CourtListener 10712575•People v. Marshall CA2/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 10/28/25 P. v. Marshall CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B337796
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA089045)
v.
ERIC DWIGHT MARSHALL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Carol J. Najera, Judge. Reversed and remanded
with directions.
California Appellate Project and Jonathan E. Demson,
under appointments by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and John Yang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Eric Dwight Marshall appeals from the trial court’s
summary denial of his petition under Penal Code section 1172.6
for resentencing on his conviction for manslaughter.1 Because the
record of conviction does not conclusively establish Marshall is
ineligible for resentencing on his manslaughter conviction as a
matter of law, we reverse and remand the matter for the court to
issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing
on that count.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The charges and trial
In March 2007, the People filed an information charging
Marshall with the murder of Asebedo Daiz2 on January 13, 2006
(§ 187, subd. (a) (count 1)). The People alleged that Marshall
committed the murder for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with a gang and that a principal personally used and
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death
in the commission of the murder (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A),
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The information states the victim’s name as “Asebedo
Daiz.” In closing argument, however, the prosecutor referred to
this victim as “David Asevedo.”
2
12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d) & (e)(1) (count 1). An amended
information filed in 2008 charged Marshall and Adam Lenard
Cain with murdering Daiz. The amended information included
the same gang and firearm allegations as the original
information. Both documents also charged Marshall with
assaulting Mario Orabucno with a firearm on December 4, 2005
(§ 245, subd. (a)(2) (count 2).) In that count, the People alleged
Marshall had personally used a firearm. (§ 12022.5.)
The case went to trial in 2008. At trial, the court instructed
the jury on (among other principles) murder (CALCRIM Nos. 500,
501, 520), aiding and abetting of intended crimes (CALCRIM
Nos. 400, 401), accomplices (CALCRIM No. 335), and other
perpetrator (CALCRIM No. 373). The court did not instruct the
jury on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.
In closing, the prosecutor argued Marshall was the actual
killer and Cain was the getaway driver. He also argued Stanley
Mitchell—an un-joined perpetrator—was an accomplice and a
principal in the murder who also fired shots at the victim.
Mitchell “accepted some responsibility” for his actions and “he
received leniency . . . in exchange for his testimony.” The
prosecution conceded the evidence did not “absolutely confirm
who fired the fatal bullet.” Although the prosecutor argued
Marshall was “the one who pulled the trigger that killed” Daiz,
he also argued the jury could, alternatively, find Marshall guilty
of murder as an aider and abettor.
The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the murder
charge as to either defendant, voting 11 to one for guilty. The
court declared a mistrial on that count. The jury convicted
Marshall on count 2, assault with a firearm on Orabucno, and
3
found the personal use of a firearm allegation true. Another
panel of this court affirmed Marshall’s conviction. (People v.
Marshall (Nov. 15, 2010, B214231) [nonpub. opn.] (Marshall I).)
The plea agreement and sentencing
In September 2008, Marshall entered into a plea agreement
with the People. The prosecution moved to amend the
information to add counts 3 and 4. Count 3 charged attempted
murder (without an allegation that the attempted murder was
willful, deliberate, and premeditated) and count 4 charged
manslaughter. The prosecutor did not specify a victim or an
offense date for either count 3 or count 4. Marshall pleaded no
contest to both counts 3 and 4. In connection with count 3,
Marshall admitted he had personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53,
subdivision (c). On both counts 3 and 4, Marshall admitted the
gang allegations.
In accordance with Marshall’s plea agreement with the
People, the trial court sentenced him to 41 years and four months
in the state prison. On count 3, for attempted murder, the court
imposed the upper term of nine years, plus 20 years for the
firearm allegation, and 10 years for the gang allegation. On count
2 (assault with a firearm, on which the jury already had
convicted Marshall), the court imposed one-third the midterm of
three years (thus, one year) plus one-third the midterm of four
years for the firearm (thus, 16 months), for a total of two years
four months. On count 4, manslaughter, the court imposed the
midterm of six years, to be served concurrently with the other
4
counts. The court dismissed the murder count (count 1) in
accordance with the plea deal.3
The trial court denies Marshall’s resentencing petition
In July 2022, Marshall filed a form petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6.4 The one box Marshall
checked stated, “I was convicted of murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter following a trial or I accepted a plea
offer in lieu of a trial at which I could have been convicted of
murder or attempted murder.” The superior court found the
petition was “facially sufficient” and appointed counsel later that
month.
In May 2023, the prosecution filed an opposition to
Marshall’s petition. The prosecution asserted the trial court had
not instructed Marshall’s jury on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine and he had been prosecuted as the actual
shooter. The prosecution attached the reporter’s transcript of the
change of plea proceeding and sentencing, the jury instructions
given at Marshall’s trial, and the reporter’s transcript of the
prosecutor’s closing argument.
3 The prosecution also added count 4, manslaughter, against
Cain. Cain pleaded to the charge and admitted the gang
allegation for an agreed-upon sentence of 21 years (the upper
term of 11 years for the manslaughter plus 10 years for the gang
enhancement).
4 In the version of the petition included in the record on
appeal, Marshall checked only one of the three boxes necessary to
comprise a facially sufficient petition, and he did not check the
box requesting appointment of counsel. The trial court, however,
deemed the petition sufficient and appointed counsel.
5
In October 2023, Marshall’s counsel filed a reply. Counsel
contended the court should rely on the “trial transcripts” and
“trial record,” and not on the opinion on direct appeal. Counsel
also stated Marshall was 19 at the time of the manslaughter and
the court should take his youth into account.
The trial court held a hearing on the petition on December
15, 2023. The court stated Marshall was ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law. The court noted whether trial
transcripts from a mistrial were part of the “record of conviction”
was an interesting question. In any event, the court continued,
there was an “intervening factor,” and that was the change of
plea and admissions made in connection with the pleas.
Marshall timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Section 1172.6 resentencing
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) eliminated the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for murder
liability and limited the scope of the felony murder rule. (People
v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) The Legislature
later extended resentencing eligibility to individuals convicted of
murder on any “other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime,” of
manslaughter, or of attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. (Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2(a); § 1172.6, subd. (a).)
Together, Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and 775 created a
procedure allowing a person convicted of murder, manslaughter,
or attempted murder under the former law to seek resentencing if
the person could no longer be convicted under the amended law.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; § 1172.6.)
6
The prima facie stage and the record of conviction
A defendant who pleaded no contest to manslaughter must
make a make a prima facie showing of eligibility to establish
entitlement to resentencing. (People v. Estrada (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 328, 336.) “After the parties have had an opportunity
to submit briefings,” the superior court must “hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for
relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the
petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to
show cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
“[T]he ‘prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set
very low.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) At this stage,
“ ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and
makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the
petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual
allegations were proved.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 971.) In assessing whether
a defendant has made a prima facie showing, the court may
review the record of conviction, which will “necessarily inform the
trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing
the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those
that are clearly meritless.” (Ibid.)
“We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6
petition at the prima facie stage.” (People v. Bodely (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200.)
Analysis
In arguing Marshall is ineligible for resentencing on his
manslaughter conviction as a matter of law, the Attorney General
relies heavily on the jury instructions from Marshall’s trial and
the reporter’s transcript of the prosecutor’s closing argument. The
Attorney General also seems to rely on testimony given at trial
7
and the opinion on direct appeal, Marshall I. Below, however, the
People never submitted the trial transcripts to the superior court
in connection with their opposition to Marshall’s petition.
Nor did the Attorney General request to augment the
record on appeal or ask us to take judicial notice of the trial
transcripts. The Attorney General filed his respondent’s brief on
March 11, 2025, and Marshall’s counsel filed his reply brief on
April 21, 2025. Not until oral argument on August 13, 2025, did
the Deputy Attorney General request—orally—that we consider
trial transcripts. But, “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances”—and
the Deputy Attorney General has cited none here—“appellate
courts generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not
presented to the trial court.” (Bullock v. City of Antioch (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 407, 417, fn. 7.) Moreover, “ ‘[o]bvious reasons of
fairness militate against consideration of an issue raised initially’
at oral argument.” (People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924,
990.) Following oral argument, the Attorney General rescinded
his request for judicial notice. We do not consider the trial
transcripts.5
5 Accordingly, we need not consider the question of whether
the transcripts from a trial that ended in a mistrial constitute
part of the “record of conviction” as defined by Lewis and other
cases decided under section 1172.6. (But cf. People v. Bartow
(1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1573, 1579–1580 [reporter’s transcript
from mistrial forms part of record of conviction generally; “even
more protections are afforded a defendant at the actual trial
before a superior court judge and jury than are afforded by a
preliminary hearing before a magistrate”]; People v. Patton (2025)
17 Cal.5th 549, 564 [court may “rely on unchallenged, relief-
foreclosing facts within a preliminary hearing transcript to refute
conclusory, checkbox allegations” in a petition at the prima facie
stage].)
8
Marshall is not conclusively ineligible for resentencing on
his manslaughter conviction as a matter of law
A defendant who pleaded no contest to manslaughter is
eligible for resentencing if the charging document permitted the
prosecution to pursue a conviction under the felony-murder rule,
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other
imputed malice theory. (People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
1206, 1211; § 1172.6, subd. (a).) Marshall contends that, had he
not resolved his case by plea after the mistrial, he could have at a
retrial been prosecuted under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. We agree that nothing in the record of
conviction conclusively precludes that possibility.
Where an information charges murder with malice
aforethought, it encompasses “any theory of murder,” including
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
(People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 233.) Marshall was
charged with murder, and the record of conviction does not
establish that the prosecution could not have proceeded at retrial
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The
prosecution could have argued—as it suggested at the 2008
trial—that Marshall intended to aid and abet Mitchell (the un-
joined perpetrator) in a target offense such as assault, that
Mitchell murdered the victim, and that the murder was the
natural and probable consequence of the target offense. (See
People v. Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 611 [“ ‘if a person aids and
abets only an intended assault, but a murder results, that person
9
may be guilty of that murder, even if unintended, if it is a natural
and probable consequence of the intended assault.’ ”].)6
In sum, here, the record of conviction—construed broadly—
does not conclusively refute Marshall’s allegations or establish as
a matter of law that he is precluded from pursuing resentencing
on his manslaughter conviction under section 1172.6.7 The
6 Marshall also contends he is eligible for resentencing
because he could have been prosecuted for second degree felony
murder at a retrial. (Cf. People v. Nino (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th
844 [reversing denial of section 1172.6 petition because defendant
“could have been convicted of second degree felony murder based
on the now-invalid imputed malice theory that [he] intended only
to commit an inherently dangerous felony such as the grossly
negligent discharge of a firearm”].) We need not address this
alternative basis for relief.
7 According to the record, Marshall did not pursue
resentencing on his conviction for attempted murder. The
briefing in the trial court by the district attorney’s office as well
as Marshall’s court-appointed counsel focused only on whether he
was the “actual killer.” That argument concerns the
manslaughter count. Marshall’s counsel never argued—in his
brief or at oral argument—that Marshall also was seeking
resentencing on the attempted murder count. On appeal,
counsel’s briefing is devoted to “the murder charge,” “murder
liability,” and whether “he was the actual killer.” When moving to
amend the information as part of the plea agreement, the People
did not name a victim or a date in either count 3 or count 4. We
assume the victim of the manslaughter was Daiz. However, the
victim of the attempted murder in count 3 cannot have been
Orabucno, the victim in count 2. According to the prosecutor’s
closing argument, Marshall pointed a gun at Orabucno, kicked
his car, and spat in his face. But there was no allegation he fired
10
“ ‘prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very low.’ ”
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) Marshall has met this
burden and established a prima facie case. This necessitates an
order to show cause and a hearing on the merits consistent with
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). We express no opinion on how
the trial court on remand should evaluate or weigh the evidence,
nor do we express any opinion as to whether the petition has
merit.8
his weapon at Orabucno. The record does not reflect any other
person who was present during the January 13, 2006 incident
and was shot at. In any event, as far as we can tell, nothing
precludes Marshall from petitioning for resentencing on count 3 if
he wishes to do so.
8 Because we reverse the order denying Marshall’s petition,
we do not reach his assertion that the denial violated his due
process rights.
11
DISPOSITION
We reverse the order denying Marshall’s petition for
resentencing on his manslaughter conviction and remand the
matter. On remand, the trial court is directed to vacate its prior
order denying Marshall’s petition, issue an order to show cause,
and hold an evidentiary hearing on count 4 as required by section
1172.6, subdivision (d).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KLATCHKO, J.*
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
ADAMS, J.
* Judge of the Riverside Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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