CourtListener 10711780•Cagle v. Rublevich CA2/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 10/27/25 Cagle v. Rublevich CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
JEFFREY CAGLE, B342923
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24SMCV01890)
v.
EVE RUBLEVICH et al.,
Defendants and
Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, H. Jay Ford III, Judge. Affirmed.
Krishel Law Firm and Daniel L. Krishel for Defendants
and Appellants.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________
Appellants Eve Rublevich, Eden Rublevich, Michael
Rublevich, and Yiffat Rublevich (the Rubleviches) appeal the trial
court’s denial of their anti-SLAPP motion.1 The Rubleviches
argue the basis of respondent Jeffrey Cagle’s complaint against
them was an affidavit Eve filed under Civil Code section 2924m
(section 2924m) in connection with her bid on a foreclosed-upon
Beverly Hills condominium (the Property), and that—contrary to
the trial court’s finding—this affidavit constituted an act in
furtherance of Eve’s right to free speech in connection with a
public issue under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,
subdivisions (e)(2) and (e)(4) (section 425.16(e)(2) and section
425.16(e)(4)). Finding no error, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. Section 2924m
“Section 2924m was added to the statutory scheme
governing nonjudicial foreclosure sales effective January 1, 2021.
(Stats. 2020, ch. 202, § 7.) The statute ‘prescribe[s] an
alternative process’ for ‘a trustee’s sale of property under a power
of sale contained in a deed of trust or mortgage on real property’
that contains one to four residential units. (Legis. Counsel’s Dig.,
Sen. Bill No. 1079, Stats. 2020 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), ch. 202.)
Where . . . a prospective owner-occupant, as defined in section
2924m, is not the last and highest bidder at the trustee’s sale, the
statute grants other entities, as defined in the statute, ‘certain
rights and priorities to make bids on the property after the initial
trustee sale and potentially to purchase it as the last and highest
1 Because appellants share a surname, we refer to them by
their first name.
2
bidder, subject to certain requirements and timelines.’ ” (Bird
Rock Home Mortgage, LLC v. Breaking Ground, LP (2025) 114
Cal.App.5th 492, 500-501 (Bird Rock).)
“The way section 2924m works is to delay the finality of a
trustee’s nonjudicial foreclosure sale to allow specified entities to
submit bids equal to or greater than the highest bid made at the
sale. A trustee’s sale generally is deemed final when the
auctioneer accepts the last and highest bid. [Citations.] If the
sale is ‘under a power of sale contained in a deed of trust or
mortgage on real property containing one to four residential
units,’ however, the sale will be deemed final at the end of the
auction only if the last and highest bidder is ‘a prospective owner-
occupant’ (§ 2924m, subd. (c)(1)), i.e., a natural person who
intends to occupy the property as a primary residence and meets
other requirements (id., subd. (a)(1)). If the last and highest bid
at the trustee’s sale is not made by a prospective owner-occupant,
certain entities may submit bids matching or exceeding the last
and highest bid at the sale. In that event, the trustee’s sale is not
deemed final until the earliest of the following: . . . (3) 45 days
after the sale, during which period an eligible bidder may submit
a bid that exceeds the last and highest bid at the sale (id., subd.
(c)(4)).” (Bird Rock, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 501.) An
“eligible bidder” includes a “prospective owner-occupant.” (Civ.
Code, § 2924m, subd. (a)(3)(B).) A prospective owner-occupant is
“a natural person who presents to the trustee an affidavit or
declaration” attesting that, within 60 days of the trustee’s deed
being recorded, they will occupy the property as their primary
residence for at least a year, that they are not acting as anyone’s
agent in purchasing the property, and that they are neither the
mortgagor nor related to the mortgagor. (Id. at subd. (a)(1).)
3
B. Cagle Files a Complaint
In April 2024, Cagle filed a complaint against the
Rubleviches and “S.B.S. Lien Services.” He alleged that, two
weeks after a trustee’s sale was held for the Property, he
submitted to trustee SBS a “Notice of Intent to Bid” and
supporting affidavit, “certifying Plaintiff’s status as an Eligible
Bidder, Prospective Owner-Occupant.” Forty-six days after the
trustee’s sale—the forty-fifth day was a Sunday—Cagle
submitted a bid of $752,000.
After the deadline to submit a bid passed, SBS initially
informed Cagle he was the highest bidder. Two weeks later, SBS
told him there had been a “small miscommunication” and he was
not the winning bidder. Eve submitted the winning bid of
$755,000, along with a form affidavit in which she checked the
box next to several preprinted statements, including: “I will
occupy the property as my primary residence within 60 days of
the trustee’s deed being recorded, and will maintain my
occupancy for at least one year” and “I am not acting as the agent
of any other person or entity in purchasing the real property.”
On June 7, 2023, a Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale was recorded
in favor of Eve. On the deed, Eve’s address was listed as the
address of her parents, Michael and Yiffat. Cagle alleged
Michael “owns a long list of rental properties in the area,
including three more condos . . . that are very similar to the
Property.”
On June 29, 2023, a Short Form Deed of Trust in favor of
the Rublevich Family Trust was recorded to secure a $700,000
loan from the Trust to Eve.
On July 24, 2023, Eve’s brother Eden—a “real estate
professional” licensed by the California Department of Real
4
Estate—applied for a permit to replace wood floors, retile the
bathroom, and install new kitchen cabinets at the Property.2
Cagle alleged the permit was granted on August 1, 2023, and the
final permit inspection was completed by the city on January 4,
2024. Eleven days later, the Property was listed for rent on
several rental websites “under Eden’s name.” “[D]espite Eve
certifying under penalty of perjury that she was a prospective
owner-occupant, Eve never actually occupied the Property as a
primary residence at any time.”
Based on these allegations, Cagle brought five causes of
action against the Rubleviches: (1) Violation of Civil Code section
2924m; (2) Declaratory Relief; (3) Injunctive Relief (preventing
any further transfer or lease of the Property until the case was
adjudicated); (4) Quiet Title; and (5) Intentional Interference with
Prospective Economic Advantage. In his first cause of action
(which allegations were incorporated into his other causes of
action), Cagle alleged “Eve was not a qualified bidder but rather
a straw-bidder for Michael.”
C. The Rubleviches Demur and Move to Strike the
Complaint
1. Demurrer
(a) The Rubleviches Demur
In July 2024, the Rubleviches demurred to the complaint,
arguing there was no private right of action under section 2924m
and, in any case, Eve had been forced to file an unlawful detainer
2 Cagle also alleges Eden “has been holding himself out as
the owner of the Property.”
5
action against the foreclosed owner, “thereby providing an
express, absolute and unconditional statutory defense to the
‘occupancy’ requirement in Section 2924m.”3 The Rubleviches
concluded that because there was no private right of action for
violation of section 2924m, an “[anti-]SLAPP motion is
appropriate to dispose of the remaining allegations because all
remaining claims are all based on that same Civil Code Section
2924m affidavit, and therefore, Plaintiff will likewise not be able
to prevail on any of the other causes of action as a matter of law.”
(b) Cagle Opposes the Demurrer
Cagle contended it was irrelevant whether there was a
private right of action under section 2924m because its violation
was “merely incidental to Plaintiff’s overall claim,” which was
that “Defendants conspired to perpetrate a fraud in order to avoid
competitive bidding at the foreclosure sale.” Specifically, Cagle
alleged “Eve was merely a proxy bidder, falsely bidding as an
3 (Civ. Code, § 2924m, subd. (g) [“A prospective owner-
occupant shall not be in violation of this section if a legal owner’s
compliance with the requirements of Section 2924n renders them
unable to occupy the property as their primary residence within
60 days of the trustee’s deed being recorded”]; id. at § 2924n
[“Nothing in this article shall relieve a person deemed the legal
owner of real property when the trustee’s deed is recorded from
complying with applicable law regarding the eviction or
displacement of tenants . . .”].)
In conjunction with their demurrer and motion to strike,
the Rubleviches asked the court to judicially notice pleadings
showing an unlawful detainer complaint was filed on June 21,
2023, default judgment was entered on August 25, 2023, a writ of
possession was issued on September 19, 2023, and the eviction
was scheduled for November 15, 2023.
6
agent on behalf of her family members” and pointed out that “Eve
has never occupied the Property despite having claimed under
penalty of perjury that she would do so.” Cagle argued there
were “both equitable claims (quiet title, declaratory relief) and
tort claims (negligence and intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage) at issue beyond any statutory
violation.”4 He insisted he had pleaded sufficient facts to support
his causes of action for quiet title, unfair competition, and
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.
(c) The Rubleviches Reply
The Rubleviches countered the court should sustain the
demurrer as to all causes of action because they were all “based
on that same defective Civil Code Section 2924m first cause of
action.” The Rubleviches pointed out that Cagle did not dispute
there was no private right of action under that statute and did
not dispute Eve’s occupancy requirement was excused by her
initiation of the unlawful detainer action.
2. Motion to Strike
(a) The Rubleviches Move to Strike
Along with the demurrer, the Rubleviches simultaneously
filed a motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section
425.16. They argued the foundation of Cagle’s complaint was
Eve’s mandatory and publicly recorded affidavit, which
4 Cagle alleged negligence against “Defendant Trustee
Corps and Does 1-20” but not the Rubleviches. The term
“Trustee Corps” is undefined in the complaint but presumably
refers to trustee SBS.
7
constituted “conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the
constitutional right free speech in connection with a public
issue/interest, and therefore, the proper subject of this [anti-
]SLAPP motion” under section 425.16(e)(4).5 Specifically, there
was a “strong public interest/issue behind the enactment of
Section 2924m”—namely, “ ‘to stem the transfer of residential
ownership from owner-occupants to institutional investors,
avoiding repeating the pitfalls of the 2007-2010 real estate and
housing crisis’ ”—and the recorded affidavit “is at the core of the
entire 2924m statute, and is at the core of the entire complaint,
and thus at the core of the ‘public issue/interest’ contained within
Section 2924m and this case.”
Addressing the merits of Cagle’s complaint, the
Rubleviches contended his first cause of action failed because
there was no private right of action under section 2924m, and
because Eve’s unlawful detainer action excused the “occupancy”
requirement.6 They concluded that “because all remaining claims
are all based on that same Civil Code Section 2924m affidavit,”
5 (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(4) [“As used in this
section, ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free
speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue’ includes: . . . any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition
or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a
public issue or an issue of public interest”].)
6 The Rubleviches also explained Eve did not occupy the
Property because the property manager discovered extensive
water and mold damage. Due to a health condition, Eve was
“extremely sensitive to her surroundings and living conditions”
and ultimately decided she could not live in the Property,
although she had intended to when she first bid on it.
8
Cagle “will likewise not be able to prevail on any of the other
causes of action as a matter of law.”
The Rubleviches supported their motion with declarations
from Eve and the property manager who discovered the mold and
oversaw its remediation.
(b) Cagle Opposes the Motion to Strike
Cagle argued his complaint was not based on a matter of
public interest, and the Legislature’s enactment of a statute
addressing foreclosures did not mean “the foreclosure sale for the
subject Property and Defendant’s bid thereon is a ‘public issue.’ ”
Indeed, “[s]uch a standard would effectively turn any law that the
public is required to follow into a SLAPP issue.” Cagle added
that even if an activity protected under the anti-SLAPP statute
were “implicated,” “it is not the primary motivation for the
action.” Cagle claimed “Eve’s affidavit is merely ‘evidence of
liability’ rather than the ‘wrong complained of.’ ”7 Cagle argued
he had made a prima facie case for prevailing under his quiet
title and unfair competition causes of action.8
(c) The Rubleviches Reply
The Rubleviches reiterated the points in their moving
papers, contending Eve’s affidavit was the basis of Cagle’s
7 (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1060 [“a claim may be struck only if the
speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of,
and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some
different act for which liability is asserted”].)
8 Cagle alleged an unfair competition cause of action
against “Defendant Trustee Corps and Does 1-20” but not the
Rubleviches.
9
complaint because it was through that affidavit that she
purportedly committed fraud. Further, they pointed out Cagle
did not dispute there was no private right of action under section
2924m and failed to address that the unlawful detainer action
excused Eve’s occupancy requirement. Nor did Cagle submit any
evidence to contradict the declarations of Eve and the property
manager.
(d) The Parties Submit Supplemental
Briefs
On October 10, 2024, the court heard the motion to strike.
The court continued the hearing and ordered: “Parties are to
meet and confer regarding the Demurrer, and submit a
supplemental brief” within two weeks. As the court explained in
a later minute order: “At the first hearing on the motion, the
Court observed the sole basis of Defendant’s [sic] motion
appeared to be under the ‘catch all’ subdivision (b)(1).
Defendants[’] counsel suggested their motion was made under
‘425.16 . . . subdivision (b)(1)’ independently from subdivision
(e)(4) but did not identify what other subdivision was raised in
the motion. The Court noted protected speech or conduct under
subdivision (b)(1) is defined by subdivision (e)(1) through (e)(4).
In that regard, the Court agreed to continue the hearing to
permit the parties to simultaneously submit supplemental briefs
addressing how defendant’s submittal of the affidavit to the
foreclosure trustee was done ‘in connection with a public issue or
an issue of public interest’ under subdivision (e)(4).”
(i) Cagle’s Supplemental Brief
Cagle argued Eve’s affidavit was not protected speech
because the affidavit “is insufficiently tethered to the ‘public
10
issue.’ ” Cagle contended the affidavit “does not address the
public issue of home-ownership whatsoever. It does not address
the inequity that is central to the ‘public issue’. It does not
address nonjudicial foreclosures at large in any way. All it does
is address her singular intent regarding this singular nonjudicial
foreclosure sale. Accepting Defendant’s [sic] theory would imply
that all bids at all nonjudicial foreclosure sales are subject to
anti-SLAPP scrutiny.”
(ii) The Rubleviches’ Supplemental
Brief
For the first time, the Rubleviches contended the complaint
was subject to an anti-SLAPP motion under section 425.16(e)(1)
and (e)(2) because Eve’s affidavit was “an issue under ‘official
review.’ ”9 The Rubleviches also reiterated their arguments
under section 425.16(e)(4).
9 (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e) [“As used in this
section, ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free
speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral
statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or
judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law . . .”].)
11
D. The Court Partially Sustains the Demurrer But
Denies the Motion to Strike
1. Demurrer
The court sustained the demurrer to the first cause of
action, holding there was no private right of action under section
2924m. The court overruled the demurrer as to the remaining
causes of action, finding no authority for the argument “that a
claim cannot survive demurrer if it is based on a statute with no
private right of action but the cause of action itself is not a
violation of the statute with no private right of action.”
2. Motion to Strike
The court denied the motion to strike, finding the
Rubleviches failed to: (a) “address what element of each
challenged cause of action is met by the claimed protected
activity and, therefore, forms the basis for any liability”; and (b)
“show any authority or persuasive argument why the filing of the
affidavit pursuant to CC § 2924m (d) concerns a matter of public
interest within the meaning of Section 425.16 subdivision (e)(4)”
as the affidavit did not “in any way contribute[] to a public
discussion regarding any ‘public issue.’ ”
Addressing the Rubleviches’ arguments under section
425.16(e)(1) and (e)(2), the court held “it would be imp[ro]per to
grant the motion on the new grounds asserted after the first
hearing under subdivision (e)(1) or (e)(2)” because “[n]owhere i[n]
their motion or memorandum, or even reply memorandum do
Defendants assert the submittal of the eligibility affidavit fits
within[] subdivision (e)(1) or (e)(2)” and “the Court did not give
the Defendants leave to amend the basis of their motion by way
of a supplemental brief.” The court also noted it was “not
12
persuaded by Defendant’s [sic] belated argument that the
submittal of the eligibility affidavit under Civil Code section
2924m is an issue under ‘official review.’ ” Therefore, the court
did not reach the question of whether Cagle had shown a
probability of prevailing. The Rubleviches timely appealed the
denial of their motion to strike.
DISCUSSION
The Rubleviches contend the trial court erred in denying
their anti-SLAPP motion because Eve’s affidavit constituted
protected speech under sections 425.16(e)(2) and 425.16(e)(4). An
appellate court reviews de novo whether defendants have met
their burden of demonstrating that the activity from which the
lawsuit arises falls within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute’s
protection. (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1250.)
A. The Rubleviches Forfeited Any Argument Under
Section 425.16(e)(2)
The Rubleviches do not deny they failed to raise their
section 425.16(e)(2) argument in either their moving or reply
papers. Nor do they dispute the court granted them leave to file
a supplemental brief to address only how the “submittal of the
affidavit to the foreclosure trustee was done ‘in connection with a
public issue or an issue of public interest’ under subdivision
(e)(4),” and not to raise a new argument under section
425.16(e)(2). The Rubleviches thus forfeited reliance on section
425.16(e)(2). (See, e.g., Premier Medical Management Systems,
Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th
550, 564 [“Failure to raise specific challenges in the trial court
forfeits the claim on appeal. ‘ “ ‘[I]t is fundamental that a
reviewing court will ordinarily not consider claims made for the
13
first time on appeal which could have been but were not
presented to the trial court.’ Thus, ‘we ignore arguments,
authority, and facts not presented and litigated in the trial court.
Generally, issues raised for the first time on appeal which were
not litigated in the trial court are waived’ ” ’ ”].)
B. The Rubleviches Did Not Meet Their Burden
Under Section 425.16(e)(4)
An act is “in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or
free speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue” under section 425.16(e)(4) if it is a
“conduct in furtherance of the exercise of . . . the constitutional
right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue
of public interest.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)
Our Supreme Court has outlined “a two-step inquiry for
deciding whether the activity from which a lawsuit arises falls
within section 425.16(e)(4)’s protection: first, we ask what public
issue or issues the challenged activity implicates, and second, we
ask whether the challenged activity contributes to public
discussion of any such issue.” (Geiser v. Kuhns, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 1243.) It is this second step that “usually plays the more
prominent role in screening anti-SLAPP motions because caselaw
‘demonstrate[s] that virtually always, defendants succeed in
drawing a line—however tenuous—connecting their speech to an
abstract issue of public interest.’ ” (Id. at p. 1250.)
The Rubleviches contend Eve’s affidavit constitutes a
protected activity under section 425.16(e)(4) because it “furthers
the public discourse and issues it implicates – preventing another
real estate crisis – because without that affidavit, there is
effectively no Civil Code 2924m. Without that affidavit there is
nothing for the Attorney General, county counsel, city attorney,
14
or district attorney to review, investigate and enforce as provided
for in Civil Code 2924m(j)(k).” We disagree.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “implicate” as “[t]o bring
into play; to involve or affect.” (Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed.
2024).)10 Cagle’s complaint against the Rubleviches centers
around his contention that Eve falsely attested in her affidavit
that she was not acting as an agent for someone else, and that
she would occupy the Property as her primary residence. The
Rubleviches do not explain, and we do not see, how these
statements “bring into play,” “involve,” or “affect” the public issue
of preventing a real estate crisis. Any connection to preventing a
real estate crisis is, indeed, tenuous.
Moreover, even were we to accept that Eve’s allegedly false
statements “implicated” the issue of preventing a real estate
crisis, it certainly contributes nothing to a public discussion
about the issue. Section 2924m required Eve to file an affidavit
attesting that she met the statute’s definition of “Prospective
owner-occupant.” (See Civ. Code, § 2924m, subd. (a)(1).) She did
so. While the Rubleviches proclaim the affidavit “furthers the
public discourse,” they fail to explain how it does so.
We conclude the Rubleviches fail to show how Eve’s
affidavit constitutes protected activity under section 425.16(e)(4).
Therefore, the court did not err in denying the Rubleviches’ anti-
SLAPP motion.
10 Black’s Law Dictionary also defines implicate as “[t]o
show (a person) to be involved in (a crime, misfeasance, etc.)” and
“[t]o be shown to be a cause” as in “viruses have been implicated
in the spread of some cancers.” (Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed.
2024).)
15
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. Respondent shall
recover his costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
WEINGART, J.
16
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