CourtListener 10692029•Paperman v. Besser CA2/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 10/7/25 Paperman v. Besser CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
DEBBIE PAPERMAN, B336740, B340882
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20SMCV00343)
v.
SEAN B. BESSER et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEALS from a judgment and orders of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, H. Jay Ford III, Judge. Reversed
and remanded.
WDA, Whitney D. Ackerman, Joshua C. Greer, and Duncan
McGee Nefcy for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Brian R. Condon for Defendants and Respondents.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Debbie Paperman appeals the judgment entered after the
trial court granted defendants Sean and Samantha Bessers’
motion to quash service of Paperman’s first amended complaint
and to dismiss the action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
sections 583.210 and 583.250.1 Paperman separately appeals the
trial court’s order awarding the Bessers attorney fees as
prevailing parties pursuant to Civil Code section 1717.
We conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the
action. It is undisputed that Paperman effected proper service of
the original complaint and summons. This was sufficient to meet
the requisites of section 583.210. That the complaint’s defects
prevented Paperman from obtaining a default judgment did not
support a finding that she failed to serve the complaint and
summons within three years of the commencement of the action.
We therefore reverse the judgment and the subsequent order
awarding the Bessers contractual attorney fees.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Paperman filed the original complaint on March 3, 2020.
She alleged that she signed a month-to-month lease agreement
with the Bessers in August 2016 and had issues with the
habitability of the property throughout her tenancy. According to
the complaint, months before the tenancy began, the Bessers had
been informed that the property was not a legal residence and
could not be used as a rental property, but they concealed that
information from Paperman. Paperman discovered the property
was not a legal rental in February 2019. She alleged that she
was “constructively evicted due to no fault of her own” in April
2019.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
2
Paperman alleged that she suffered damages of $1,000 per
month of the tenancy, her security deposit, relocation fees,
attorney fees, and costs. The Bessers also “reported to
[Paperman’s] credit the details of the tenancy which were not
correct or not true,” which caused Paperman to be unable to rent
a new apartment and cost her “in excess of $500 additional
dollars per month in rent and [is] still damaging her credit.”
Paperman asserted 10 causes of action against the Bessers,
including breach of contract. The complaint asserted that the
amount in controversy exceeded the court’s jurisdictional
minimum of $25,000, but it did not state the total amount of
damages Paperman sought.
In July 2020, Paperman filed a proof of service of summons
for each defendant, stating that service had been completed on
March 15, 2020. She obtained an entry of default. However, over
the next two years, Paperman repeatedly attempted, and failed,
to perfect a default judgment. Among other things, the trial
court found that the declarations Paperman submitted in support
of default judgment were insufficient to support the award
requested—over $600,000—and the complaint failed to state the
amount of damages sought. Paperman moved to vacate the
default several times in the process and filed proofs of service of
statements of damages on the Bessers. In October 2022, the trial
court granted Paperman’s motion to vacate the default and also
ordered that Paperman was permitted to file a first amended
complaint.
Shortly thereafter, Paperman filed a first amended
complaint against the Bessers in which she stated the actual and
general damages she sought in her prayer for relief. She also
3
filed proofs of service of the first amended complaint, which were
signed by a registered process server.
In December 2022, Paperman filed another request for
default, which the clerk entered. In January 2023, Paperman
requested entry of judgment and filed further supporting
declarations.
At a hearing on January 19, 2023, the trial court found that
Paperman’s filings were insufficient to support a default
judgment despite the multiple opportunities she had been given.
The court stated it was not inclined to set further hearings if
judgment could not be entered. It granted Paperman’s oral
motion to vacate the default. Paperman subsequently filed proofs
of service of amended statements of damages.
In July 2023, Paperman filed a request for entry of
judgment and another declaration in support of the request. On
July 25, 2023, the trial court entered a default judgment.
In October 2023, the Bessers filed a motion to set aside the
judgment. The motion referenced the original complaint, not the
first amended complaint, and argued that the original complaint
failed to disclose the amount of damages sought and the court
therefore lacked jurisdiction to enter default judgment pursuant
to section 580. The Bessers also argued that the court should
dismiss the action for failure to prosecute under sections 583.410
and 583.420 because Paperman had failed to prove up the default
in three and a half years. The Bessers suggested the court could,
alternatively, vacate the portion of the award in excess of the
court’s minimum jurisdiction of $25,000 and modify the award to
an amount warranted by the complaint, which they asserted was
$2,000 to $3,000. They indicated they would not object to a
judgment of that amount.
4
Paperman opposed the motion on the ground that it
ignored the first amended complaint. In response, the Bessers
filed declarations in which they stated that they “ha[d] been
advised of this lawsuit since about May of 2020” and chose to
take a “ ‘wait and see’ approach” on the advice of counsel. They
denied that they were ever served with the first amended
complaint or the amended statement of damages.
On October 26, 2023, the trial court granted the motion to
vacate the default judgment. The court noted that the judgment
was entered in error as the court had vacated all previous
defaults.
In November 2023, the Bessers filed a motion to quash
service of process of the first amended complaint and summons
and to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. They submitted
declarations stating they were not served with the first amended
complaint. In their motion, the Bessers did not claim that
Paperman had failed to serve the original complaint. Instead,
they argued that “[t]he original complaint had a defective prayer
that prevented the Court from having jurisdiction to fashion a
remedy in the absence of an answer.” They asserted the court
should grant the motion to quash because Paperman had not
served the first amended complaint within three years of the
commencement of the action, and dismissal was mandatory
under sections 583.210 and 583.250. Alternatively, the Bessers
argued that the court should exercise its discretionary power
under sections 583.410, 583.420, and California Rules of Court,
rule 3.1340, to dismiss the action.
In her opposition, Paperman asserted that she had served
the original complaint and summons on the Bessers. She
contended the Bessers did not dispute that the initial service was
5
proper or that the court obtained personal jurisdiction over them
pursuant to the service of the summons and original complaint.
Paperman also argued that service of the first amended
complaint was proper because a registered process server
completed personal service on Sean Besser on October 27, 2022,
and he had accepted service on behalf of himself and his wife.
On February 20, 2024, the trial court granted the Bessers’
motion to quash service of the first amended complaint and to
dismiss the action pursuant to section 583.250. The court found
Paperman had failed to meet her burden of proving effective
service of the first amended complaint. The court ordered the
case dismissed without prejudice because “[t]he case was filed on
3-3-20, and as of 2-15-24 the Bessers have not been properly
served, more than three years after the filing, thus the case must
be dismissed.” The court cited sections 583.210 and 583.250 and
Slaybaugh v. Superior Court (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 216
(Slaybaugh), which concerned former section 581a, the
predecessor to section 583.250. The court relied on the
Slaybaugh court’s holding that, “ ‘where summons has not been
served and returned and where the defendant has made no
general appearance within the three-year period,’ ” dismissal
under the statutory provisions is “ ‘mandatory and
jurisdictional.’ ” (Id. at p. 221.) The court found there were “too
many inconsistencies within Paperman’s declarations to
persuasively overcome the Bessers’ declarations, and attached
evidence, that show they were not served” with the first amended
complaint. It granted the motion to quash service of the first
amended complaint and granted the Bessers’ motion “pursuant to
[sections] 583.210, 583.250.” The court reiterated: “[S]ince more
than three years have passed since the filing of the claim without
6
proper service the case must be dismissed.” The court did not
address the service of the original complaint and summons.
On February 26, 2024, the trial court entered a judgment of
dismissal. Paperman timely appealed the judgment.
In April 2024, the Bessers moved for an award of attorney
fees as the prevailing parties under Civil Code section 1717. In
August 2024, the court granted the motion. Paperman timely
appealed. We consolidated the two appeals for purposes of oral
argument and decision.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Erred in Granting the Motion to
Dismiss Pursuant to Sections 583.210 and 583.250
Paperman contends the trial court erred in dismissing the
action pursuant to sections 583.210 and 583.250 because she
properly served the original complaint and summons, and the
trial court therefore obtained personal jurisdiction over the
Bessers only weeks after the action commenced. Paperman
further contends the record does not support the conclusion that
the trial court alternatively granted the motion to dismiss on
discretionary grounds. We agree.
A. Standard of review
Where the relevant facts are undisputed, we review de novo
a trial court’s order dismissing an action for failure to serve the
summons and complaint within three years of the filing of the
original complaint. (Higgins v. Superior Court (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 973, 980.)
This appeal also raises the question of the proper
interpretation of section 583.210. “Statutory interpretation is a
question of law that we review de novo. [Citation.] ‘Our
fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the
7
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first
examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and
commonsense meaning. . . . If the language is clear, courts must
generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation
would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not
intend.’ ” (Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th
717, 724 (Bruns).)
B. Service of the original summons and complaint
satisfied the section 583.210 requirements
Under section 583.210, subdivision (a), “[t]he summons and
complaint shall be served upon a defendant within three years
after the action is commenced against the defendant. For the
purpose of this subdivision, an action is commenced at the time
the complaint is filed.” (Ibid.) “ ‘Complaint’ includes a cross-
complaint or other initial pleading.” (§ 583.110, subd. (b).)
Section 583.250 provides that if service is not made within three
years, “[t]he action shall be dismissed by the court on its own
motion or on motion of any person interested in the action . . . .”
(Id., subd. (a)(2).) Dismissal is mandatory. (Id., subd. (b).)
Read together, the plain meaning of these statutory
provisions is that the trial court must dismiss an action if the
plaintiff fails to serve the initial pleading and summons upon a
defendant within three years after the initial pleading is filed.
Here, Paperman filed her initial pleading, and the action
commenced, on March 3, 2020. Paperman served the original
complaint and summons on March 15, 2020, well within the three
year deadline. She filed proofs of the service of the initial
pleading and summons in July 2020. The Bessers did not
challenge the service of the original complaint. Rather, they
stated they were aware of the action in 2020 and chose not to
8
respond to it. Dismissal under section 583.250 was not
mandatory or proper under the undisputed facts.
The Bessers contend the absence of a specific damages
request in the original complaint means “there was never any
operative complaint served on the Bessers within the mandatory
time-frame” and the court never “obtained fundamental
jurisdiction.” As we understand their argument, the Bessers
conflate two jurisdictional concepts: personal jurisdiction over a
defendant, and the court’s jurisdiction to enter a default
judgment in the amount of damages a plaintiff requests.
Section 583.210 implicates only personal jurisdiction.
“Ordinarily, a court gains jurisdiction over the defendant from
the time the defendant is served with a copy of the summons and
the complaint on which it’s based, as required under the Code of
Civil Procedure.” (Stancil v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th
381, 392 (Stancil), citing §§ 410.50, 412.20.) “Proper service of
process of a petition or complaint is the means by which a court
obtains personal jurisdiction over a party.” (Abers v. Rohrs
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1206.)2 “From the defendant’s
perspective, ‘[d]ue notice to the defendant is essential to the
jurisdiction of all courts, as sufficiently appears from the well-
known legal maxim, that no one shall be condemned in his person
or property without notice, and an opportunity to be heard in his
2 Section 410.50, subdivision (a), provides that “the court in
which an action is pending has jurisdiction over a party from the
time summons is served on him” pursuant to the chapter
concerning service of summons (§ 413.10 et seq.). Section 412.20
sets forth what a summons must contain. It also provides that
“[a] summons in a form approved by the Judicial Council is
deemed to comply with this section.” (Id., subd. (c).) The original
summonses served on the Bessers were Judicial Council forms.
9
defence.’ [Citation.] Service of process thus protects a
defendant’s due process right to defend against an action by
providing constitutionally adequate notice of the court
proceeding.” (Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII v.
Changzhou SinoType Technology Co., Ltd. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 125,
139.)
The record establishes that Paperman served the Bessers
with the summons and original complaint. The Bessers had
adequate notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to present a
defense, though they chose not to do so. The trial court therefore
obtained personal jurisdiction over them, within the time
constraints of section 583.210.
The Bessers, however, rely on authorities that concern the
trial court’s jurisdiction to enter a default judgment. Our
Supreme Court has explained that “section 580 is to be
interpreted, in accordance with its plain language, to deprive a
trial court of jurisdiction to enter a judgment against a defaulting
defendant which awards greater relief than that sought in the
plaintiff’s complaint.” (In re Marriage of Lippel (1990) 51 Cal.3d
1160, 1167.) Unlike section 583.210, section 580 does not address
a trial court’s ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant. Thus, while the Bessers’ argument regarding the
original complaint’s failure to state a specific amount of damages
was relevant to the trial court’s ability to enter a default
judgment for a certain amount, it was not relevant to whether
the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the Bessers. The
Bessers offer no authority or specific argument to suggest that
there is a basis to treat personal jurisdiction and jurisdiction to
enter a default judgment as one and the same.
10
We note that the Bessers’ motion to vacate judgment in fact
recognized that the court could enter a judgment in an amount
supported by the complaint which did not exceed the court’s
jurisdictional minimum. They therefore implicitly conceded that
the court had personal jurisdiction over them, notwithstanding
Paperman’s failure to specifically identify a damages amount in
the complaint. (See Airs Aromatics, LLC v. CBL Data Recovery
Technologies, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1013, 1024 [where
complaint only “refer[red] to damages in excess of the $25,000
jurisdictional minimum,” court “could reverse and reduce the
default judgment to that amount”].)
Finally, the Bessers contend that Paperman’s request to
vacate the default on the original complaint to allow her to file an
amended complaint rendered the original complaint a “nullity,”
and, “[p]rocedurally, it was as though no complaint had ever been
served.” The Bessers thus appear to argue that although the
filing of the original summons and complaint started the three-
year clock running under section 583.210, the undisputedly
effective service of process became invalid once Paperman filed
an amended complaint. The Bessers offer no legal or logical
analytical support for this contention.3
3 The Bessers cite three cases to support this portion of their
brief. Two, Slaybaugh, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at page 221, and
Busching v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 44, 49, are
inapposite. We are unable to locate any case that corresponds
with respondents’ third citation: Slayter v. Riverside County Dept.
of Child Support Services (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 341. It appears
that no such case exists. We remind and caution counsel that
“[a]n attorney is an officer of the court and owes the court a duty
of candor,” which means that an attorney must not make any
11
Neither section 583.210 nor any caselaw interpreting it
suggests that a plaintiff who files a complaint and properly
serves it with a summons on the defendant within three years
invalidates that service by filing an amended complaint, while, at
the same time, the plaintiff remains subject to a three-year
service period that began with the filing of the original
complaint. The Bessers ask us to interpret section 583.210 as
requiring that the summons, complaint, and any amended
complaints, be served within three years of the commencement of
the action. Had this been the Legislature’s intent we would
expect that it would have so stated. It did not, and we decline to
adopt an interpretation which runs counter to the plain language
of the provision. (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 724 [courts must
follow a statute’s plain meaning if the language is clear].)
The Bessers argue that once Paperman filed the amended
complaint she could no longer obtain relief based on her original
pleading. But, as discussed above, section 583.210 is not
false statement of fact or law to the court. (Levine v.
Berschneider (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 916, 921, citing Rules Prof.
Conduct, rule 3.3(a)(1) and Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (d).)
It is incumbent upon counsel to ensure that citations to
authorities in an appellate brief are legitimate and accurate. We
further emphasize that “it is a fundamental duty of attorneys to
read the legal authorities they cite in appellate briefs or any
other court filings to determine that the authorities stand for the
propositions for which they are cited.” (Noland v. Land of the
Free, L.P. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 426, 445.) Had counsel
attempted to read Slayter, “he would have discovered, as we did,
that the case[ ] . . . did not exist.” (Ibid.; see also id. at pp. 447–
448 [imposing sanctions on counsel for reliance on fabricated
cases and quotations].)
12
concerned with the entry of judgment or whether a complaint is
ultimately defective. Instead, it requires only that the plaintiff
enable the court to obtain personal jurisdiction over the
defendant within three years of the commencement of the action.
The filing of the amended complaint did not disrupt the personal
jurisdiction that flowed from the proper service of the initial
summons and complaint. (See, e.g., Hardell v. Vanzyl (2024) 102
Cal.App.5th 960, 968 [“the filing of an amended complaint does
not require the issuance of a new summons when the parties
remain the same”]; Gillette v. Burbank Community Hosp. (1976)
56 Cal.App.3d 430, 433 [same].)
In sum, Paperman served the summons and original
complaint on the Bessers within three years after commencing
the action against them. That the original complaint may have
been insufficient to support the entry of a default judgment in the
amounts Paperman requested was not relevant to the analysis
under sections 583.210 and 583.250. The trial court’s dismissal
of the action under section 583.250 was error.
C. The trial court did not exercise its discretion to
dismiss the action pursuant to section 583.410
The Bessers argue that it would have been reasonable for
the court to dismiss the action for lack of prosecution under the
discretionary provisions of section 583.410 et seq., and, further,
that the record does not definitively establish that the trial
court’s order was not based, in part, on this discretionary
authority. While in general this court may affirm a trial court
order if it is correct on any ground, the record in this case
13
prevents us from affirming based on the discretionary dismissal
provisions.
Under section 583.410, subdivision (a), a court may in its
discretion dismiss an action for delay in prosecution pursuant to
its own motion or on motion of the defendant if appropriate under
the circumstances of the case. The court may not dismiss an
action for delay in prosecution unless one of several conditions
has occurred, including that the action was not brought to trial
within three years. (§ 583.420, subd. (a)(2)(A).) California Rules
of Court, rule 3.1342(e) sets forth matters the trial court must
consider when determining whether to dismiss an action on
discretionary grounds.
“Where a written order clearly expresses the legal and
factual basis for the trial court’s resolution of controverted issues,
an appellate court will not imply findings the trial court did not
make.” (L.Q. v. California Hospital Medical Center (2021) 69
Cal.App.5th 1026, 1049; accord, Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v.
Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1384,
superseded by statute on other grounds.)
Here, in its minute order, the trial court repeatedly stated
“the case must be dismissed” because there had been no proper
service in three years. It granted the Bessers’ “motion to dismiss
pursuant to [sections] 583.210, 583.250.” The court quoted
section 583.210 and cited Slaybaugh for the proposition that
statutory dismissal provisions are “ ‘mandatory and
jurisdictional’ ” if the plaintiff has not served the summons and
complaint within three years and the defendant has made no
general appearance. (Slaybaugh, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at p. 221.)
The trial court did not cite the statutes permitting discretionary
dismissal for delay in prosecution, California Rules of Court,
14
rule 3.1342(e), or any decisions discussing those statutes or that
rule. The court also did not make any findings about Paperman’s
diligence. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1342(e)(2), (4).)
The Bessers nevertheless contend that the trial court did
not necessarily dismiss the action on mandatory rather than
discretionary grounds. Quoting Skelly Estate Co. v. San
Francisco (1937) 9 Cal.2d 28, 33, the Bessers assert that
“ ‘ “must” is not necessarily determinative of [a statute’s]
mandatory import’ ” and may be “ ‘construed as [a] directory
term[ ].’ ” However, construing the trial court’s use of “must” as
directory—i.e., as “providing advisory but not compulsory
guidance”—does not make sense in context here. (Merriam-
Webster Dict. Online (2025) <https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/directory> [as of Oct. 6, 2025], archived at
<https://perma.cc/8CLX-TDUN>.) Any ambiguity in the trial
court’s use of “must” is resolved by its express references to
sections 583.210 and 583.250, and the absence of any mention of
section 583.410.
The Bessers also assert that “there is no real dispute that it
would be within reason for the trial court to have dismissed the
case under its discretionary authority, for lack of prosecution
under CCP § 583.410.” In other words, the Bessers argue that
the trial court would not have abused its discretion if it had
dismissed the action on discretionary grounds. This is
immaterial since the trial court did not exercise that discretion.
As the court explained in Ystrom v. Handel (1988) 205
Cal.App.3d 144, “whether a case should be dismissed for failure
to prosecute diligently is a complex question of fact and law.
Adjudication of this issue involves assessing credibility, resolving
conflicts in the evidence and balancing competing judicial
15
policies. [Citation.] All of these tasks are uniquely within the
province of the trial court.” (Id. at p. 151.) We may not
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.
II. The Order Granting the Motion to Quash Must Be
Reversed, However We Do Not Disturb the Trial
Court’s Finding That Paperman Failed to Properly
Serve the First Amended Complaint
On appeal, Paperman additionally challenges the trial
court’s order granting the Bessers’ motion to quash service of
process related to the first amended complaint. Paperman
disputes that there was substantial evidence to support the
finding that she did not properly serve the first amended
complaint.
An order granting a motion to quash is a conclusion that
the plaintiff has failed to establish that the court has personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. (§ 418.10, subd. (a)(1); Stancil,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 396 [motion to quash is “a limited
procedural tool appropriate where the court lacks personal
jurisdiction because the statutory requirements for service of
process are not fulfilled”]; Kroopf v. Guffey (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d
1351, 1360 [“a motion to quash service is strictly limited to the
question of jurisdiction over the defendant”].) Here, irrespective
of any failure to serve the amended complaint and additional
summons on the Bessers, we have already determined that the
court had personal jurisdiction over the Bessers due to the proper
service of the original complaint and summons. Our conclusion
that dismissal of the action was not proper under
sections 583.210 and 583.250 necessarily encompasses the trial
court’s order granting the motion to quash and compels reversal.
16
However, whether service of the first amended complaint
was proper is a legitimate question, even if the vehicle for the
challenge was incorrect. “Where the defendant has failed to
appear in the action, service of an amended complaint in the
manner provided for service of summons, while not necessarily a
requirement for personal jurisdiction [citation], is an essential
prerequisite to a valid default judgment [citation].” (Engebretson
& Co. v. Harrison (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 436, 443 (Engebretson).)
We therefore review the trial court’s underlying ruling that
service of the first amended complaint did not occur.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding. The
record establishes that a registered process server signed the
proofs of service of the first amended complaint, which creates a
rebuttable presumption of proper service. (American Express
Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 390; Evid.
Code, § 647.) Paperman argues that the Bessers “produced
nothing in response to [her] process server’s declaration.” Not so.
The Bessers submitted declarations and documentary evidence
that called the truth of the process server’s statements into
question. (American Express, at p. 390 [plaintiff failed to carry
burden of proving effective service where evidence demonstrated
the proof of service was “untruthful”].)
According to the process server’s declaration, Sean
informed the process server that both Sean and Samantha were
home and he agreed to accept service on behalf of them both. The
Bessers’ declarations and a work calendar attached to
Samantha’s declaration provided evidence that Samantha was
not home on the morning service purportedly took place. The
court found there were “too many inconsistencies within
Paperman’s declarations to persuasively overcome the Bessers’
17
declarations and attached evidence.” “ ‘[I]t is the trial court’s role
to assess the credibility of the various witnesses, to weigh the
evidence to resolve the conflicts in the evidence.’ ” (Nevarez v.
Tonna (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 774, 786.) We will not disturb the
trial court’s conclusion that the Bessers were credible and service
of process of the first amended complaint did not occur.
Paperman’s failure to personally serve the first amended
complaint on the Bessers therefore precludes her from obtaining
a default judgment against them based on that complaint
(Engebretson, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d at p. 443), unless and until
she demonstrates proper service of the first amended complaint
upon remand.
III. The Order Awarding Fees under Civil Code
Section 1717 Must Also Be Reversed
The trial court awarded the Bessers attorney fees pursuant
to Civil Code section 1717. However, because we reverse the
judgment, there is no longer a final resolution of the contract
claims. The trial court’s determination that the Bessers were the
prevailing parties under Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (a),
cannot stand and the order awarding attorney fees must also be
reversed. (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 876 [“prevailing
party determination is to be made only upon final resolution of
the contract claims”].) We need not reach the other issues raised
in Paperman’s appeal of that order.
18
DISPOSITION
The judgment and trial court orders dated February 20 and
August 6, 2024 are reversed and the matter is remanded for
further proceedings. The parties are to bear their own costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
HANASONO, J.
19
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