CourtListener 10701301•In re K.M. CA6
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 10/13/25 In re K.M. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re K.M., a Person Coming Under the H052866
Juvenile Court Law. (Santa Cruz County
Super. Ct. No. 22JU00101)
SANTA CRUZ COUNTY HUMAN
SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
K.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant K.M. (Mother) seeks review of the juvenile court’s order terminating
her parental rights as to minor child, K.M. The sole issue on appeal is whether the
juvenile court erred in finding the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
(ICWA) inapplicable. Mother contends respondent Santa Cruz County Human Services
Department (the Department) failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice
requirements. We affirm the order.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
In June 2022, the Department initiated dependency proceedings pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b),2 alleging that Mother’s and
K.M.’s presumed father’s, J.L., (Presumed Father) substance abuse problems put K.M. at
risk. In the petition, the Department noted that its ICWA inquiry gave reason to believe
K.M. is or may be an Indian child. The assigned social worker stated in the investigation
narrative that Mother and Presumed Father denied having any Indian heritage. The social
worker asked maternal grandmother whether she had any Indian ancestry. Maternal
grandmother responded that maternal grandfather’s side may have Indian heritage. She
believed maternal great-grandmother on maternal grandfather’s side may have Azteca
Indian ancestry. Maternal grandmother said that she would try obtaining more
information from maternal grandfather’s side. Mother and maternal grandmother told the
social worker they did not have maternal grandfather’s contact information. Maternal
grandmother contacted maternal grandfather via social media. Maternal grandfather
responded to maternal grandmother’s social media message stating he did not have any
Indian heritage. She could not find the message. Maternal grandmother contacted
maternal grandfather’s sister. His sister did not respond to maternal grandmother.
The social worker tried contacting maternal grandfather twice but was
unsuccessful. The Department conducted a relative search request of maternal
grandfather. The social worker obtained his two sisters’ and brother’s contact
information. First, the social worker spoke with one of the maternal grandfather’s sisters.
The social worker asked if she had maternal grandfather’s contact information. She said
1
“ ‘In accord with the usual rules on appeal, we state the facts in the manner most
favorable to the dependency court’s order.’ [Citation.] In light of the limited scope of
this appeal, we provide an abbreviated summary of the dependency proceedings.” (In re
D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1046 (D.S.).)
2
Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2
that she did not have a relationship with him and that he was hard to reach. Then, the
social worker asked if she knew whether she had any Native American ancestry or Indian
heritage. She responded that there might be on maternal great-grandfather’s side. She
told the social worker maternal great-grandfather’s name. She said maternal great-
grandfather passed away the prior year. She also stated that only he knew about possible
Indian ancestry. She informed the social worker that she had an aunt who might have
known, but the aunt also passed away. She said that the information about their ancestry
was never passed on and did not believe maternal grandfather knew.
Next, the social worker contacted maternal grandfather’s brother. Maternal
grandfather’s brother stated that he has not had contact with maternal grandfather in over
a year. He also said that he did not have maternal grandfather’s contact information and
did not believe maternal grandfather had a phone. The social worker asked him if he
knew whether he had any Native American ancestry or Indian heritage. He responded
that they might on maternal great-grandfather’s side. He was not “100% sure” and did
not have any more information. He suggested the social worker contact his other sister.
Finally, the Department contacted the second sister. The social worker asked her
if she knew whether she had any Native American ancestry or Indian heritage. She
responded that she did not know and did not think they did. She said that only maternal
great-grandfather knew, but he passed away. She also told the social worker that she did
not have maternal grandfather’s contact information and believed he broke his phone.
Prior to the initial hearing, Mother and Presumed Father filed parental
notifications of Indian status denying any Indian ancestry. The court conducted its own
ICWA inquiries of maternal great-grandmother, maternal grandmother, and maternal
great-aunts who were present at the hearing. Based on the Department’s reports and the
ICWA inquiries conducted at the hearing,3 the juvenile court found that there was no
3
The record does not include a reporter’s transcript for this hearing.
3
reason to know, but may be reason to believe that K.M. may be an Indian child. The
court ordered the Department to continue its inquiry.
On the same day, the Department sent a letter to the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA). The Department wrote in its letter that there is a reason to believe that K.M. may
be an Indian child but insufficient information to determine that there is reason to know
that K.M. is an Indian child. The Department provided K.M.’s name and birthdate. The
letter also stated Mother’s name and her denial of Native American ancestry. The
Department included maternal grandmother’s name and her statement that maternal
grandfather’s side may have Native American affiliation. The letter also noted that
maternal grandmother said she did not have maternal grandfather’s contact information.
The Department wrote that maternal grandmother contacted maternal grandfather on
social media. The letter included that he reported not having any Indian heritage. The
social worker noted maternal grandfather’s name, birthdate, and possible current location.
The letter stated that the social worker asked maternal grandfather’s relatives about their
Indian heritage. The Department noted they were unaware of any Native American
affiliation. The letter included the relatives’ names. The Department also wrote that
maternal grandfather’s relatives did not have maternal grandfather’s current contact
information. The Department stated that one relative said that any affiliation would be on
maternal great-grandfather’s side. The social worker included maternal great-
grandfather’s name and that he is deceased. The BIA responded that the Department
failed to provide documentation showing that K.M. and K.M.’s parents “are members of
a federally recognized Indian Tribe and/or the child is eligible for membership in a
federally recognized Indian Tribe.”
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court ordered family
maintenance services for Mother and Presumed Father. Over a month after, the
Department contacted maternal great-grandmother. Maternal great-grandmother reported
that no one in the family was a tribal member.
4
Soon thereafter, the Department learned that A.O. was K.M.’s biological father
(Biological Father). The Department conducted ICWA inquiries with Biological Father
and paternal grandmother. They denied having any Indian ancestry. At the six-month
review hearing, the juvenile court conducted its own ICWA inquiries of Biological
Father, paternal grandmother, and paternal aunt who were present at the hearing. Based
on the Department’s report and the court’s inquiries, the court found that K.M. was not an
Indian child; there was no reason to know and no reason to believe K.M. was an Indian
child; and ICWA did not apply as to Biological Father.
In their status review report, the social worker noted that Mother continued
denying Indian ancestry. At the six-month family reunification services review hearing,
the juvenile court questioned paternal grandmother about her Indian heritage. The court
found that there was still no reason to know or believe that K.M. was a Native American
child or that ICWA applied. The juvenile court terminated Mother’s and Presumed
Father’s reunification services because they did not comply with the case plan. The court
set the matter for a contested section 366.26 hearing. Mother filed a section 388 petition,
requesting reunification services be restored. At the joint section 388 and section 366.26
hearing, the juvenile court took judicial notice of all prior findings and judgments. The
court denied Mother’s section 388 petition and terminated Mother’s, Presumed Father’s,
and Biological Father’s parental rights.
Mother timely appealed the order terminating parental rights.
II. DISCUSSION
Mother contends the juvenile court’s ICWA findings should be reversed because
the Department did not conduct adequate initial and continuing inquiries into K.M.’s
Indian heritage. Mother also asserts that the Department provided defective notice to the
5
BIA.4 The Department argues that they conducted proper and adequate inquiry and that
ICWA did not apply.
A. ICWA Compliance
Congress enacted ICWA to establish minimum standards for state courts to follow
before removing Indian children from their families and placing them in adoptive homes.
(D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1048.) In turn, California enacted and amended
legislation to conform to federal regulation, which included establishing requirements in
dependency proceedings involving Indian children. (Ibid.) An “Indian child” is defined
under ICWA and California law as “ ‘any unmarried person who is under age eighteen
and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe[.]’ ” (25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(4); § 224.1, subd. (b).)
Under the relevant California provisions (§§ 224.2, subds. (a)-(e), 224.3), the
juvenile court and county welfare departments have three distinct duties in dependency
proceedings: (1) a duty to inquire whether the child may be an Indian child; (2) a duty of
further inquiry if that initial inquiry creates a “reason to believe” the child is an Indian
child; and (3) a duty to provide formal notice if that further inquiry results in a “reason to
know” the child is an Indian child. (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1052.)
There is a “reason to believe” the child may be an Indian child whenever
“information suggest[s] that either the parent of the child or the child is a member or
citizen, or may be eligible for membership . . . in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).)
If so, a duty of further inquiry arises. (Id., subd. (e).) The duty of further inquiry requires
the Department to interview parents and extended family members, contact the BIA and
4
Mother requests that we take judicial notice of the federal BIA’s guidance on
“active efforts” to maintain or reunite an Indian child with his or her family. The record
does not establish that K.M. is an Indian child and nothing in the guidance addresses the
sufficiency of the Department’s inquiry. Accordingly, we deny Mother’s request as the
document is irrelevant to the issues presented on appeal.
6
State Department of Social Services to identify names and contact information of the
tribes in which the child may be a member or eligible for membership, and contact the
tribe(s) and any other person that “may reasonably be expected to have information
regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status, or eligibility.” (Id., subd. (e)(2)(C);
see also In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 999 (Ezequiel G.), disapproved on
other grounds by In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1152, fn. 18 (Dezi C.).)
If further inquiry results in a “reason to know” the child is an Indian child, the
third duty to provide formal notice to the pertinent tribes arises. (§§ 224.2, subds. (d) &
(f), 224.3.) “There is ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child if any one of six
statutory criteria is met—i.e., if the court is advised that the child ‘is an Indian child,’ the
child’s or parent’s residence is on a reservation, the child is or has been a ward of a tribal
court, or either parent or the child possess an identification card indicating membership or
citizenship in an Indian tribe. [Citation.]” (Ezequiel G., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 999;
see also § 224.2, subd. (d); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b).)
However, “[i]f the juvenile court finds that ‘proper and adequate further inquiry
and due diligence as required in this section have been conducted and there is no reason
to know whether the child is an Indian child,’ the court may make a finding that ICWA
does not apply to the proceedings, ‘subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the
evidence.’ [Citation.]” (Ezequiel G., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 999; see also § 224.2,
subd. (i)(2).)
B. Standard of Review
“The juvenile court’s factual finding that ICWA does not apply is ‘subject to
reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence.’ [Citation.].” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th
at p. 1134.) But while “[s]ome courts apply a straightforward substantial evidence test”
to review this conclusion, “other courts have used a hybrid standard, reviewing for
substantial evidence whether there is reason to know a minor is an Indian child, and
reviewing a finding of due diligence and proper inquiry for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.,
7
fn omitted) Although the California Supreme Court did not resolve this split in authority,
it acknowledged Ezequiel G.’s language that “the juvenile court’s fact-specific
determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is a ‘quintessentially
discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a deferential standard of review.” (Dezi C.. at
p. 1156-1157.) “ ‘ “On a well-developed record, the court has relatively broad discretion
to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the
specific facts of the case. However, the less developed the record, the more limited that
discretion necessarily becomes.” ’ [Citations.].” (Ibid.)
C. No Error in the Juvenile Court’s ICWA Findings
Whether we adopt the hybrid approach articulated in Ezequiel G., or the
“straightforward substantial evidence test,” we conclude that the juvenile court did not err
in determining that ICWA does not apply to the minor here, as the Department’s inquiry
met the ICWA requirements and there is no reason to know that K.M. is an Indian child.
1. Adequate Inquiry
Mother asserts that the Department erred in its initial duty of inquiry. Further, she
argues that the Department erred by not inquiring about maternal grandfather’s, maternal
great-grandfather’s, and maternal grandfather’s siblings’ biographical information. She
also contends that the Department failed to investigate Mother’s claimed heritage after
the letter to the BIA. Finally, Mother asserts that the Department provided defective
notice to the BIA.5
First, we reject Mother’s argument that the Department failed in its initial duty of
inquiry. The Department interviewed all “reasonably available” family members,
including maternal grandmother, maternal great-grandmother, maternal great-aunts, and
maternal great-uncle. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.) The social worker inquired
about Biological Father’s and paternal grandmother’s Indian heritage. The juvenile court
5
Mother does not challenge the ICWA findings related to K.M.’s paternity.
8
conducted its own ICWA inquiries of the paternal relatives at the six-month review
hearing.
Next, the Department’s investigation into Mother’s claimed heritage was adequate
and proper. After learning that maternal grandfather may have Indian ancestry, the social
worker unsuccessfully tried contacting maternal grandfather. The Department conducted
a relative search request of maternal grandfather. The social worker interviewed
maternal grandfather’s siblings. They each stated that they may have Indian ancestry on
maternal great-grandfather’s side but were uncertain. They did not identify any federally
recognized Indian tribe that the Department could contact. The Department and Mother’s
family members cannot ask maternal great-grandfather for information because he is
deceased. One sister noted that her aunt might have known about whether they have any
Indian ancestry. However, she is also deceased. The investigative trail ended with
maternal grandfather’s siblings. (See In re J.S. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 678, 689-690
(J.S.) [affirmed juvenile court’s ICWA findings where the paternal grandmother stated
she did not know of any tribe associated with her family, had no other information, and
did not identify any other paternal relatives].) After the juvenile court ordered the
Department to continue its inquiry, the Department sent a letter to the BIA. The BIA’s
letter stated the Department’s documentation did not demonstrate that K.M. was an
Indian child.
Mother contends that the Department did not inquire about maternal grandfather’s,
maternal great-grandfather’s, and maternal grandfather’s siblings’ biographical
information. “[The Department’s] inquiry obligation is ‘not an absolute duty to ascertain
or refute Native American ancestry.’ [Citation.]” (In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558,
570.) Maternal grandfather’s siblings could not identify a tribe. Thus, the Department’s
failure to gather biographical information is not dispositive to the adequacy of the
Department’s inquiries. Even if the Department gathered the biographical data, without
“the identity of a tribe, let alone a federally recognized one, or at least a specific
9
geographic area of possible ancestry origin, the [ ] (BIA) could not [be expected to assist]
the Department in identifying the tribal agent for any relevant federally recognized tribes.
[Citations.]” (J.S., supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 689.) Further, maternal great-aunts and
maternal great-uncles are not among the “[e]xtended family member[s]” that must be
interviewed. (See § 224.1, subd. (c) [“[e]xtended family member” is defined as provided
in [s]ection 1903 of ICWA].)
We recognize that maternal grandmother asserted possible “Azteca Indian”
ancestry through maternal great-grandmother on maternal grandfather’s side. However,
federal recognition of an Indian tribe involves the establishment of government-to-
government relations with a tribe indigenous to the lands occupied by the United States.
(25 C.F.R. § 83.1.) Aztec is not a federally recognized Indian tribe for ICWA purposes.
(89 Fed.Reg. 944 et seq. (Jan. 8, 2024).)
Mother also argues that the Department erred by not investigating Mother’s
claimed heritage after the letter to the BIA. However, neither Mother nor her family
members identified additional family members that the Department could have
interviewed. “Where . . . a parent largely fails . . . to provide names and contact
information for extended family members, [the Department]’s ability to conduct an
exhaustive ICWA inquiry necessarily is constrained.” (In re Q.M. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
1068, 1082.) “[W]e cannot ask the agency to intuit the names of unidentified family
members or to interview individuals for whom no contact information has been
provided.” (Ibid.) The only identified family members that could have provided
information were maternal great-grandfather and maternal great-grand-aunt. Both are
deceased. Certainly, where family members with possible ties to an Indian tribe are
deceased, we cannot ask the Department to intuit information that no known living family
member possesses.
Finally, Mother asserts that the Department sent a defective notice to the BIA
because it lacked the biographical information that Judicial Council form ICWA-030,
10
Notice of Child Custody Proceeding for Indian Child, requires. However, form
ICWA-030 relates to the third duty of “formal notice” when there is a “reason to know”
the child is an Indian child. (§§ 224.2, subd. (d), 224.3.) Here, the criteria for “reason to
know” was not met. Mother also has not cited any evidence from the record to
demonstrate otherwise. The Department was not required to utilize form ICWA-030 to
conduct its further inquiry. The failure to include information listed in that form is not
dispositive as to the adequacy of the Department’s inquiries.
Based on this record, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s
determination that the Department acted with due diligence and conducted an adequate
inquiry. Mother has not shown the juvenile court’s findings to be arbitrary, capricious or
whimsical. (See Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939,
957.) The Department extended as far as was feasible to investigate K.M.’s ancestry with
the information provided by Mother and maternal family members. The record
establishes that the court read and reviewed the Department’s reports, including the
Department’s ICWA inquiries. The juvenile court also conducted ICWA inquiries. The
juvenile court appropriately exercised its discretion when it concluded that the inquiry
regarding K.M.’s possible Indian ancestry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent.6
2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding K.M. is not an Indian Child
Our careful review of the record also demonstrates that substantial evidence
supports the juvenile court’s ultimate determination that there is no reason to know K.M.
is an Indian child. The maternal family could not identify their association with a
federally recognized Indian tribe. Mother and her family did not identify other family
members who could have been interviewed to provide information regarding Indian
ancestry, and certain family members are deceased. The investigative leads provided by
6
Our extensive summary of the record also demonstrates that the “straightforward
substantial evidence test” applied by some of our colleagues in other appellate courts to
the adequacy of the initial inquiry is satisfied here. (See In re H.B. (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 711, 721.)
11
maternal family members did not develop evidence that K.M. had Indian ancestry. The
BIA confirmed that the documentation provided by the Department did not substantiate
that K.M. was an Indian child.
The trial court did not err in finding that the Department’s inquiry complied with
ICWA requirements and that there is no reason to know K.M. is an Indian child.
III. DISPOSITION
The order terminating Mother’s parental rights is affirmed.
12
_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
________________________________
Grover, J.
________________________________
Lie, J.
H052866 In re K.M.; Santa Cruz County HSD v. K.M.
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