CourtListener 10692781•Zheng v. Cisternino CA1/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 10/8/25 Zheng v. Cisternino CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
XIAO YI ZHENG,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A169850
v.
MICHAEL CISTERNINO, (Contra Costa County Sup. Court
No. C2202021)
Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Xiao Yi Zheng and his counsel, David Sturgeon-Garcia,1
appeal from the trial court’s order imposing monetary sanctions against them
for misusing the discovery process. We affirm.
I.
BACKGROUND
Defendant Michael Cisternino is a real estate broker who acted as a
dual agent representing Zheng, the owner of commercial real estate, and an
entity that agreed to lease the property. Zheng filed this action against
Cisternino, alleging he breached his fiduciary duty in brokering a deal that
1 Although Sturgeon-Garcia was not listed as a party on the notice of
appeal, we construe the notice to have included him because it appears
reasonably clear that he intended to join in the appeal. (See K.J. v. Los
Angeles Unified School Dist. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 875, 878.)
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was favorable to the tenant with whom he was having a personal
relationship. Cisternino cross-complained, alleging that Zheng failed to pay
his commission and misrepresented the condition of the property.
Discovery was initiated, and the sanctions order at issue in this appeal
arose out of a dispute about Cisternino’s second set of requests for production
of documents. In his responses to the requests, Zheng asserted numerous
and lengthy objections. Cisternino’s attorney, Daniel King, sent a detailed,
nine-page letter setting forth his client’s position on the requests and asking
Sturgeon-Garcia to meet and confer about the dispute. King expressed the
“hope that by raising these issues now, we may avoid unnecessary motion
practice.” Nothing in our record indicates that Sturgeon-Garcia responded to
the letter. King also twice asked Sturgeon-Garcia for an extension of time for
him to file a motion to compel to allow the parties time to meet and confer,
but again nothing in our record indicates that Sturgeon-Garcia responded.
Cisternino proceeded by filing a motion to compel further responses to
the requests and seeking sanctions in the amount of $14,380.50 The motion
was supported by a declaration from an attorney associated with King’s law
firm and a separate statement filed under California Rules of Court,
Rule 3.1345.
Zheng, acting through Sturgeon-Garcia, opposed the motion to compel
and the request for sanctions by defending some, but not all, of the objections
that he had asserted. He also sought cross-sanctions against Cisternino.
A hearing was held, and although a tentative ruling was apparently
issued, it is not contained in our record. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
court adopted its tentative ruling, granting Cisternino’s motion to compel and
sanctioning Zheng and Sturgeon-Garcia in the amount of $9,082.50.
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II.
DISCUSSION
1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Imposing Sanctions
Against Zheng and Sturgeon-Garcia.
“We review the trial court’s order [imposing discovery sanctions] under
the abuse of discretion standard and resolve all evidentiary conflicts most
favorably to the trial court’s ruling. We will reverse only if the . . . order was
arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical. It is appellant’s burden to affirmatively
demonstrate error and where the evidence is in conflict, we will affirm the
trial court’s findings.” (Williams v. Russ (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1224.)
The trial court’s reasons for its ruling “are not binding on us because we
review its ruling, not its rationale.” (Ram’s Gate Winery, LLC v. Roche (2015)
235 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1079.) We “must affirm on any ground supported by
the record.” (Jiminez v. County of Los Angeles (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 133,
140.)
Misusing the discovery process includes failing to respond or submit to
discovery, asserting unmeritorious objections, and responding evasively to
discovery requests. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010, subds. (d)-(g);2 Los
Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 377, 390.) It also includes
failing to confer with the opposing party “in a reasonable and good faith
attempt to resolve informally any dispute concerning discovery” before filing
a discovery motion. (§ 2023.010, subd. (i).) Such a reasonable and good faith
attempt “ ‘ “entails something more than bickering with [opposing]
counsel. . . . Rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter
over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate.” ’ ” (Ellis v. Toshiba
America Information Systems, Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 853, 880.) One
2 All further statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
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who fails to confer with their opponent is subject to mandatory sanctions
regardless of the merits of their position on the discovery dispute.
Section 2023.020 plainly states, “Notwithstanding the outcome of the
particular discovery motion, the [trial] court shall impose a monetary
sanction ordering that any party or attorney who fails to confer as required
pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as
a result of that conduct.” (Italics added.)
Ample evidence supports the conclusion here that Zheng and Sturgeon-
Garcia did not participate in a meet-and-confer process regarding the
discovery dispute involving Cisternino’s second request for the production of
documents. At the hearing, the trial court expressed frustration that “all of
this could have been avoided by [a] meet-and-confer, which appears to never
have happened, which leaves the Court questioning what it was that was
done in response to these discovery requests. And that then makes it very
difficult for the Court because you [referring to Sturgeon-Garcia] want the
Court to tell you where you’ve gone wrong. I’m not really sure what it is that
you did based upon what your responses are and all of the objections that
you’ve stated.” The court elaborated that counsel were “unable to meet and
confer in a productive way, as required by the code, in order to ascertain what
discovery [was] being requested and how to resolve that issue.· That is a
requirement under the code. [¶] And in bickering and arguing, there’s no
way that you could have a fruitful meet-and-confer and determine what is
being requested if . . . counsel is only going to argue as to what the meaning
of the words are rather than try to resolve the issue, which I believe is a
requirement under the statute and a requirement as officers of the court.”
Sturgeon-Garcia took the position at the hearing, as he does in his
appellate briefing, that he did participate in a meet-and-confer process. But
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the record shows that while he may have participated in such a process, he
did so in connection with an earlier discovery dispute involving another
defendant, but not one in connection with Casternino’s second request for the
production of documents. Sturgeon-Garcia claims his participation in the
earlier meet-and-confer process satisfied his meet-and-confer obligations in
connection with Cisternino’s request because the two discovery requests were
“largely duplicative” and the other defendant and Cisternino were
represented by the same law firm. But he cites no authority to support the
notion that participating in a meet-and-confer process about an earlier
discovery dispute satisfies the obligation to meet and confer about later
disputes, and we reject it. In short, Sturgeon-Garcia did not satisfy his
obligation to meet and confer about the dispute over the second request for
the production of documents, and sanctions were therefore mandatory under
section 2023.020.
Even if we could excuse Sturgeon-Garcia’s failure to participate in the
meet-and-confer process, we would still conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in entering the sanctions order. Substantial evidence
shows that many of the objections Zheng and Sturgeon-Garcia asserted were
baseless. Many of them, for example, asserted that the requests were vague
and ambiguous. But Zheng and Sturgeon-Garcia advanced no arguments in
the trial court, and they advance none in their appellate briefing, to support
these assertions. Therefore, any such arguments have been forfeited. And in
any event, as suggested by the trial court, it would be disingenuous for them
to contend that the requests were vague and ambiguous while at the same
time insisting that the requests plainly sought the same documents that had
already been produced. The sanctions order was well within the trial court’s
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discretion and Zheng and Sturgeon-Garcia have failed to sustain their
appellate burden to show otherwise.
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Determining the
Amount of the Sanctions or Imposing Them on Sturgeon-Garcia.
Zheng and Sturgeon-Garcia also argue that the $9,082.50 sanctions
award was “an unreasonable sum” under the circumstances. Sturgeon-
Garcia separately argues that sanctions should not have been imposed
against him, as he was simply acting as Zheng’s counsel. The arguments are
meritless.
To begin with, the arguments were forfeited because Zheng and
Sturgeon-Garcia have not shown that they raised them in the trial court. “It
is axiomatic that arguments not raised in the trial court are forfeited on
appeal.” (Kern County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Camacho (2012)
209 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1038.) “ ‘[T]heories not raised in the trial court cannot
be asserted for the first time on appeal; appealing parties must adhere to the
theory (or theories) on which their cases were tried. This rule is based on
fairness—it would be unfair, both to the trial court and the opposing
litigants, to permit a change of theory on appeal.’ ” (Nellie Gail Ranch
Owners Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 982, 997.)
Zheng and Sturgeon-Garcia also presented no counter evidence in the
trial court that the number of attorney hours, or the amount of the hourly
rate, used to calculate the “reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees”
under section 2023.020 was improper. Once a documented fee claim is
presented, the burden shifts to the opposing party to present specific
objections to either the hours claimed or the rates charged by counsel.
(2 Pearl, Cal. Attorney Fee Awards (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. 2025) §§ 11.58–11.60,
pp. 11–77 to 11–81.) Mere assertions that the claimed fees are unreasonable
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or excessive are not sufficient; the objections must be supported by evidence.
(See Avikian v. WTC Financial Corp. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1119.)
Sturgeon-Garcia similarly forfeited his argument that no sanctions
should have been imposed against him by not raising it in the trial court, and
we reject the argument on its merits in any event. Section 2023.030
specifically allows sanctions to be imposed against “anyone”—a party, an
attorney, or both—who misuses the discovery process. There is no merit to
Sturgeon-Garcia’s contention that sanctions cannot be imposed against an
attorney without a finding that the attorney was “advising” (§ 2023.030,
subd. (a)) the client to engage in conduct amounting to abusive discovery.
(See Ghanooni v. Super Shuttle (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 256, 261 [sanction on
attorney reversed when there was no evidentiary basis that counsel
participated in any discovery wrongdoing].) Advising misconduct is only one
of several independent grounds that can support imposition of sanctions on
counsel. “[O]ne engaging in misuse of the discovery process” (§ 2023.030,
subd. (a)), including counsel directly participating in such misuse, as occurred
here, can also warrant imposition of sanctions. Such misuse includes failing
to confer with opposing counsel reasonably and in good faith, and asserting
unmeritorious discovery objections. (§§ 2023.010, 2023.020.) No trial court
finding was required that Sturgeon-Garcia advised Zheng to misuse the
discovery process, because that was not the basis for the imposition of the
sanction against Sturgeon-Garcia.
Zheng and Sturgeon-Garcia have failed to sustain their appellate
burden of showing that the trial court abused its discretion in entering the
sanctions order against them.
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III.
DISPOSITION
The order awarding sanctions against Zheng and Sturgeon-Garcia is
affirmed. Cisternino is awarded appellate costs.
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_________________________
Humes, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
_________________________
Smiley, J.
Zheng v. Cisternjno A169850
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