People v. Camacho CA2/7

CourtListener 10699760Calctapp09.10.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 10/9/25 P. v. Camacho CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B335481

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA501171)
v.

MISAEL CAMACHO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Alison S. Matsumoto, Judge. Conditionally
reversed and remanded with directions.
Travis Daily, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nima Razfar, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

Misael Camacho appeals from a judgment that sentences
him to seven years four months in state prison for several
incidents of burglary and indecent exposure occurring over four
weeks in October and November of 2021. Camacho contends the
trial court erred when it denied his Penal Code section 1001.36
motion for mental health diversion because it improperly applied
a lower legal standard to conclude he posed a public safety risk.1
We conditionally reverse the judgment and remand the matter to
the trial court with instructions to conduct a new hearing to
consider Camacho’s eligibility and suitability for mental health
diversion using the correct standard, which requires a court to
find that a defendant is likely to commit a super strike offense.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Underlying Offenses
On October 13, 2021, at 3:00 a.m., Caroline Juarez woke to
someone pushing open the door to her bedroom and then to noises
in the bathroom. She discovered Camacho naked in her
bathroom attempting to take a shower. Juarez immediately
closed the bathroom door and yelled for her husband to help. Her
husband held the door closed, trapping Camacho inside, while
Juarez and their two children left the apartment and called the
police. Juarez testified Camacho did not threaten her and he

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise specified.

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appeared to be confused or disoriented when she encountered him
in the bathroom.
On November 7, 2021, a tenant observed Camacho
masturbating in the laundry room of the same apartment
building. The tenant immediately left through a door that
required a key fob to access. She did not interact with Camacho.
Camacho attempted to follow her but was unable to open the
locked door. The tenant returned with her father approximately
20 minutes later but Camacho was not there. After the tenant
and her father left, Camacho came back and continued touching
himself. The tenant did not report the incident to the police or
testify at trial. The People admitted surveillance video from the
apartment building and the apartment manager testified to the
events occurring on the video.
On November 15, 2021, at approximately 9:30 p.m.,
Camacho entered Maria Carrillo Morales’s second floor
apartment from her unlocked balcony door. Morales testified the
balcony could be reached by climbing a fence surrounding the
first floor. Camacho wore a t-shirt but was naked from the waist
down. Morales observed him “playing with his private parts.”
Morales told him to “get out of here.” Camacho responded, “I’m
sorry. I’m sorry. I’m sorry.” When Morales’s daughter came out
of the bathroom and began to scream, Morales physically pushed
Camacho out of the apartment. Camacho stated, “Thank you.
Thank you. Thank you.”
Morales immediately reported the incident to the
apartment manager. The manager and Morales found Camacho
still inside the building, and the manager hit him with a broom to
get him to leave. Camacho left and sat down at the entrance to
the library next door. Morales testified, “He continued playing

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with his private parts.” The manager called the police but
Camacho had departed by the time they arrived.
Camacho returned to the building approximately two hours
later. He entered Xiaohong Zhong’s bedroom by prying open her
window. Zhong ran into the living room screaming for help.
Camacho followed her into the living room. Camacho was
wearing shorts but no top. Zhong’s son told him to “get out” and
pushed Camacho out the front door. Zhong’s son followed
Camacho out of the apartment and noticed he was walking slowly
and appeared confused. When Camacho entered the room
containing the dumpster, Zhong’s son trapped him inside by
holding the door closed. He called the police. The apartment
manager and two other tenants helped to keep the door closed
until the police arrived.
Camacho was arrested. The responding officer testified it
was a “possibility” that Camacho was under the influence of a
controlled substance because “he was rambling, wasn’t answering
questions, with glossy eyes.”
An information charged Camacho with three counts of first
degree residential burglary for entering Juarez’s, Morales’s, and
Zhong’s apartments (§ 459; counts 1, 2, and 4) and three counts of
indecent exposure (§ 314, subd. (1); counts 3, 5, and 6).

B. The Mental Health Diversion Proceedings
Camacho filed a pretrial motion for mental health diversion
pursuant to section 1001.36. He submitted a report from
Dr. Nadim Karim who diagnosed him with substance use
disorder, a qualifying disorder for mental health diversion under
section 1001.36. Camacho reported to Dr. Karim that, at the
time of the offenses, he was using methamphetamine, alcohol,

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and rock cocaine daily. Dr. Karim stated Camacho’s substance
use significantly contributed to the offenses, and he believed
Camacho would respond to treatment. Applying the section
1001.36 definition of “an unreasonable risk to public safety,”
Dr. Karim opined Camacho “would be at the lowest possible risk
to commit any of the aforementioned crimes if treated in the
community. He would, therefore, not present an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety as per this definition. Moreover,
he has no prior criminal history.”
The People objected to mental health diversion and the
trial court indicated its tentative was to deny the motion.
Although Camacho was “technically eligible,” the court stated it
would not find him eligible based on the sole diagnosis of
substance use disorder without additional disorders, such as
“PTSD effective disorder [or] anything of that nature.” The court
continued the matter for Camacho to supplement his motion.
Camacho filed a supplemental motion with a psychological
evaluation by Dr. Armando de Armas, who concluded Camacho
had borderline intellectual functioning, which impacted his
adaptive functioning. The People again opposed mental health
diversion, citing only to public safety issues given Camacho
entered apartments with women in them “for the purpose of
sexual gratification of some kind.”
The court denied appellant’s motion stating, “My concern,
and this goes to whether or not the person is suitable, is whether
or not Mr. Camacho could potentially commit a super strike. A
super strike is rape, rape by force. The fact that he is naked,
entering into women’s bedrooms, I absolutely believe that that is
a hundred percent possible. Any woman who’s in a bedroom and
a man comes in unclothed, the first thing they feel is terror at the

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possibility of being sexual[ly] assaulted. And so I do believe that
he is capable and could potentially commit a super strike based
on these facts.”

C. The Trial
The matter proceeded to a jury trial and the jury found
Camacho guilty as charged. On February 15, 2024, the trial
court sentenced Camacho to a total determinate term of seven
years four months in state prison, comprised of consecutive terms
of four years for burglary on count 1, one year four months each
for burglary on counts 2 and 4, and eight months for indecent
exposure on count 6 plus concurrent terms of six months each for
indecent exposure on counts 3 and 5.
Camacho timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law
In 2018, the Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and
1001.36 to create a pretrial diversion program for defendants
with certain mental health disorders. (See People v. Frahs (2020)
9 Cal.5th 618, 624 (Frahs); Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133.) Pretrial diversion “allows for the
suspension of criminal proceedings and potential dismissal of
charges upon successful completion of mental health treatment.”
(Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 890
(Sarmiento).) The statute expressly promotes “[i]ncreased
diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the
individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system
while protecting public safety.” (§ 1001.35, subd. (a); see

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Sarmiento, at p. 887 [“section 1001.36 was designed to encourage
trial courts to broadly authorize pretrial mental health diversion,
providing treatment for qualifying mental disorders that result in
criminal behavior”]; People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
1138, 1149 (Whitmill) [“[t]he Legislature intended the mental
health diversion program to apply as broadly as possible”];
accord, People v. Williams (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 990, 1004
(Williams).)
Section 1001.36, subdivisions (b) and (c), set forth the
criteria for eligibility and suitability for diversion. Eligibility
entails satisfying two prongs: (1) a defendant has been diagnosed
with a recognized mental health disorder, and (2) the disorder
was “a significant factor in the commission of the charged
offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)
Once eligibility is established, a trial court “must consider
whether the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c).) A defendant is suitable if: (1) in the
opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s
mental health disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the
defendant consents to diversion and agrees to waive his or her
speedy trial rights; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with
treatment requirements; and (4) the defendant will not pose an
“unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” if treated in the
community. (Id., subd. (c)(1)-(4).)
“‘“Unreasonable risk of danger to public safety”’ means an
unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit” any one of a
set of statutorily defined violent offenses, including homicide,
sexually violent offenses, sex acts against minors, and other
serious felonies punishable by life imprisonment or death.
(People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 121 (Brown);

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Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892; see §§ 667,
subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv), 1170.18, subd. (c).) Sexually violent offenses,
in turn, include various forms of rape and sexual assault
“committed by force, violence, duress, menace, fear of immediate
and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person, or
threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or any
other person.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (b).)
The violent felonies encompassed in the definition of
“unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” are known as
“‘“super strikes.”’” (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440,
449 (Moine).) “Thus, the risk of danger is narrowly confined to
the likelihood the defendant will commit a [super strike].” (Id. at
p. 450; see Williams, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 1001.)
Section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4), further instructs the court to
“consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a
qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s
treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the
current charged offense, and any other factors that the court
deems appropriate” to make its risk to public safety
determination.
Finally, the statute gives the trial court discretion to deny
diversion even if the statutory requirements are met: “[T]he
court may, in its discretion, . . . grant pretrial diversion to a
defendant” after the court considers the two eligibility and four
suitability requirements. (§ 1001.36, subd. (a); Sen. Bill No. 215,
Assem. Com. on Pub. Saf., June 12, 2018 hearing, p. 7 [“If a judge
feels that a defendant’s participation in a diversion program is
not appropriate from the standpoint of public safety, or any other
reason, the judge can prohibit the defendant from participating in
diversion.”]; Brown, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 121; Sarmiento,

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supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892; People v. Gerson (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1079.)
This residual discretion is not unfettered and must be
exercised “‘consistent with the principles and purpose of the
governing law.’” (People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
879, 891 (Qualkinbush); see People v. Superior Court (Alvarez)
(1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977 [“‘[A]ll exercises of legal discretion
must be grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal
principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at
issue.’”]; Williams, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 1001 [“scope of
discretion always resides in the particular law being applied”].)
“Where the court chooses to exercise this residual discretion to
deny diversion, its statement of reasons should reflect
consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute and
explain why diversion would not meet those goals.” (Sarmiento,
supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 893.)
“If the trial court grants pretrial diversion and the
defendant performs ‘satisfactorily in diversion, at the end of the
period of diversion, the court shall dismiss the defendant's
criminal charges that were the subject of the criminal
proceedings at the time of the initial diversion.’ (§ 1001.36,
subd. (e).) If the defendant does not perform satisfactorily in
diversion, becomes gravely disabled, or commits new crimes, the
court may reinstate criminal proceedings. (§ 1001.36, subd. (d).)”
(Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 448; accord, Frahs, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 627.)

B. Standard of Review
Section 1001.36, subdivision (e), places the burden on the
defendant “to make a prima facie showing that the defendant will

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meet the minimum requirements of eligibility for diversion and
that the defendant and the offense are suitable for diversion.” If
the defendant is both eligible and suitable, the trial court must
also be satisfied “that the recommended inpatient or outpatient
program of mental health treatment will meet the specialized
mental health treatment needs of the defendant.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (f)(1)(A)(i); see Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892
[explaining assessment of the recommended mental health
treatment “is not an additional eligibility or suitability
requirement the defendant must meet” but rather
“contemplate[s] an ongoing assessment to assure that defendants
will receive appropriate treatment for their particular
conditions”].)
We review the trial court’s denial of a motion for mental
health diversion for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Graham
(2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795; Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1147; Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 448-449.) “‘A
court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or
capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard
[citations], or bases its decision on . . . factual findings that are
not supported by substantial evidence.’” (Graham, at p. 795.)
“‘Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.’ [Citation.]
However, ‘[a] reasonable inference may not be based on suspicion
alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise,
conjecture, or guesswork; a finding of fact must be an inference
drawn from evidence rather than a mere speculation as to
probabilities without evidence.’” (People v. Grant (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 323, 330.)

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C. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Denying Pretrial
Mental Health Diversion Because Camacho “Could
Potentially” Commit a Super Strike
The sole suitability factor in dispute is whether Camacho
posed an unreasonable risk to public safety as defined by
section 1001.36. The People do not contend the other suitability
factors were not met. The trial court found Camacho “could
potentially” commit a super strike based on the facts of the
charged offenses, that is, “he is naked, entering into women’s
bedrooms.” Camacho challenges this finding on two grounds:
(1) the court improperly applied a lower legal standard to
conclude he posed a public safety risk; and (2) it failed to properly
consider the statutory factors.
We focus our analysis on whether the court used the proper
standard to make its finding. The record reflects the trial court
stated twice that Camacho “could potentially commit a super
strike.” The trial court did not indicate it used any other legal
standard to make its determination. The People acknowledge,
and the legal authorities establish, however, that a court must
find that a defendant is “‘“likely to commit a super-strike
offense”’” in assessing whether he poses an unreasonable danger
to the community. (Gomez v. Superior Court (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 671, 690; see Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th
at p. 898; Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1151; Williams,
supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 1001; Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at
p. 450.)
The California Supreme Court has held a person is “‘likely’”
to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior if “‘the person
presents a substantial danger, that is, a serious and well-founded
risk, that he or she will commit such crimes if free in the

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community.’” (People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th 979, 982
[addressing Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, subd. (a)(1)]; accord,
People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 922
[addressing Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6601, subd. (d)].) The Court
further explained the phrase “‘likely to engage in acts of sexual
violence . . . connotes much more than the mere possibility’” the
person will reoffend. (Ghilotti, at p. 922.) By its use of the term
“potentially,” which common usage equates with a possible
condition,2 rather than a likely condition, the trial court
improperly applied a legal standard that is lower than what is
required. Under Roberge and Ghilotti, the court must find it is
likely or there is “a serious and well-founded risk” that Camacho
will commit a super strike, not that it is merely possible he will
do so or that he has the potential to do so.
The People argue the court’s use of the word “potentially”
must be examined in context. In their view, the court’s statement
that it “absolutely believe[d] that that is a hundred percent
possible” provided sufficient context to demonstrate its use of the
words “‘potential’ or ‘possibility’ was the functional equivalent of
assessing whether appellant was ‘likely’ to commit a super strike
involving a sexual offense.” We disagree. The court did not use
the word “likely” in its remarks from the bench. It instead denied
mental health diversion because it found Camacho “could
potentially” commit a super strike and it was “a hundred percent
possible” he could commit a super strike. Given this record, we

2 See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dict.
<https://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/collegiate/potentially>
[as of Oct. 7, 2025] [defining “potentially” as “in a potential or
possible state or condition”].

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cannot interpret the court’s words to mean it applied the correct
legal standard.

D. The Proper Remedy is Remand for a New Hearing
Having concluded the trial court erred, we now consider the
appropriate remedy.3 The People assert, “In the event this Court
concludes the trial court did not base its motion on the proper
standard, then the matter should be conditionally reversed with
directions that the court reconsider appellant’s motion for mental
health diversion under section 1001.36. (See People v.
Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 891-892 [conditionally
remanding for the trial court to reconsider the motion for mental
health diversion on proper criteria]; see also Wade v. Superior
Court (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 694, 718 [directing reconsideration
of request for diversion under § 1001.80 based on a proper
exercise of discretion].)”
In his opening brief, Camacho requested remand for a new
hearing to consider his suitability for mental health diversion. In
reply, however, Camacho argues conditional remand is
inappropriate because “remand would merely delay the inevitable
conclusion that appellant is suitable for mental health diversion.”
We conclude the appropriate remedy is conditional reversal
with directions to the trial court to conduct a new hearing to
determine Camacho’s eligibility and suitability under
section 1001.36, bearing in mind the correct legal standard as
well as the statutory principles and purpose of the mental health
diversion statute. (See Qualkinbush, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at

3 The People do not dispute that Camacho demonstrated
prejudice if the trial court applied the wrong standard.

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p. 892; People v. Burns (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 776, 789-790
[conditional reversal where remand for consideration of mental
diversion would not be futile]; cf. People v. Gutierrez (2014)
58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 [in general, remand is the appropriate
remedy where a court is unaware of the scope of its discretionary
powers].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is conditionally reversed with directions to
the trial court to conduct a new hearing on Camacho’s eligibility
and suitability for pretrial mental health diversion in accordance
with this opinion. If the trial court grants diversion and
Camacho successfully completes diversion, the court shall dismiss
the charges. (See § 1001.36, subd. (e).) If the court denies the
motion for mental health diversion or if Camacho does not
successfully complete diversion, then the court shall reinstate the
conviction and sentence.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J. FEUER, J.

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