CourtListener 10703761•In re L.L. CA2/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 10/14/25 In re L.L. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re L.L. et al., Persons Coming B341035
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. Nos.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 20CCJP01381G,
AND FAMILY SERVICES, 20CCJP01381H
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
G.L.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEALS from a judgment and an order of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, Gabriela H. Shapiro, Juvenile
Court Referee. Affirmed; appeal dismissed.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Brian Mahler, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Elizabeth Klippi, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
_________________________
The juvenile court declared L.L. (born in 2020) and M.L.
(born in 2022) dependent children, finding mother physically
abused the children’s half sibling and father had engaged
in domestic violence against mother that placed the children
at risk of serious harm. The court removed the children from
the parents’ custody and declined to provide father reunification
services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5 based
on his past felony conviction for abducting the children’s older
half sibling and removing her from the state.1
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (Department) appeals the judgment to the extent
the juvenile court dismissed two jurisdictional counts alleging
father’s abduction and concealment of the children’s half sibling
placed them at risk of serious harm. As the Department
concedes, however, reversal of the challenged finding will have
no practical effect on the juvenile court’s jurisdiction because
father does not challenge the sustained counts regarding
domestic violence and mother did not appeal the sustained
counts regarding her physical abuse of the children’s half sibling.
We therefore deem the Department’s appeal moot and dismiss
it accordingly. (See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 [“A
court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide actual controversies
by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give
opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to
1 Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code, unless otherwise designated.
2
declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter
in issue in the case before it.” ’ ”].)
Father appeals the court’s order bypassing reunification
services. While he concedes the undisputed evidence established
he willfully abducted the children’s older half sibling from
her placement and refused to disclose the girl’s whereabouts
(see § 361.5, subd. (b)(15)), father argues the juvenile court
failed to consider the appropriate factors in determining whether
reunification would be in the children’s best interests (see
§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2)). The record does not support father’s
contention. We affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
The family’s current dependency case stems from a May
2024 incident in which mother reportedly struck the children’s
seven-year-old half sibling J.S. with a hanger. Mother has an
extensive child welfare history, largely involving substance abuse
and domestic violence. In 2013, her parental rights over two
other half siblings were terminated. In February 2016, she lost
her parental rights over another half sibling. And, in October
2016, she lost her parental rights over a fourth half sibling.
In August 2020, L.L. was declared a dependent child
based on sustained allegations that father had been charged
with human trafficking of a minor (Pen. Code, § 236.1, subd. (c));
father had a history of domestic violence against mother; and
father had a history of mental and emotional disorders that
rendered him incapable of providing regular care for the child.
In February 2021, the juvenile court ordered L.L. placed with
mother on the condition that she obtain a restraining order
against father. Mother obtained a three-year restraining
order the next month. In November 2021, the juvenile court
3
terminated its jurisdiction, granting sole legal and physical
custody to mother, and restricting father to monitored visits
with L.L.
In April 2023, L.L. and M.L. were declared dependent
children based on sustained allegations that mother had
physically abused L.L. and half sibling J.L and that father had
a history of domestic violence, mental health problems, and
a pending criminal charge for human trafficking. In November
2023, the juvenile court released the children to mother’s custody
and terminated jurisdiction. The exit order granted mother
legal and physical custody of L.L. and M.L. and restricted father
to monitored visitation with the children. Father’s compliance
with his court-ordered case plan had been “insubstantial.”
As for the current dependency case, in July 2024,
the Department filed a first amended petition adding counts
against father. The new counts alleged father and mother
had a history of violent physical and verbal altercations in the
children’s presence; father and mother violated the restraining
order entered in connection with L.L.’s earlier dependency case;
and father had felony convictions for child stealing (Pen. Code,
§ 278) and attempting to dissuade a victim/witness from
prosecuting (id., § 136.1). With respect to the count regarding
father’s criminal history, the petition alleged father had
arranged for the children’s half sibling J.A. to abscond from
her foster care placement and leave the state without permission.
The count further alleged that father had refused to disclose
J.A.’s whereabouts or to return her to her placement.
Father admitted he did not participate in his earlier
dependency cases, claiming he “ ‘felt attacked.’ ” He
acknowledged there was domestic violence, but said mother
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was always the aggressor and denied ever harming her. He
nonetheless felt he was “still held accountable” and claimed he
did not oppose the restraining order because he wanted to see
L.L. returned to mother. He said he had not visited with the
children for seven or eight months and blamed mother for
“ ‘manipulat[ing] the system.’ ”
Father said his criminal case and felony convictions
stemmed from his minor daughter J.A. (the children’s half-sister)
making false allegations that he allowed her to appear in
pornographic material on the Internet. He explained it was his
daughter’s 20-year-old boyfriend who had solicited her to make
the material and that when he learned of it, he arranged to fly
his daughter to her mother’s home in Texas to get her away from
the boyfriend. He said this resulted in his daughter making the
false allegations against him, which led to the human trafficking
charges. He added that a jury acquitted him of those charges
after his daughter testified that he was not aware of or involved
in her making the material. And, while he was convicted of
removing his daughter from her foster care placement and
flying her out of the state without permission, father claimed
the criminal court granted him a “military diversion.”
Father’s criminal court records confirmed he was convicted
of child stealing and attempting to dissuade a witness from
prosecuting but was acquitted of the human trafficking charges.
A senior case manager with the veterans treatment court
explained that father was participating in an 18-month veteran’s
treatment program—not military diversion—designed to address
his substance abuse and mental health issues. She reported
father’s felony convictions could be reduced to misdemeanors
or dismissed if he completed the program. Father’s probation
5
officer reported that father had been granted three years’
probation. He had been participating “well in groups” and drug
testing as directed. The group session leader said the sessions
“touch on anger management, coping skills, substance use, and
domestic violence.” He explained that father tended to exhibit
“ ‘obsessiveness’ ” around certain topics and was “ ‘consumed
with’ ” his “ ‘children and [the] criminal court case.’ ”
Father testified on his own behalf at the adjudication
hearing. He denied there had ever been domestic violence
between himself and mother and explained that he had
no need to address domestic violence in counseling because
he had “never been convicted” of that charge. While he
acknowledged he faced child kidnapping charges, he asserted
he had been “falsely accused by three [police] officers who since
took early retirement.” He added that the criminal court judge
who sentenced him “understood” his daughter “should have
never been in [the dependency system],” so the court “granted
[him] military diversion to make it right for what the officers
had done.” He also claimed the criminal court judge recognized
“there was no domestic violence” and father had only a
“parenting issue.”
The juvenile court sustained the counts regarding the
parents’ domestic violence, declared the children dependents, and
dismissed the remaining counts related to father’s mental health
and criminal convictions.2 Despite father’s denials, the court
2 Mother pled no contest to the endangerment counts
related to her physical abuse of the children’s half sibling.
With respect to father’s criminal convictions, the court found
insufficient evidence of a nexus between the conduct and a
current risk to the children. Although arranging for his teenage
6
found there was compelling evidence of domestic violence in the
earlier dependency cases. Because father had “never addressed
domestic violence previously” and denied that it ever occurred,
the court found the children faced a current risk of harm.
The juvenile court removed the children from the parents’
custody, ordered reunification services for mother, and bypassed
reunification services to father. The court determined father’s
felony conviction for child stealing plainly established the
predicate for bypassing services under section 361.5, subdivision
(b)(15) and father had failed to meet his burden to prove
reunification would otherwise be in the children’s best interests.
Because father had refused to comply with his case plan in the
children’s earlier dependency cases and he continued to deny
responsibility in his testimony at the adjudication hearing,
the court found there was no “legitimate” reason to believe
he would successfully regain custody if services were extended
to him in this case. While father’s evidence suggested he
was meeting the terms of his probation, it lacked sufficient
“specificity” to satisfy the court that father would complete
the services required to ensure the children could be safely
returned to his custody.
Father filed a timely notice of appeal from the disposition
order.
daughter to be removed from her placement and flown to her
mother’s home in Texas was criminal, the court reasoned the
younger children (whose mother resided in California) were
differently situated and there was insufficient evidence to sustain
a finding that father would engage in similar conduct with them.
The court likewise found insufficient evidence that father
currently suffered from a mental illness that rendered him
incapable of caring for the children.
7
DISCUSSION
A juvenile court is generally required to order reunification
services for a parent “whenever a child is removed” from that
parent’s custody. (§ 361.5, subd. (a); see In re Jayden M. (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 1261, 1271 (Jayden M.); In re Baby Boy H.
(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 474.) However, in certain statutorily
enumerated circumstances, our Legislature has authorized the
juvenile court to “bypass” reunification efforts when it determines
extending services to a parent would not be “ ‘in the best interest
of the child.’ ” (Jayden M., at p. 1271; § 361.5, subds. (b) & (c)(2);
see In re A.E. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1141.) “Consonant
with the general presumption in favor of mandatory reunification
services, the bypass provisions are ‘narrow in scope’ and
reach situations where ‘ “the likelihood of reunification” ’
is ‘ “so slim” ’ due to a parent’s past failures that ‘expend[ing]’
the Department’s ‘ “scarce” ’ resources on reunification services
is likely to be ‘fruitless,’ or when ‘attempts to facilitate
reunification’ would otherwise not ‘serve and protect the child’s
interest.’ ” (Jayden M., at p. 1271; Baby Boy H., at pp. 474, 478.)
“By making the grant of reunification services discretionary in
these situations, the bypass provisions aim to ‘focus reunification
efforts’ and resources on the cases ‘most likely to succeed’ with
reunification.” (Jayden M., at p. 1271; In re Joshua M. (1998)
66 Cal.App.4th 458, 471.)
In this case, the juvenile court bypassed reunification
services for father under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(15).
Under this provision, reunification services “need not be provided
to a parent” if the juvenile court “finds, by clear and convincing
evidence,” that “the parent or guardian has on one or more
occasions willfully abducted the child or child’s sibling or
8
half sibling from their placement and refused to disclose
[their] whereabouts” or “refused to return physical custody”
to either “their placement” or “to the social worker.” (§ 361.5,
subd. (b)(15).) When the bypass provision applies, the court
“shall not order reunification for a parent . . . unless the court
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is
in the best interest of the child.” (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).)
When read as a whole, section 361.5 establishes “a two-
step, burden-shifting procedure for bypassing reunification
services.” (Jayden M., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1272.) “In
the first step, the Department bears the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence” that the bypass provision applies.
(Ibid.) “In the second step, which presupposes the Department
has carried its initial burden, the burden shifts to the parent to
prove that it is in the child’s best interest for the juvenile court
to exercise its discretion to provide reunification services.” (Ibid.)
In exercising its discretion under the bypass provisions,
“the court may consider a variety of factors relevant to the child’s
best interest, including (1) the parent’s ‘ “ ‘current efforts and
fitness,’ ” ’ (2) the parent’s ‘ “ ‘history,’ ” ’ (3) the ‘ “ ‘gravity of
the problem’ ” ’ that led to the assertion of dependency, (4) the
‘ “strength of the bonds” ’ between the child and the parent
and between the child and the current caregiver, and (5) the
‘ “ ‘child’s need for stability and continuity.’ ” ’ ” (Jayden M.,
supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1272–1273, quoting In re G.L.
(2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1164 (G.L.).) “One factor that is
essential—and hence necessary—to the assessment of a child’s
best interest is whether there is ‘ “some ‘reasonable basis to
conclude’ ” ’ that reunification is possible; if it is not, offering
reunification services that are destined to fail is not in the child’s
9
best interest.” (Jayden M., at p. 1273; accord G.L., at p. 1164;
In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1228–1229
(William B.) [“[A]t least part of the best interest analysis must
be a finding that further reunification services have a likelihood
of success. In other words, there must be some ‘reasonable basis
to conclude’ that reunification is possible before services are
offered to a parent who need not be provided them.”].)
Father does not dispute that his criminal conviction for
child stealing satisfied the Department’s initial burden of proving
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(15) authorized the court to bypass
reunification services. However, he argues the court erred on
the second prong of the analysis by failing “meaningfully [to]
focus on the minors’ best interests, and whether they would
benefit from [his] participation in family reunification services.”
(See § 361.5, subd. (c)(2).)
“A juvenile court has broad discretion when determining
whether . . . reunification services would be in the best interests
of the child under section 361.5, subdivision (c). [Citation.]
An appellate court will reverse that determination only if the
juvenile court abuses its discretion.” (William B., supra, 163
Cal.App.4th at p. 1229; G.L., supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1164–
1165.) “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether
the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or
more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts,
the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision
for that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th
295, 318–319.)
The record plainly supports the juvenile court’s decision,
and father has not shown that his evidence compelled a different
determination or that the court’s conclusion exceeded the bounds
10
of reason. Critically, once the juvenile court determined the
bypass provision applied (a determination that father does not
dispute), the burden shifted to father to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that extending reunification services to him
would still advance the children’s best interests, notwithstanding
his felony conviction for child stealing. (See § 361.5, subd. (c)(2)
[if a parent is subject to a bypass provision, the court “shall
not order reunification for [the] parent . . . unless the court finds,
by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the
best interest of the child” (italics added)]; Jayden M., supra, 93
Cal.App.5th at p. 1272.) Father simply ignores this statutory
framework and instead argues the court erred by offering—
what he contends were—insufficient reasons to support
its determination. His premise is fatally flawed.
When a bypass provision applies, the burden does not rest
with the juvenile court to give sufficient reasons to support its
best interest determination, because the Legislature—in crafting
the bypass provisions—has already made the determination
that a child stealing conviction (or any of the other enumerated
circumstances set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (b)) is
sufficient reason alone to find that reunification services should
not be offered to an offending parent. As our Supreme Court has
explained, “ ‘[o]nce it is determined one of the situations outlined
in subdivision (b) applies, the general rule favoring reunification
is replaced by a legislative assumption that offering services
would be an unwise use of governmental resources.’ ” (Renee J. v.
Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 744.) In this circumstance,
“[t]he burden is on the parent to change that assumption and
show that reunification would serve the best interests of
11
the child,” notwithstanding the parent’s past misconduct.
(William B., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1227, italics added.)
Father relies on William B. The case is instructive,
but not in a way that helps father. The children in William B.
(a nine-year-old and a five-year-old) had been removed from
the parents’ custody for a third time when the case came to the
reviewing court. (William B., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1223.)
The juvenile court had determined the bypass provision set forth
in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13) applied, finding “by clear
and convincing evidence that both parents had a history of
chronic drug use and had resisted court-ordered treatment for
the problem.” (William B., at pp. 1226–1227.) Nevertheless,
the court found extending services to mother was in the children’s
best interests because “the boys had both testified they loved her
and wanted to be with her.” (Id. at p. 1226.) This was an abuse
of discretion. (Id. at p. 1229.) The relevant bypass provision
reflected “ ‘a legislative determination that an attempt to
facilitate reunification between a parent and child generally
is not in the minor’s best interests when the parent is shown
to be a chronic abuser of drugs who has resisted prior treatment
for drug abuse.’ ” (Id. at p. 1228.) Under the prescribed statutory
framework, the juvenile court could not set aside that legislative
determination without clear and convincing evidence that
afforded it “some ‘reasonable basis to conclude’ that reunification
[was] possible before services [could be] offered to a parent who
need not be provided them.” (Id. at pp. 1228–1229.) Because
there was “no substantial evidence to support the conclusion that
[the children] [would] reunify with their mother,” the juvenile
court abused its discretion when it ordered reunification services
12
for a parent who was subject to the bypass provision. (Id. at
p. 1229.)
Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(15) reflects a legislative
determination that it generally is not in a child’s best interest
to facilitate reunification with a parent who—like father—has
violated court orders and endangered the child’s half sibling
by willfully abducting the half sibling from her placement
and refusing to disclose her whereabouts. Setting aside this
legislative determination requires clear and convincing evidence
that the offending parent will comply with future court orders
issued to protect the child before services are offered to a parent
whose misconduct otherwise disqualified him from receiving
services. (See § 361.5, subd. (b)(15); William B., supra, 163
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1228–1229.) Here, in assessing the children’s
best interests in light of the bypass provision’s undisputed
application, the juvenile court correctly focused on father’s past
refusal to participate in services, his violation of the restraining
order that had been issued to protect the children in their earlier
dependency case, and his persistent denial of responsibility for
domestic violence that endangered the children. The court also
reasonably assessed that father’s evidence was too vague to
satisfy the court that he would comply with future orders if it
extended reunification services to him. On this record, we cannot
say the juvenile court abused its discretion by finding father’s
evidence insufficiently convincing to support a finding that
reunification would be in the children’s best interests. (§ 361.5,
subd. (c)(2).)
13
DISPOSITION
The appeal by the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services is dismissed as moot.
The disposition order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
We concur:
ADAMS, J.
HANASONO, J.
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