CourtListener 10711677•People v. Small CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 10/27/25 P. v. Small CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Tehama)
----
THE PEOPLE, C101922
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 22CR-000578)
v.
GERALD EUGENE SMALL,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Gerald Eugene Small pled guilty to felony failure to update his annual
sex offender registration (Pen. Code, § 290.012, subd. (a))1 and was sentenced to three
years’ formal probation. On appeal, Small challenges the trial court’s imposition of
probation conditions regarding association with minors, completion of a sex offender
treatment program, polygraph examinations, possession of pornography, electronic
search, and electronic monitoring. We conclude the association with minors and
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
pornography conditions are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad and will remand the
case to the trial court to modify them. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2024, Small was charged with failure to annually update his sex offender
registration. (§ 290.012, subd. (a).)
On June 10, 2024, Small pled guilty to the charge. The trial court suspended
execution of a three-year state prison sentence, placed Small on three years’ formal
probation, and ordered him to serve 330 days in county jail.
A few weeks after he was sentenced, the probation department requested
modification of Small’s probation to add conditions requiring sex offender registration
(No. 28);2 prohibiting Small from associating with any person under 18 years of age
(No. 29); requiring Small to complete a sex offender treatment program (No. 30);
requiring Small to submit to polygraph examinations (No. 31); prohibiting Small from
possessing pornographic material (No. 32); requiring Small to consent to warrantless
searches of his electronic devices and provide passwords to his devices (No. 33); and
placing Small on electronic monitoring for the duration of probation (No. 34).
The probation department argued these additional conditions should be imposed
given Small’s criminal history, repeated sex offenses, and sexually violent predator status.
The department reported that Small had two previous sex offense convictions in Florida
in 1994 and 2005.3 In 1994, Small was convicted of one count of lewd and lascivious
acts with a child and three counts of engaging in sexual activities with a child in a
familial relationship. In 2005, Small was convicted of lewd and lascivious acts with a
child under 12. At a 2006 sentencing hearing in Florida, Small was found to be
2 Small does not challenge this condition, which is mandated by section 290.
3 Section 290.005 provides for sex offender registration in California of persons
convicted of registrable offenses in out-of-state courts.
2
potentially eligible for involuntary civil commitment under Florida law as a sexually
violent predator. The probation department also reported that Small had a Static-99R
score of three, which falls into the average risk category with a five-year recidivism
estimate of 6.5 percent.
The trial court directed the parties to submit letter briefs addressing the probation
department’s recommendation. In Small’s brief, he acknowledged he was designated as a
sexual predator as a result of a plea, admission, and sentence in 2006. However, he was
never subjected to involuntary civil commitment under Florida law and never found to
meet the criteria of a sexually violent predator. Small argued the conditions the probation
department recommended were not reasonably related to his current conviction for failing
to update his sex offender registration in California.
The People agreed that Small had not been found to be a sexually violent predator
under Florida law. The People contended, however, the additional conditions were
reasonably related to Small’s history of sexual offenses in Florida, which had required
him to register under section 290.
At a hearing on August 23, 2024, defense counsel argued that the additional
probation conditions proposed were for those required to register as a sexually violent
predator, which the People conceded Small was not. Counsel also pointed out that a
defendant convicted of failing to register would not be required to submit to a polygraph
examination or complete sex offender treatment, because these requirements were
specific to new sex offenders.4 The People in response argued that all of the additional
4 Section 1203.067 provides that the terms of probation granted to a person
convicted of certain sex offenses and required to register under section 290 include
completion of a sex offender management program and “[w]aiver of any privilege against
self-incrimination and participation in polygraph examinations, which shall be part of the
sex offender management program.” (§ 1203.067, subd. (b)(3); see id., subd. (b)(2).)
3
probation conditions were reasonably related to Small’s multiple prior convictions in
Florida.
The trial court granted probation’s request, explaining that “just because the terms
are used in different types of sexual cases routinely doesn’t mean they’re not appropriate
for this case. That’s not the issue. The issue is whether or not a probationary term is
helping the defendant in his rehabilitation. [¶] And so the question is is it reasonably
related to rehabilitation. And the Court finds that all these terms are reasonably related in
a failure to register pursuant to sex offense type case, which this is.” The trial court
ordered Small’s probation conditions modified to include the conditions “exactly” as
recommended by the probation department.
Small appealed.
DISCUSSION
Small contends the challenged probation conditions Nos. 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and
34 are invalid under California law and should be reversed because they are unrelated to
his failure to register or rehabilitation. Alternatively, Small argues many of the conditions
are unconstitutionally overbroad, vague, and violate his right to due process and should
be modified. While we disagree that these conditions are invalid under California law,
we agree that condition No. 29 prohibiting contact with minors and No. 32 prohibiting
Small from possessing pornography are unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad and
will remand the case to the trial court to modify these conditions.
A. Reasonableness
“Penal Code section 1203.1 et seq. gives trial courts broad discretion to determine
whether to grant an eligible defendant probation, and if so, what terms of probation will
promote rehabilitation and protect public safety. [Citation.] A probation condition is
valid under the statutory scheme if it relates to the crime for which the defendant was
convicted, relates to other criminal conduct, or requires or forbids conduct that is
reasonably related to future criminality.” (People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 498,
4
citing People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486.) The Lent test is conjunctive—all three
factors must be found in order to invalidate a probation condition. (People v. Balestra
(1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57, 65, fn. 3.) We apply the deferential abuse of discretion
standard in reviewing probation conditions under the statutory scheme. (Id. at p. 65.) A
trial court abuses its discretion only when the probation conditions imposed are arbitrary,
capricious, or exceed the bounds of reason. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 233-
234.)
Condition No. 29 prohibiting Small from associating with people under 18 is
designed to protect vulnerable young people from the risk of reoffending by Small and,
thus, is reasonably related to both Small’s crime and future criminality. Section 290 “is
intended to promote the ‘ “state interest in controlling crime and preventing recidivism in
sex offenders.” ’ ” (Wright v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 521, 527.) The
Legislature has determined that the risk of reoffending by registered sex offenders is
high. In amending section 290 in 1996, the Legislature declared: “ ‘[S]ex offenders pose
a high risk of engaging in further offenses . . , and protection of the public from these
offenders is a paramount public interest.’ ” (In re Alva (2004) 33 Cal.4th 254, 279,
fn. 12, quoting Stats. 1996, ch. 908, § 1.) “Children, in particular, ‘are a class of victims
who require paramount protection’ from sex offenders.” (Johnson v. Department of
Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 877.) Thus, probation condition No. 29 prohibiting Small
from associating with minors is reasonably related to Small’s crime and future
criminality.
Condition No. 30 requiring Small to complete a sex offender treatment program is
also reasonably related to both Small’s crime and future criminality. As discussed above,
the purpose of section 290 is to protect the public from recidivism by sex offenders.
(Wright v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 527.) A probation condition requiring
completion of a sex offender treatment program furthers that statutory purpose. We note
that the crimes Small committed in Florida that required him to register as a sex offender
5
in California, if committed in this state, would have required Small to complete a sex
offender management program, including sex offender treatment. (§§ 1203.067, subd.
(b)(2), 9000, subd. (b).) The “overriding purpose of management of sex offenders is to
enhance community safety by preventing future sexual victimization.” (§ 9000, subd.
(d).) Thus, probation condition No. 30 requiring Small to complete a sex offender
treatment program is reasonably related to the purpose of section 290 and preventing
Small’s future criminality.
Condition No. 31 requiring Small to submit to polygraph examinations is also
reasonably related to Small’s future criminality. Polygraph examinations are a standard
requirement for a sex offender released on probation in California “to monitor
compliance with treatment and supervision requirements, and to focus on a specific
allegation or behavior.” (In re Jordan R. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111, 129, fn. 17; see
also § 1203.067, subd. (b)(3).) Here, polygraph testing provides a means of monitoring
compliance with the conditions that Small complete sex offender treatment and not
associate with minors. (People v. Miller (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1311, 1314.) In Miller,
the defendant pled guilty to a sex crime with a seven-year-old girl. (Ibid.) The court
noted that “[o]ne condition of probation is that [the defendant] not be alone with young
females.” (Ibid.) The court concluded, “Because this condition is aimed at deterring and
discovering criminal conduct most likely to occur during unsupervised contact with
young females, the condition is reasonably related to future criminality.” (Ibid.)
Polygraph testing serves a similar purpose here and thus is related to preventing Small’s
future criminality.
Condition No. 32 prohibiting Small from possessing pornography also reasonably
relates to Small’s future criminality. Some studies have concluded that there is a “causal
link between pornography and sex crimes.” (Amatel v. Reno (D.C. Cir. 1998) 156 F.3d
192, 199.) The United States Supreme Court has explicitly recognized a possible link
between child pornography and pedophilia. (Osborne v. Ohio (1990) 495 U.S. 103, 111
6
& fn. 7.) Condition No. 32 removes an influence that may be a contributing factor in the
commission of sex crimes. Because Small committed sexual offenses involving children
in 1994 and reoffended in 2005, the trial court could reasonably conclude that permitting
Small to possess pornography created a risk that he would commit additional offenses.
(People v. Connors (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 729, 737; In re George F. (2016)
248 Cal.App.4th 734, 740.)
Condition No. 33 authorizing warrantless searches of Small’s electronic devices is
reasonably related to Small’s crime of failure to register under section 290. Registration
is required to protect public safety by “providing for the collection of information about
the identity and whereabouts of convicted sex offenders, [and making] it harder for such
persons to reoffend without getting caught.” (In re Alva, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 288; see
also People v. McClellan (1993) 6 Cal.4th 367, 376, fn. 7 [“The purpose of section 290 is
‘to assure that persons convicted of the crimes enumerated therein shall be readily
available for police surveillance at all times because the Legislature deemed them likely
to commit similar offenses in the future’ ”].) A defendant’s whereabouts is often
disclosed on social media accessed through cell phones and other electronic devices.
Warrantless searches enhance the ability of law enforcement to ensure Small’s
compliance with section 290 and are therefore reasonably related to his crime.5
5 The People do not argue that this condition is reasonably related to Small’s crime
of failing to register but assert solely that it is reasonably related to future criminality,
even if this condition had no relationship to Small’s crime. (See People v. Olguin (2008)
45 Cal.4th 375, 379-381.) The People argue an electronic search condition ensures
compliance with conditions that Small not associate with children or view pornographic
material, pointing out that electronic devices are often used for these purposes. (In re
P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 295.) However, in In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th
1113, the California Supreme Court held invalid a warrantless electronics search
condition unrelated to the defendant’s crime of burglary, explaining that not every
probation condition enhancing effective supervision of a probationer is reasonably related
to future criminality. (Id. at p. 1127.) Future criminality “contemplates a degree of
7
Regarding condition No. 34, Small contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by placing Small on electronic monitoring for the duration of his probation.
Small argues there was no evidence he was a high-risk offender likely to commit a crime
in the next five years, pointing out that his Static-99R score placed him in the average
risk category for reoffending, and his 1994 conviction was from 30 years before this case.
We conclude the electronic monitoring condition is reasonably related to Small’s crime
and future criminality. (See § 3010.10 [requiring GPS monitoring as parole condition for
any person required to register as sex offender under § 290].) For reasons similar to those
discussed with respect to electronic searches, electronic monitoring is reasonably related
to Small’s crime in that this condition enhances the ability of the police to track Small’s
whereabouts. It thus strikes us that this condition is a deterrent to future criminality. As
to Small’s Static-99R score, although electronic monitoring was expressly authorized by
statute in 2009 for registered sex offenders who have been found to have a high risk of
reoffending using the Static-99R evaluation (§§ 1202.8, 1203f), this designation is not a
prerequisite for a monitoring probation condition. Here, the risk of Small’s committing
future sexual offenses was not de minimis given that he was convicted of child
molestation in 1994 and committed another sex offense involving a minor more than 10
years later. The trial court could properly conclude that maintaining knowledge of
Small’s whereabouts is particularly imperative given his criminal history. (See In re R.V.
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 239, 247.)
We conclude that all the probation conditions Small challenges are valid under the
Lent test.
proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate
interests served by the condition.” (Id. at p. 1122.) The test “requires more than just an
abstract or hypothetical relationship between the probation condition and preventing
future criminality.” (Id. at p. 1121.) Since we conclude the electronics search condition
is related to Small’s crime, we do not address whether this condition is related to his
future criminality. (See People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403.)
8
B. Vagueness and Overbreadth
Even valid probation conditions must not be unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad. (People v. Rhinehart (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1123, 1126-1127.) “Vagueness
considers whether a condition is sufficiently precise to give the probationer fair warning
of what conduct is required or prohibited; overbreadth considers the closeness of fit
between the state's interest in reformation and rehabilitation and the burden imposed on
the [probationer’s] constitutional rights.” (In re I.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 260; see
also In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 (Sheena K.).) Accordingly, a probation
condition must be “sufficiently definite” for the probationer to know what conduct is
required or prohibited, and to allow the court to determine when that condition has been
violated. (People v. Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 500.) A probation condition also “must
be closely tailored to its legitimate objective to avoid being invalidated as
unconstitutionally overbroad.” (People v. Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934, 946
(Patton); see also Sheena K., at p. 890; People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 101-
102 [such conditions must be “narrowly drawn”].) We review de novo constitutional
challenges to probation conditions. (People v. Mendez (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1167,
1172.)
Small did not raise a constitutional objection in the trial court to any of the
probation conditions he challenges on appeal. As described above, Small opposed the
conditions as only appropriate for a sexually violent predator, which the People
acknowledged he was not. In general, an objection that a probation condition is
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad is forfeited unless previously raised. (Patton,
supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 946; Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 889 [“given a
meaningful opportunity, the probationer should object to a perceived facial constitutional
flaw at the time a probation condition initially is imposed in order to permit the trial court
to consider, and if appropriate in the exercise of its informed judgment, to effect a
correction”]; People v. Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 234-235, 237 [failure to object to a
9
probation condition on a ground at the sentencing hearing forfeits that specific claim on
appeal]; In re Josue S. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 168, 170 [“constitutional objections must
be interposed in order to preserve such contentions on appeal”].)
“However, the forfeiture rule does not extend to facial constitutional challenges
presenting pure questions of law that can be resolved without referring to the particular
sentencing record developed below. [Citation.] A facial challenge ‘does not require
scrutiny of individual facts and circumstances but instead requires the review of abstract
and generalized legal concepts.’ [Citation.] The claim is that a condition cannot have
any valid application, without relying on any facts in the sentencing record.” (Patton,
supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 946; see also Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 885, 889.)
Small contends that probation conditions Nos. 29, 31, 32, and 33 are
unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad. The People agree as to conditions Nos. 29,
31, and 32. The People argue that condition No. 33 is not overbroad but submit,
alternatively, that if we find this condition overbroad, it can be modified on remand. We
agree that conditions Nos. 29 and 32 are inherently vague or overbroad and will remand
to the trial court to modify these conditions. Small, however, has forfeited his
constitutional claim concerning conditions Nos. 31 and 33.
Condition No. 29 states, “the defendant shall not associate with any person under
the age of eighteen years old.” Small contends this condition is “vague as worded,”
because it contains “no knowledge requirement,” and therefore Small “could violate the
term even if he did not know that the individual was under the age of eighteen.” This is a
facial challenge to the condition. (People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1434-
1435 (Turner).) We agree that the condition prohibits association with a category of
people whose members are not readily identifiable, especially given that people are not
always truthful about their age or look older or younger than they really are. In Turner,
this court determined that a similar condition was unconstitutionally vague, reasoning,
“[a] person may reasonably not know whether he or she is associating with someone
10
under the age of 18.” (Id. at p. 1436.) “Fair notice . . . is not possible unless the
probation condition is modified to require that defendant must either know or reasonably
should know that persons are under 18 before he is prohibited from associating with
them.” (Ibid.)
Condition No. 31 states, “the defendant shall submit to polygraph examinations.”
Small agrees that polygraph testing may be required to ensure compliance with valid
probation conditions. (People v. Miller, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 1315.) He contends,
however, that, while this condition “may be appropriate to ensure that [Small] adheres to
other probation conditions such as not associating with children under the age of
eighteen, the condition is overbroad as worded.” Small relies on Brown v. Superior Court
(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 313, where the appellate court found a similar polygraph
condition overbroad because it did not “place any restrictions on the questions that could
be asked by the examiner or otherwise tailor the order to comport with the court’s
purpose in imposing the polygraph condition.” (Id. at p. 321; but see People v. Garcia
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 792, 809 [rejecting claim of overbreadth regarding polygraph testing
condition “expressly linked to the purposes and needs of the sex offender management
program” (§ 1203.067, subd. (b)(3))]; In re David C. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 657, 670.)
In Brown, however, the defendant opposed a broad polygraph condition in the trial court
as violating the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Brown,
at p. 318.) Moreover, the appellate court rejected the defendant’s contention that a
polygraph condition is per se invalid and illegal. (Id. at p. 319.) Here, Small did not
object to the polygraph testing condition as overbroad in the trial court and does not argue
on appeal that this condition would be invalid under any circumstances. Accordingly, we
conclude that Small has raised an as-applied constitutional claim, which he forfeited by
failing to raise it in the trial court.
Condition No. 32 states, “the defendant shall not possess or view any
pornographic material, defined as any videotape, film, photograph, publication, or other
11
medium depicting graphic sexual activity actual or simulated, nudity of children, or
sexual deviance, nor any material decreed off-limits by the defendant’s counselor, sex
offender program, or probation officer.” Small objects to this condition as vague. This is
a facial challenge, as well. (See Turner, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1434-1435.) We
agree with Small that the condition is vague but also conclude this condition is
overbroad.
The term “pornography” has been held to be “inherently vague and subjective.”
(In re D.H. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 722, 728 (D.H.).) Condition No. 31 attempts to avoid
this defect with various definitions of “pornographic material” as depictions of “graphic
sexual activity actual or simulated,” “sexual deviance,” and “any material decreed off-
limits by the defendant’s counselor, sex offender program, or probation officer.” These
definitions, however, are themselves vague and overbroad. In Turner, the court held that
a similar definition of pornography as “ ‘sexually stimulating/oriented material deemed
inappropriate by the probation officer’ ” was unconstitutionally vague unless it was
modified to provide advance notice of what the probation officer deemed prohibited.
(Turner, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1436; see People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th
1341, 1352-1353 [“The probation condition, modified with an express knowledge
requirement, is sufficient to put defendant on notice for his actions”].)
Modification of condition No. 32, however, to require advance determination—
assuming this were logistically possible—of the material “decreed off-limits” by the
probation officer and others does not address the constitutional infirmity of the other
definitions of “pornographic material.” (D.H., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 728.) The
terms “graphic sexual activity” and “sexual deviance” are outdated language that is
inherently vague and overbroad. The term “graphic sexual material” was apparently
borrowed from the former definition of obscenity. (In re Panchot (1968) 70 Cal.2d 105,
107, fn. 5 [“Graphic depiction of sexual activity is the distinguishing feature of the only
materials which the United States Supreme Court has ruled to be obscene”].) However,
12
sexually graphic scenes are readily found in many television shows and movies that are
no longer classified as obscene or pornographic.
As for “sexual deviance,” one commentator observed: “Sexual deviancy is a
rather broad and vague term. Its usage connotes that there are recognized norms of
sexual behavior which are accepted by society in general. In fact, ‘normal’ sexual
behavior has never been well categorized. Rather, aberrant behaviors, sufficiently
unacceptable to most persons, have been lumped together to comprise sexual deviancy.
These of course may vary over time and across different cultures, although there are
probably some behaviors which almost everyone would label deviant.” (Kaye, Sexual
Deviancy <https://courtpsychiatrist.com/react/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/sexual-
deviancy.pdf> [as of October 1, 2025], archived at < https://perma.cc/24MH-VLQB>.)
Pedophilia undoubtedly continues to qualify as “sexual deviance,” but this concept
has also included “ ‘such deviations as sadomasochism, fetishism, and homosexuality.’ ”
(People v. Noroff (1967) 67 Cal.2d 791, 794, fn. 6.) Homosexuality is no longer
classified as deviant behavior. (See Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) 576 U.S. 644, 661.)
Nonetheless, the use of the term “sexual deviance” in condition No. 32 continues to
import obsolete societal norms into the prohibition on materials that Small may not
possess, rendering this condition both vague and overbroad.
Condition No. 33 states, “the defendant shall waive any right to the necessity of
consent or obtaining a search warrant to search any electronic device as required by
People v. Lara. Further, the defendant shall provide the pass code to his cellular
telephone, or any pass code protected device to any probation officer or other peace
officer conducting a search of the device.” Small contends that a probation condition
authorizing warrantless searches of his cell phone and other devices and requiring Small
to disclose passwords is overbroad, impinges on his privacy, and cannot be narrowly
tailored to protect his privacy. The People contend this condition is not overbroad and,
13
alternatively, argue it can be modified to reflect the purpose of conditions Nos. 29 and 32;
i.e., to prohibit contacts with minors and pornographic materials.
We conclude Small raises an as-applied constitutional challenge to this condition,
which he forfeited by failing to raise it in the trial court. In evaluating whether a
defendant brings a facial challenge to the electronics search condition, we consider
whether the search condition in the abstract, and not as applied to the particular
probationer, is sufficiently narrowly tailored to the state’s legitimate interest in
reformation and rehabilitation of probationers in all possible applications. (Sheena K.,
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 885.) Small does not argue the electronics search imposed in
condition No. 33 is unconstitutional in all possible applications.6 In Ricardo P., the
Supreme Court concluded that electronics search conditions are not categorically invalid.
(In re Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1128; see also People v. Guzman (2018)
23 Cal.App.5th 53, 65 [a warrantless electronic search probation condition is not “per se
unconstitutional”]; Patton, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at pp. 946-947 [reasoning that because
electronics search conditions may be constitutionally imposed under some circumstances,
they are not facially invalid].)7 Although application of this search condition could be
6 Small notes that in People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, the court
expressed doubt regarding a trial court’s ability to tailor an electronic search condition to
avoid infringing on constitutional rights. (Id. at pp. 725-726.) In Appleton, however, the
defendant did not forfeit his overbreadth claim on appeal because “the record show[ed]
defendant raised his objections below,” and “the objections he lodged were identical to
the claims raised” on appeal. (Id. at pp. 722-723, 725.)
7 Small relies on Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, which extended Fourth
Amendment protections to cell phones, recognizing the immense storage capacity of
modern cell phones, to argue that condition No. 33 infringes on his right to privacy. (Id.
at pp. 393-394, 397.) However, as Guzman points out, the court in Riley held only that
cell phone data is subject to Fourth Amendment protection, “ ‘not that the information on
a cell phone is immune from search.’ ” (People v. Guzman, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at
p. 64, quoting Riley, at p. 401.) Guzman held that Riley does not support a facial
challenge to an electronic search probation condition, noting that the defendant in that
14
unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to certain probationers, in other circumstances it
may be entirely appropriate and constitutional. (Ricardo P., at p. 1128.) Small argues his
“crimes had nothing to do with the use of any electronic devices. The crime here was
failing to register two years ago.” The implication of this argument is these
circumstances would not support the application of electronics search conditions (we
disagree, as discussed, concluding this condition was reasonably related to ensuring
compliance with § 290, the statute Small was convicted of violating). Small forfeited this
claim by failing to object on that basis in the trial court. (Patton, at p. 946 [“An as-
applied constitutional challenge is forfeited unless previously raised”]; Guzman, at p. 63,
fn. 3.)8
C. Remand
“We have the power to modify a probation condition to render the condition
constitutional.” (Turner, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1436.) However, while the
modification to condition No. 29 can be accomplished fairly straightforwardly by adding
a scienter requirement that Small not knowingly associate with minors (ibid.), a
modification to condition No. 32 is not so readily effected. The parties propose that we
modify condition No. 32 essentially to also require a scienter requirement that Small be
given notice by the probation officer or others in official capacity of what is deemed
pornography. (See Turner, at p. 1436; People v. Pirali, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at
case was not convicted of a crime and was protected by the presumption of innocence,
while the defendant in Guzman had pled guilty to a felony sex offense involving a child
and was on probation for that offense. (Guzman, at pp. 64-65.) A court granting
probation may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the defendant of some freedoms
enjoyed by law-abiding citizens. (Ibid.)
8 In People v. Guzman, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at page 63 and footnote 3, the court
deemed forfeited the defendant’s claim that the condition was overbroad as applied to
him but considered the claim as a facial overbreadth claim. Here, Small does not
differentiate between his claim as a facial or an as-applied challenge to condition No. 32.
15
p. 1353.) We agree with the appellate court in D.H. that this approach fails to address the
inherent vagueness and overbreadth of the terms used, such as “graphic sexual activity”
and “sexual deviance” here. (D.H., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 728-729.) Therefore,
instead of modifying conditions Nos. 29 and 32 ourselves, we direct the trial court to do
so, in particular with respect to condition No. 32 “to define more precisely the material
the court intends to prohibit.” (D.H., at p. 729.) As in D.H., we encourage the trial court
on remand to carefully consider the scope and purpose of these probation conditions,
condition No. 32 in particular, because Small’s sex offenses underlying his crime for
violation of section 290 involved minors, not adults.
DISPOSITION
This matter is remanded with directions to the trial court to strike or modify
condition No. 29 prohibiting association with minors and condition No. 32 prohibiting
possession of pornography in a manner consistent with this decision. The judgment is
otherwise affirmed.
/s/
EARL, P. J.
We concur:
/s/
ROBIE, J.
/s/
WISEMAN, J.*
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
16
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