People v. Chapman CA1/2

CourtListener 10699759Calctapp09.10.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 10/9/25 P. v. Chapman CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171062
v.
MICHAEL JOHN CHAPMAN, (Mendocino County Super. Ct.
No. 24CR03730)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Michael Chapman was diagnosed with delusional and
narcissistic personality disorder, and in late September 2023, was referred to
a mental health facility where T.R. worked as a clinical analyst and case
manager. T.R. met Chapman early on, and whatever their interactions were
over the first several months, they were uneventful. Things changed in early
2024, when Chapman moved to an apartment across from the facility and
T.R. was helpful to him, and one morning T.R. found a poster board taped to
the facility door that had plastic roses attached to it and a heart that read
“[T.R.] is a goddess!!!” Chapman’s conduct toward T.R. escalated—and met
resistance from facility personnel. But numerous voicemails from Chapman
followed, with increasing intensity and vituperation, culminating in late
February when Chapman appeared at the facility “angry and yelling,” with
black paint across his eyes, “meat claws” zip-tied to his wrists, and a ball-
peen hammer hanging off his belt. Chapman was later arrested.

1
Chapman was charged with two counts of stalking, the first of which
included an enhancement for use of a dangerous or deadly weapon. A jury
found Chapman guilty of that charge and found the enhancement true.
Chapman appeals, arguing that there is no substantial evidence to support
that enhancement, on three separate bases: (1) he did not display the meat
claws in a menacing manner; (2) they do not constitute a dangerous weapon;
and (3) he did not display them during the commission of a crime. We reject
the arguments, and we affirm.
BACKGROUND
The General Setting
Chapman was diagnosed with delusional and narcissistic personality
disorder, and in late 2023, was referred to the Mendocino Coast Hospitality
Center in Fort Bragg (Center). One of the employees at the Center was T.R.,
a clinical analyst and case manager, who was often the first contact point for
people scheduling appointments to determine eligibility for services.
Chapman and T.R. met in September 2023 and whatever their early
interactions, they were uneventful. In early 2024, Chapman moved into an
apartment across from the Center, and staff of the Center, including T.R.,
assisted him, including telling Chapman he could store his mattress at the
Center. And Chapman’s conduct changed.
Early in the morning of January 30, Chapman left two voicemails for
T.R. One referred to parking his truck at the Center for a few days, but also
commented that the Center hired beautiful women. The second voicemail
said this:
“Hello, . . . this message is for [T.R.] again, this is Michael Chapman,
the Footlocker savage. Um, I wanted to, uh, say that . . . I’ve been told I have
the serial killer gene. Which is kind of funny. . . but, uh, that doesn’t mean

2
I’m a serial killer, but I must admit it’s probably 100 [percent] true. . . [laugh]
I’ve been known to eat. . . a lot of cereal. . . and. . . however, I thought I’m
serious about the gene though. It’s, uh, you may think, oh, man, this guy’s a
sicko, but, no, I just think about things, you know, don’t necessarily do ‘em,
but hey, hey, hey. Have a good day.”
On February 12, Chapman came to the Center and said he did not have
ice trays; T.R. gave him some ice trays from the Center, and Chapman was
appreciative. T.R. arrived at work the next morning to find a large poster
attached to the Center door. The poster had a large heart drawn on it, inside
of which were the words T.R. “is a goddess!!!” And a note under the heart
said, “I love you,” and plastic roses were attached to the poster.1
T.R. “just felt weird,” and reported the incident to the Center’s
executive director Paul Davis. Davis told T.R. they had to treat it “sensitively
. . . due to the people that we work with, the client base.” T.R. was not happy
with that response, but understood. Nevertheless, a part of her felt unsafe.
On February 15, T.R. arrived at work to find an envelope taped to the
door, again in Chapman’s handwriting. Inside was a card on which was a
note, a handwritten letter on lined paper, and a shorter letter with a key to
Chapman’s apartment taped to it. The card was addressed to “My [T.R.]
Macarina” and contained Elton John song lyrics and other statements. In the
letter, Chapman wrote that “I AM Michael . . . and im [sic] so attracted to
you, that I’m gonna burst, into flames. Understand this, if I like you and you
like me, NOBODY can stop us!”; that he had been “head over heals” [sic] for
T.R. since he first saw her; that if she was not interested, “it’s ok!”; and that
“No matter what, you are a beautiful soul and I want you all to myself and I

1 The note was signed “Jesus King,” which Chapman had previously
written on various documents.

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will NEVER stop loving you!” The note with the key attached said, “im [sic]
naked . . . lol, joking . . . but . . . lol. Let’s cry about it, lol. [¶] Better just
think about this sitting down . . . on my face . . . Ha!” Chapman described his
apartment as T.R.’s “spare office,” and said she could come over “ANY time.”
T.R., a married woman, felt “scared, like harassed” and “taunted.” She
did not appreciate the sexual innuendos, was struck by Chapman’s statement
that he would always love her, and did not “understand where he was coming
from.”
T.R. showed the documents to Davis and also reported it to the clinical
director. Davis wrote a letter to Chapman telling him to stop leaving notes
and voicemails, and advising that he could pick up his key. Davis mailed the
letter to Chapman’s apartment, kept a copy and the key in his mailbox at the
Center, and had a copy placed at the clinic reception area. Chapman did not
retrieve the key.
Later on February 15, T.R. saw Chapman, shirtless and with his dog,
walking back and forth in front of the Center, and then sit at a nearby cafe
for some 45 minutes, which she described as “very taunting.”2 And from that
point until February 23, T.R. saw Chapman outside the Center every day.3
Meanwhile, between February 20 and 23, Chapman left several
voicemails on the main phone line, which Center employees forwarded to
Davis, transcripts of which were provided to the jury. Suffice to say that
these voicemails were darker and more threatening than earlier ones, and

2 At one point, Chapman tried to open the door from the sidewalk to the
lobby, but T.R. had locked it.
3
During that time T.R. had her husband come to work with her, so she
would not be alone; she also brought pepper spray and a baseball bat “just in
case.”

4
increasing in intensity. The prosecutor read portions of those voicemails to
the jury at some length, and we quote some portions of that reading. Thus:
“And you have those, again for you to listen to should you so choose.
Just reading from a few lines of them:
“1, Mr. Chapman acknowledging that he’s understanding as of today
that [T.R.] is married. And at the conclusion of his message he states:
“ ‘But if she ain’t happily married, then I’ll be glad to, uh, make her my
bitch.’
“There’s another message that he leaves immediately after that where
he states:
“ ‘I don’t like how the government tells me who I can and can’t love. I’m
like, excuse me. How do I—how about I put your head in a fucking vice grip
and make you pop your fucking eye out?’
“There’s another voice mail that comes in that states:
“ ‘If people hurt me, I just give it to God and God handles the situation.’
“A little further down in that voice mail:
“ ‘You mess with God’s son and you get seven fold, so I don’t do it, God
does. So the people that mess with me, mess with God.’
“Another voice mail that came in in that same time frame, a portion of
that:
“ ‘Yeah, one day you’re going to be living my fucking life and all that
pain that you fucking just gave me, you’re going to be eating it.’ . . . [¶] . . . .
“Further: ‘And it doesn’t matter about laws or anything like that. You
just don’t give a fuck. That’s why I’m impenetrable when it comes to laws
and bull shit like that. They could bring in an army against me, but it would
not work. As long as I’m on the right side because I’m on God’s side you guys

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understand? So the sooner you get that, the sooner you can be
unstoppable.’ . . . [¶]. . . .
“Subsequent voice mail: ‘And I don’t think that I don’t, I’m just very
sad right now because I’m disappointed. I do—I don’t get mad. I really just
get disappointed. And, you know, it’s—I mean, I’m just very disappoint [sic]
in [T.R.], okay?’
“And then he says, ‘I wasn’t trying to force myself on anybody. You
think I want to be—you think I want a married fucking gorilla looking bitch?
Fucking no. Fucking, I looked at her as a beautiful woman, now I look at her
as a dumb, fucking gorilla bitch.’
“There’s a subsequent message, this is, again, all in that same time
period leading up to the 23rd, that specifically says: ‘This message is for
anybody in charge or wants to listen to it Paul or anybody or Jessica or
whoever wants to listen to it.’
“He says—and this, I think, goes to the pattern of threat conduct,
specifically if you consider what he’s saying in light of everything else that’s
been going on, that while he may be expressing what appears to be concern
for the staff at Hospitality Center, what he’s actually doing is relaying to
them a threat. And that verbiage is, in reference to a staff member.
“ ‘I do think she’s being left high and dry with that front area right
where you walk in. It’s kind of susceptible and I don’t like the way it’s set up.
It’s very unsafe for her. And, like, people at the front desk, I don’t like it.
There’s, like, a blind spot with that computer. You can’t really see what’s
going on. So, like, if someone came in there and really wanted to fuck people
up, they’d be fucked.’

6
“And he says further in that same voice mail: ‘I don’t have any
complaints for the staff, besides [T.R.], I mean, I love her to pieces. But she’s
a little provocative and then tries to blame it on somebody else.’
“And then he says, ‘I thought she really digged me. And I don’t care—I
don’t care about rules. I don’t give a fuck about rules. Like, I wasn’t born to
sit and follow man’s rules. So sorry.’ ”
On the morning of February 23, Jessica Fitch, a vocational training
specialist at the Center, prepared to open the Center for the day, when she
saw Chapman approaching his truck that was parked directly in front of the
Center. The Center staff had been instructed to return Chapman’s
apartment key to him. Fitch got the key and opened the door to give it to
him, and as she did saw that Chapman’s face was painted “and he had some
weapons, like meat shredders and a hammer hanging from him which was
not normal for him.” Fitch went to hand Chapman the envelope with his key
in it, and he said, “ ‘If I were you, I would have called in sick today.’ ” He
then took the envelope.
Fitch closed the door to the Center and kept it locked. Fitch took
Chapman’s statement as a threat, and called Davis, who was working at
home that day, and who advised her to call the police, which she did. Fitch
also called T.R. and told her about Chapman’s comment, to keep the clinic
locked, and to come to the main part of the Center.
Officer David Franco of the Fort Bragg Police Department was
dispatched to the Center, as staff had requested Chapman be “trespassed
from the property,” meaning that he be told he could not return to the Center,
and if he did, he would be subject to arrest. Franco contacted Chapman and
spoke with him outside his apartment. Chapman was angry and yelling; he
was shirtless, with black paint across his eyes, which Franco described as

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“war paint”; and he had meat claws zip-tied to each wrist and a ball-peen
hammer hanging off of his belt.
Franco told Chapman he was trespassed from the property. Chapman
said: “ ‘If anybody tries to stop me, we’re going to have a big fucking
problem.’ ” Chapman said he was going to protest outside the Center and
that was why his truck was parked in front of it. Asked about the hammer
and meat claws, Chapman said he had the hammer because he was a
carpenter and the meat claws because he likes to cook. Franco, who was
familiar with carpentry, knew that a ball-peen hammer was used for metal,
not carpentry.
Franco left, and Chapman went back inside his apartment. Franco
returned to the Center, where Captain Thomas O’Neal, who supervised the
patrol division, had arrived on scene. O’Neal did not know it was a stalking
investigation or that Chapman was “armed.” O’Neal was also familiar with
Chapman’s truck, which he normally parked in the lot of his apartment
complex. When O’Neal arrived on the scene, however, the truck was parked
in a loading zone outside the Center with a dog inside. O’Neal called
Chapman and left a voicemail telling him he needed to move the truck.
As O’Neal was walking around the truck to check on the dog, he saw
Chapman approaching quickly, with the hammer and meat claws still zip-
tied to him. O’Neal described the meat claws as hardened plastic claws used
for shredding pork, and “they’re sharp.” O’Neal testified that in his 11 years
as a law enforcement officer, he had never seen anyone with “weapons” zip-
tied to them, and that a person would do that if they wanted to “prevent the
opposing party from taking it from them. It’s so you can’t pull it from their
body when you’re fighting.” It was also “uncommon” for a person to carry
around a ball-peen hammer.

8
Chapman was also holding a three-foot tall poster that had an “I,” a
heart, and the letter “U,” and next to the heart was an apostrophe and the
letter “D”—in other words, the poster read, “I loved you.”
Body-camera video of the exchange between Chapman and O’Neal was
admitted into evidence, which revealed that Chapman said he had not gotten
the message to move his truck as he had blocked O’Neal’s phone number.
O’Neal cautioned Chapman that the meat claw in his hand was “a felony,”
and Chapman replied he had the meat claws because he was cooking “a
bunch of food for people” and the hammer because it was a carpentry tool and
he was on his way to work. At some point, Chapman reached his fist back as
though he was going to punch O’Neal, and O’Neal detained him.
Franco read appellant his Miranda rights and Chapman made a
statement. Franco asked if Chapman was angry about the letter from Davis
but he said no; he also said that the meat claws and hammer were for his
protection while he was protesting, not repeating his earlier claim that they
were for cooking and carpentry.
T.R. also saw Chapman with the hammer and meat claws. She was
scared and believed Chapman intended to scare her with them. She also saw
Chapman with the poster board that said “I love[d] you.” At T.R.’s request,
Franco obtained an emergency protective order.
On February 26, Center staff checked the outside mailbox, and found
three notes from Chapman. One stated, “You are murderers! Drugs kill!
You are a pimp!” Another stated in part, “Deny love to the son of God? Well,
the price for that is losing all your love. . . . Say goodbye to all you love, ‘kids’
too!” And the third said: “It’s denied love to the son of God. Well that’s the
price for—well, the price for that is losing all you love. Let the government
tell you who to love, we will unfund the government, do you see? You can’t

9
win or heal without love. Say goodbye to all you love, kids too. Was it worth
it? Love the real Jesus, the Christ. Join me. Safe love.” Davis found the
notes vaguely threatening and took them to the police station.
The Proceedings Below
On April 30, the Mendocino County District Attorney’s Office filed an
information charging Chapman with two counts: stalking (Pen. Code4,
§ 646.9, subd. (a); count 1), with an enhancement for personally using a
deadly or dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and stalking in violation
of a restraining order (§ 646.9, subd. (b); count 2), which further alleged that
Chapman committed the offense while out of custody on bail (§ 12022.1).
Jury trial began in the afternoon of June 11, and testimony was taken
over some two and a half days. On the morning of June 14, the court heard
brief testimony, following which the court instructed the jury, and counsel
gave their closing arguments. That afternoon the court gave its concluding
instructions, and the case was in the hands of the jury. Later that afternoon,
the jury reached its verdict: guilty of stalking on count 1, and finding true
that he personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon; not guilty of stalking
in violation of a restraining order.
On July 8, the court sentenced Chapman to an aggregate term of two
years four months: 16 months, the mitigated term for stalking, and one year
for the enhancement.
The next day, Chapman filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
As indicated, Chapman was convicted of stalking, and the jury found
true the section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) enhancement that he “personally
use[d] a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of a felony.” Not

4 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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challenging the conviction itself, Chapman attacks only the enhancement,
doing so in a brief that sets forth a version of facts treating Chapman’s
actions in isolation, with no acknowledgement that he engaged over a period
of weeks in a pattern of harassment that culminated on February 23, when
he appeared with painted eyes, meat claws zip-tied to his wrists, and a ball-
peen hammer hanging off his belt, and parked his truck directly in front of
the Center where T.R. worked.
With such a brief, Chapman argues there is insufficient evidence to
support the true finding, an argument that has three sub-parts, that there
was insufficient evidence that: (1) he displayed the meat claws in a menacing
manner; (2) the meat claws constitute a dangerous weapon; and (3) he
“displayed the meat claws in a menacing manner during the commission of
the crime.”
The Law of Substantial Evidence
As the Supreme Court described in its most recent decision, just over a
month ago: “In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, the reviewing
court’s role is a limited one. ‘ “The proper test for determining a claim of
insufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a
rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citations.] On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738–739 (Smith II).)
“ ‘ “ ‘Although we must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value, nonetheless it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury
to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts
on which that determination depends. [Citation.] Thus, if the verdict is

11
supported by substantial evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier
of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a witness’s credibility for that of
the fact finder.’ ” ’ (Id. at p. 739.)” (People v. Alvarez (2025) 18 Cal.5th 387,
470 (Alvarez); accord, People v. Abillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60.)
The same rule applies where, as here, we are reviewing whether the
evidence is sufficient to support an enhancement. (People v. Wilson (2008) 44
Cal.4th 758, 806.)
In sum and in short, we “ ‘ “ ‘presume in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence,’ ” ’ ” (Alvarez, supra, 18 Cal.5th 387, 470 [p. 112]), and will not
reverse “unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ ” (People v. Bolin
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 370.)
Chapman has not demonstrated there is “no hypothesis whatever.”
There is substantial evidence to support the jury finding.
Section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) imposes additional punishment when
a defendant “personally uses a deadly or dangerous weapon in the
commission of a felony or attempted felony[.]” And as the CALCRIM
instruction notes, the first way a defendant can “personally use” a deadly or
dangerous weapon is if he “[d]isplays the weapon in a menacing manner.”
(CALCRIM No. 3145.) Chapman did that here.
Claiming that he did not, Chapman cites only People v. Hays (1983) 147
Cal.App.3d 534, which he describes as “instructive.” We would describe it as
“distinguishable.” To begin with, Hays involved the crime of assault with a
deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)), not stalking. Moreover, the facts are
markedly different, as there, in the course of committing a robbery, Hays
crashed through a ceiling with a rifle strapped across his chest, but did not

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touch it, point it at any victim, or threaten anyone with it. (Id. at p. 544.)
The Court of Appeal held that passively displaying a firearm was insufficient
to support a finding that the defendant personally used the firearm. (Id. at
pp. 548–549.) That is not the situation here.
We ourselves discussed—and distinguished—Hays, in People v.
Granado (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 317, 324, where we observed that “[t]he
holding in Hays reflects a principle under which a finding of weapon use is
precluded if the defendant’s conduct with respect to the weapon appears to be
purely incidental to the crime. In Hays the evidence was insufficient because,
even though the gun was exposed to the victim’s view, the exposure was not
an act in furtherance of the crime, but a mere incident of possession.”
Whatever was said in 1996, various cases since hold that “use” is to be
“broadly construed.” People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1198,
disapproved on another ground in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192,
1216 is instructive, where, affirming a jury finding true the use
enhancement, the Court said this:
“In determining whether there was substantial evidence of Vo’s knife
use, we may properly consult cases construing the term ‘uses’ in other
enhancement statutes under ‘ “The Dangerous Weapons’ Control Law.” ’
(People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1006.) Hence, we may rely on
cases construing the term as it is understood for purposes of section 12022.5,
which addresses personal use of a firearm in the commission or attempted
commission of a felony. (People v. James (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1155, 1163;
see People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 806–807 [construing ‘uses’ in
former § 12022.5, subd. (a)]; People v. Granado (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 317,
325 (Granado) [same].) As we have recognized in the context of former
section 12022.5, subdivision (a), ‘ “The obvious legislative intent to deter the

13
use of firearms in the commission of the specified felonies requires that ‘uses’
be broadly construed.” [Citation.] “Thus when a defendant deliberately
shows a gun, or otherwise makes its presence known, and there is no
evidence to suggest any purpose other than intimidating the victim (or
others) so as to successfully complete the underlying offense, the jury is
entitled to find a facilitative use rather than an incidental or inadvertent
exposure.” ’ (People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 806–807, quoting
Granado, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 325.)” (People v. Hajek and Vo, supra,
58 Cal.4th at p. 1198.)5
Likewise here. A jury could reasonably find that Chapman’s possession
of the meat claws was not merely incidental.
Chapman had been “taunting” T.R. for days, without any weapons, by
walking up and down the street in front of the Center and trying to open the
door to the clinic, which T.R. had to lock out of fear of him, fear that caused
her to bring pepper spray and a baseball bat to work “just in case.” Chapman
also left increasingly “threatening” voicemails, and on February 23, escalated
that behavior by zip-tying meat claws and a hammer to his body before
proceeding to the Center. And just as T.R. believed Chapman intended to
scare her by doing so, a jury could reasonably find that Chapman used the
meat claws to scare T.R. and facilitate his crime of stalking her.
Chapman asserts that “even the officer’s body-camera footage shows
that [Chapman] displayed the meat claws passively,” and points to two
photographs in evidence that, he claims, show him “holding the meat claws”
and “the meat claws merely resting on his chest on some sort of chain.” While

5 The Supreme Court went on to discuss with approval Granado
“applying these principles,” in what the Supreme Court described as our
“thoughtful opinion.” (Ibid.)

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the photographs show what they show, the evidence from Fitch, Franco, and
Captain O’Neal was that Chapman had zip-tied the claws to his wrists.
Moreover, the entire footage from O’Neal’s body cam was in evidence,
showing precisely how Chapman displayed the meat claws. Finally,
Chapman was carrying the “I loved you” poster when he returned to the
Center, which supported that he was there to harass T.R., not some innocent
reason.
Chapman asserts that his motivation in approaching the Center was to
protest, citing what he told Franco. There is no evidence Franco believed
him; indeed, he knew that Chapman’s claim that the hammer was for
“carpentry” was false. Certainly the jury was not required to accept
Chapman’s statement that he was there to protest, much like it was not
required to accept his explanations that the ball-peen hammer was for a
carpentry job and the meat claws because he liked to cook. (See People v.
Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 369 [“A rational trier of fact could disbelieve
those portions of defendant’s statements that were obviously self-serving”].)
Chapman also contends that he approached the Center “in response” to
O’Neal’s phone call, despite that Chapman told O’Neal he had not received
his message.
Dangerous or Deadly Weapon
Chapman’s next argument is that there is insufficient evidence that the
meat claws “constitute a dangerous weapon.”
We begin by noting that this was not any part of Chapman’s position
below, as one looks in vain for any reference to such an argument in his
counsel’s closing argument. In any event, the argument has no merit.
Chapman’s brief argument, slightly over a page, is that meat claws
have a “utilitarian purpose,” and that such an object which has practical uses

15
(such as a knife) is not a dangerous weapon as a matter of law. Maybe not as
a matter of law. But that does not end the inquiry.
The law has long recognized there are two categories of dangerous or
deadly weapons, the first of which includes instrumentalities that are
“weapons in the strict sense of the word, such as guns, dirks, etc.” (People v.
Reid (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 354, 365), and the second of which includes
“those instrumentalities which are not weapons in the strict sense of the
word, but which may be used as such, such as razors, pocket knives, hat pins,
canes, hammers, hatchets, and other sharp or heavy objects.” (Ibid.) And as
to them, if it appears that the item is “capable of being used in a dangerous or
deadly manner, and it may be fairly inferred from the evidence that its
possessor intended on a particular occasion to use it as a weapon should the
circumstances require, its character as a dangerous or deadly weapon may be
established, at least for purposes of that occasion.” (Ibid.; People v. Godwin
(1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1562, 1575.)
In light of this, various instrumentalities that in most circumstances
would be innocuous have been held to be dangerous weapons, including, for
example, a pencil (People v. Page (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1472) and a
screwdriver. (People v. Simons (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1107.) As
Chapman’s own brief acknowledges, quoting People v. Montes (1998) 74
Cal.App.4th 1050, 1054, “[o]bjects which are not inherently dangerous but
which have been found to be a deadly weapon include ‘a pillow. . . ; an
automobile. . . ; a large rock. . . ; a razor blade. . . ; [and] a fingernail file.’ ”
Captain O’Neal described the meat claws as made from “hardened
plastic and they’re sharp. Yeah, they’ll scratch on stuff for sure.” And, the
prosecutor argued, the meat claws were very sharp and could puncture skin
and “certainly could cause great bodily injury to a person if they were applied

16
in that way.” The meat claws themselves were admitted into evidence, so the
jury could examine them, and see—and feel—just what harm they were
capable of doing. They were a dangerous weapon.
During the Commission of the Crime
Chapman’s last argument is that there was insufficient evidence he
displayed the meat claws “during the commission of the crime,” that is, of
stalking T.R. Setting forth the claimed evidence, however myopically, in a
light favorable to him, Chapman’s argument begins as follows: “This is not
the typical stalking situation, where the stalker stakes out the victim’s
workplace, shows up, and harasses her for months. Here, the Center’s staff
were the ones who helped appellant find his apartment across the street from
the Center. Appellant was also receiving services from the Center at the time
he developed feelings for T.R., who was employed by the Center. T.R. never
told appellant directly that his advances were unwelcome and it is unclear
when the letter sent by T.R.’s director informing him of such was
received. . . . T.R. never testified that appellant made any romantic advances
towards her or that he behaved inappropriately on the call. While it is
unclear when appellant made that call, appellant was seen not long after the
call with the meat claws on February 23, 2024, in order to protest at the
Center.”
Missing from this description is that when Chapman came to the scene
he was carrying the sign that stated, “I loved you,” which, as the prosecutor
argued, was a direct reference to—and a threat to—T.R., all while he had the
meat claws zip-tied to his wrists and the hammer on his belt. As to this,
Chapman dismisses it with the statement that “the prosecutor’s argument
that the poster somehow represented a threat to [T.R.] rests on pure
speculation. What is clear is that appellant came back to the truck in

17
response to O’Neal’s phone call.” Chapman later asserts that it was Fitch
who initiated the contact in the morning, and that Captain O’Neal “appeared
to be the cause” why Chapman showed up in the afternoon. But Fitch saw
Chapman that morning because he was parked directly in front of the Center,
manifesting that he intended to be there. And when Chapman returned in
the afternoon, he had not listened to O’Neal’s message about moving his car.
A jury could reasonably find that Chapman used the meat claws
“during the commission” of the crime.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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RICHMAN, J.

We concur.

STEWART, P. J.

DESAUTELS, J.

(A171062N)

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