People v. Taylor CA1/2

CourtListener 10700394Calctapp10.10.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 10/10/25 P. v. Taylor CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A172267
v.
ERIC TAYLOR, (San Bernardino County
Super. Ct. No. FVI24000854
Defendant and Appellant.

A jury found defendant Eric Taylor guilty of making criminal threats,
found true the enhancement allegation that he was armed with a handgun
while committing the offense, and separately found him guilty of possession
of a firearm by a felon.1 Defendant’s sole claim on appeal is that the trial
court should have stayed, pursuant to Penal Code section 654, the
punishment for either the firearm enhancement or the offense of possession
of a firearm by a felon.2 Finding no error, we affirm.

1 The California Supreme Court transferred this matter from the Court

of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District to the First Appellate District on
January 15, 2025.
2 Defendant, represented by court-appointed appellate counsel, did not

file a reply brief.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Christopher Brown is a manager of a 7-Eleven in Victorville. On
March 27, 2024, Brown was ringing up a customer when defendant entered
the 7-Eleven. Another manager reported to Brown that defendant was not
allowed in the store because he had been caught stealing; so Brown told
defendant he was not allowed in the store and asked him to leave. Defendant
“started to get aggressive” and said he was going to do what he wanted, and
he just wanted a beer. Brown told defendant, “ ‘If you’re not going to leave,
I’m going to call the cops.’ ” Defendant started to leave, and then he stopped
and said he was Crips, and he would shoot Brown and everyone in the store.
Defendant “pointed his hand at [Brown] like a handgun.” As defendant left,
his “shirt lifted up,” and Brown saw “the butt of a gun in his belt line.”
Defendant exited the store and continued to yell while there were customers
outside.
Brown was afraid defendant was going to shoot him. The customer he
was ringing up was “freaking out and screaming.” Brown called 911. During
the 911 call, Brown reported that defendant was “going over to the Chevron
now across the street.” Brown remained afraid because he did not know if
defendant was going to return.
San Bernardino County deputies responded to the Chevron gas station
on “a high priority call of a man with a gun” and detained defendant. A
firearm with ammunition “chambered in the barrel, ready to shoot” was
found in his pants pocket.
Defendant was charged with criminal threats (Pen. Code,3 § 422, subd.
(a); count 1); possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2);

3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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unlawful possession of ammunition by a person prohibited from possessing a
firearm ( § 30305 subd. (a)(1); count 3); and carrying a loaded firearm in
public (§ 25850, subd. (a); count 4). As to count 1, it was alleged that
defendant was armed with a firearm in the commission of the offense within
the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1). It was further alleged that
defendant suffered a prior serious or violent felony conviction and that
various aggravating circumstances were present.
The jury found defendant guilty of all four counts and found true the
firearm allegation as to count 1. In a bench trial, the trial court found
defendant suffered a prior strike conviction and found true six aggravating
circumstance allegations.
At sentencing, the trial court imposed six years for count 1 (the upper
term of three years, doubled), one year for the accompanying firearm
enhancement, and a consecutive one year, four months (one-third the middle
term of two years, doubled) for count 2, for a total sentence of eight years,
four months. Terms of one year, four months (one-third the middle term,
doubled) for counts 3 and 4 were imposed and stayed under section 654.
DISCUSSION
Section 654, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part, “An act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act
or omission be punished under more than one provision.”
“[T]he purpose of section 654 ‘is to insure that a defendant’s
punishment will be commensurate with his culpability.’ ” (People v. Latimer
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1211.) The California Supreme Court has observed
that crimes are not generally “ ‘the result of a single physical act. “Section
654 has been applied not only where there was but one ‘act’ in the ordinary

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sense . . . but also where a course of conduct violated more than one
statute.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1208.) The question “ ‘[w]hether a course of criminal
conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the
meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all
of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished
for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.’ ” (Ibid., italics
omitted.)
“Whether section 654 applies in a given case is a question of fact for the
trial court” (People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143), and we
review for substantial evidence a trial court’s implied determination that two
offenses are separate (and therefore may be punished separately) for
purposes of section 654. (People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618.)
Defendant contends the trial court was required, under section 654, to
stay the punishment for either count 2 (felon in possession of a firearm) or
the firearm enhancement associated with count 1 (criminal threats) because
the substantive offense of count 2 and the enhancement for count 1 were
based on the same act. For his position, defendant relies on People v.
Buchanan (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 603 (Buchanan), which in turn, relied on
People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350 (Jones).
In Jones, a defendant was convicted of three felony offenses based on
his possession of a loaded revolver: (1) possession of a firearm by a felon,
(2) carrying a readily accessible concealed and unregistered firearm, and
(3) carrying an unregistered loaded firearm in public. (54 Cal.4th at p. 352.)
Our high court concluded the case “involve[d] a single act or omission that
can be punished but once” under section 654. (Id. at p. 360.)
In Buchanan, defendant Buchanan was convicted of two counts of drug
possession for sale with a firearm enhancement and one count of possession

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of a firearm by a felon based on evidence that methamphetamine, heroin, and
a firearm were discovered in Buchanan’s vehicle following a traffic stop. (248
Cal.App.4th at pp. 606, 608.) The Court of Appeal concluded section 654 and
Jones “preclude[d] separate sentences for being a felon in possession of a
firearm and for the firearm enhancements attached to [the] narcotics
offenses—all of which were based on defendant’s possession of a single
firearm on a single occasion.” (Id. at p. 607.) The court reasoned, “The
criminal act for which defendant was convicted and the aspect of the
enhancements attached to his sentence were identical, and therefore section
654 applies.” (Id. at p. 617.)
However, in other cases involving a defendant convicted of felon-in-
possession and a separate offense with a firearm enhancement, courts have
reached different results depending on the facts of the case. In People v.
Jones, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, the court surveyed the case law and
distilled the principles that “multiple punishment is improper where the
evidence ‘demonstrates at most that fortuitous circumstances put the firearm
in the defendant’s hand only at the instant of committing another offense,’ ”
but that “section 654 is inapplicable when the evidence shows that the
defendant arrived at the scene of his or her primary crime already in
possession of the firearm.” (Id. at pp. 1144, 1145.)
In People v. Ratcliff (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1401 (Ratcliff), for example,
defendant Ratcliff was convicted of two counts of robbery with enhancements
for use of a firearm and one count of being a felon in possession of a handgun,
and the trial court imposed punishment for both a firearm enhancement
related to one of the robbery counts and the felon-in-possession offense. (Id.
at pp. 1404, 1407.) Ratcliff argued the term for the felon-in-possession
offense had to be stayed under section 654 because the offense and the

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enhancement “were part of a continuous transaction,” but the Court of
Appeal disagreed. (Id. at pp. 1407–1408.)
The Ratcliff court recognized, “[I]f the evidence demonstrates at most
that fortuitous circumstances put the firearm in the defendant’s hand only at
the instant of committing another offense, section 654 will bar a separate
punishment for the possession of the weapon by an ex-felon.” (Id. at p. 1412.)
But in Ratcliff’s case, “the evidence showed that defendant [Ratcliff] used a
handgun to perpetrate two robberies separated in time by about an hour-and-
a-half. He still had the gun in his possession when he was arrested half-an-
hour later. . . . [Ratcliff] already had the handgun in his possession when he
arrived at the scene of the first robbery. A justifiable inference from this
evidence is that defendant’s possession of the weapon was not merely
simultaneous with the robberies, but continued before, during and after those
crimes. Section 654 therefore does not prohibit separate punishments.” (Id.
at p. 1413.) The court further reasoned that the commission of the crime of
being a felon in possession of a firearm was “complete once the intent to
possess is perfected by possession,” and “[w]hat the ex-felon does with the
weapon later is another separate and distinct transaction undertaken with
an additional intent which necessarily is something more than the mere
intent to possess the proscribed weapon.” (Id. at p. 1414.) Thus, the court
concluded Ratcliff’s intent to possess the weapon did not include his
subsequent, separate intent to commit the robberies. (Ibid.)
We find defendant’s case is more like Ratcliff than Buchanan.
Defendant was arrested with a firearm in his possession at a Chevron gas
station. It is reasonable to infer defendant possessed the firearm before he
entered the 7-Eleven and committed the crime of making criminal threats
and defendant’s possession of the firearm continued after he committed that

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crime. Defendant’s possession of a firearm as a felon was “not merely
simultaneous with” the criminal threats, and his “intent to possess the
weapon did not import or include the intent to commit” the separate crime of
making criminal threats. (Ratcliff, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1413, 1414.)
Accordingly, under the rationale of Ratcliff and People v. Jones, section
654 did not preclude the trial court from imposing punishment for both the
firearm enhancement associated with count 1 (criminal threats) and the
offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

_________________________
Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Richman, Acting P. J.

_________________________
Desautels, J.

A172267, People v. Taylor

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