CourtListener 10687906•People v. Hackett CA2/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 10/2/25 P. v. Hackett CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B336651
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA045110)
v.
SAMUEL LAFAYETT HACKETT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Dorothy L. Shubin, Judge. Affirmed.
Samuel Lafayett Hackett, in pro. per.; Patricia S. Lai,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Samuel Hackett appeals from an order denying his Penal
Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing.1 His appellate
counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216 (Delgadillo). Hackett filed a supplemental brief arguing the
trial court erred in denying his petition. We consider Hackett’s
contentions and affirm the trial court order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Underlying Crime
We take the following facts from the opinion affirming
Hackett’s convictions on direct appeal.2 (People v. Hackett (Feb.
25, 2003, B154152, B159148 (Hackett) [nonpub. opn.].)
“In January 2001, 32-year-old Christopher Hollis lived with
his mother, Laura, in Altadena. Hollis’s son, Ketren Allen, had
been living with them but he moved out in December 2000.
Ketren and defendant Hackett were longtime friends, and
Hackett had been a frequent visitor to the Hollis residence before
Ketren moved out. Hackett occasionally spent the night and,
when he did, he kept his things in a navy blue duffel bag.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code. Hackett’s petition was filed pursuant to former
section 1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was
renumbered to section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
2 We refer to the Court of Appeal opinion only “for
background purposes and to provide context” for Hackett’s
arguments. (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 978,
fn. 2, disapproved of on another ground in People v. Patton (2025)
17 Cal.5th 549, 569 (Patton).) We do not rely on the facts in the
opinion to review the trial court’s determination of Hackett’s
eligibility for resentencing at the prima facie stage. (Flores, at
p. 988.)
2
Sometime during fall 2000, Hollis borrowed this duffel bag and
then refused to return it because Hackett had not returned
something he had borrowed from Hollis (either an outfit of
clothes or another duffel bag). Over the course of a few months,
Hackett asked Ketren many times when Hollis was going to
return the duffel bag.
“On January 2, 2001, [fn. omitted] Diana Ramirez was
visiting with Hollis on the front porch of his house when Hackett
drove up. Hackett walked up to the porch, carrying a lighted
marijuana cigarette, and asked about his duffel bag. Hollis asked
about his own duffel bag. When Hackett said he had returned
Hollis’s bag to Laura two weeks ago, Hollis called him a liar.
Ramirez testified Hackett got ‘pissed off’ and ‘had like a rage.’
Hollis ‘said he wasn’t going to give [Hackett] his duffel bag
because [Hackett] came up talking shit.’ Hackett said in an
angry, threatening manner that ‘he would be back with his
cousin,’ and walked to his car while Hollis went into the house.
Ramirez told Hollis she would give him $20 ‘if it [meant] that
much, just to keep the peace.’ She didn’t want Hackett to ‘leave
angry,’ and she ‘was just worried about him coming back’ with his
cousin. Hackett left without taking the money. Ramirez later
asked Hollis where his .45-caliber gun was (she was going to be
leaving her young daughter at his house that day and she wanted
to make sure the gun was inaccessible). Hollis showed her the
gun-it was ‘on top of the closet in the speaker [sic].’
“On January 4, the police stopped Hackett for traffic
violations. Because Hackett did not have a driver’s license, his
Honda was impounded. The trunk of the Honda was stuffed with
duffel bags and backpacks that were filled with clothing and
towels. On the rear seat there was more clothing and some
3
household items, including an iron. Hackett would have had to
pay about $280 to get his car out of the impound yard.
“On the morning of January 5, Laura left home to go to
work. Hollis was asleep on a couch in the TV room. Although it
was a sofa bed, Hollis slept on it unopened. Laura left by the
back door, locking it behind her. The rest of the house was locked
up. Nobody besides Hollis and herself had keys to the house.
“At 9:00 or 9:30 a.m. that same morning, Hackett visited
his girlfriend, Cinnamon Scott, in Pasadena. Scott testified
Hackett was wearing a ‘white T-shirt, gray sweats, white Jordans
[tennis shoes] and [a] gray beanie.’ Asked if Hackett’s sweat
pants had pockets, Scott testified: ‘His shirt covered them so I
couldn’t see them.’ She denied having told police the sweat pants
had pockets. Hackett told her his Honda had been impounded
and he asked to borrow money so he could get it back, but Scott
didn’t have any money. Hackett left her apartment between
10:00 and 10:30 a.m.
“The jury heard a taped interview, recorded on January 9,
in which Scott told police the sweat pants Hackett was wearing
that morning had ‘two pockets on the side, [and a] draw string
pocket in the back.’
“Lawrence Duncan, who lived next to Hollis and Laura,
testified that sometime between 10:30 a.m. and noon on January
5, he saw someone go through the Hollises’ backyard gate.
Duncan described the person as a man, 18-to-25 years old,
medium build and height (under six feet), wearing a gray and
white stocking cap or beanie, gray sweat pants with pockets, a
white sweatshirt and black gloves. Duncan did not get a good
look at the person’s face. About 20 minutes later, a car pulled up
in front of the Hollis residence and blew its horn two or three
4
times. There were two people in the car. The passenger got out
and approached the front door. A few minutes later the horn
blew again, the passenger returned to the car and the car drove
off. The passenger was someone Duncan recognized and it was
definitely not the person who had gone through the rear gate.
“Duncan did not see the man who had gone through the
rear gate leave, but sometime in the afternoon he saw the same
person again approach the Hollis residence and go toward the
rear gate. At the time, Duncan assumed this person was Ketren
Allen because he had gone through the back and the ‘[p]eople
that live there come in the back gate. The people that come to
visit, go to the front door.’ But when he saw Ketren the following
day, Duncan realized he had been mistaken because Ketren was
taller and had a very different walk. ‘Ketren walked like he was
carrying a sack of potatoes. The individual I saw walking had a
glide walk, kind of confident, arrogant walk.’ Duncan testified he
was 100 percent sure Ketren was not the person he had seen.
“Laura returned home from work about 5:00 p.m. to find
the back door ajar. There was no sign of a forced entry. Hollis’s
wallet was on the kitchen floor, its contents ‘just scattered.’ A
cabinet drawer in the kitchen that had been closed when Laura
left was now open. The cushions of the sofa bed where Hollis had
been sleeping were ‘pulled out.’ In Laura’s bedroom, ‘[t]he bed,
the mattress, box spring, all of that [was] thrown up against the
. . . wall. All the drawers . . . [of] the dressers [were] pulled and
like dumped because they was empty. [¶] All my clothing in my
closet was pulled out.’ Clothing and bedding had also been pulled
out of the hall closet and left in a heap that came up to Laura’s
knees. Another bedroom and the living room had also been
ransacked. One of her black gloves, which she usually kept on
5
top of her bedroom armoire, was on the bathroom floor; the
matching glove was on the bedroom floor. There was no sign of
Hollis. Laura called Duncan and then the Sheriff’s Department.
Deputies responded and did a quick sweep of the house, but did
not find Hollis’s body. Laura spent the night at a friend’s house.
“Hackett’s older sister Samantha also lived in Altadena.
Hackett went to her apartment on that same day, January 5,
sometime between 11:00 and 11:30 a.m., and stayed for a couple
of hours. Samantha testified Hackett did not have anything with
him when he arrived, ‘[j]ust the clothes on his back.’ She
identified People’s exhibit #12, a large Tasmanian devil doll, as
the doll she gave Detective Mitchell Loman on January 9. She
denied having told him that Hackett brought this doll and a blue
duffel bag with him on January 5. However, Loman testified
Samantha told him that when Hackett arrived at her apartment,
he had a ‘blue duffel bag containing a bunch of stuffed animals’
and clothes, and he ‘was carrying [separately] a big Tasmanian
devil.’ When he departed, Hackett took the duffel bag with him
and left the Tasmanian devil doll with Samantha (apparently as
a present for her son). Loman identified People’s #12 as the doll
Samantha had given him.
“On the morning of January 6, Laura went back home. As
she was cleaning up the mess, she uncovered the top of Hollis’s
head sticking out from the things that had been piled up in the
hall. She ran to Duncan’s house and he called police, who arrived
to find Hollis’s dead body.
“Laura later determined that a number of items were
missing from the house. ‘First thing I missed was my stuffed
animals because the bag I had it in had been slit and it was in
the kitchen on the floor.’ She normally kept these stuffed
6
animals in an armoire in her bedroom. These stuffed animals
included teddy bears and a Tasmanian devil doll. Shown People’s
exhibit #12, Laura testified it was the same size, shape and style
as her Tasmanian devil doll. Laura identified People’s #13, a
Victoria’s Secret bag containing various toiletries, as having been
taken from her house. She identified a set of bath towels and
wash cloths monogrammed with her initials (‘L.B.H.’), as having
been taken from a cabinet underneath her bathroom sink. She
identified some soap as having been taken from her bathtub. She
identified People’s #16, a jeans jacket and pants outfit, as similar
to an outfit of Hollis’s that was missing after he was killed. She
identified People’s #17-two plastic red roses-as having come from
‘a vase that was in a little stuffed animal that my son had gave
me for Valentine’s day,’ and that was kept ‘in the plastic bag with
the others.’ Also missing from the house were $53 in ‘rolled
pennies, nickels and dimes’ that Laura had saved up, and Hollis’s
45-caliber handgun.
“Lillian Naud testified that at about 7:15 p.m. on January
6, two men assaulted her and stole her purse and her car, a 1994
Acura Legend. One of the men looked ‘very similar’ to Hackett.
There was a $100 traveler’s check in Naud’s purse.
“Cinnamon Scott testified Hackett visited her on January
6, at 6:00 or 6:30 p.m. He arrived alone in a blue Ford Escort and
stayed 15 or 30 minutes. Half an hour or an hour later, he
returned to Scott’s apartment in Naud’s car. [Fn. omitted.] Later
that night, Hackett and Scott went for a drive in the Acura. Scott
testified there was a Victoria’s Secret bag in the back seat.
Hackett told Scott the bag was for her. There was also a bag of
towels in the car. When Scott asked Hackett where he got the
Acura, he told her, ‘Don’t worry about it.’ They visited Hackett’s
7
friends Ketren Allen, Broderick Allen (Ketren’s cousin), and
Tijuan Chapman. Ketren testified Hackett and Scott drove up in
Naud’s car. When Hackett gave Ketren a hug, Ketren felt a
handgun in the small of Hackett’s back.
“Later that same night, Pasadena Police Officers Rudy
Lemos and William Broghamer saw Naud’s Acura parked in front
of Scott’s residence. They saw Hackett approach the car.
Because the officers knew Hackett did not have a driver’s license,
they stopped him, ran the license plate, and ascertained the car
had been stolen. They arrested Hackett. After they put him into
the patrol car, Hackett said: ‘ “Can you get my jacket and cell
phone out of the back seat of my car.” ’ Lemos retrieved the
jacket. Lemos testified People’s #16—the jeans outfit that had
been identified as similar to Hollis’s—consisted of the jacket he
took out of Naud’s car and the pants Hackett was wearing at the
time. Also inside Naud’s car were Laura’s monogrammed towels,
her plastic roses and her bag of Victoria’s Secret toiletries.
During a booking search, police found Naud’s traveler’s check in
Hackett’s pocket. Hackett also had in his possession exactly $53
in currency.
“On January 15, Ketren discovered his voice mail had
recorded a conversation between his cousin Broderick and
Hackett. The tape was played for the jury. According to the
transcript of the tape recording, Hackett told Broderick: ‘[N****r]
tell me to my face, [n****r], on the phone, you think I did it?
[N****r], I don’t need you tellin’ my baby’s mama you think I did
it . . . .’[3] When Broderick said, ‘Well I don’t care what you
talking about, Sam, you in jail, so,’ Hackett replied: ‘*** I could
3 Epithet redacted. (See People v. Aguirre (Aug. 28, 2025,
S175660) ___ Cal.5th ___ [2025 Cal. LEXIS 5621, p. *20, fn. 11].)
8
have you killed, just like that, Broderick ***. Okay, it’s a done
deal, you bitch.’
“The autopsy showed Hollis had been killed by a single .25-
caliber gunshot wound to the forehead. Laura’s glove, the one
that had been found lying on the bathroom floor, tested positive
for gunshot residue. A so-called ‘canine scent identification
lineup’ was conducted during which a trained dog matched the
smell of this glove to Hackett.”
In 2001, Hackett was convicted by “jury trial, for first
degree murder, petty theft, robbery, carjacking, burglary,
receiving stolen property, and driving or taking a vehicle without
the owner’s consent, with firearm use and aged victim findings
(Pen. Code, §§ 187, 484, 211, 215, 459, 496, [former]12022.5,
12022.53, 667.9; Veh. Code, § 10851).” (Hackett, supra, B154152,
B159148.)
With respect to the crimes involving Hollis, the jury found
true that Hackett committed first degree murder under
section 187, subdivision (a). It also found true that in the
commission of the murder, Hackett personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm, a handgun, within the meaning of
section 12022.53, subdivision (d), and personally used a firearm,
a handgun, within the meaning of sections 12022.53,
subdivision (b) and former 12022.5, subdivision (a). The jury
found not true the special circumstance allegation that the
murder was committed while Hackett was engaged in the
commission of a crime, robbery, within the meaning of
section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). It also found Hackett not
guilty of robbery but guilty of the lesser included offense of petty
theft.
9
Hackett was sentenced to an aggregate state prison term of
“61 years, 4 months to life.” (Hackett, supra, B154152, B159148.)
In 2003, a panel of this court affirmed Hackett’s convictions on
direct appeal and denied his accompanying habeas petition.
(Hackett, supra, B154152, B159148.)
Resentencing
In 2022, Hackett filed a form petition for resentencing
under former section 1170.95. The People opposed the petition,
arguing that Hackett was convicted of first degree murder, with
the jury finding true the allegations that in the commission of the
murder, he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d) and
personally used a firearm within the meaning of
section 12022.53, subdivision (b). The People further asserted
that the jury was not instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, but was instructed on first degree felony
murder and willful, deliberate, and premediated murder. The
People contended that the only theory presented to the jury was
that Hackett was the actual killer who either killed the victim
willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation, or killed the
victim in the commission of a robbery.
In support of their opposition, the People submitted a copy
of the jury instructions from Hackett’s trial. As relevant here,
the jury was instructed on murder (CALJIC No. 8.10); willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder (CALJIC No. 8.20);4 first
degree felony murder based on the crime of robbery (CALJIC
4 CALJIC No. 8.20 stated in relevant part: “All murder which
is perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated
killing with express malice aforethought is murder of the first
degree.”
10
No. 8.21);5 and aiding and abetting (CALJIC Nos. 3.00 [defining
principals] and 3.01 [defining aiding and abetting]). The jurors
were also instructed that if they found the defendant guilty of
murder in the first degree, they needed to determine if the special
circumstance was true that the murder was committed while the
defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery (CALJIC
No. 8.80.1).6
The People also attached the Court of Appeal opinion on
direct appeal, verdict forms from Hackett’s trial, excerpts of the
reporter’s transcript from Hackett’s trial, including the closing
arguments, and the information. The trial court appointed
defense counsel. Through defense counsel, Hackett filed a brief
in support of his original petition. Hackett contended he had
established a prima facie showing of eligibility for resentencing
because the jury was instructed on felony murder and on aiding
and abetting, with an instruction that each principal is equally
guilty, and the jury’s findings did not establish he was convicted
as the actual killer.
In 2024, the trial court heard argument from counsel and
denied the petition at the prima facie stage. The court indicated
5 CALJIC No. 8.21 stated in relevant part: “The unlawful
killing of a human being, whether intentional, unintentional or
accidental, which occurs during the commission or attempted
commission of the crime of robbery is murder of the first degree
when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit that
crime.”
6 CALJIC No. 8.80.1 stated in relevant part: “If you find the
defendant in this case guilty of murder of the first degree, you
must then determine if the following special circumstance is true
or not true: [¶] The murder was committed while the defendant
was engaged in the commission of a robbery.”
11
it had reviewed the People’s response to the petition for
resentencing and its attachments, and the defense brief in
support of Hackett’s original petition. The court determined that
Hackett was prosecuted as the actual killer and that the jury
found Hackett to be the actual killer. The court therefore found
Hackett ineligible for relief.
Hackett timely appealed. His court-appointed appellate
counsel filed an opening brief that raised no issues and asked this
court to independently review the record under Delgadillo, supra,
14 Cal.5th 216. We directed appellate counsel to send Hackett
the record and a copy of the opening brief. We additionally
advised that within 30 days of the date of the notice, Hackett
could submit a supplemental brief or letter stating any grounds
for an appeal, contentions, or arguments he wished this court to
consider. Hackett timely submitted a supplemental brief, with
several exhibits.7
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Section 1172.6
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
No. 1437) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) eliminated the natural and
7 Hackett subsequently filed a “supplemental declaration,”
which, among other things, stated he had timely filed his
supplemental brief, a request for judicial notice of his
supplemental brief, and a “request for relief from default/motion
to accept late filing.” However, this court had already deemed
Hackett’s supplemental brief timely. Hackett’s motions
regarding a late filing are moot. Hackett’s “supplemental
declaration” also raises arguments regarding evidentiary and
other issues at his original trial and with his appointed counsel in
his section 1172.6 proceeding, which we address later in this
opinion.
12
probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant
guilty of murder and limited the scope of the felony murder rule.
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708 (Strong); People
v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).)
The bill amended section 188, requiring that to be convicted
of murder, “a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based
solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (Id., subd. (a)(3).)
The bill also amended section 189, subdivision (e), so that a
person may now be convicted of felony murder only if he or she
(1) was the actual killer; (2) was not the actual killer but, with
the intent to kill, aided and abetted the actual killer in
committing first degree murder; or (3) “was a major participant
in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life.”
Senate Bill No. 1437 also created “a procedural mechanism
for those previously convicted of murder under a theory amended
in [Senate Bill No. 1437] to petition for resentencing.” (People v.
Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 880; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 959.) “The process begins with the filing of a petition that
declares, among other things, that ‘[t]he petitioner could not
presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to
Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019,’ the effective
date of Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3); see id.,
subd. (b)(1)(A).)” (Emanuel, at p. 880.) Senate Bill No. 775
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) subsequently extended resentencing relief
to any person convicted of murder based on any “other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime . . . .” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
13
These amendments to the Penal Code did not invalidate
murder convictions based on the theory that the defendant
intended to kill or was the actual killer. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015,
§ 1, subd. (f); Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 707; People v. Mares
(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1166.)
II. The Record of Conviction Established Hackett is
Ineligible for Relief as a Matter of Law
Here, the record of conviction establishes that Hackett was
not convicted of murder on a now invalid theory. (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 971–972 [trial court may look at the record of
conviction at prima facie stage].) Indeed, the record of conviction
demonstrates that Hackett was convicted as the direct
perpetrator: the actual killer. Whether convicted under a theory
of premeditation and deliberation or felony murder, Hackett was
convicted on a still valid theory. (People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45, 53 [“defendants convicted of felony murder are
not eligible for relief if they were the actual killer”].)
The information charged only Hackett with murder. The
People’s theory at trial was that Hackett was the sole perpetrator
of the murder and the actual killer of Hollis. (People v. Hurtado
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 893 [petitioner ineligible for relief
where he alone attempted to commit murder].) Accordingly, the
People alleged that as to the murder count, Hackett personally
used and discharged a firearm in the commission of the murder.
The jury found these allegations true. (People v. Garrison (2021)
73 Cal.App.5th 735, 744 [only use of handgun was by one robber
and no evidence anyone else was present].) Hackett’s petition for
resentencing did not identify anyone else as the direct
perpetrator of the murder or anyone else involved in any manner
in the murder. As our high court has explained in the plea
14
context, “absent specific facts, no such [material fact] dispute
arises . . . from mere latent, speculative possibilities; that is, a
hypothetical alternate direct perpetrator cannot be conjured from
thin air or a legal conclusion.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 567.)
On appeal, Hackett argues that because the jury rejected
the special circumstance allegation that the homicide occurred
during the commission of a robbery, “the jury did not conclude
that [he] was the actual killer or acted with reckless indifference
to human life.” However, that the jury found not true the
allegation that the murder was committed while Hackett was
engaged in the commission of a robbery does not indicate it also
found he was not the actual killer. The elements of the special
circumstance were distinct from any determination of whether
Hackett was the direct perpetrator of the murder.8
The authorities Hackett relies upon to support his
arguments are inapposite. In People v. Clayton (2021) 66
Cal.App.5th 145, the crime involved four perpetrators engaged in
a robbery and murder. The defendant claimed he had no part in
the killing. In Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th 698, the defendant and
an accomplice attempted to rob a drug dealer. The accomplice
shot and killed two victims. In People v. Bascomb (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 1077, the defendant and another man committed a
8 The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC
No. 8.81.17: “To find that the special circumstance, referred to in
these instructions as murder in the commission of robbery is true,
it must be proved: [¶] 1. The murder was committed while the
defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery; and [¶]
2. The murder was committed in order to carry out or advance
the commission of the crime of robbery or to facilitate the escape
therefrom or to avoid detection.”
15
robbery, during which the other man shot and killed the victim.
In contrast, the murder case against Hackett did not involve
accomplices. The reasoning of Clayton, Strong, and Bascomb
regarding felony murder, or the felony murder special
circumstance allegation, is of no assistance to Hackett. Because
Hackett was prosecuted and convicted as the actual killer, there
was no need for the trial court to consider whether the jury did or
did not find he was a major participant in the crime, acting with
reckless indifference to human life.
In sum, because Hackett was convicted as the actual killer,
he has no basis to argue he was convicted under a theory in
which the jury imputed malice to him.
III. Hackett’s Other Assertions of Error
Hackett raises several other claims of error unrelated to his
eligibility for relief under section 1172.6.
Hackett argues that the trial court’s denial of his petition
without an evidentiary hearing violated his equal protection and
due process rights. We disagree. A petitioner is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing only if undisputed facts contained in the
record of conviction do not demonstrate the petitioner’s
ineligibility for relief as a matter of law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); see
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971–972.) As explained, we find
no error in the trial court’s conclusion that Hackett failed to
make the requisite prima facie showing of eligibility for
resentencing. We therefore reject his due process and equal
protection arguments.
Hackett also contends that his constitutional rights were
violated when the trial court did not allow him to speak at the
16
prima facie hearing.9 However, Hackett was represented by
counsel at the hearing and, as the court explained to Hackett, it
could not take additional evidence at that juncture. Rather,
testimony is appropriate at the evidentiary hearing stage.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3) [the “petitioner may also offer new or
additional evidence” at the evidentiary hearing]; People v.
Bratton (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1128 (Bratton) [no new
evidence, including defendant’s testimony, at prima face stage].)
Hackett additionally asserts several arguments related to
his trial counsel’s alleged inadequate performance in connection
with the resentencing proceedings, the trial court’s failure to
address his concerns, and problems with the video feed and audio
at the resentencing proceeding, which Hackett attended
remotely. To the extent these claims are not forfeited by the
failure to support them with reasoned argument and citations to
the record or relevant authority (Delta Stewardship Council
Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1075), they fail to provide a
basis for reversal. Not only is there “ ‘no constitutional right to
the effective assistance of counsel’ in state postconviction
proceedings” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 226), Hackett
also cannot show prejudice from any deficient performance of
counsel or conduct of the hearing. The record of conviction alone
9 At the conclusion of the hearing, after the court had made
its ruling, the court and Hackett had the following exchange:
Hackett: “Your Honor, may I have a word?”
The Court: “No, sir. It’s not a hearing where the court takes any
further evidence. You could speak with your attorney after the
hearing.”
After a pause in the proceedings, the court and counsel
discussed and set a date for a hearing pursuant to People v.
Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261.
17
demonstrates Hackett is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a
matter of law. Hackett has identified no purported error of
counsel or irregularity in the proceedings that would permit us to
conclude anything other than that any purported error or
irregularity in the proceedings was harmless, under any
standard. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687;
People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334, 342, fn. 2, 350, fn. 5.)
Hackett also raises various claims of error relating to the
evidence underlying his conviction, and he alleges that the
prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence. These claims are not
cognizable on a section 1172.6 petition. (See Strong, supra, 13
Cal.5th at p. 713 [resentencing proceedings involve “prospective
relief from a murder conviction that was presumptively valid at
the time,” not the correction of “errors in past factfinding”];
Bratton, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1127 [§ 1172.6 does not allow
a “ ‘ “do-over” ’ ” on previous factual disputes].) Finally, Hackett
asserts that his youth and mitigating circumstances weigh in
favor of resentencing. This is not an independent basis for
resentencing relief pursuant to section 1172.6.
The trial court properly denied Hackett’s section 1172.6
petition.
18
DISPOSITION
The trial court order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
HANASONO, J.
19
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