People v. Spain CA4/2

CourtListener 10711761Calctapp27.10.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 10/27/25 P. v. Spain CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E083917

v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF134994)

WILLIAM G. SPAIN, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Matthew C. Perantoni,

Judge. Reversed and remanded.

Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A.

Natasha Cortina and Alan L. Amann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and

Respondent.

1
INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant William G. Spain pled

guilty to attempted murder (Pen. Code1, §§ 667/187, subd. (a)) and robbery (§ 211). He

also admitted that he personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), personally

inflicted great bodily injury (GBI) (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and committed the offense for

the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). He further admitted that he had

served one prior prison term. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court sentenced him to the

agreed-upon term of 25 years in state prison, which included the one-year prison prior

enhancement. After the passage of Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), the court

held a resentencing hearing at which it recalled defendant’s sentence, struck the prison

prior enhancement, sentenced defendant to a term of 24 years, and set the matter for

further resentencing. At the subsequent hearing, the court denied defendant’s motion to

strike his 10-year gang enhancement, finding that granting it would endanger public

safety.

On appeal, defendant asserts the court erred in failing to conduct a full

resentencing — specifically, that it did not consider Assembly Bill No. 333’s impact on

his sentence. He also claims the court erred by considering his current dangerousness,

rather than his future dangerousness upon release, and by not recalculating his custody

credits at resentencing. The People concede that the matter should be remanded for a full

resentencing and that defendant’s credits should be recalculated.

1 All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.

2
We reverse the court’s denial order and remand the matter with directions for the

trial court to determine whether the gang enhancement should be vacated, conduct a full

resentencing, and recalculate defendant’s custody credits.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2009, defendant was charged by information with attempted murder

(§§ 664/187, subd. (a), count 1), kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a), count 2), robbery (§ 211,

count 3), and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a), count 4).2 The information

alleged gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) as to all counts, and personal use of a

weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and personal infliction of GBI (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) as to

count 1. The information also alleged one prior prison enhancement. (§ 667.5.)3

Defendant entered a plea agreement and pled guilty to counts 1 (attempted

murder) and 3 (robbery) and, as to count 1, admitted the gang enhancement (§ 186.22,

subd. (b)) and enhancements for personal use of a weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and

personal infliction of GBI (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). He also admitted one prison prior. On

October 9, 2009, the court sentenced defendant, pursuant to the plea agreement, to a total

term of 25 years in state prison, comprised of nine years on count 1, with consecutive

2 Three of defendant’s codefendants were also charged in the information, but
they are not parties to this appeal; thus, this opinion will focus only on defendant.

3 We note the information alleged that defendant served a prior prison term for a
July 7, 1999, conviction of assault by force likely to produce GBI, pursuant to section
667.5, subdivision (a). Section 667.5, subdivision (a) states that the court shall impose an
additional three-year term for each prison prior. However, it appears the information
may have been amended, since the record indicates that defendant admitted a prior prison
enhancement for a conviction from October 14, 2009, under section 667.5, subdivision
(b), and the court accordingly imposed one year on the prison prior.

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terms of 10 years on the gang enhancement, one year on the personal use of a weapon

enhancement, three years on the GBI enhancement, one year on count 3, plus one year on

the prison prior. The court dismissed the remaining charges and enhancements. It also

awarded defendant a total of 1018 days of credit for time served (885 actual and 133

conduct).

On October 9, 2023, the court recalled defendant’s sentence pursuant to section

1172.75, struck the prison prior as invalid, and ordered a new abstract of judgment to

reflect a 24-year sentence. The court set the matter for further resentencing.

Defendant filed a resentencing brief pursuant to sections 1172.7/1172.75,

1170, and 1385, as well as Senate Bill No. 483 (Senate Bill 483), arguing that he was

entitled to a full resentencing. He contended that he was entitled to have the court

consider any changes in sentencing laws since his conviction, as well as post-conviction

factors which showed he was no longer a danger to the public. Defendant specifically

asked the court to strike the gang enhancement pursuant Senate Bill No. 81 (Senate Bill

81) and sentence him to a term of 15 years.

The People filed a brief opposing defendant’s request. The People first explained

there is a split in authority on the issue of whether the court can alter a plea agreement

without the consent of the prosecutor. (See People v. Coddington (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th

562, 565 (Coddington) [if court indicates inclination to reduce sentence beyond striking

prison prior, prosecution may withdraw its assent to plea agreement] and People v.

Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 977 (Carter) [prosecution may not withdraw from a

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plea agreement if court further reduces a sentence].) The People then argued that the

court should not dismiss the gang enhancement, which would lead to defendant’s

immediate release, since he was a danger to the public.

On May 10, 2024, the day of the resentencing hearing, defendant filed a reply

brief arguing that his sentence was enhanced in ways that were now considered excessive

under section 1385. He further contended that he was qualified for relief due to changes

made to section 186.22 under Assembly Bill No. 333 (Assembly Bill 333).4

The court held the resentencing hearing, and defense counsel argued that he set

forth a number of reasons in his motion that the court should strike the gang enhancement

based on recent changes in the law, and that he added another reason in his reply brief

based on changes made to section 186.22 itself. The court stated it was concerned about

the endangerment of the public, noting defendant’s violent behavior of participating in an

attack on inmates while in prison, which the People cited in its brief. The court stated

that some mitigating factors in section 1385 applied here, but section 1385 created an

exception if there was a danger to public safety. Defense counsel responded that, while

there may have been an incident in prison, defendant had shown improvement overall and

was no longer a danger to society.

The prosecutor argued that defendant had shown he was unwilling to comply with

laws both out of custody and in custody, that his violence was escalating, and the court

4 Assembly Bill 333 essentially adds new elements to the substantive offense and
gang enhancements in section 186.22. (People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 479
(E.H.).)

5
should deny his motion. The court asked if the prosecutor wanted to address defendant’s

additional argument in his reply brief regarding Assembly Bill 333, and the prosecutor

said he did not see the reply brief until that morning, but he thought the same exceptions

to section 1385 applied.

The court commented that defendant’s original crime was “atrocious” and he was

about to receive a life sentence until the parties struck a plea bargain. The court then

asked about the state of the law regarding whether, if it granted defendant’s motion, the

People “would be able to wipe out the plea and start all over again.” The parties simply

noted there was still a split in authority and they were “waiting for a decision.” The court

continued to comment on the facts of the case and viewing them in combination with

defendant’s violent behavior in prison, it concluded that granting defendant’s motion

would endanger public safety. The court thus denied the resentencing motion.

DISCUSSION

The Matter Should Be Remanded For a Full Resentencing

Defendant contends the court erred in failing to conduct a full resentencing since it

did not apply the ameliorative changes under Assembly Bill 333 to his gang

enhancement. He also argues the court erred in basing its conclusion that he was a

danger to society under section 1385 on whether he was currently dangerous, rather than

on whether he would pose a danger upon release in the future, if it dismissed his gang

enhancement. The People concede the matter must be remanded for a full resentencing.

They also contend that we need not address the issue of whether the court erred in its

6
application of section 1385, since remand is necessary due to Assembly Bill 333. The

People assert that the proper procedure is for us to vacate the gang enhancement and

remand for resentencing, with instructions that the prosecution be given the opportunity

to retry the gang enhancement, if it wishes.

In his reply brief, defendant contends that because the current record does not

establish the elements for a section 186.22 gang enhancement, as amended by Assembly

Bill 333, this court should remand the matter for resentencing with directions to simply

strike the gang enhancement and recalculate his custody credits.

We agree with the parties that the matter should be remanded for a full

resentencing and the trial court should apply Assembly Bill 333 to defendant’s sentence.

A. Relevant Law

In October of 2021, the Governor signed Senate Bill 483, effective on January 1, 2022,

which added section 1171.1 to the Penal Code (subsequently renumbered as section

1172.75). This section declares: “Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to

January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any

enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in

subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.”

(§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)

Section 1172.75 establishes a mechanism to provide affected defendants an

avenue for relief from now invalid prison prior enhancements. Once the sentencing court

receives information that a person in custody is serving a term for a judgment that

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includes a now invalid prior prison term enhancement, the court must verify the

judgment, recall the sentence, and resentence the defendant. (§ 1172.75, subds. (b) &

(c).)

Section 1172.75, subdivision (d) states that resentencing “shall result in a lesser

sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed

enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a

lesser sentence would endanger public safety,” and that resentencing “shall not result in a

longer sentence than the one originally imposed.” Subdivision (d)(2) directs the court to

“apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law

that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of

sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” The court may also consider

postconviction factors, such as the defendant’s disciplinary record and record of

rehabilitation while incarcerated. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)

“By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that

the trial court strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.” (People v. Monroe (2022) 85

Cal.App.5th 393, 402; see People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“the resentencing

court has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the sentence, and not just the portion

subjected to the recall”].)

Section 1172.75 applies to defendants convicted after trial and to defendants

convicted by plea. Subdivision (a) invalidates “[a]ny sentence enhancement” imposed

under section 667.5, subdivision (b), without qualification. Subdivision (c) mandates that

8
upon determining “the current judgment includes an enhancement described in

subdivision (a), the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.” This

unqualified language demonstrates the Legislature’s intent that resentencing apply to all

judgments containing an invalid enhancement, regardless of how the conviction was

obtained.

Moreover, the Legislature expressly declared in Senate Bill 483 that “any changes

to a sentence as a result of the act that added this section shall not be a basis for a

prosecutor or court to rescind a plea agreement” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1). This

confirms that the Legislature intended section 1172.75 to apply to plea-bargained

sentences.

Appellate courts disagreed regarding whether the prosecution may be permitted to

rescind a plea agreement if a trial court grants sentencing relief beyond merely striking

one-year priors. (Coddington, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 565 [prosecution may

withdraw its assent to plea agreement]; but see Carter, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 964

[prosecution not entitled to withdraw assent to plea bargain if court further reduces a

sentence].) The California Supreme Court granted review to address this dispute in

People v. Montgomery (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 768. However, the Supreme Court in

Montgomery subsequently transferred the matter back to the court of appeal to vacate its

decision and reconsider the case in light of Assembly Bill No. 2483, which added section

1171. (Stats. 2024, ch. 964, § 2.)

9
Thus, after this appeal was filed, the Legislature enacted section 1171, which

became effective January 1, 2025. This statute provides that in postconviction

resentencing hearings, trial courts have “jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the

defendant's sentence, including if it was imposed after a guilty plea” (§ 1171, subd.

(c)(2)), and that “[a]ny changes to a sentence shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court

to rescind a plea agreement” (§ 1171, subd. (c)(3)). While this statute was not in effect

at the time of defendant’s resentencing hearing, it reflects the Legislature’s intent to

ensure that defendants receive the benefit of ameliorative sentencing changes, regardless

of whether their original sentence resulted from a plea bargain. This statute appears to

codify the holding in Carter and reject the approach taken in Coddington regarding the

prosecution’s right to withdraw from plea agreements at resentencing.

B. The Court is Required to Conduct a Full Resentencing

Section 186.22 enhances the punishment of a person convicted of an enumerated

felony committed “for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any

criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal

conduct by gang members.” (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) Assembly Bill 333, which became

effective on January 1, 2022 (see Stats. 2021, ch. 699), made significant changes to

section 186.22, as it “amended the definitions of ‘criminal street gang’ and ‘pattern of

criminal gang activity’ and clarified the evidence needed to establish an offense benefits,

promotes, furthers or assists a criminal street gang.” (E.H., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p.

477.) Assembly Bill 333 essentially “amends section 186.22 to require proof of

10
additional elements to establish a gang enhancement.” (People v. Lopez (2021) 73

Cal.App.5th 327, 343 (Lopez).)

Defendant specifically contends the matter should be remanded for the court to

apply the Assembly Bill 333 amendments to section 186.22 to his case. The People

concede that, in light of newly-enacted section 1171, defendant has the right to a full

resentencing, and we agree. In People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207, the

Supreme Court held that amendments made by Assembly Bill 333 applied retroactively

under the rule of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada). (See, People v. Burgos

(2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 28 [“Estrada’s inference of retroactivity applies to the punishment-

mitigating changes to section 186.22”] and Lopez, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 344 [“As

Assembly Bill 333 increases the threshold for conviction of the section 186.22 offense

and the imposition of the enhancement, . . . [defendant] is entitled to the benefit of this

change in the law”].)

At the resentencing hearing here, the court made no reference to any of the

statutory factors it was required to consider under amended section 186.22. Instead, the

court noted defendant’s “atrocious” crimes and commented that defendant had avoided a

life sentence through his plea bargain. The prosecutor argued that the court should not

dismiss the gang enhancement, since it would lead to defendant’s immediate release, and

he was a danger to the public. The court then asked what the state of the law was on

whether or not the People would be able to “wipe out the plea and start all over again,” if

the court granted defendant’s motion. The parties stated there was still a split of

11
authority. The court then stated, “[W]hen I look at the original facts of the crime, and I

combine that now with what appears to be continued behavior in prison that is contrary to

the law, including the violent acts most recently, I do think that granting the motion

would endanger public safety.” These comments indicate the court just accepted the

prosecutor’s argument and enforced the plea agreement, rather than conducting a full

resentencing as required.

We conclude that section 1172.75 requires the trial court to conduct a full

resentencing, particularly in light of section 1171. Because the record does not show the

court applied Assembly Bill 333 to defendant’s case, we reverse the court’s denial order

and remand the matter for a further resentencing hearing.

We note the People’s contention that this court should vacate the gang

enhancement and remand with the instructions that the prosecution be given the

opportunity to “reprove that enhancement if it so wishes.” In his reply brief, defendant

argues that the People should not be given the opportunity to retry the gang enhancement

under the amended law, since his conviction was by plea and the factual basis for the plea

was the written plea agreement, which does not provide sufficient evidence to prove the

elements of section 186.22. He specifically contends the People cannot now rescind the

plea agreement to conduct a trial of the gang enhancement, and we should just remand

the matter with directions for the court to strike the enhancement, essentially keeping the

rest of the plea agreement intact.

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We will reverse the court’s denial of defendant’s motion and remand the matter

for a full resentencing, with directions for the trial court to determine if the gang

enhancement should be vacated in light of Assembly Bill 333. If the court determines the

gang enhancement must be vacated, the People must be given the opportunity to retry the

gang enhancement in compliance with the amendments brought about by Assembly Bill

333. If the People choose to retry it, the trial court is directed to conduct a full

resentencing after that issue has been decided. (See People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th

1169, 1207; see also, People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 669 and United States v.

Tateo (1964) 377 U.S. 463, 465] [Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial of a

“defendant whose conviction is set aside because of an error in the proceedings leading to

conviction”].) If the People elect not to retry it, the court must strike the gang

enhancement and resentence defendant.

The People additionally contend that, given remand is necessary to apply

Assembly Bill 333, we need not address defendant’s claim that the court erred in its

analysis under section 1385 by considering whether defendant posed a danger currently,

rather than upon release in the future. In his reply brief, defendant agrees that we need

not resolve the parties’ disagreement on this issue, given the remand.5

5 We also need not address defendant’s alternative argument that his counsel
provided him with ineffective assistance by failing to argue for the court to resentence
him and apply Assembly Bill 333.

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C. The Court Erred By Not Recalculating Defendant’s Custody Credits

Defendant argues that the court erred by failing to update his actual custody

credits when it amended the abstract of judgment. The People concede that the court

must update his custody credits, and we agree.

If the court modifies a defendant’s sentence, then the court must recalculate the

number of days that the defendant has already spent in custody and award those

recalculated credits in the new abstract of judgment. (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26

Cal.4th 20, 29, 37, 41; § 2900.1.) The court here did not update defendant’s custody

credits. The 2023 amended abstract of judgment reflected that defendant had 885 days of

actual custody credits — the same number reflected in the 2009 abstract of judgment.

Accordingly, we also remand for the court to recalculate defendant’s custody credits.

DISPOSITION

The court’s denial order is reversed, and the matter is remanded for a full

resentencing, with directions for the trial court to determine if the gang enhancement

should be vacated in light of Assembly Bill 333. If the court determines that it must be

vacated, the People must be provided the opportunity to retry the gang enhancement in

compliance with the amendments brought about by Assembly Bill 333. If the People

choose to retry it, the trial court is directed to conduct a full resentencing after that issue

has been decided. If the People elect not to retry it, the court must strike the gang

enhancement and resentence defendant. Upon completion of the resentencing, the trial

court is directed recalculate defendant’s custody credits and forward an amended abstract

14
of judgment, reflecting the corrected credits, to the California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS
J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.
RAPHAEL
J.

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