In re Sofia S. CA2/7

CourtListener 10700511Calctapp10.10.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 10/10/25 In re Sofia S. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re SOFIA S., A Person Coming B341519, B342725
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. 22CCJP00812)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LORENA R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the orders of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Cristina Gutierrez Legaspi, Judge. Affirmed
(appeal No. B341519); conditionally reversed (appeal
No. B342725).
Christopher R. Booth, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________

Lorena R. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
suspending her overnight visits and conjoint counseling with her
daughter Sofia at a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 3881 (appeal No. B341519) and a subsequent order
terminating Mother’s parental rights under section 366.26
(appeal No. B342725). Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that
the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (Department) and the court failed to comply with the
inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and the California Indian Child
Welfare Act (Cal-ICWA; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.).
Mother and Father (Valente S.) denied they had Indian
ancestry, and the Department inquired of both maternal
grandparents and the paternal grandmother, who stated they
were not aware of any Indian ancestry. We agree with Mother
with respect to the paternal relatives that the Department’s
failure to interview any extended family members other than the
paternal grandmother did not satisfy the Department’s duty of
inquiry because it left unexplored a branch of Sofia’s family
tree—Father’s paternal ancestry. The fact Father and the

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

2
paternal grandmother denied any Indian ancestry does not mean
other extended family members, including the paternal
grandfather and paternal aunts and uncles, would not have had
meaningful information on whether Sofia had Indian ancestry.
The Department therefore did not satisfy its duty to inquire of
reasonably available extended family members with respect to
the family’s Indian ancestry, and substantial evidence does not
support the juvenile court’s finding that Sofia was not an Indian
child. We conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s order
terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and remand
for the court and the Department to comply with the inquiry and
notice provisions of ICWA and Cal-ICWA.
With respect to the maternal relatives, the Department’s
interviews with Mother and both maternal grandparents
provided a more complete picture of the family’s Indian ancestry
on Mother’s side. In light of our conditional reversal, we do not
reach whether the Department and the court also violated ICWA
and Cal-ICWA with respect to the maternal relatives. However,
we note that on remand the Department continues to have an
obligation to interview reasonably available extended family
members under section 224.2, subdivision (b). We also reject the
Department’s argument that Mother forfeited her challenge to
the adequacy of the Department’s ICWA inquiry by not objecting
in the juvenile court.
Because our order requires that an ICWA inquiry be
performed, and Mother raises no other issues with respect to the
court’s October 16, 2024 order suspending Mother’s overnight
visits and conjoint counseling with Sofia, we affirm that order.

3
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Dependency Proceedings
On April 28, 2022 the juvenile court sustained the
allegations in a petition under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1)
and (j), as amended, with respect to then-seven-year-old Sofia
that Mother had a history of substance abuse and was a current
user of amphetamine, methamphetamine, and marijuana, which
rendered her unable to provide regular care for Sofia, and on
February 9, 2022 Mother was under the influence of illicit drugs
while Sofia was in her care. The court also sustained the
allegations that Father2 had a history of substance abuse,
including methamphetamine, and he was a current abuser of
marijuana; further, Sofia’s half-siblings were former dependents
of the juvenile court and Father’s reunification services had been
terminated due to Father’s substance abuse. The court declared
Sofia a dependent of the court and removed her from Mother’s
and Father’s custody. The court granted the parents family
reunification services and ordered monitored visitation for the
parents three times a week for three hours each visit. Sofia was
placed with the maternal grandmother (Alma G.), where she
remained during the dependency proceeding.
On October 16, 2023, at the 18-month review hearing, the
juvenile court terminated Mother’s reunification services and set
the matter for a selection and implementation hearing

2 Father is not a party to these appeals.

4
(§ 366.26).3 At the hearing the court ordered Mother and Sofia to
undergo conjoint counseling and allowed Mother to have
overnight visits with Sofia in the maternal grandmother’s home.
In August 2024 the Department filed a section 388 petition
requesting the juvenile court suspend its order for conjoint
counseling and require that Mother’s visits be monitored. The
Department argued that Sofia did not want to participate in
conjoint counseling and felt unsafe with Mother, and further, the
therapist had not recommended conjoint counseling. On
October 16, 2024 the court granted the petition in part,
suspending conjoint counseling and overnight visits, but allowing
unmonitored day visits to continue.
At the December 11, 2024 selection and implementation
hearing, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing
evidence that Sofia was adoptable and no exceptions to
termination of parental rights applied. The court terminated
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, found adoption was the
appropriate permanent plan, and designated the maternal
grandmother as the prospective adoptive parent.
Mother timely appealed from the October 16, 2024 order
suspending conjoint counseling (case No. B341519) and the
December 11, 2024 order terminating her parental rights (case
No. B342725).

3 The juvenile court previously terminated reunification
services for Father.

5
B. The Department’s ICWA and Cal-ICWA Inquiry
On April 27, 2022 Mother and Father each filed a parental
notification of Indian status (ICWA-020) form stating none of the
listed factors indicating Indian ancestry applied. Mother and
Father denied having Indian ancestry at other times during the
dependency proceeding. The maternal grandmother and
maternal grandfather (Victor R.) also denied having any Indian
ancestry. The juvenile court inquired of Mother and the
maternal grandmother at multiple hearings, including the initial
section 366.26 hearing on August 13, 2024, and they consistently
responded that they were not aware of anyone in the family
having Indian ancestry. Mother told the social worker she had
two sisters (Jacqueline and Alma R. (Alma)) and two brothers
(Michael and Victor), and she had good relationships with them.
Alma told the social worker that she picked up Sofia from school
and sometimes took care of Sofia when maternal grandmother
had to work. Alma also told the social worker that Michael was
designated as a substitute caregiver for Sofia in the event the
maternal grandmother became incapacitated or died. Further,
Jacqueline had a daughter who was in the same class as Sofia.
On February 28, 2022 the social worker spoke with Jacqueline
about her relationship with Mother and Mother’s use of alcohol
and drugs. The Department did not inquire of Alma or
Jacqueline about Sofia’s Indian ancestry.
Father told the social worker that he had six siblings:
Ruben, Dalia, Maria, Juan Manuel, Dario, and Luis. He had a
good relationship with them and had regular contact with all of
them except Ruben (who was deported to Mexico and maintained
“sporadic contact”). In November 2022, as part of its due
diligence search to locate Father (who had not been in contact

6
with the Department since July 2022), the Department mailed
letters to four of the siblings (Ruben, Dalia, Maria, and Juan
Manuel), requesting they contact the Department to provide
information about Father’s whereabouts. As of February 2024,
however, none of the siblings had contacted the Department.
Father also had regular contact with his parents. Father had
been employed in his father’s business “on and off” for the prior
15 to 20 years, and he did side jobs with his uncle (the paternal
great-uncle), who was a contractor. Father also had two other
children (Sofia’s half-siblings), Emily and Valente. The social
workers also described multiple cousins of Sofia in reports,
including Jacqueline’s children and Alma’s daughter.
At the April 28, 2022 jurisdiction and disposition hearing
the juvenile court stated it had no reason to know or believe
ICWA applied. The court ordered the Department to “continue
its efforts to interview any appropriate relatives.” At the
December 11, 2024 section 366.26 hearing the court again
inquired of Mother and the maternal grandmother as to whether
the family had any Indian ancestry, to which they responded no.
The court found, based on Mother’s and maternal grandmother’s
responses and the Department’s continued inquiry, that Sofia
was not an Indian Child, and ICWA does not apply.

DISCUSSION

A. ICWA and Cal-ICWA Inquiry and Notice Requirements
Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 “in response to ‘rising
concern in the mid-1970’s over the consequences to Indian
children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child
welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers

7
of Indian children from their families and tribes through
adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-Indian homes.’”
(In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112 (Dezi C.).) To address this
concern, “ICWA establishes minimum standards for state courts
to follow before removing Indian children from their families and
placing them in foster care or adoptive homes and does not
prohibit states from establishing higher standards.” (Id. at
p. 1129.) In 2006 the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 678
(2005-2006 Reg. Sess.), which mandated compliance with ICWA
in all Indian child custody proceedings in an effort to increase
compliance with ICWA. (Dezi C., at pp. 1130-1131.)
In dependency proceedings, ICWA and Cal-ICWA require
that where the court knows or has reason to know an Indian
child is involved, notice must be given to the relevant tribes.
(25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.3, subd. (a); In re
Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 5 (Isaiah W.); Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.481(c)(1).) The notice requirement is at the heart of ICWA
because it “enables a tribe to determine whether the child is an
Indian child and, if so, whether to intervene in or exercise
jurisdiction over the proceeding.” (Isaiah W., at p. 5; accord, Dezi
C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1144, fn. 15.)
The juvenile court and child welfare agency “have ‘an
affirmative and continuing duty’ in every dependency proceeding
to determine whether ICWA applies by inquiring whether a child
is or may be an Indian child.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 1131-1132, quoting § 224.2, subd. (a), italics added; see
Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 9; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.481(a).) The duty to inquire begins with the initial contact
with the reporting party, and it continues with the child welfare
agency’s “first contact with the child and each family member,

8
including extended family members.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1); see
Dezi C., at p. 1132.) The duty of inquiry continues throughout
the dependency proceedings. (Dezi C., at p. 1132; In re J.C.
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 70, 77; see § 224.2, subd. (a).)
Under section 224.2, subdivision (b)(2), once a child is
placed into the temporary custody of a “county welfare
department,” the duty to inquire “includes, but is not limited to,
asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian,
extended family members, others who have an interest in the
child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the
child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (See Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1132; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1) [the
child welfare agency “must ask . . . extended family
members . . . whether the child is or may be an Indian child”];
In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 551-552 [§ 224.2,
subd. (b)(2), “requires the child protective agency to
ask . . . ‘“‘extended family members’”’” whether the child is or may
be an Indian child].) An “extended family member,” if not defined
by the law or custom of the child’s Indian tribe, includes “a
person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian
child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-
law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or
stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1,
subd. (c) [adopting same definition].)
The duty of further inquiry is triggered under
section 224.2, subdivision (e), “[i]f the court, social worker, or
probation officer has reason to believe that an Indian child is
involved in a proceeding, but does not have sufficient information
to determine that there is reason to know that the child is an
Indian child.” (See Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132; In re

9
T.R. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 206, 219; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.481(a)(4).) Further inquiry includes “(1) interviewing the
parents and extended family members; (2) contacting the Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA) and State Department of Social Services;
and (3) contacting tribes the child may be affiliated with and
anyone else that might have information regarding the child’s
membership or eligibility in a tribe.” (Dezi C., at pp. 1132-1133,
citing § 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)-(C).)
We review the juvenile court’s factual finding that ICWA
does not apply for substantial evidence. (See § 224.2, subd. (i)(2)
[“If the court makes a finding that proper and adequate further
inquiry and due diligence as required in this section have been
conducted and there is no reason to know whether the child is an
Indian child, the court may make a finding that [ICWA] does not
apply to the proceedings, subject to reversal based on sufficiency
of the evidence.”]; In re Wendy C. (Oct. 9, 2025, B344660) __
Cal.App.5th __ <https://courts.ca.gov/opinions> [p. 10] (Wendy
C.); In re C.R. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 793, 800 [“We generally
review the juvenile court’s factual finding that ICWA does not
apply for substantial evidence.”]; In re Josiah T. (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 388, 401 [“‘“[w]e review the juvenile court’s ICWA
findings under the substantial evidence test, which requires us to
determine if reasonable, credible evidence of solid value supports
the court’s order”’”].) “[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific
determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly
diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation]
subject to a deferential standard of review.” (Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1141; accord, Wendy C., at pp. 10-11; In re C.R.,
at. p. 800; see In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1101 [“‘On
a well-developed record, the court has relatively broad discretion

10
to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate,
and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.”].)4

B. Substantial Evidence Does Not Support the Juvenile Court’s
Finding ICWA Did Not Apply
Mother contends the Department failed to conduct an
adequate ICWA inquiry because it failed to inquire of two
maternal aunts and two maternal uncles (Mother’s siblings), six
paternal aunts and uncles (Father’s siblings), multiple maternal
cousins (including Jacqueline’s and Alma’s children), paternal
great-uncle (for whom Father did odd jobs), and two paternal
half-siblings (Emily and Valente).5

4 The Supreme Court in In re Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th
at page 1101 observed that some Courts of Appeal had applied a
“standard substantial evidence test, ‘which requires [the
appellate court] to determine if reasonable, credible evidence of
solid value supports the court’s ICWA finding,” but “other courts
have used a hybrid standard, reviewing for substantial evidence
whether there is reason to know a minor is an Indian child, and
reviewing a finding of due diligence and proper inquiry for abuse
of discretion.” Kenneth D. did not decide which standard applied
because it was undisputed that the initial ICWA inquiry was
inadequate. (Id. at pp. 1101-1102.)

5 Mother does not contend the Department failed to
interview the paternal grandfather (for whom Father had worked
over the prior 15 to 20 years), although it does not appear from
the record that he was interviewed. The Department likewise
does not mention the paternal grandfather in its respondent’s
brief. On remand, the Department should determine whether to
inquire of paternal grandfather as part of its duty of inquiry
under ICWA.

11
The Department responds that the repeated denials of
Indian ancestry by Mother, the maternal grandparents, and the
paternal grandmother satisfied the Department’s duty of inquiry
under ICWA, relying on the language in Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at page 1140, that ICWA “does not require reversal in
all cases in which every possible extended family member has not
been asked about the child’s Indian ancestry.” But the Supreme
Court in Dezi C. clarified in the next sentence, “[S]ection 224.2
‘does not require the agency to “find” unknown relatives and
others who have an interest in the child, merely to make
reasonable inquiries. The operative concept is those people who
are reasonably available to help the agency with its investigation
into whether the child has any potential Indian ancestry should
be asked.’” (Ibid.)
The record shows, at a minimum, that five of the six
paternal aunts and uncles were reasonably available, and the
Department could have easily contacted at least some of them to
inquire about the family’s Indian ancestry. As discussed, Father
identified his six siblings and stated he had regular contact with
all of them, except Ruben, with whom Father had “sporadic
contact.” Mother identified her two sisters and two brothers and
stated she had a good relationship with all of them. Accordingly,
it is reasonable to infer that Mother and Father could have
provided contact information for all the aunts and uncles.
Moreover, the social worker spoke with Jacqueline and Alma but
never inquired whether the family had Indian ancestry. The
Department was also aware that Michael was the backup
caregiver for Sofia. It is undisputed that the aunts and uncles
are “extended family members” under section 224.1,

12
subdivision (c), and 25 United States Code section 1903(2).6 Yet
the Department never contacted any of these family members or
requested Mother, Father, or the maternal grandmothers provide
contact information for them.
The Department argues that as part of its due diligence
search for Father in November 2022, it attempted to contact four
of Father’s siblings (Juan, Ruben, Maria, and Dalia) by sending
letters to them asking about Father’s whereabouts, but none of
them responded to the letters. The fact the four paternal aunts
and uncles did not respond to the Department’s letters does not
mean they could not be contacted by phone or email, which
presumably was how Father contacted them. Nor does it mean
the four family members would not respond to an inquiry about
the family’s ancestry, in contrast to an inquiry as to Father’s
whereabouts.
Moreover, we reject the Department’s contention that
“there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that these relatives
would have provided any meaningful information above and
beyond what had already been provided by the maternal and
paternal grandmothers.” This position ignores the statutory

6 We agree with the Department that great-uncles and step-
siblings are not extended family members under section 224.1,
subdivision (c), and 25 United States Code section 1903(2). In
some circumstances a child welfare agency has a duty to inquire
of non-extended family members under section 224.2,
subdivision (b)(2), which requires an inquiry of “others who have
an interest in the child.” (See Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1132.) But Mother has not argued or shown the paternal
great-uncle or step-siblings have an interest in the child (or there
is another basis for inquiry).

13
mandate that the child welfare agency inquire of extended family
members with respect to a child’s Indian ancestry. (See § 224.2,
subd. (b); Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1132; In re Y.W., supra,
70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 551-552.) Further, the Department would
not know whether the extended family members have meaningful
additional information without asking them. “‘[O]ral
transmission of relevant information from generation to
generation and the vagaries of translating from Indian languages
to English combine to create the very real possibility that a
parent’s or other relative’s identification of the family’s tribal
affiliation is not accurate.’” (Dezi C., at p. 1146; see In re T.G.
(2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 289.) And here, given that all the
siblings were in contact with Mother and Father, it would be “a
rather simple task to ask those family members about Indian
ancestry in this process,” which inquiry would be “‘slight and
swift.’” (Dezi C., at p. 1143.)7
Finally, the Department contends we should consider on
appeal that Mother failed to object to the juvenile court’s ICWA
findings, relying on In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984,
1012, disapproved of on another ground by Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1152, fn. 18.) The court in Ezequiel concluded
that on appeal from an order terminating parental rights, an
appellate court should take into account “whether an objection
was made below to the adequacy of an ICWA inquiry,” explaining

7 We agree with the Department, however, that it is unlikely
the two identified maternal cousins would have additional
information that their mothers (Jacqueline and Alma) or
maternal grandparents did not have.

14
that ICWA “requires all counsel to critically review the agency’s
ICWA inquiry at every stage of the proceedings and to alert the
juvenile court if an inquiry is inadequate.” (Ibid.)
Although we agree that a parent should raise the
inadequacy of an ICWA inquiry in the juvenile court, the parent’s
failure to object in the juvenile court is not relevant to whether a
child is an Indian child or whether the Department has
performed an adequate inquiry. (See In re G.H. (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 15, 29 [a parent may raise lack of ICWA
compliance for the first time on appeal because “[a] tribe’s rights
under ICWA, and similarly under related state law, are
‘meaningless if the tribe has no notice that the action is
pending’”]; In re A.R. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 197, 204 [“the law
allows a parent to raise failure to comply with ICWA on appeal,
even if the issue was not raised in the trial court, because ‘[t]he
parent is in effect acting as a surrogate for the tribe in raising
compliance issues on appeal’”]; In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th
701, 706 [“the parent’s failure to object in the juvenile court to
deficiencies in the investigation or noticing does not preclude the
parent from raising the issue for the first time on appeal from an
order entered at any hearing in which the juvenile court
determined that ICWA was satisfied or does not apply”].)
The Department’s position—supporting affirmance of an
order terminating parental rights despite an inadequate ICWA
inquiry where a parent fails to object in the juvenile court—
would prejudice the Indian tribe, which has a “right to intervene
at any point in the proceeding” (25 U.S.C. § 1911(c)) but will not
be able to exercise that right unless it receives notice that the
subject of a dependency proceeding may be an Indian child. As
the Supreme Court explained in Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at

15
page 13, “Indian tribes have interests protected by ICWA that are
separate and distinct from the interests of parents of Indian
children,” and further, “ICWA’s notice requirements are ‘intended
to protect the interests of Indian children and tribes despite the
parents’ inaction.’” The court concluded, “We agree with the
majority view among the Courts of Appeal that ‘given the court’s
continuing duty throughout the dependency proceedings to
ensure the requisite notice is given [citation], and the protections
the ICWA affords Indian children and tribes, the parents’
inaction does not constitute a waiver or otherwise preclude
appellate review.’” (Ibid.) Further, as the Supreme Court
underscored in Dezi C., we “‘cannot assume a parent’s interest
necessarily aligns with the tribe’s interest.’ [Citation.] ‘“The
parents or Indian custodian may be fearful to self-identify, and
social workers are ill-equipped to overcome that by explaining the
rights a parent or Indian custodian has under the law.”’” (Dezi
C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1146.)
Accordingly, substantial evidence does not support the
juvenile court’s findings that the Department satisfied its duty of
inquiry under section 224.2, subdivision (b), and that ICWA does
not apply. (Wendy C., supra, __ Cal.App.5th __
<https://courts.ca.gov/opinions> [pp. 18-19] [juvenile court erred
in finding ICWA did not apply where Department limited inquiry
to parents and a single family member on the maternal side and
two family members on the paternal side of the family despite
other available extended family members who could have been
contacted]; In re J.C., supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 74 [“the court’s
finding ICWA did not apply” was not supported by substantial
evidence where the court “failed to ensure the Department
fulfilled its duty of inquiry under section 224.2, subdivision (b)”];

16
In re Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 432 [court’s finding
ICWA did not apply was erroneous where Department failed to
inquire of child’s extended family members about possible Indian
ancestry, and court failed to ensure the Department satisfied its
duty of initial inquiry].)8
We therefore conditionally reverse the order terminating
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights with directions for the
Department and the juvenile court to comply with ICWA and
Cal-IWCA. (See Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1152 [“[A]
judgment [must] be conditionally reversed when error results in
an inadequate Cal-ICWA inquiry. It is only by conditionally
reversing that we can ascertain whether error in the inquiry is
prejudicial.”].)
However, there is no reason to disturb the juvenile court’s
October 16, 2024 order suspending conjoint counseling and
Mother’s overnight visits while the Department performs its
further ICWA investigation, because if new information is
discovered showing Sofia is an Indian child, the relevant tribe
and Indian custodian will have a right to intervene (§ 224.4) and
to petition the court to invalidate any action taken in violation of
ICWA. (§ 224, subd. (h); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.487(a).) Until
that time, the juvenile court has authority to protect Sofia by

8 As discussed, because we conclude substantial evidence
does not support the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not
apply based on the Department’s failure to inquire of multiple
paternal extended family members, we do not reach whether the
juvenile court would have abused its discretion in finding ICWA
did not apply had the Department interviewed all four
grandparents, and all four denied any Indian ancestry.

17
limiting Mother’s visitation and suspending the order for conjoint
counseling. Mother has not cited any authority to the contrary.

DISPOSITION

The March 10, 2025 order terminating Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights is conditionally reversed. We direct the
Department and the juvenile court to comply with the inquiry
and notice provisions of ICWA and Cal-ICWA consistent with this
opinion. If the court finds Sofia is an Indian child, it shall
conduct a new section 366.26 hearing, as well as all further
proceedings, in compliance with ICWA and Cal-ICWA. If not, the
original section 366.26 order shall be reinstated. The
December 16, 2024 order granting the Department’s section 388
petition in part is affirmed.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

STONE, J.

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