CourtListener 10687901•People v. Williams CA2/8
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 10/2/25 P. v. Williams CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B336403
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA076584)
v.
ELON KASHIM WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. William L. Sadler, Judge. Reversed and remanded with
directions.
Richard D. Miggins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Marc A. Kohm and David A. Wildman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
**********
In 2012, defendant and appellant Elon Kashim Williams pled
to three counts of robbery and two counts of taking or driving a
vehicle without the owner’s permission. In entering his plea,
defendant admitted a prior strike conviction within the meaning of
the “Three Strikes” law, two prior felony convictions under Penal
Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1),1 and two prior prison terms
under section 667.5, subdivision (b), commonly referred to as prison
priors. The court sentenced defendant under the Three Strikes law
and imposed a 33-year prison sentence, which included two 5-year
felony enhancements and two 1-year prison prior enhancements.
After defendant’s judgment became final, the Legislature
passed Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) which
invalidated prison prior enhancements imposed before January 1,
2020, except for those imposed for sexually violent offenses.
(§ 1172.75, subd. (a) [any sentence enhancement imposed “pursuant
to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement
imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is
legally invalid”].) Senate Bill No. 483 also created a procedural
mechanism for eligible defendants to obtain a recall of their
sentence and to be resentenced under current, amended sentencing
statutes. (§ 1172.75, subds. (b)–(e).)
The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation notified
the superior court that defendant was eligible for a recall of his
sentence under section 1172.75 as neither of his prison prior
enhancements were based on convictions for sexually violent
offenses. Thereafter, the superior court held a hearing at which it
recalled defendant’s sentence and conducted a full resentencing
under section 1172.75. The court struck the two 1-year prison
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
priors and imposed concurrent terms on counts 1 and 5, resulting in
a reduction in defendant’s total sentence from 33 years to 26 years
8 months. The court otherwise reimposed the same sentence,
including an upper term sentence on the base count (count 3), citing
three aggravating facts. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2) & (3).)
While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court issued its
decision in People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069 (Wiley). Wiley,
following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Erlinger v.
United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821 (Erlinger), concluded that “a
defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other
than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose
the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the
statutorily provided midterm.” (Wiley, at p. 1086, fn. omitted.)
Wiley explained that section 1170, subdivision (b), must be
interpreted to comport with federal constitutional requirements as
clarified by Erlinger. (Wiley, at p. 1085.) We requested and
received supplemental briefing from the parties.
In light of Wiley, we vacate the resentencing order and
remand for a full resentencing hearing at which the court exercises
its sentencing discretion anew in accordance with current law.
BACKGROUND
1. Original sentencing in 2012
On October 18, 2012, defendant pled no contest to one count
of second degree robbery (§ 211; count 1), two counts of first degree
robbery (§ 211; counts 3 & 6), and two counts of taking or driving a
vehicle without the owner’s consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a);
counts 5 & 14). During the plea colloquy, defendant admitted he
personally used a deadly weapon in committing the robbery in
count 1 (§ 12022, subd. (a)). As to counts 5 and 14, defendant
admitted he previously had been convicted of having taken or
driven a vehicle without the owner’s permission. (§ 666.5.)
3
Defendant also admitted a prior strike conviction (§ 1170.12), two
prior felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and two prior prison
terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
At the same hearing, the court sentenced defendant to a
determinate term of 33 years in prison. The court chose count 3 as
the base term and imposed an upper term of six years, doubled due
to the prior strike conviction. The court imposed consecutive
subordinate terms of one-third the midterm on each of counts 1, 5,
6, and 14, and doubled each term due to the prior strike (two years
four months on count 1, two years each on counts 5 & 14, and two
years eight months on count 6). The court also imposed two 5-year
felony enhancements and two 1-year prison prior enhancements.
The court awarded defendant 718 days of presentence custody
credits (625 actual, 93 conduct). Consistent with the terms of the
plea agreement, the remaining eight counts were dismissed.
2. Resentencing in 2024
The resentencing hearing under section 1172.75 was held on
January 9, 2024. Defendant was present and represented by
appointed counsel. Defendant argued there were presentence
mitigating facts which militated in favor of leniency, including a
history of depression and childhood trauma because both his father
and brother were murdered. Defendant also argued his prison
record demonstrated there were numerous postsentencing factors
that favored a sentence reduction. Defendant had obtained his
general education degree in prison and had successfully held
several prison jobs. He also completed various programs that
showed he was working at rehabilitating himself, including
vocational training and substance abuse programs. Defendant
requested the court strike the five-year felony enhancements and
impose a low term on the base count, in addition to striking the one-
year prison priors.
4
The prosecutor responded by arguing that defendant was a
third-strike offender and, as part of his 2012 plea deal, he had
already received a significant benefit by not being sentenced to an
indeterminate life term as a third-strike offender. The prosecutor
said defendant’s “record [was] horrible” and referred to defendant
as “a one-man crime spree” with respect to the charges for which he
was currently in prison. The prosecutor pointed out that
defendant’s prison records showed negative behavior and multiple
write-ups, including possessing a cell phone, disobeying orders and
participating in several fights and a riot. The prosecutor urged the
court to find that defendant was not entitled to further leniency
beyond the striking of the two prison priors.
The court acknowledged it had received and read the parties’
briefs and a certified copy of defendant’s prior convictions. The
court said it found defendant’s criminal history to be “very
substantial.” But the court also acknowledged there appeared to be
a basis for some leniency in light of defendant’s postconviction
efforts at rehabilitation. The court said it wanted “to encourage
positive behavior.”
Based on defendant’s certified record of convictions, the court
found the aggravating facts outweighed the mitigating facts and
that an upper term sentence was warranted on count 3. The court
said defendant’s criminal history showed “increasing seriousness
and numerous convictions” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)),
“poor prior performance on probation” (rule 4.421(b)(5)), and that
defendant committed the current offenses “while he was on parole”
(rule 4.421(b)(4)). The court also declined to strike the two 5-year
felony enhancements, explaining the interests of justice would not
be served by doing so. The court imposed the same sentence as
defendant’s original sentence, with the following exceptions: the
court struck the two 1-year prison priors and ordered the terms on
5
counts 1 and 5 to run concurrently. Defendant’s aggregate sentence
was reduced to 26 years 8 months—a reduction of six years four
months. The court declined to recalculate custody credits.
DISCUSSION
1. Wiley warrants remand for a new resentencing hearing
In Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th 1069, the Supreme Court
announced a significant change in the law that governs the
imposition of upper term sentences, explaining it was compelled to
do so because of the high court’s decision in Erlinger, supra,
602 U.S. 821. Erlinger instructs that federal constitutional
guarantees set forth in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require
“[v]irtually ‘any fact’ that ‘ “increase[s] the prescribed range of
penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed” ’ must be
resolved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or freely
admitted in a guilty plea).” (Erlinger, at p. 834.)
The prior conviction exception is one recognized exception to
the constitutional right to a jury trial on sentence-enhancing facts.
(Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 837.) Erlinger noted the exception
had garnered some criticism, but emphasized it remained a valid
but “ ‘narrow exception’ ” under which a sentencing “judge may ‘do
no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine
what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.’ ”
(Id., at p. 838.)
Several California decisions had long taken a more expansive
view of the prior conviction exception. Citing the clarification
enunciated in Erlinger, Wiley overruled People v. Towne (2008)
44 Cal.4th 63 and People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, as well as
several appellate court decisions, to the extent they were contrary
to Erlinger. (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 1076, 1085–1086.)
Of particular relevance here, Wiley explained that
section 1170, subdivision (b)(3), must be construed in accordance
6
with Erlinger. Section 1170, subdivision (b)(3), provides that a
sentencing court “may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in
determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction
without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” Wiley held that
“[t]o avoid any application that would set section 1170(b)(3) at odds
with the high court’s constitutional interpretation, we interpret
section 1170(b)(3)’s procedure in a manner that is coextensive with
high court dictates.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1086.)
The trial court here relied, as was the common practice before
Wiley, on defendant’s certified record of convictions to make
findings on aggravating facts in imposing an upper term sentence.
The court made a finding of three aggravating facts: defendant’s
convictions were numerous and increasingly serious (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)), defendant had committed the current
offenses while on parole (rule 4.421(b)(4)), and defendant had poor
performance during prior terms of probation/parole (rule
4.421(b)(5)). The court’s findings were based solely on its review of
the certified record of convictions. There was no trial on these facts,
nor did defendant stipulate to these facts.
Under Wiley, this is no longer permissible.
Wiley’s recitation of the procedures now required is worthy of
lengthy quotation: “In sum, a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on
all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction
and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a
sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm.
The proper procedure for adjudicating such aggravating facts is as
follows: Defendants may assert the right to a jury trial, may waive
jury in favor of a court trial, or may waive trial altogether. Subject
to the standard rules of evidence both parties may stipulate to the
admission of probation reports or other evidence bearing on a
defendant's social and educational history, as well as other
7
information relevant to sentencing, including criminal history.
The burden is on the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
facts relied on to justify an upper term sentence. If those facts are
properly proven, the court may take them into account and exercise
its discretion under section 1170(b) to determine what sentence to
impose, keeping in mind the statutory limits on upward departures
from the midterm and the requirement for stating its reasons on
the record. (§ 1170(b)(2), (5).)” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1086,
fn. omitted.)
The People urge us to conclude the failure to afford defendant
a jury trial on the aggravating facts or otherwise obtain a valid
waiver or stipulation was harmless. We are not persuaded.
Prejudice in this instance is governed by Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18. (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1087.)
“Under that standard, ‘a sentence imposed under . . . section
1170(b) must be reversed and remanded unless the reviewing court
concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that
same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts
upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was
justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in
compliance with the current statute.’ ” (Wiley at p. 1087; accord,
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 743 (Lynch).)
It is not enough there may be evidence sufficient to support
the trial court’s findings. The proper inquiry is “ ‘whether any
rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion.’ ”
(Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1090.) Moreover, the Supreme Court
aptly noted that many aggravating facts, like whether the
defendant’s criminal history shows increasing seriousness, call for a
“comparative and qualitative” assessment. (Ibid.) Thus, the
Supreme Court “cautioned that a prejudice analysis following a
change in the law respecting proof of aggravating circumstances
8
‘can be problematic. The reviewing court cannot assume that the
record reflects all of the evidence that would have been presented to
the jury, or that the defendant had the same incentive and
opportunity at a sentencing hearing to contest the aggravating
circumstance. [Citation.] . . . “[T]o the extent a potential
aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular case rests on a
somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a
reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been
submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the
same manner as did the trial court.” ’ ” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 775–776.)
The record before this court does not allow us to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that no rational fact finder could have
come to the opposite conclusion as the trial court on the three
recited aggravating facts. Remand for a new sentencing hearing is
therefore warranted.
2. The custody credits
The People concede the trial court erred in declining to
recalculate defendant’s custody credits in accordance with People v.
Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20 (Buckhalter). Buckhalter tells us
that where, as here, “a prison term already in progress is modified
. . . , the sentencing court must recalculate and credit against the
modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already served,
whether in jail or prison, and whether before or since he was
originally committed and delivered to prison custody.” (Id. at p. 29.)
The trial court declined to do so, reimposing only the original award
of presentence custody credits and deferring the recalculation to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
On remand, the trial court, after resentencing defendant,
shall calculate custody credits in accordance with Buckhalter,
supra, 26 Cal.4th 20, and prepare a new abstract of judgment.
9
DISPOSITION
The resentencing order of January 9, 2024 is vacated. The
case is remanded to the superior court for the purpose of conducting
a full resentencing hearing. Defendant is entitled to be present and
represented by counsel. After resentencing defendant, the superior
court is directed to prepare a new abstract of judgment and
transmit it to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
10
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.