal due to the sexual
nature of the online chat with which he had been engaged immediately preceding the
offense.” Given these facts, we cannot say it was an abuse of discretion to impliedly find
a relationship between Jack’s use of electronic devices and the offense. That is sufficient
to reject Jack’s claim under Lent because a “probation condition must trigger all three
Lent factors to be invalid.” (People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 719-720,
724 [electronics search condition reasonable, even while “somewhat attenuated” under
Lent’s first prong, where defendant met victim via smartphone app several months before
committing sex offense]; see also People v. Salvador, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 63-64
[nexus between offenses and use of electronic devices somewhat attenuated “but not
altogether absent” where defendant used cell phone to communicate with victims on
social media, even though communications did not “facilitate[] his commission of the
offenses”].)
Turning next to Jack’s alternative argument that the electronics search conditions
are unconstitutionally overbroad, we agree that they are not adequately tailored. “If a
probation condition serves to rehabilitate and protect public safety, the condition may
‘impinge upon a constitutional right otherwise enjoyed by the probationer, who is “not
entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as other citizens.” ’ ” (People v.
O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1355.) “A probation condition that imposes
limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the
purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.”
(In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) “The essential question in an overbreadth
challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and
the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of
course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will
justify some infringement.” (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153.) We review
8
constitutional overbreadth questions de novo. (In re P.O., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at
p. 297.)
Jack objects to the portion of condition 16 permitting warrantless searches of his
“electronic storage devices,” including his cell phones and computers, and condition 9’s
required disclosure of “all e-mail accounts, all Internet accounts,” and “all passwords and
access codes.” The People concede that these conditions “are not narrowly tailored to
achieve their purpose,” which is to ensure Jack’s compliance with his sex offender
management program and other terms of probation. We accept this concession. As
written, these conditions permit searches of all manner of Jack’s digital information,
including, for example, health records and financial information lacking any connection
to the purpose of the conditions. Given that broad sweep, we agree the electronics search
requirements contained in conditions 9 and 16 are not sufficiently tailored. (See In re
P.O., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 298 [finding electronics search condition overbroad
because it permitted “review of all sorts of private information that is highly unlikely to
shed any light on whether [the juvenile was] complying with the other conditions of his
probation, drug-related or otherwise”]; People v. Appleton, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 719, 725 [finding overbroad condition that authorized “search[es] of [the] defendant’s
mobile electronic devices [that] could potentially expose a large volume of documents or
data, much of which may have nothing to do with illegal activity,” including “medical
records, financial records, personal diaries, and intimate correspondence”].)
The People propose that we modify the electronics search conditions to require
Jack to provide his social media accounts and passwords to the probation officer. We
decline to order a specific revision and instead remand for the trial court to strike or
modify the electronics search conditions and to consider their proper scope in the first
instance. (See People v. Bray (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 494, 503; People v. Appleton,
supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 727.)
9
II.
Jack next contends that condition 5’s limitation on his association with minors
should be modified because it is an unconstitutionally overbroad infringement of his right
of association. We review de novo whether this limitation is “closely tailor[ed]” to its
purpose. (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890; see In re P.O., supra,
246 Cal.App.4th at p. 297.)
Condition 5 prohibits Jack’s association “with any minor under the age of
eighteen (18) without an adult being present who has been approved by the Court,”
except for Jack’s minor son. (Condition 5 also prohibits Jack from knowingly
communicating with minors under age 18 without prior court approval, but Jack does not
challenge this part of the condition.) Jack argues that condition 5 is overbroad because,
first, as the primary caregiver for his minor son (who was 16 years old at the time this
appeal was taken), Jack will need to attend school activities and come in contact with his
son’s friends and, second, as a sign language interpreter by trade, he will sometimes be
asked to interpret for a minor or group of minors. He argues that these types of
associations do not present any risk to the public and may not involve advance notice,
making the presence of a pre-approved chaperone “impractical.” At the same time, Jack
acknowledges that “some restriction” on his association with minors is warranted. Jack
proposes modifying condition 5 to permit certain activities involving minors with his
probation officer’s permission rather than requiring a pre-approved chaperone, offering
condition 13 as an example of this model. He suggests: “Normal parental and work
activities can be described and approved, leaving only private one-on-one interactions
with a minor subject to the chaperone requirement.”
As to Jack’s concern with this condition’s impact on his ability to work as a sign
language interpreter, the People question whether Jack is presently working in that
capacity, and there is evidence in the record suggesting he is not. But even assuming
Jack has constitutionally protected associational interests in both categories of
10
associations he asserts, a question his briefs do not address (see Isbister v. Boys’ Club of
Santa Cruz, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 72, 85 [Constitution protects “ ‘intimate’ ” and
“ ‘expressive’ ” associational rights]), we discern no constitutional defect in condition 5.
Given the circumstances of the offense, there is a legitimate purpose for restricting his
unchaperoned access to minors, even those he encounters outside of his home. While
Jack emphasizes the trial court’s finding that he is not a danger to the community or
likely to reoffend, he nevertheless concedes that some restriction on his association with
minors is warranted.
The chaperone requirement is also adequately tailored to that purpose. (In re E.O.,
supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1153 [perfection not required].) It does not forbid
associations altogether, but instead simply requires the presence of another adult as a
means to prevent repetition of the type of conduct underlying Jack’s offense. Indeed, at
least one court has suggested that this sort of chaperone condition is a more narrowly
tailored condition than others that could be imposed when, like here, limits on a
probationer’s contact with minors are warranted. (People v. Bray, supra,
112 Cal.App.5th at p. 503 [striking different condition and observing that there are “other
more narrowly tailored conditions that could be imposed to serve the same purpose of
protecting children, such as a requirement that [the defendant] not associate with minors
unless a responsible adult approved by his probation officer is present”], citing People v.
Urke (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 766, 769, 775 [affirming revocation of probation based on
violation of condition prohibiting association with minors without pre-approved
responsible adult present].)
Jack likens the burden imposed by condition 5 to those identified in United
States v. Wolf Child (9th Cir. 2012) 699 F.3d 1082, where a probation condition
prohibited a father, who had been convicted of attempted sexual abuse, from being in the
company of minors without prior written approval from his probation officer. (Id. at
p. 1087.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the condition
11
overbroad, reasoning that it “effectively prohibit[ed] [the defendant] from acting as a
responsible father to his own daughters. It require[d] him to obtain written permission
before taking his daughter to a pediatrician; or meeting one of his daughter’s boyfriends
before allowing her to go on a date with him; or taking his children to places of worship
or other tribal functions, or to family gatherings, or other social affairs.” (Id. at p. 1101;
see id. at p. 1102.) In contrast here, the challenged condition does not forbid associations
without advance approval, but allows them, provided that an approved adult is present.
And while Jack argues that he is required to “forfeit supervision of his son’s social
activities,” he has not demonstrated, for example, that no chaperoning adults are available
or that other particular barriers to satisfying the condition are present such that the
condition operates to prevent him from participating in his son’s life or other protected
associations. We therefore reject Jack’s challenge to condition 5.
DISPOSITION
We remand the matter to the trial court to strike or modify probation conditions 9
and 16 in accordance with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
We concur:
/s/
RENNER, Acting P. J.
/s/
KRAUSE, J.
12
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.