People v. Aguirre CA2/4

CourtListener 10691541Calctapp06.10.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 10/6/25 P. v. Aguirre CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B342033

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA087922
v.

JOSE PHILLIP AGUIRRE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Reversed and
remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
Nancy Gaynor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Chung L. Mar,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2008, a jury convicted Defendant-Appellant Jose Aguirre
of murder under the provocative act doctrine. In 2019, Aguirre
sought resentencing relief under former Penal Code section
1170.95 (now section 1172.6).1 The trial court denied Aguirre
relief, and a different panel of this court affirmed the order
denying relief, concluding among other things that the statute at
that time, by its express terms, only extended relief to individuals
convicted of murder under the felony murder rule or natural and
probable consequences doctrine.
In 2024, after the Legislature amended the statute to
extend relief to individuals convicted of murder under any
“theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely
on that person’s participation in a crime” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)),
Aguirre filed a new section 1172.6 resentencing petition, arguing
that he is entitled to relief because his murder conviction under
the provocative act doctrine was based on imputed malice. The
trial court summarily denied the petition without appointing
counsel, explaining that Aguirre’s arguments were previously
addressed in prior rulings and he was not entitled to successive
petitions. Aguirre now appeals the summary denial of his
petition.
On appeal, the parties agree that because the jury
instructions at Aguirre’s trial allowed the jury to convict him of
murder without finding he harbored malice, and in light of our
Supreme Court’s recent holding that petitioners with pre-2009
murder convictions under the provocative act doctrine are not
categorically ineligible for section 1172.6 relief (People v.
Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 727–731 (Antontelli)), the trial

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

2
court’s order denying relief should be reversed and the matter
remanded for further proceedings. We agree with the parties
that remand is warranted.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from this court’s opinion in
case number B307367, which is contained in the current record
on appeal. We include these facts solely to provide background
and context for the parties’ arguments, and do not rely on them to
resolve the purely legal issues presented in this appeal. (See
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 222, fn. 2.)
“In November 2006, appellant, along with David Edward
Santos and Anthony Gurule, went to the house of Walter
Dominguez to extort money from him. [Citation.] After
Dominguez refused their demand, Gurule punched him, and
Dominguez drew a gun. [Citation.] In response, Santos drew his
gun and it discharged. [Citation.] In the ensuing melee,
Dominguez shot and killed Gurule, Dominguez shot appellant,
and appellant shot Dominguez.”

RELEVANT LAW

Penal Code section 1172.6

In 2018, the Legislature, through Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), amended section
188 to eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine
as it applies to murder and to require, with certain exceptions
under the felony murder rule, that a defendant act with malice to
be convicted of murder. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3) & 189, subd. (e).) In
2021, through Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.
2021, ch. 551), the Legislature clarified that the amendments

3
made by Senate Bill No. 1437 were also intended to eliminate any
other theory of imputed-malice murder liability. (See § 1172.6,
subd. (a).)
Under section 1172.6, a defendant who was convicted of
imputed-malice murder must attest to the following: “(1) A
complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of . . . murder . . . under which malice is imputed to a person
based solely on that person’s participation in a crime . . . . [¶] (2)
The petitioner was convicted of murder . . . following a trial . . . at
which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder . . . . [¶]
(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder . . .
[under current law].” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)–(3).)
Upon receipt of a facially sufficient petition, the trial court
“shall appoint counsel” for petitioner if requested. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (b)(3).) The trial court then assesses whether the petitioner
is prima facie eligible for relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) If the court
determines that the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of
eligibility for relief, the court must issue an order to show cause
and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution bears
the burden “to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder” under current law. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (c), (d)(3).)

Provocative Act Doctrine

“[O]ver 50 years ago, the provocative act doctrine was
originally explained as follows, ‘When the defendant or his
accomplice, with a conscious disregard for life, intentionally
commits an act that is likely to cause death [the “provocative
act”], and his victim or a police officer kills in reasonable

4
response to such act, the defendant is guilty of murder. In such a
case, the killing is attributable, not merely to the commission of a
felony, but to the intentional act of the defendant or his
accomplice committed with conscious disregard for life.’”
(Antonelli, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 727–728, original italics.)
“Thereafter, [the Supreme Court] repeatedly confirmed that the
provocative act doctrine is a theory of vicarious liability for
murder; an accomplice to a felony could ‘be vicariously
responsible for any killing [except where the decedent is the sole
provocateur] attributable to the intentional acts of his associates
committed with conscious disregard for life, and likely to result in
death.’ ” (Id. at p. 728, original italics.)
As noted above, in Antonelli, our Supreme Court recently
clarified that petitioners who were convicted of provocative act
murder prior to 2009 are not categorically ineligible for section
1172.6 relief. (Antonelli, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 722–723, 727–
731.)2 The Antonelli court explained that, prior to its decision in
People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, “our case law on
provocative act murder ‘imposed culpability on all perpetrators of
the underlying crime so long as the provocateur acted with
malice, and did so in furtherance of the common criminal design,’
provided that the deceased was not the sole provocateur.”
(Antonelli, at p. 730.) Because “a jury could have imputed malice
to a nonprovocateur defendant” under pre-Concha precedent,
such a defendant would not be “categorically ineligible for section
1172.6 relief.” (Antonelli, at p. 731.)

2 As mentioned above, Aguirre was convicted of provocative
act murder in 2008.

5
DISCUSSION

We review de novo a trial court’s determination of whether
a petitioner has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for
section 1172.6 relief. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45,
52.) Applying this standard, we conclude that Aguirre’s record of
conviction demonstrates he is prima facie eligible for section
1172.6 relief. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971 [“The record
of conviction will necessarily inform the [ ] prima facie inquiry
under section [1172.6]”].)
The jury instructions given at Aguirre’s trial allowed the
jury to convict him of murder based solely on his participation in
attempted extortion without finding that he personally harbored
malice. The trial court instructed the jury, using CALCRIM No.
561, that it could find Aguirre guilty of provocative act murder if
the following elements were true: (1) appellant was an accomplice
of his codefendant Santos in the crime of attempted extortion; (2)
Santos intentionally did a provocative act while committing that
crime; (3) Santos knew that the natural and probable
consequences of his act were dangerous to human life but acted
with conscious disregard for life; (4) in response to Santos’s
provocative act, the victim of the attempted extortion
(Dominguez) killed the other accomplice to the attempted
extortion (Gurule); and (5) that accomplice’s death was the
natural and probable consequence of Santos’s provocative act.
In other words, although the instructions required the jury
to find that Santos harbored malice, they also allowed the jury to
convict Aguirre of murder based solely on his participation in
attempted extortion without finding he personally harbored
malice. Because the provocative act doctrine instructions allowed
the jury to convict Aguirre of imputed-malice murder, the record

6
demonstrates he is prima facie eligible for section 1172.6 relief.
We therefore agree with Aguirre that his case should be
remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (c) & (d)(3).)3

3 Because Aguirre’s current resentencing petition is based in
part on changes in the law enacted by Senate Bill No. 775 and
recently clarified by our Supreme court in Antonelli, we conclude
that this successive petition is not barred by collateral estoppel
principles. (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 949–951
[“Here, because appellant’s 2020 petition was based on new
authority which challenged the primary ground for the superior
court’s summary denial of his 2019 petition, the 2020 petition
was not procedurally barred as a successive petition”].)
Additionally, because we conclude remand is warranted under
state statutory law, we need not address Aguirre’s contention
that the trial court proceedings violated his rights to due process
under the federal and California Constitutions.

7
DISPOSITION

The order denying Aguirre section 1172.6 relief is reversed,
and the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to
appoint counsel for Aguirre, issue an order to show cause, and
hold an evidentiary hearing under subdivision (d) of the statute.
We express no opinion on the ultimate outcome of that hearing.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:

COLLINS, Acting P.J.

MORI, J.

8

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.