CourtListener 10701284•Holt v. Tator CA2/6
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 10/13/25 Holt v. Tator CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
GARY HOLT, 2d Civ. No. B343529
(Super. Ct. No.
Plaintiff and Respondent, 2023CUOR017395)
(Ventura County)
v.
MALCOLM TATOR,
Defendant and Appellant.
A property owner who took the property subject to a trust
deed sought to enjoin foreclosure on the ground that the notice of
default was defective. The trial court granted the injunction and
awarded the property owner attorney fees. We affirm.
FACTS
Valentine and Christine Rutherford owned a parcel of
property in Ojai. A dispute with Gary Holt resulted in multiple
lawsuits. Attorney Malcom Tator represented the Rutherfords
under a retainer agreement that specified Tator’s hourly rate and
scope of services.
During the course of the litigation, the Rutherfords became
unable to pay Tator’s fees. Tator agreed to continue to represent
them in exchange for a note and trust deed secured by the
property for a $78,382.20 fee then due, plus any future fees. The
note would mature 75 days after the litigation ended. The trust
deed was recorded in August 2012. The note carried no interest.
Holt ultimately obtained a judgment against the
Rutherfords for $181,000 in 2015. Holt recorded an abstract of
judgment, giving him a judgment lien on the property. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 697.410, subd. (a).)
In 2020, Holt filed an action against Christine Rutherford
and Tator seeking to enforce the 2015 judgment through a
sheriff’s sale and to invalidate Tator’s 2012 deed of trust, as well
as a deed of trust Tator recorded in 2016. The trial court found
that Holt had a secured interest in the property through his
recording of the abstract of judgment; that the 2016 deed of trust
is cancelled, but the 2012 deed of trust is not cancelled. The
court ordered a sheriff’s sale. Holt purchased the property at the
sale with a full credit bid.
Following the sheriff’s sale, Tator initiated nonjudicial
foreclosure proceedings by recording a notice of default. The
notice demanded $198,354.79 to cure the default. The amount
was composed of the original $78,382.20, plus $16,313.74 for
further fees earned in the case, and the balance of $103,658.85
for interest on the principal amount at a rate of 10 percent per
annum.
Instant Action
Holt brought the instant action to enjoin the foreclosure
sale on the ground that the notice of default was defective due to
the inclusion of unauthorized interest. The trial court agreed and
2.
enjoined the sale. The court awarded Holt $54,500 in attorney
fees based on a provision in the deed of trust.
DISCUSSION
I
Civil Code section 3289, subdivision (b)1
Tator contends section 3289, subdivision (b) authorizes 10
percent per annum interest on deeds of trust after the debtor’s
default.
Section 3289, subdivision (b) provides: “If a contract
entered into after January 1, 1986, does not stipulate a legal rate
of interest, the obligation shall bear interest at a rate of 10
percent per annum after a breach. [¶] For the purposes of this
subdivision, the term contract shall not include a note secured by
a deed of trust on real property.”
Tator’s claim that section 3289, subdivision (b) authorizes
10 percent per annum interest on a note secured by a deed of
trust is belied by the plain language of the subdivision. Tator
argues that the statute should be interpreted in light of justice
and wise policy, and that creditors should be assisted instead of
punished for allowing extensions for debtors. But where, as here,
the Legislature has clearly spoken, we have no power to interpret
the statute to reach a different result.
II
7 Percent Per Annum Interest
Tator contends 7 percent per annum interest should be
imputed on the note.
The contention is moot. The question here is whether a
notice of default computed with 10 percent per annum interest is
void. It is irrelevant whether a notice of default calculated with a
1 All further statutory references are to the Civil Code.
3.
different rate of interest would have been valid. Nevertheless,
because the issue is bound to rise again, the parties litigated the
issue in the trial court and the trial court ruled on it, and the
issue is fully briefed here, we will discuss it for the benefit of the
parties and the trial court.
Tator relies on article XV, section 1 of the California
Constitution, establishing the maximum rate of interest on a loan
or forbearance at 7 percent per annum, with specified exceptions
not relevant here. Courts have long held that where no interest
is specified in a note, it bears interest at the legal rate of 7
percent per annum from its maturity date. (Nesbit v. MacDonald
(1928) 203 Cal. 219, 222.) The rule applies to a note secured by a
deed of trust. (Soleimany v. Narimanzadeh (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 915, 924.)
The trial court ruled Tator was not entitled to interest
because enforcement of the note was barred by the statute of
limitations. But it is well settled that where a note is secured by
a deed of trust, the statute of limitations does not extinguish the
debt and the note may be enforced by foreclosure. (Sipe v.
McKenna (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 1001, 1005.). Holt cites no
authority barring interest on such a note.
III
Attorney Fees
Tator contends the trial court erred in awarding Holt
attorney fees.
Tator argues the clause under which Holt is seeking fees is
not an attorney fees clause, but an indemnity clause. The clause
requires the Rutherfords “[t]o appear in and defend any action or
proceeding purporting to affect the security or the rights or
powers of beneficiary or Trustee, and to pay all costs and
4.
expenses, including . . . attorney fees in a reasonable sum, in any
such action or proceeding in which Beneficiary or Trustee may
appear, and in any suit brought by Beneficiary to foreclose this
Deed.”
In Saucedo v. Mercury Savings & Loan Assn. (1980) 111
Cal.App.3d 309, grantees who purchased real property subject to
an existing trust deed successfully sued to enjoin foreclosure.
Grantees sought attorney fees under a provision identical to the
provision at issue here contained in the deed of trust. The trial
court denied the request for fees on the ground that grantees who
take subject to a trust deed are not personally liable under the
trust deed’s provisions. The Court of Appeal reversed. The court
reasoned that had the trust deed beneficiary prevailed, the
trustor would be liable for attorney fees, and the fees would
become part of the debt secured by the trust deed. As a practical
matter, the grantees would be required to pay the attorney fees
in order to preserve their interest in the property. The court
concluded that under the reciprocal fee provision of section 1717,
the grantees are entitled to attorney fees. (Saucedo, at p. 315.)
The same rule applies here. Had Tator prevailed, the
Rutherfords would have been liable for his attorney fees. The
amount of the fees would be added to the debt, and Holt would
have to pay the fees to preserve his interest in the property.
Thus Holt is entitled to attorney fees under the reciprocal
provisions of section 1717.
5.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to
respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:
YEGAN, J.
CODY, J.
6.
Mark S. Borrell, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Malcolm R. Tator, in pro. per., for Defendant and
Appellant.
Law Offices of Bryan J. Clifton, Bryan J. Clifton; Ferguson
Case Orr Paterson and Joshua S. Hopstone for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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