In re M.H. CA2/3

CourtListener 10705253Calctapp16.10.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 10/16/25 In re M.H. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re M.H., et. al., Persons Coming B340510
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
_____________________________________
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP01910)
FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.H.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Syna M. Dennis, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Paul Couenhoven, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Melania Vartanian, Deputy
County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

Father challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
findings as to his two daughters made pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivision (d) and (j). He argues
there was insufficient indicia of reliability as to the younger
daughter’s statements to support the court’s finding that father
sexually abused her. We affirm because substantial evidence
supports the juvenile court’s findings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The family consists of mother, father, and their daughters,
M.H. (born July 2016) and C.H. (born July 2020). In March 2022,
mother obtained a restraining order against father. A year later,
the parents divorced and mother was awarded sole legal and
physical custody, with father receiving monitored visitation three
days per week. At some later point, the parents verbally agreed
that father’s visits would be unmonitored and the weekend visit
would be overnight.
At the time of these dependency proceedings, the children
lived with mother. Father lived with his girlfriend and her three
sons from another relationship in a two-bedroom home.

1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

2
I. C.H.’s Statements Regarding the Sexual Abuse
In late May 2024, while with her babysitter, three-year-old
C.H. cried when she went to the bathroom and complained of
pain in her “ ‘pee pee,’ ” pointing to her vaginal area. C.H. told
the babysitter that father had touched her in her “ ‘private
area,’ ” pointing to her vaginal area with her finger. C.H. stated
the abuse occurred at father’s girlfriend’s house, while she and
father were in the kitchen or on the couch. C.H. told the
babysitter that she had told mother about the sexual abuse.
However, when the babysitter told mother about it in early June,
mother stated C.H. had not reported it to her.
Upon learning about the sexual abuse, mother took C.H. to
the hospital for an external/visual exam, which had no findings,
and then to the police station. C.H. told the investigating police
officer that father had put his finger inside her “private part” ten
times a week. C.H. said her “ ‘private part’ ” was located between
her legs. When asked, C.H. stated she was telling the truth. She
stated that father takes his finger out and puts it back in
multiple times. She explained it usually happens when father’s
girlfriend is cooking and her sister is in the room but not nearby.
The sister, M.H., consistently denied abuse by father, and did not
witness father abusing C.H.
DCFS investigated, and C.H. told the social worker, “ ‘Did
you know my dad touches my private parts for no reason.’ ” C.H.
reported that father would say “ ‘Come here’ ” and that the
touching would happen on the couch. She stated that her sister,
M.H., was also on the couch but not close enough to hold her
hand. C.H. also stated that M.H. “punches her in her private
parts.”

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During a forensic interview conducted by the Children’s
Advocacy Center in mid-June 2024, C.H. stated that “dad touched
my pee really hard inside,” that he “uses his finger to touch her
private parts” and that he “put his finger in her private parts.”
C.H. reported that the touching happened more than once and
that she asked father to stop touching her “private parts, [but] he
keeps doing it.” She said that it had happened on the couch when
the girlfriend was making dinner and when M.H. was not close to
her. She also said the assault happened when father was
standing on the carpet. C.H. explained that her sister and
father’s girlfriend had not seen it happen. She stated that father
ripped some of her clothing. During the forensic interview, C.H.
also said that mother and the maternal grandmother touch her
private parts. When the interviewer asked how mother’s touch
differed from father’s, C.H. showed the interviewer by rubbing
her finger on top of her other hand and stated that mother
applies “medicine butter” so her “private part stops itching.”2
Mother told DCFS that she had been in a relationship with
Father for 18 years and never thought he would sexually assault
their child. Mother “stated that at times, [C.H.] can say things
that are not true or that have not happened” but C.H. had never
before made up sexual abuse allegations. When mother found
out about the sexual abuse from the babysitter, mother asked
C.H. what had happened. C.H. told her that father put his
fingers in her private parts, hurting her. C.H. stated this
occurred when she was on the couch with father, father’s
girlfriend was in the kitchen, and M.H. was on the other side of
the couch.

2 C.H. has severe eczema.

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When mother told M.H. about C.H.’s disclosure, M.H.
responded it was possible C.H. was referring to when father had
applied cream for C.H.’s eczema rash. Hearing this, C.H.
responded that M.H. was wrong and that C.H. was talking of
another time. Mother did not know of father putting cream on
C.H. until M.H. mentioned it. Mother said M.H. loved her father
and it was possible M.H. would lie to protect him.
When interviewed by DCFS and the forensic interviewer,
M.H. denied that father had ever touched her or C.H.’s private
parts. She said father had only put “ ‘butt cream’ ” on C.H. with
a Q-tip.
When questioned by police, father was shocked by the
allegation and denied touching C.H. inappropriately. Father
lived with his girlfriend, who denied seeing father touch the
children inappropriately and did not suspect such conduct by
father. Father told DCFS he could not think of how or where
C.H. got the idea that he had touched her this way. He could not
think of a scenario that C.H. misinterpreted. Father stated C.H.
wipes herself when using the bathroom and has not had a rash;
he stated he has not put cream on her. Father later stated that
mother, mother’s family, and the babysitter coerced C.H. to make
the sexual abuse claims. During one monitored visit with M.H.,
father told M.H. that C.H. was lying.
II. Section 300 Petition and Detention
On June 18, 2024, the Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) filed a petition which alleged the children were
subject to juvenile court jurisdiction pursuant to section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1), (d), and (j). The petition alleged that father
sexually abused three-year-old C.H. by digitally penetrating her
on multiple occasions, and the children were at risk of being

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abused and suffering serious physical harm because of father’s
sexual abuse of C.H.
A detention hearing was held on July 3, 2024. The court
found a prima facie case that the children came within the ambit
of section 300. The court ordered the children removed from
father’s custody and released to mother’s custody.
III. Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
On August 21, 2024, the juvenile court conducted the
jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The court admitted DCFS’s
reports summarized above.
C.H.’s counsel asked the juvenile court to sustain counts
(b)(1) and (d). C.H.’s counsel stated C.H. “has repeatedly stated
that father touches her for no reason and is able to distinguish
this from when mother applies medication on her.” M.H.’s
counsel asked the court to sustain all three counts and joined
with C.H.’s counsel’s argument as to counts (b)(1) and (d). Citing
the consistency of C.H.’s statements and the collateral
statements by the babysitter and mother, M.H.’s counsel asked
the petition to be sustained as pled.
Father’s counsel asked the juvenile court to dismiss the
section 300 petition for insufficient evidence. Father’s counsel
said the allegations were a “misunderstanding.” Father’s counsel
stated that C.H. suffers from severe eczema and pointed out that
C.H. “very credibly accused her mother, she very credibly accused
of [sic] her grandmother of doing the exact same thing” she
accused father of doing. Father’s counsel argued, “At most, it was
[a] four-year-old[’s] misinterpretation of the events[,] and even
sexual battery criminal counts have exceptions for medical
reasons.”

6
DCFS asked the juvenile court to sustain all three counts.
DCFS’s counsel asserted “it’s very clear . . . that [C.H.] can
distinguish that, when mother and the grandmother apply or
touch her private areas, it’s with a purpose of applying cream
versus when the father touches her which is for no reason on the
couch when another adult in the home is away not able to
observe.” DCFS’s counsel argued that when police interviewed
C.H., “the child indicated that the father places one finger inside
her private part by putting the finger back in multiple times.
This does not appear to be a reasonable way to apply any sort of
cream to a child to insert one finger multiple times into a child’s
vaginal area.”
The juvenile court sustained counts (d) and (j), and
dismissed count (b)(1). Counts (d) and (j) alleged that father
“sexually abused the child, [C.H.] On multiple prior occasions,
the father digitally penetrated the child, [C.H.]’s vagina by
inserting the father’s finger deep inside of the child’s vagina
causing the child pain. Such sexual abuse of the child, [C.H.] by
the father endangers the child’s physical health and safety and
places the child, [C.H.] and the child’s sibling, [M.H.] at risk of
serious physical harm, damage, danger and sexual abuse.”
The court stated, “I can appreciate that the minor is four
years of age and she was only three years of age when the alleged
abuse occurred. And I do note that there are some
inconsistencies in her statement and also that she alleged that
the mother and the grandmother also touched her
inappropriately. [¶] However, I agree with the statements as
presented by [DCFS’s counsel] that the minor has made a
distinction between inappropriate touching and touching that
was done in response to the application of medication for eczema

7
and a rash[,] and the minor’s statements were very clear that the
father penetrated her private parts.” The juvenile court
concluded it could not ignore C.H.’s consistent statements.
As to disposition, mother’s counsel asked the court to close
the case with a juvenile custody order granting her sole physical
and legal custody of the children. DCFS joined in mother’s
request as the children had remained safe in her care. C.H.’s
counsel likewise joined mother’s request to terminate
jurisdiction, granting mother sole physical and legal custody.
M.H.’s counsel asked the court to maintain jurisdiction at
M.H.’s request and due to other concerns not relevant to this
appeal. Father’s counsel asked for the children to be returned to
his custody “for appellate purposes” and argued it was
appropriate to keep the case open.
The juvenile court found that continued jurisdiction was
not required because the children were safe in mother’s care. The
court terminated jurisdiction and awarded mother sole legal and
physical custody of the children with father having monitored
visitation.
Father appealed.
DISCUSSION
Father argues there was insufficient indicia of reliability as
to C.H.’s statements to support the court’s finding that father
sexually abused C.H. As we explain, substantial evidence
supported the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings.
I. Applicable Law
Section 300, subdivision (d), provides the juvenile court
may adjudge a child a dependent of the court if “[t]he child has
been sexually abused, or there is a substantial risk that the child
will be sexually abused, as defined in Section 11165.1 of the

8
Penal Code, by the child’s parent.” As relevant here, sexual
abuse includes “child molestation” (Pen. Code, §§ 11165.1,
subd. (a), 647.6) and “[i]ntrusion by one person into the genitals
or anal opening of another person, including the use of an object
for this purpose, except that, it does not include acts performed
for a valid medical purpose” (Pen. Code, § 11165.1, subd. (b)(3)).
Section 300, subdivision (j), provides the juvenile court may
adjudge a child a dependent of the court if “[t]he child’s sibling
has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b),
(d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be
abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions.”
“In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting jurisdictional findings . . . , we ‘consider the entire
record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s findings.’ [Citations.] ‘Substantial evidence is
evidence that is “reasonable, credible, and of solid value”; such
that a reasonable trier of fact could make such findings.’ ” (In re
L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848.) In reviewing for
substantial evidence, “a reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the
evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve
evidentiary conflicts.’ ” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614,
640; see In re Nathan E. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 114, 122 [“ ‘In
making [a substantial evidence] determination, . . . we note that
issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.’ ”].) “The appellant has the burden of showing there is no
evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the
findings.” (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.)
In In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 886 (I.C.), the Supreme
Court explained: “ ‘[T]here are particular difficulties with
proving child sexual abuse: the frequent lack of physical

9
evidence, the limited verbal and cognitive abilities of child
victims, the fact that children are often unable or unwilling to act
as witnesses because of the intimidation of the courtroom setting
and the reluctance to testify against their parents. [Citation.]
Given these realities, the categorical exclusion of child hearsay
. . . will often mean the exclusion of significant, reliable evidence
required for the juvenile court to assert its jurisdiction over the
child and to ultimately protect him or her from an abusive family
relationship.’ ”
Due to these obstacles to obtaining direct testimony,
section 355 “ ‘broadly authorize[s] reliance on any hearsay
contained in the social study by a child victim under the age of
12, as long as an objecting party does not prove that the
statement was procured by means of fraud, deceit, or undue
influence.’ ” (I.C., supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 885; see § 355, subd.
(c)(1).) Hearsay from young children, like C.H., “may not be
relied on exclusively unless the court finds that ‘the time, content
and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of
reliability.’ ” (In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1248 (plur.
opn. of Mosk, J.) (Lucero L.).) Hearsay supported by indicia of
reliability is sufficient to support a jurisdictional finding. (Id. at
pp. 1242, 1245 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.) [such statements “can
serve as sole support for a jurisdictional finding”].)
II. Substantial Evidence Supported Jurisdiction
Here, C.H. spontaneously told her babysitter about father
digitally penetrating her. She then repeatedly and consistently
reported the sexual abuse to investigating adults at different
times and in different contexts. Over a two-month period, C.H.
disclosed to six different adults—her babysitter, mother, a police
officer, two social workers, and the forensic interviewer—that

10
while at father’s home, father placed his finger inside her vagina
multiple times, causing her pain. She stated the abuse happened
while father’s girlfriend was in the kitchen and her sister, M.H.,
could not see it because she was either turned away or on the
other side of the couch. As summarized above, C.H.’s statements
remained largely consistent, with only minor variations,
throughout the dependency investigation. This constituted
substantial evidence supporting jurisdiction over the children
under both counts (d) and (j). (In re P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th
1339, 1344 [substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction findings where, “although [the child]’s accounts of
[her] father’s abuse varied in the details, each account related
essentially the same two incidents”].)
Father argues that we must reverse the jurisdictional
finding because it was based entirely on C.H.’s uncorroborated
statements and a young child’s hearsay statements cannot be the
sole basis for a jurisdictional finding of sexual abuse, citing I.C.,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at page 887. In I.C., a three-year-old was abused
by an older child shortly before she made allegations against her
father that were “strikingly similar” to the abuse incident
involving the older child. (Id. at p. 896.) The three-year-old “had
a tendency to blend fantasy with reality” and, despite promising
to tell the truth, made several demonstrably false statements
during her forensic interview. (Id. at p. 894.) In ruling on the
allegations, the juvenile court noted that the only evidence
consisted of the three-year-old’s hearsay statements and observed
that she appeared confused at times. Nevertheless, because she
had repeated the allegations on multiple occasions, the court
found the evidence supporting the reliability of her statements
more persuasive. (Id. at pp. 881–882.) In reversing jurisdiction,

11
the Supreme Court stated that the evidence of the prior
molestation made this “an unusual situation,” and the child’s
confusing statements did not show an indicia of reliability. (Id.
at pp. 893–896.)
The case at bar substantially differs from I.C. Here, there
was no prior molestation for C.H. to conflate with father’s digital
penetration. C.H. did not appear to be confused about the
allegations she was making. In fact, when her sister dismissed
the alleged abuse as father applying cream, C.H. insisted she was
not talking about cream. Also unlike the child in I.C., C.H. did
not make demonstrably false statements after promising to tell
the truth. And, most importantly, C.H. provided a factually
consistent account of the digital penetration to six different
adults in different settings over the span of two months (from
late May to July 31, 2024).
Father urges that C.H.’s statements were unreliable
because they were not corroborated. He argues that his girlfriend
or M.H. should have heard or seen the sexual abuse, the physical
exam of C.H. should have shown evidence of trauma given that
C.H. stated the abuse occurred ten times per week, and “everyone
who knew father said he would never do such a thing.” He points
out that eight-year-old M.H. said father never touched her or
C.H. inappropriately.
However, the Supreme Court has clarified that
“corroboration is not necessary” where there are sufficient indicia
of reliability. (Lucero L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1249 (plur. opn.
of Mosk, J.).) Here, as previously mentioned, the time, content,
and circumstances of C.H.’s repeated disclosures made her
hearsay statements reliable, independent of corroboration.
Furthermore, that the girlfriend and M.H. did not witness or

12
know of the abuse is consistent with C.H.’s account of events.
The absence of physical trauma does not establish that the abuse
did not occur, particularly here, where then-three-year-old C.H.
did not physically resist father and stated she did not bleed from
the digital penetrations. Likewise, the fact that father enjoyed a
good reputation and that others did not believe he was capable of
such abuse does not establish his innocence. (See, e.g., People v.
McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1314 [“it is important to
recognize that good character evidence, of even the most positive
and probative sort, does not purport to establish conclusively that
the defendant could not have committed the charged offense”].)
Father also points out that C.H. made inconsistent
statements by additionally reporting that the penetration
occurred in the bathroom or on the carpet, by telling her
babysitter that she had told mother about the sexual assaults
when she had not, and by stating that her sister punched her in
her private parts. Yet, these discrepancies identified by father
are insignificant in light of the overall consistent account
provided by C.H. to six different people. Moreover, it was the
juvenile court’s responsibility to assess C.H.’s credibility and to
determine the weight to be given to her statements, taking into
account her age and the minor inconsistencies in her testimony.
(See In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451 [“Weighing
evidence, assessing credibility, and resolving conflicts in evidence
and in the inferences to be drawn from evidence are the domain
of the trial court, not the reviewing court.”]; In re Sheila B. (1993)
19 Cal.App.4th 187, 199 [“an appellate court defers to the trier of
fact . . . and has no power . . . to consider the credibility of
witnesses; or to resolve conflicts in, or make inferences or
deductions from the evidence”].) Further, C.H.’s account of abuse

13
need not be perfectly consistent to support jurisdiction. (See I.C.,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 896 [“A child’s account may reflect
uncertainty, and may even contain some contradictions, and
nevertheless warrant the court’s trust.”].)
To the extent father urges there was an innocent
explanation for the penetration allegations—that he was
applying cream to eczema—this too was an evidentiary issue for
the juvenile court to weigh and assess. It is not enough that
another factfinder might have reached a different conclusion; the
question is whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s determination, which we will uphold even if substantial
contrary evidence exists. (See In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th
1218, 1225 [upholding juvenile court findings where substantial
evidence to the contrary exists]; In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th
767, 774 [“ ‘we do not consider whether there is evidence from
which the dependency court could have drawn a different
conclusion but whether there is substantial evidence to support
the conclusion that the court did draw’ ”].) Father’s “arguments
demonstrate the juvenile court could have resolved the
evidentiary and credibility conflicts differently, but they do not
show there was no substantial evidence to support the findings.”
(In re E.G. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 707, 722 [evidence sufficient
when child gave “largely consistent, detailed report of
[stepfather’s] sexual abuse to at least six people” but later
recanted due to familial pressure].)
We also reject father’s argument that the “court’s failure to
view C.H.’s taped interview undercuts its conclusion her
statements should be credited.” To begin with, the record does
not support father’s claim that the court failed to review the
recording. As part of discovery, the court ordered production of

14
the video, and nothing in the record suggests the court did not
review it. Moreover, father’s counsel neither offered the video
into evidence nor listed it as an exhibit. Accordingly, any
purported error was forfeited by counsel’s failure to rely on the
video at trial. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“a
reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a
ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the
trial court”].)
Furthermore, even assuming the juvenile court did not
personally review the interview recording, the juvenile court was
not required to review it so long as it had before it other
competent, reliable evidence of C.H.’s disclosures. (In re Lucero
L., supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1242, 1245 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.)
[hearsay statements in social study reports “can serve as sole
support for a jurisdictional finding”].) Here, the court considered
statements from social workers, mother, the babysitter, the
forensic interviewer, and law enforcement describing C.H.’s
consistent disclosures. On this record, substantial evidence
supports the juvenile court’s determination.

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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

EGERTON, J.

ADAMS, J.

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