CourtListener 10687030•People v. Diop CA1/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 10/1/25 P. v. Diop CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A170129
v.
JOSEPH WELLS, (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 05–2005551)
Defendant and Appellant.
THE PEOPLE,
A169710
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 05–2005551)
ADAMA DIOP,
Defendant and Appellant.
In these consolidated appeals, defendants Joseph Wells and Adama
Diop challenge victim restitution orders made after they pled guilty to
several offenses.1 Their sole contention is that the prosecutor prejudiced
them and undermined the integrity and reliability of the restitution
1 We consolidated these appeals for purposes of briefing and oral
argument, if any. We hereby consolidate them for purposes of the issuance of
this single opinion resolving both appeals, given the overlap of issues and
nearly identical briefing.
1
proceeding by acting as an unsworn witness at the restitution hearing in
violation of the advocate-witness rule. We reject their argument and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendants were charged with several counts for offenses committed in
late 2019. In exchange for an 18-year sentence, Diop pled guilty to four
counts of home invasion robbery (Pen. Code,2 § 213), one count of dissuading
a witness by force or threat (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1)), one count of first degree
residential burglary (§ 460, subd. (a)), one count of kidnapping (§ 207, subd.
(a)), and one count of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)).
For a 15-year sentence, Wells pled guilty to the same counts except for the
assault count. Wells also admitted that he was armed with a firearm during
the commission of one of the robberies. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).)
In July 2023, the People filed a restitution brief on behalf of some of the
victims of defendants’ crimes, Neil Librock, Charmain Detweiler, and Wendi
and Thomas Giordano. The People requested (1) $32,696.61 for Mr.
Giordano’s medical bills, property losses, vehicle damage, “home security,”
and home repairs; (2) $15,300 for Mrs. Giordano’s property losses; and (3)
$143,955.63 for Librock and Detweiler’s property losses and the costs of
installing a security system.
The restitution hearing was held in December 2023. At the beginning
of the hearing, the prosecutor submitted restitution “packages” containing
signed statements from Librock, Detweiler, and the Giordanos regarding
their economic losses and documentation supporting their restitution
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
requests. The prosecutor stated, “My opinion and belief that this—all those
expenses are accounted for based on the documentation contained herein.”
The prosecutor further noted that he had “spoken with the victims”
regarding whether their homeowners insurance covered any of their losses,
and, according to the prosecutor, Detweiler and Librock had already deducted
the money they had received from their insurance from the amount they were
requesting for restitution. Diop’s counsel objected on the ground that the
prosecutor was referring to hearsay information. The prosecutor continued,
stating that the police department had “returned all property to victims in
this restitution request as for the property that was neither located or
recovered.”
Defendants’ attorneys then submitted the defense exhibits, one of
which was a compilation from a few years earlier by Detweiler of “estimated
values and lost items.”3 Diop’s counsel argued that some of those estimates
did not match the estimates reflected in the prosecution’s documentation.
The other defense exhibits purported to show the items recovered from
defendants’ apartment and items that were returned to Detweiler and the
Giordanos. Diop’s counsel claimed that “it appears that at least some of the
items that were collected were returned and are still being requested by at
least Mr. Giordano.” He further argued that the prosecution had not
established that “all of the items requested [by Detweiler] were not, in fact,
returned, given the amount of jewelry that was found in the apartment.”
3 The exhibits submitted by the parties were returned to counsel at the
end of the restitution hearing. The prosecution’s exhibits were lodged with
this court in September 2024, and the court clerk served the parties with a
copy of the exhibits the following month. However, defendants’ trial
attorneys were unable to locate their copies of the defense exhibits, so those
exhibits are not part of the appellate record.
3
When the prosecution asked for clarification as to the recovered items that
were included in the restitution requests, Diop’s attorney replied that “there
is no way the defense could know with the evidence that was given to us what
exactly lines up.” Wells’s attorney chimed in to note that Detweiler was the
only victim who reported missing a pearl necklace, and one of the items
photographed in the defense exhibits was a pearl necklace.
The prosecutor responded that Librock and Detweiler “heavily
document[ed] their losses” with “[a]pporximately 50 pages worth or more, and
these are from jewelers.” He claimed that “the victims were asked by the
police department to compile a list of their lost property” but “now we have a
full documentation of it and time went by, and they were able to make
appropriate estimates.” “More importantly, I have spoken to these victims,
and they said these are the items that were not provided back to them or
recovered after the defendants’ apartment was searched.” The prosecutor
conceded that the Giordanos requested restitution for two computers even
though one of the computers was returned to them. Accordingly, he agreed to
reduce the amount the Giordanos were requesting by $979. “Other than that,
I don’t see any other items that were returned or any other miscounting.”
At this point, Diop’s counsel objected again and asked the court to
disregard “anything [the prosecutor] is offering as to what the victims in this
case told him.” Defendants’ attorneys otherwise argued that the
prosecution’s documentation did not support some of the restitution amounts
requested.
After the matter was submitted by the parties, the trial court said it
was going to “review all of the documents and compare them with the
exhibits” received by the court.
4
A few weeks later, the trial court issued restitution orders holding
defendants jointly and severally liability for restitution in the amounts of
$143,955.63 for Detweiler and Librock, $15,300 for Mrs. Giordano, and
$31,421.97 for Mr. Giordano.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendants contend the prosecutor violated the advocate-witness rule
at the restitution hearing. They point to the prosecutor’s explanation for
Detweiler’s inconsistent estimates and the comments he made that it was
“his opinion and belief that . . . all expenses are accounted for” in the
restitution requests, that he had “spoken with the victims” and they told him
that the items returned to them were not included in their restitution
requests and that their insurance did not cover all their losses, and that the
police department “returned all property to victims in this restitution request
as for the property that was neither located or recovered.” We conclude that
defendants have not shown reversible error.
“It is generally prohibited for a prosecutor to act as both an advocate
and a witness.” (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1185–1186.) “ ‘If a
lawyer is both counsel and witness, he becomes more easily impeachable for
interest and thus may be a less effective witness. Conversely, the opposing
counsel may be handicapped in challenging the credibility of the lawyer when
the lawyer also appears as an advocate in the case. An advocate who
becomes a witness is in the unseemly and ineffective position of arguing his
own credibility. The roles of an advocate and of a witness are inconsistent;
the function of an advocate is to advance or argue the cause of another, while
that of a witness is to state facts objectively.’ ” (People v. Donaldson (2001) 93
Cal.App.4th 916, 928 (Donaldson).)
5
In some cases, “ ‘[c]ombining the roles of advocate and witness can
prejudice the opposing party’ and confers on the opposing party ‘proper
objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party’s rights in
the litigation.’ [Citation.] ‘A witness is required to testify on the basis of
personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment
on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an
advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.’ ”
(Donaldson, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 929.)
The People do not dispute that the advocate-witness rule applies to a
prosecutor’s unsworn statements at a restitution hearing. Rather, the People
argue that the prosecutor did not violate the rule because the comments at
issue reflect his analysis of the evidence presented at the restitution hearing,
and thus they constitute proper attorney argument. Defendants respond that
the challenged statements improperly referred to hearsay evidence.
We disagree with the People’s depiction of the challenged statements.
Although the advocate-witness cases cited by the parties involve an
attorney’s sworn testimony, case law recognizes that an attorney who
“argue[s] beyond the record by stating facts not in evidence” has essentially
offered unsworn testimony and has committed prosecutorial misconduct.
(People v. Nadey (2024) 16 Cal.5th 102, 188; People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th
147, 204.) Here, at least some of the statements the prosecutor made at the
restitution hearing went beyond the parties’ exhibits by referring to
independent hearsay evidence, namely comments the victims made to the
prosecutor.
Nonetheless, regardless of whether the prosecutor’s actions are
characterized as prosecutorial misconduct or a violation of the advocate-
witness rule, the record does not reveal any prejudice to defendants.
6
Prosecutorial error is evaluated under the Chapman standard of
prejudice when a prosecutor’s behavior “ ‘ “is sufficiently egregious that it
infects the trial with such a degree of unfairness as to render the subsequent
conviction a denial of due process, [such that] the federal Constitution is
violated.” ’ ” (People v. Shazier (2014) 60 Cal.4th 109, 127.) Under that
standard, “the [appellate] court must be able to declare a belief that [the
error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Vargas (1973) 9
Cal.3d 470, 478.) But if the prosecutor’s conduct does not render the trial
fundamentally unfair, we will reverse “only if it is reasonably probable the
trial outcome was affected.” (Shazier, at p. 127; see People v. Pensinger
(1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1250.)
Donaldson, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 916, relied on by defendants, is a
case where the prosecutor’s conduct rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.
There, the key witness was the only person who had given inculpatory
information to the police. (Id. at p. 919.) Upon being cross-examined by the
defense at trial, she testified that the prosecutor had said something to her
prior to the preliminary hearing which caused her to lie when she provided
inculpatory testimony at the hearing. (Id. at p. 922.) The prosecutor then
took the stand to testify about the conversation she had with the witness
before the preliminary hearing. (Id. at pp. 923–926.) When defense counsel
cross-examined her, he elicited her personal opinion about the witness’s
credibility, which suggested to the jury that the witness’s inculpatory
statements were truthful but not her trial testimony. (Id. at pp. 926, 931.)
The appellate court concluded that defense counsel had rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel because his failure to protect his client
against the prosecutor’s violation of the advocate-witness rule “undermines
[the court’s] confidence in the integrity and reliability of the trial.”
7
(Donaldson, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 919.) The court reasoned that the
prosecutor’s challenge to the credibility of the key witness was “ ‘highly
relevant’ since [the witness’s] pretrial statements were the ‘heart of the
prosecution’s case.’ ” (Id. at p. 931.)
Here, unlike in Donaldson, the prosecutor made the challenged
comments before a judge rather than a jury. As Donaldson recognized, the
advocate-witness rule addresses the risk “ ‘that jurors will be unduly
influenced by the prestige and prominence of the prosecutor’s office and will
base their credibility determinations on improper factors.’ ” (Donaldson,
supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 928–929, italics added; see U.S. v. Edwards (9th
Cir. 1998) 154 F.3d 915, 921 [“the danger in having a prosecutor testify as a
witness is that jurors will automatically presume the prosecutor to be
credible and will not consider critically any evidence that may suggest
otherwise”]; Doe v. Yim (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 573, 582, 584–585 [citing this
risk as a potential source of prejudice].) There is also the risk that the
factfinder will confuse the roles of advocate and witness and erroneously
grant testimonial weight to the attorney’s arguments. (See id. at pp. 582,
584–585.) “ ‘This confusion could prejudice one or more of the parties.’ ”
(Donaldson, at p. 928.)
Those concerns have little weight in proceedings tried before a judge.
(See U.S. v. Morris (7th Cir. 1983) 714 F.2d 669, 672.) A judge is “better able
to take account of a witness-prosecutor’s adversarial role in weighing the
objectivity of his testimony.” (U.S. v. Johnston (7th Cir. 1982) 690 F.2d 638,
644.) “A judge, without a jury, is presumably competent ‘ . . . to filter out and
put in true perspective whatever impropriety, real or imagined, might
otherwise [exist].’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Hollenbeck) (1978) 84
Cal.App.3d 491, 501–502, disagreed with on other grounds in People ex rel.
8
Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 180, 192, fn. 9, 193.) A judge
is also “unlikely to be confused by the dual appearance as advocate and
witness.” (Morris, at p. 672.)
This is especially true in this case because no sworn testimony was
presented at the restitution hearing, only attorney argument. It is well-
established that attorney argument is not evidence.4 (Evid. Code, § 140;
People v. Barajas (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 804, 809; People v. Kiney (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 807, 815 [“[u]nsworn statements of counsel are not evidence”].)
As such, in cases where the prosecutor refers to facts or evidence outside the
record, the remedy is usually an objection followed by an admonition to the
jury to not consider the attorney’s argument as evidence. (See People v.
Fayed, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 204; People v. Nadey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 189.) Since we are dealing with a proceeding tried by a judge, we presume
the court was aware of, understood, and properly applied the relevant law.
(People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114; Evid. Code, § 664.)
Nothing in the record rebuts the presumption that the trial court knew
to not consider the prosecutor’s arguments as evidence. In fact, defense
counsel brought the issue to the court’s attention by objecting to the
prosecutor’s argument twice on the ground that it improperly referred to
4 Although a restitution hearing “ ‘does not require the formalities of
other phases of a criminal prosecution’ ” (People v. Keichler (2005) 129
Cal.App.4th 1039, 1048), a restitution order must still be supported by
substantial evidence. (People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 468–469;
People v. Thygesen (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 988, 995; see County of Alameda v.
Moore (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1423–1424, 1426–1427 [holding that
resolution of disputed factual issues must be based on more than the
unsworn statements of counsel, even in hearings that are intended to be
informal], disapproved of on other grounds in Elkins v. Superior Court (2007)
41 Cal.4th 1337, 1361 & fn. 15.)
9
hearsay evidence. Moreover, at the close of arguments, the court said it
would review “all of the documents and compare them with the exhibits”
before making its restitution orders.
Because we presume the trial court can filter out improprieties (People
v. Superior Court (Hollenbeck), supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at pp. 501–502) and will
not grant evidentiary weight to attorney argument, we conclude that any
prosecutorial errors that occurred at the restitution hearing did not render
the proceeding fundamentally unfair. Defendants’ arguments to the contrary
are conclusory.5
Doe v. Yim, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th 573, a case defendants cite in their
reply, is inapposite, as it does not concern an attorney’s violation of the
advocate-witness rule and any resulting prejudice. Rather, the issue was
whether the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying an attorney
from representing her daughter in pretrial activities in an action the
daughter brought against the attorney’s ex-husband. (Id. at pp. 576, 580.)
Among the factors the trial court considered was the potential prejudice to
the ex-husband if the attorney was to represent her daughter, given her
relationship to the parties and the likelihood that she would testify at trial.
(Id. at pp. 584–585.) In affirming the trial court’s decision, the appellate
court noted that “ ‘most courts recognize that an attorney who intends to
testify at trial may not participate in “any pretrial activities which carry the
5 While Wells suggests that any prejudice was compounded by the lack
of a probation report, he admits that he waived referral to probation. It also
does not appear from the record that defendants’ attorneys objected to the
lack of a probation report or requested more time to review the prosecution’s
evidence. Thus, any due process violations stemming from the lack of a
probation report were waived. (See People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 352–
353 & fn. 15, limited on another ground by People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th
1107, 1112–1113.)
10
risk of revealing the attorney’s dual role to the jury.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 583; see
also U.S. v. Johnston, supra, 690 F.2d at p. 644 [noting that while the risks
stemming from a testifying advocate are less in proceedings tried before a
judge, the court’s subsequent rulings at trial could “create the
appearance . . . of favoring the cause of the party-witness”].) No similar risk
exists here.
Further, on the inadequate record before us, we cannot conclude that
the restitution orders were affected by the prosecutor’s comments at the
restitution hearing, considering the burden-shifting framework applicable to
restitution hearings.6 (See People v. Guerrero (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 441, 444
[concluding that the prosecutor’s violation of the advocate-witness rule was
harmless because the guilty verdicts on some of the charges gave rise to an
inference that the prosecutor’s testimony did not affect the verdicts].)
Under section 1202.4, a victim who seeks restitution from the
defendant has the burden to make a prima facie showing of economic losses
incurred as a result of the defendant’s criminal acts. (People v. Gemelli
(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1543.) “A victim’s statement of economic loss is
prima facie evidence of loss.” (People v. Grandpierre (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th
111, 115; People v. Keichler, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1048 [“statements
6 Though neither party addressed this precise issue, the parties’ briefs
note the relevant facts and the burden-shifting framework in restitution
hearings, and arguments concerning the effect of the challenged statements
on the restitution orders are fairly included within the issue of prejudice.
(See People v. Alice (2007) 41 Cal.4th 668, 679 [“The parties need only have
been given an opportunity to brief the issue decided by the court, and the fact
that a party does not address an issue, mode of analysis, or authority that is
raised or fairly included within the issues raised does not implicate the
protections of [Gov. Code] section 68081”]; People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th
1219, 1228.)
11
by the victims . . . about the value of property stolen constitute ‘prima facie’
evidence of value for purposes of restitution”]; In re S.S. (1995) 37
Cal.App.4th 543, 548, fns. 1–2 [noting no authority requiring a victim to
“supply a sworn proof of loss or detailed documentation of costs and
expenses”].) Once a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the
defendant to rebut the victim’s statement of losses. (Gemelli, at p. 1543;
People v. Fulton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 876, 886.)
Here, the prosecution submitted signed statements from the victims
that included itemized lists of their “[p]roperty loss” and supporting
documentation, such as receipts and appraisals. Detweiler and Librock’s
statement also noted that they subtracted the “Insurance Payment Received”
from the restitution amount they were requesting. The victims’ statements
and their supporting documentation constituted prima facie evidence of their
economic losses regardless of whether the prosecutor improperly referred to
other evidence at the restitution hearing. (See People v. Fulton, supra, 109
Cal.App.4th at p. 887.) The burden thus shifted to defendants to rebut the
victims’ statements. (Ibid.)
To rebut the victims’ showing, defendants submitted their own exhibits
at the restitution hearing. Defendants’ exhibits do not appear in the record,
but according to the transcript for the hearing, one of the exhibits was a list
of property value estimates that Detweiler compiled shortly after defendants
robbed her home. As previously mentioned, defense counsel argued that
some of the estimates provided by Detweiler in her statement of economic
loss were inconsistent with her earlier estimates. The defense exhibits also
allegedly showed the items that were recovered from defendants’ apartment
and some of the items that were returned to the victims, though defense
12
counsel did not identify any returned items that were listed on the victims’
statements as a property loss.
On appeal, defendants argue that the prosecutor’s violation of the
advocate-witness rule prejudiced them based on the “inconsistent estimates”
before the trial court and the “sheer volume of items” that “made it difficult to
discover whether or not the recovered items have been returned.” But since
defendants’ exhibits do not appear in the record, we cannot confirm whether
their evidence actually conflicted with the victims’ statements of economic
loss. If defendants did not rebut the victims’ prima facie showing of economic
losses, the prosecutor’s comments at the restitution hearing would not have
affected the outcome of the hearing. Even if we assume that some of
Detweiler’s earlier estimates were different from her more recent estimates,
it is possible that the defense exhibits showed that the original estimates
were made without the benefit of documentation, which was the gist of the
prosecutor’s argument at the restitution hearing. “[T]he prosecution ‘enjoys
wide latitude in commenting on the evidence, including the reasonable
inferences and deductions that can be drawn therefrom.’ ” (People v. Fayed,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 204.)
Absent a contrary showing in the record, we make “ ‘all presumptions
in favor of the trial court’s action.’ ” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
609.) “ ‘ “A necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate
for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial
court should be affirmed.” ’ ” (Ibid.) It is the appellant’s burden to provide an
adequate record, and failure to do so as to a given issue “ ‘requires that the
issue be resolved against [the appellant].’ ” (Ibid.)
Applying these principles here, we presume that the defense exhibits
submitted at the restitution hearing indicated that Detweiler’s earlier
13
estimates were merely preliminary and that the exhibits otherwise did not
conflict with the victims’ statements of economic loss. In light of this
presumption, defendants have not demonstrated that any prosecutorial
errors in this case affected the outcome of the restitution proceeding.
III. DISPOSITION
The restitution orders are affirmed.
14
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Humes, P. J.
_________________________
Smiley, J.
A170129; A169710
15
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