CourtListener 10686942•People v. Williams CA2/4
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Filed 10/1/25 P. v. Williams CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B331614
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA506431)
v.
RICKY MARSHAWN
WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Shelly B. Torrealba, Judge. Affirmed as
modified.
Patricia Lai, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Ricky Williams followed victim Luis Fernando
Lopez to a bus stop and struck him numerous times with a metal
pole. Lopez died of blunt force head trauma as a result. Appellant
was charged with his murder.
Appellant exercised his right to represent himself
throughout all stages of the proceedings and repeatedly
reaffirmed his desire to do so. The trial court denied appellant’s
request to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 508, Justifiable
Homicide: Citizen Arrest (Non-Peace Officer), though it allowed
appellant to argue that he was attempting to effectuate a citizen’s
arrest of Lopez. The jury rejected this theory, but also rejected
the People’s theory of first degree murder; it found appellant
guilty of second degree murder.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by allowing him
to represent himself without first advising him of the maximum
punishment he faced or conducting a hearing to determine his
mental competency. He also contends the court deprived him of
his right to present a defense by declining to instruct the jury
with CALCRIM No. 508, which he asserts was supported by
substantial evidence. Appellant argues that these errors were
individually and cumulatively prejudicial.
We reject these contentions and affirm. However, we agree
with appellant and respondent Attorney General that the
judgment must be modified to award appellant one additional
day of presentence custody credit. The judgment is affirmed as
modified.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. Prosecution Case
A. Incident
Brandon Rogers testified at trial that he was at a bus stop
at the corner of Santa Monica Boulevard and Vermont Avenue
early in the morning of May 18, 2022. He heard yells for help
and saw a person “getting beat with a stick.” Rogers identified
appellant in a six-pack photo array and in court as the person
wielding the stick.
Rogers testified that appellant struck the victim
approximately five times, knocking the victim to the ground.
Appellant continued to strike the victim, “more than once,” while
the victim lay on the ground in what Rogers described as a
“defensive” posture. Rogers stated that the “stick was really
moving,” and used his hand to demonstrate “somewhat of a
tomahawk action.” Rogers did not see the victim fight back or
display a weapon.
Rogers testified that a woman “came out of nowhere” and
pepper sprayed appellant in the face multiple times. Appellant
then fled the scene. When he spoke to police about the incident,
Rogers told them that appellant attacked the victim because the
victim had raped someone. Rogers refused to answer further
questions about the statement.
Two people driving in the area at the time also testified
about the incident. Aidan Yood-Howard testified that he was on
Santa Monica Boulevard waiting to turn onto Vermont Avenue
around 12:30 or 1:00 a.m. when he heard “a really quick and loud
shout” behind him. Yood-Howard checked his rearview mirror
and “saw what looked like two figures and it was really dark so
just shadows. And then followed by the sound of thumping and
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grunting and groaning kind of.” Yood-Howard described the
grunting “as if somebody was putting effort into the strikes that
were being thrown,” and the groaning “as if someone was being
attacked.” Yood-Howard said it was “[d]efinitely one person
attacking the other,” and “[a]t one point one of them ended up on
the floor and it didn’t stop.” He estimated he heard “at least 10”
thumps.
Yood-Howard made a U-turn and got closer to the scene.
He saw a woman pepper spray the assailant, who then left. The
woman screamed for help and told Yood-Howard to call 911,
because the victim was “unresponsive” and there was “blood all
over the floor.” Yood-Howard called 911; a recording of his call
was played for the jury and admitted into evidence. On cross-
examination, he testified that he did not recall hearing “metal
hitting the ground or metal hitting metal,” and did not hear
“anyone yelling ‘help rapist, help, help.’”
Juan Reyes testified that he was also driving nearby when
he saw and heard a man banging a metal pole on the wall. While
he was stopped at the intersection of Santa Monica and Vermont,
a woman standing in the street told him to call the police because
someone had been assaulted. Reyes went through the
intersection, then made a U-turn to look for the man he had seen
with the pole, because the woman “told me it was him.” Reyes
did not see the man, so he parked his car and went to the bus
stop to see what was going on. He saw a victim “laying down on
the floor full of blood,” bleeding from “his whole head.” Reyes
testified that the victim was unconscious and was not moving.
Reyes called 911; recordings of his calls were played for the jury
and admitted into evidence.
4
Los Angeles Police Department officer Nicholas Velasco
testified that he and his partner responded to the scene at about
1:10 a.m. Velasco saw the victim lying still on the ground at the
bus stop. There was blood coming out of his skull, and “it seemed
like there was brain matter that was scattered on the ground
below.” Velasco took statements from witnesses, including
Rogers. He was not able to determine a motive behind the
attack.
The victim was identified as Luis Fernando Lopez. A
deputy medical examiner opined that the cause of his death was
blunt force head trauma, and the manner of death was homicide.
No toxicology test was performed because Lopez was hospitalized
for more than 24 hours before he died.
B. Surveillance Video
LAPD officers gathered surveillance video recordings from
several businesses near the incident. The videos were played for
the jury and admitted into evidence.
Video from a convenience store showed a man enter at
about 12:47 a.m. on May 18, 2022. He was holding a pipe in his
hand. A still photo captured from the footage showed that the
man had a tattoo that appeared to include an “F” on his right
forearm. The man left the store at about 12:48 a.m.
Video from a flooring business showed a man on a bicycle
approach the front entrance around 12:41 a.m. on May 18, 2022.
A few minutes later, another man carrying a backpack
approached. Appellant later testified that the man with the
backpack was Lopez. Lopez stood near the business, “looking
down, possibly at a phone.” He sat down after a few minutes.
At around 12:52 a.m., a third man approached the flooring
business from across the street. He was holding “a stick, a pipe,
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some kind of long item” in his hand. The man with the stick
appeared to talk to Lopez and the other man. Shortly thereafter,
Lopez got up and walked away; he could be seen crossing the
street. Video from another business showed him walking toward
the bus stop.
As Lopez walked toward the stop, the man with the stick
appeared to be following him and ran toward him from across the
street. Lopez and the man with the stick appeared to engage in
“some kind of altercation,” from which Lopez appeared to retreat.
The men moved into shadows, and Lopez disappeared from view.
C. Arrest of Appellant
On July 7, 2022, several weeks after the incident, LAPD
officers responded to a call about a person “armed with a knife
acting strange.” As the officers were speaking to the caller,
appellant approached the police vehicle on foot. He was “armed
with a crowbar or what appeared to be a crowbar.” Officer
Adrian Dominguez testified that he noticed a tattoo on
appellant’s right forearm that appeared similar to that “identified
in the crime flyer for a wanted murder suspect.” Dominguez and
his partner ordered appellant to drop the crowbar and get on the
ground, but he instead “fled on foot.” Police apprehended and
arrested him approximately 30 minutes later.
On cross-examination, appellant testified that the item he
had when he approached the police was not a crowbar but a
“metal rod” that had “been molded into a seven.” Appellant
further testified that he had been using the rod to “edge up” rocks
along grass nearby.
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II. Defense Case
A. Appellant’s Testimony
The defense case consisted primarily of appellant’s
testimony. The court allowed him to narrate his testimony
because he was representing himself.
In the early morning hours of May 18, 2022, appellant went
to the area of Santa Monica and Vermont “to deliver a box of
goods to the community.” While he was there, he ran into a
friend and they made plans to meet at the convenience store for
pizza and a drink. Appellant went to the convenience store, but
the friend never showed up. “[A]long the way,” appellant “just
happened to see a stick” and picked it up. Appellant described
the stick as a “very light” “flute like instrument” that had
“nothing to do with this situation.” He planned to put it in his
“collection” of “certain metals, things of that nature.”
After going to and from the store several times to look for
his friend, appellant headed toward the train station to catch a
bus home. He “came across the tent with the young person
crying inside”; he could hear the person sobbing from across the
street. Appellant also heard the person yell “you raped me, you
f’ing raped me.” Appellant crossed the street and “stopped to
intervene.” The person in the tent told appellant that “Mr.
Fernando had raped them.” Appellant “stayed there” and
attempted “to make sure they weren’t messing around or nothing
like that.” The person, whom appellant could not see, told
appellant the rapist’s name was “Fernando Lopez.” Appellant
believed the person, even though he had never met him or her
before.
Appellant, who had never met Lopez before, testified that
Lopez was “smoking out of a meth pipe” nearby. “His pants were
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undone and his genitalia was out,” and he “started getting antsy
and nervous.” Appellant observed tattoos on Lopez’s arms.
Appellant did not have a cell phone, so he “couldn’t just call
the police.” He again asked the person in the tent if “this guy”
raped them. The person responded, “yes, what do you f’ing think”
and zipped up the tent.
Appellant tried “to motion to somebody” at the convenience
store a block away to call the police. He then told Lopez to wait
there to talk to the police. Lopez started walking away and told
appellant he would shoot him. Appellant believed Lopez had a
gun and took the threat seriously.
Because he could not “get somebody to call the cops” and
also keep track of where Lopez “was going at the same time,”
appellant “went after him with the instrument in my hand.”
Appellant intended to “apprehend him, detain him for law
enforcement. Do a citizen’s arrest and just detain him.” On
cross-examination, appellant agreed that he thought he would be
able “to detain a fleeing suspect with a gun high on
methamphetamine by” himself.
Appellant followed Lopez as he walked toward the bus stop.
When appellant “tried to do the apprehension attempt,” Lopez
“was very hostile” and “brandished what appeared to be a gun.”
Lopez “was posturing himself in a combative manner, making
threats, gang threats.” Appellant, who had “PTSD over
firearms,” “was in fear of losing my life” as Lopez “went to a
drawing motion.” Lopez “charged,” and appellant struck him
“once or twice” with the instrument “to prevent the gun.”
Appellant testified that he struck Lopez on the shoulder or waist,
and Lopez stumbled and fell to the ground.
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Appellant also stumbled and fell. He continued to strike
Lopez with the stick “to subdue him in order to prevent the gun
from coming out.” Appellant testified that he struck Lopez “more
than twice,” but did not recall where because “[i]t happened so
fast, it’s a blur.” Appellant estimated he hit Lopez a total of four
to six times. Appellant then stood up and “kicked” what he
believed to be “the butt of a gun or a taser” away from Lopez’s
hand. Lopez was “just laying” and “was not bleeding.”
Appellant banged the stick on the ground and yelled “Help,
help rapist, rapist, help, help” in an effort to get someone’s
attention. Someone approached appellant from behind, and “to
my surprise they didn’t help me. They started pepper spraying
me.” The pepper spray “was to the point of severity where I had
no choice but to leave the vicinity.” Blinded, in a panic, and still
in fear of Lopez, appellant left the scene and walked down the
street. He encountered a group of men and told them to call the
police, but they laughed and said no.
Appellant regained his eyesight after what felt like two
hours. He then returned to the scene, but to his “surprise there
was nothing there.” “There was no law enforcement, . . . there
was no blood, there was no crime scene tape, there was no
witness, there was no rapist, there was no assaulter, there was
nobody there.”
Appellant did not report the incident to police at that time.
He “didn’t even know this person was severely injured at all,” and
would have reported the incident if he had known. He also did
not report the incident later. He testified that his brother-in-law
and grandmother advised him not to call the police.
Appellant admitted that he had a criminal history and was
on probation when the incident occurred. He testified that none
9
of his past crimes was violent; a domestic violence conviction was
for a “verbal aspect” with his wife.
B. Additional Evidence
Appellant’s brother, Raevaughn Short, testified that he
knew appellant to be helpful and nonviolent. Appellant had a
tattoo on his arm that said “God First.”
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant was arrested on July 7, 2022. On July 22, 2022,
prior to his preliminary hearing, appellant advised the court he
wanted to represent himself. The court granted appellant’s
request; we discuss the details further below. Appellant declined
to waive time and proceeded to the preliminary hearing on July
25, 2022. On August 8, 2022, the People filed an information
charging him with Lopez’s murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)).1
The information also alleged several aggravating factors
pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 4.421, including that
appellant was on probation at the time of the offense.
Appellant exercised his speedy trial rights and proceeded to
jury trial on October 6, 2022. The jury found appellant guilty of
second degree murder on October 18, 2022. The People
subsequently dismissed the aggravating factor allegations.
Appellant filed several post-trial motions, including a
motion for new trial. The trial court denied the motions after
hearing. It also found that appellant violated his probation by
committing the murder.
On July 6, 2023, the trial court sentenced appellant to the
statutorily mandated sentence of 15 years to life. The trial court
awarded appellant 364 days of presentence custody credit. The
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
10
court imposed a concurrent sentence of 16 months for the
probation violation, which amounted to time served after his
custody credits were taken into account.
Appellant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends that the trial court failed to obtain a
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel because it
did not inform him of the maximum punishment he faced or
conduct a competency hearing prior to granting his request to
represent himself. He also argues that the court should have
instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 508, and that he is
entitled to one additional day of presentence custody credit.
I. Self-Representation
A. Additional Background
Appellant notified the court that he wanted to represent
himself on July 22, 2022, at a hearing on his counsel’s motion to
continue the preliminary hearing to, in the court’s words, allow
“necessary preparation, receipt of discovery, and further
investigation that is required . . . in a charge of this magnitude.”
The court immediately provided appellant with a Faretta2
advisement and waiver form and the opportunity to review and
complete it.
Appellant completed the four-page form, signing the
certification that he had “read, understood and considered all of
the above warnings included in this petition, and I still want to
act as my own attorney. I freely and voluntarily give up my right
to have an experienced professional attorney represent me.” In
the “Personal Information” section of the form, appellant wrote
that he was 35 years old and had an AA degree from “vocational
2 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).
11
college.” He also wrote that he had previously represented
himself in 2019, and obtained an acquittal. In that same section
of the form, appellant checked “Yes” next to the statement, “I
have been examined by a psychiatrist or psychologist to
determine my mental competence to proceed in a criminal case.”
He checked “No” next to the statement, “When I previously
represented myself, my pro per privileges were suspended and/or
my pro per status was revoked.”
The form included numerous pre-printed advisements
under the headings “Constitutional Rights,” “Dangers and
Disadvantages to Self-Representation,” “Charges and
Consequences,” and “Court’s Advice and Recommendation.” Each
advisement had a box for appellant to initial; he initialed every
one. The form was general in nature; although it mentioned
charges, defenses, and sentencing options, the form did not
specify the specific charges or punishment appellant faced.
After appellant completed the form, the court held a
hearing with him in open court. The court asked appellant if he
had read and understood the form and freely and voluntarily
initialed and signed it. Appellant said he had. The court then
stated, “Mr. Williams, you have before this court an open case
where the charge is murder and you have a probation violation
case. You understand that you are charged with a very serious
crime and with a probation violation currently?” Appellant
responded, “Yes, Ma’am.” Appellant also stated that he
understood that he had the right to an attorney and one would be
appointed for him if he could not afford one. Additionally, he
acknowledged the court’s comment that he may be “too involved
in the case” to be objective.
12
The court then asked appellant about his previous self-
representation. Appellant told the court it was for assault with a
deadly weapon and “two counts of 422,” criminal threats. The
court responded, “Okay. So you understand, this is a much more
serious charge than that one. You understand that?” Appellant
said he did. The court did not ask appellant about the form
question regarding his previous competency examination.
The court advised appellant that he would be opposed by a
“very experienced prosecutor in this matter,” would not receive
any “special treatment” or “helpsies” from the court, and would
be treated “the same as an attorney would be.” Appellant
responded that he understood, and further stated he understood
that he “may have limited access to funds and books and access
to the library,” and did not have the right to a standby attorney.
The court further advised, “You understand the court is not
going to advise you of the elements, any potential consequences
you might have, or anything of that nature.” Appellant said he
did. The court asked him if, “knowing all of these things, you still
want to represent yourself.” Appellant confirmed that he did.
The court then stated, “This is a very, very serious charge,
Mr. Williams. It is a case that I don’t know anything about, your
case; but it is a case where there may be a lot of experts to be
appointed. There may be a lot of evidence that may need to be
examined. Again, I don’t know anything about it. I am just
saying, generally speaking, in these cases, a lot of investigation is
required. Your abilities are going to be hampered because you
are representing yourself. I want to make sure that you
understand. You are telling me you don’t want to waive time.
You don’t even have the discovery. Do you see what I am
saying?” Appellant said he did, and again answered yes to,
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“knowing all this, this is what you want to do?” The court found
that appellant “has knowingly, expressly, understandingly, and
intelligently waived the right to be represented by an attorney”
and granted pro per status.
Appellant’s self-representation was not addressed at the
July 25, 2022 preliminary hearing. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the court found sufficient cause to support filing of a
murder charge.
At the next hearing, on September 9, 2022, appellant
appeared with his investigator and standby counsel. Appellant
told the court that he had been “having a problem with my pro
per status” and had not been transferred to the pro per housing
module in the jail. The court noted that “On July 28, your pro
per status was suspended by the Sheriff’s Department due to
your mental health needs and you’ve been ordered to a high
observation housing location until further notice.” Appellant
responded, “I’m actually in G.P. population up in Wayside at this
point. I exercised my rights on the 22nd and they never moved
me to the pro se module. I was observed by a clinician I believe
August 24 and August 27, and from there, the clinician he
declassified me to general population. I submitted a grievance in
regards to the situation and the matter. I put on there that it
was an emergency and I was headed to trial and I needed the pro
se module and be able to have to pro se funds for the reasons
[sic]. I still haven’t received anything. It’s been outside the two
week period.” Appellant nevertheless filed multiple substantive
motions.
Appellant’s investigator then advised the court that
appellant had “been moved around a few times,” and, “[b]ased on
his mental health issue, he was housed at Twin Towers” “up until
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like the last seven days.” The investigator stated that he had
been unable to meet with appellant because the elevators at Twin
Towers were broken. However, he also reported, “They
declassified him, I checked with Legal yesterday. He’s now pro
per in general population module up at N.C.C.I. As soon as they
get notification he’s pro per they will get him back down to county
jail if his pro per status is still available at that level. There may
be other reasons why he’s not a pro per at the county jail.”
The court then told appellant that “it appears that there
are some underlying issues regarding you and your status. . . .
[I]f you’re still requesting to represent yourself with all of these
impediments, it does not appear that it’s really in your best
interest to do so. Not in your best interest to do so without the
impediments, but the issues that are going on with the facility
and all of that, I have no control over that. However, if you are
going to continue to represent yourself, I’ll ask that it be included
in the minute order and that appropriate housing arrangements
be taken into consideration by the Sheriff’s Department in line
with their rules and regulations and guidelines for you to be able
to be housed in the pro per module. If you don’t meet the
requirements, then this court because of your actions and your
health care needs, including mental health issues, then your
status will continue to be suspended until you meet the
requirements of being able to be within the pro per module.”
Appellant told the court he wanted to proceed despite the
challenges and declined to waive time.
At the next hearing, on September 27, 2022, appellant
appeared with his investigator and standby counsel. Appellant
filed four additional motions, including a motion to exclude
evidence of his arrest as irrelevant to “the murder charge on
15
5/18.” After hearing argument on appellant’s motions, the court
discussed timing and procedural issues with the parties. During
those discussions, the court asked, “Maximum exposure in this
case is life?” The prosecutor responded “Yes.” The court then
asked what the People’s last plea offer had been, and the
prosecutor said, “none has been asked for.” Appellant told the
court he would “entertain an offer” from the People, and stated
that he had included in a previous motion a willingness to plead
to “involuntary manslaughter (b).” He explained, “It was
basically [section] 197(4). It was justifiable homicide while trying
to apprehend an individual for law enforcement while committing
a rape [sic].”
At the next hearing, on October 5, 2022, the prosecutor
made a plea offer of 25 years to life. Appellant said he would not
accept that and again offered to plead to “involuntary
manslaughter 192 (b).” The prosecutor declined.
During a continuation of the hearing later the same day,
the court asked appellant if he still wanted to represent himself
at trial. It reminded him that standby counsel was there, and
also that he would be held to the same standard as counsel. The
court further stated, “And are you absolutely certain that,
especially based on the gravity of the case, this is a murder first
degree murder [sic] with the possibility of penalty of 25 years to
life that you want to represent yourself in this case?” Appellant
said “Yes.”
Later still in the October 5, 2022 hearing, the court asked
appellant about his desire to represent himself “one more time to
make sure the record is clear because this is a very serious case. I
understand that you don’t want to waive time. You have been
told by your expert that he has not reviewed the reports … and
16
that at this time may not be able to render an opinion to assist
you with your defense. And knowing all that, you still want to
proceed with your trial. So we’re starting jury selection
tomorrow.” Appellant responded, “Yes.” During a subsequent
discussion of the jury selection process, the court explained that
both sides would receive 20 peremptory challenges “because this
is a life case.” The court also cautioned appellant not to mention
in front of the jury “what the punishment or penalty would be in
this matter.” Appellant responded, “Understood, understood.”
The following day, the first day of trial, the court again
asked appellant “if you still wish to continue representing
yourself before we call the jury panel in, we do have standby
counsel and counsel would be prepared and ready to go forward
with the trial. However, during the trial, you won’t be permitted
to ask her any questions or request that she step in during the
middle of the trial that would probably result in possibility of a
resulting mistrial and a delay for your process. Do you
understand?” Appellant responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” The
court clarified, “So you still wish to represent yourself in this
matter?” Appellant said, “Correct.” The matter proceeded to
trial, and appellant represented himself throughout.
B. Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary Waiver
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions. (U.S.
Const., 6th Amend.) It also guarantees a defendant the
“constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he
voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.” (Faretta, supra, 422
U.S. at p. 807; see also id. at pp. 819-821.) A defendant’s decision
to forgo counsel must be made “‘knowingly and intelligently.’” (Id.
at p. 835.) “A valid waiver requires that the defendant ‘have the
17
mental capacity to understand the nature and object of the
proceedings against him or her,’ and that the defendant waives
the right knowingly and voluntarily.” (People v. Mickel (2016) 2
Cal.5th 181, 211 (Mickel).) The defendant “should be made aware
of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that
the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his
choice is made with eyes open.’” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p.
835.)
“In deciding whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary,
we examine the record as a whole to see whether the defendant
actually understood the consequences and import of the decision
to waive counsel, and whether the waiver was freely made.”
(Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 211.) For a waiver to be valid, “the
record as a whole must establish that the defendant understood
the ‘dangers and disadvantages’ of waiving the right to counsel,
including the risks and intricacies of the case.” (Id. at p. 212.)
“We review a Faretta waiver de novo, and examine the whole
record to determine the validity of a defendant’s waiver of the
right to counsel.” (Ibid.) The “whole record” includes proceedings
after the defendant invoked the right to self-representation.
(People v. Bush (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 457, 469 (Bush).) The
defendant bears the burden of showing that the waiver of counsel
was not knowing and intelligent. (People v. Mellor (1984) 161
Cal.App.3d 32, 37.)
Appellant argues that the waiver of counsel cannot be
knowing and intelligent absent an express advisement of the
maximum punishment the defendant faces. He relies principally
on Iowa v. Tovar (2004) 541 U.S. 77 (Tovar), which considered
“the extent to which a trial judge, before accepting a guilty plea
from an uncounseled defendant, must elaborate on the right to
18
representation.” (Id. at p. 81.) Tovar specifically considered
whether the trial court was required to “(1) advise the defendant
that ‘waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether to
plead guilty [entails] the risk that a viable defense will be
overlooked’; and (2) ‘admonis[h]’ the defendant ‘that by waiving
his right to an attorney he will lose the opportunity to obtain an
independent opinion on whether, under the facts and applicable
law, it is wise to plead guilty.” (Ibid.) Tovar held that neither of
those particular admonitions was constitutionally required. (Id.
at pp. 81, 91-92, 94.) It stated that the “constitutional
requirement is satisfied when the trial court informs the accused
of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be
counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable
punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea.” (Id. at p.
81.)
Appellant argues that the “point of singling out these
warnings was to establish a constitutional minimum. Once this
minimum has been exceeded, the sufficiency of the advisement is
assessed under a totality-of-the-circumstances test. But if the
minimum is not exceeded, the advisement is constitutionally
inadequate.” We reject this narrow reading of Tovar. In
summarizing previous Supreme Court precedent, Tovar
specifically noted that it had not “prescribed any formula or
script to be read to a defendant who states that he elects to
proceed without counsel,” and the “information a defendant must
possess in order to make an intelligent election . . . will depend on
a range of case-specific factors, including the defendant’s
education or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature
of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding.” (Tovar, supra,
541 U.S. at p. 88.) Indeed, it reiterated the “eyes open” phrasing
19
it coined 40 years previously in Faretta (see ibid.) and endorsed a
‘pragmatic approach.’” (Id. at p. 90.)
Citing Tovar, our Supreme Court similarly has held that
“the scope of a proper advisement of the right to counsel depends
on the particular facts and circumstances of the case as well as
the stage of the proceedings.” (People v. Burgener (2009) 46
Cal.4th 231, 242 (Burgener).) To that end, it has reiterated, as
recently as 2016, that “There is no prescribed script or
admonition that trial courts must use in warning a defendant of
the disadvantages of self-representation.” (Mickel, supra, 2
Cal.5th at pp. 211-212; see also People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th
1041, 1070 [“[n]o particular form of words is required in
admonishing a defendant who seeks to waive counsel and elect
self-representation”], Burgener, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 241
[same].) In accordance with these binding precedents, several
California appellate courts considering the issue have concluded
that there is no requirement that a defendant specifically be
advised of the “possible penal consequences of conviction” to
knowingly and intelligently waive the right to counsel. (People v.
Conners (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 443, 456; see also Bush, supra, 7
Cal.App.5th at p. 473; People v. Harbolt (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d
140, 150.)
Appellant points to People v. Jackio (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th
445 (Jackio) in support of the contrary conclusion. In Jackio, the
trial court advised a defendant charged with several crimes
“associated with a home invasion,” including attempted murder,
that he faced life in prison. (Jackio, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p.
447.) The defendant waived his right to counsel and was
convicted. On appeal, he argued that the trial court was
obligated to provide “a breakdown of the full range of sentencing
20
options with respect to the crimes and enhancements charged.”
(Id. at p. 450; see also id. at p. 452 [“he claims…the trial court
was required to advise him of the full range of punishments he
could face for the crimes and enhancements charged”].) The
appellate court rejected the defendant’s position as impractical
and unworkable. (Id. at p. 454.) It concluded “the most
reasonable solution consistent with case law”—including Tovar
and Burgener—“and the United States Constitution is to require
the trial court to advise a defendant desiring to represent himself
at trial of the maximum punishment that could be imposed if the
defendant is found guilty of the crimes, with enhancements,
alleged at the time the defendant moves to represent himself.”
(Id. at pp. 454-455.)
Bush, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 469, more recently
considered the express question of whether a waiver of the right
to counsel was invalid because the trial court “did not warn [the
defendant] of all the possible penal consequences if he was
convicted.” Answering the question in the negative, Bush
distinguished Jackio on the ground that the dispute there
“centered on the adequacy of the warning,” because the defendant
there had been advised of the maximum punishment he faced.
(Id. at p. 473.) Bush concluded that the Jackio court therefore
“presumably did not have occasion to consider critically the
question of whether a warning about the maximum potential
penalty is always required for a valid waiver of the right to
representation at trial.” (Ibid.) We find Bush persuasive and
agree with its conclusion that the relevant case law “does not
persuade us that a pretrial waiver of counsel cannot be valid if
the court did not specifically advise the defendant of all possible
penal consequences of the charged offenses, including all
21
monetary fines.” (Ibid.) Like Bush, we have found no binding
case “specifically concluding that an advisement on this point is a
constitutional minimum in every case.”3 (Ibid.)
Of course, “the better practice would be to inform the
accused, on the record, of the maximum sentence, including any
maximum monetary fine that could be imposed on a conviction.”
(Bush, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 473; accord People v. Best (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 747, 764 [“[w]hile failure to advise on all aspects
of potential punishment does not necessarily render a Faretta
waiver invalid, it is the better practice to provide this
information”].) But we conclude that the presence or absence of
an admonition relating to potential punishment is a relevant
consideration, not a determinative one, in determining whether
the record as a whole evinces a knowing and intelligent waiver of
counsel. (See People v. Ruffin (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 536, 544.)
Appellant contends that “the record suggests that Mr.
Williams likely had no idea he might receive 15 to 25 years to life
in prison.”4 We disagree. Although the trial court did not advise
appellant of the potential punishment he faced before his initial
3 The Ninth Circuit cases appellant cites, United States v.
Erskine (9th Cir. 2004) 355 F.3d 1161 and Arredondo v. Neven
(9th Cir. 2014) 763 F.3d 1122, are not binding on this court. (See
People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 120 fn. 3.)
4 Appellant also asserts that it “is important to note” he
initially waived counsel prior to the preliminary hearing, when
the People “could still have added more charges and added
special circumstances to the murder charge,” thereby increasing
his potential exposure to the death penalty. With more charges
and allegations on the table, it is unclear how the court could
have accurately advised appellant of the maximum potential
punishment he faced at this juncture.
22
Faretta waiver, it told appellant that he was charged with
murder and repeatedly emphasized the “serious” nature of the
charge. Appellant, who holds an associate’s degree and previously
represented himself successfully, stated that he understood.
Given appellant’s education, past experience with self-
representation, the nascent stage of the proceedings, and the
easily grasped nature of the murder charge (see Tovar, supra,
541 U.S. at p. 88), we are not persuaded that more was required.
In any event, the court subsequently advised appellant multiple
times before trial that he faced 25 years to life, and appellant’s
conduct indicated that he understood the gravity of the charge he
faced. He filed motions referring to the murder charge and
attempted to negotiate a plea to involuntary manslaughter. More
importantly, even after being advised of the potential
punishment, appellant repeatedly reiterated his waiver of the
right to counsel each time the court raised the issue, up to the
moment jury selection began. It is clear from this record that
appellant knew what he was doing when he repeatedly waived
his right to counsel and made his choice with his eyes open to the
risks that decision entailed. (See Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p.
835.) We accordingly find no error.
C. Competency Determination
Appellant also argues that the court erred by allowing him
to waive counsel without first conducting a competency hearing.
Appellant asserts that the court should have inquired about (1)
his representation on the Faretta form that he underwent a
competency exam in his previous case, and (2) the “mental health
needs” he experienced during this case. He does not contend he
was incompetent; he contends the record suggests he may have
23
been, and therefore the matter must be remanded for the trial
court to retroactively make that determination. We disagree.
The federal constitution “does not permit trial of an
individual who lacks ‘mental competency.’” (Indiana v. Edwards
(2008) 554 U.S. 164, 170 (Edwards).) A defendant is competent
to stand trial if he or she “has ‘a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him’” and “‘has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding.’” (Ibid.) Where a
defendant is competent under these standards, but “suffer[s]
from severe mental illness to the point where they are not
competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves,” the trial
court may prohibit their exercise of Faretta rights and “insist
upon representation by counsel.” (Id. at p. 178.)
The California Supreme Court has adopted this standard.
(People v. Johnson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 519, 528 (Johnson).) It has
further clarified that trial courts “considering exercising their
discretion to deny self-representation” on competency grounds
should ask “whether the defendant suffers from a severe mental
illness to the point where he or she cannot carry out the basic
tasks needed to present the defense without the help of counsel.”
(Id. at p. 530.) However, a trial court “need not routinely inquire
into the mental competence of a defendant seeking self-
representation. It needs to do so only if it is considering denying
self-representation due to doubts about the defendant’s mental
competence.” (Ibid.) A trial court that doubts a defendant’s
general competence to stand trial is statutorily required to
appoint an expert to examine the defendant and render a
competency opinion. (Ibid.) “Similarly, when it doubts the
defendant’s mental competence for self-representation, it may
24
order a psychological or psychiatric exam to inquire into that
question. To minimize the risk of improperly denying self-
representation to a competent defendant, ‘trial courts should be
cautious about making an incompetence finding without the
benefit of an expert evaluation, though the judge’s own
observations of the defendant’s in-court behavior will also provide
key support for an incompetence finding and should be expressly
placed on the record.’” (Id. at pp. 530-531.) “Self-representation
by defendants who wish it and validly waive counsel remains the
norm and may not be denied lightly.” (Id. at p. 531.)
We “defer largely to the trial court’s discretion” with
respect to its determinations concerning self-representation.”
(Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 531.) This is because the trial
court has the opportunity to observe and interact with the
defendant and therefore “will often prove best able to make more
fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the
individualized circumstances of a particular defendant.”
(Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 177.) “The trial court’s
determination regarding a defendant’s competence must be
upheld if supported by substantial evidence.” (Johnson, supra, 53
Cal.4th at p. 531.)
Here, the record gives no indication that appellant at any
point lacked a rational or factual understanding of the
proceedings, lacked the ability to consult with an attorney about
them, or suffered from a mental illness that rendered him
incompetent to conduct trial proceedings by himself. Appellant
coherently and appropriately interacted with the court at every
juncture, from his first appearance to the conclusion of the
sentencing hearing. Appellant completed the Faretta form,
indicated his understanding thereof, and answered the court’s
25
questions. He suggests that his answer regarding his previous
competency evaluation alone should have given the court reason
to doubt his current competence, but “[e]vidence regarding past
events that does no more than form the basis for speculation
regarding possible current incompetence is not sufficient” to raise
a doubt about a defendant’s competence. (People v. Hayes (1999)
21 Cal.4th 1211, 1281.) The form also stated that appellant had
not previously had his pro per status suspended or revoked, from
which the court reasonably could have concluded that appellant
was not found incompetent.
Citing a concurring opinion in a case that long predates
both Edwards and Johnson, People v. Powell (1986) 180
Cal.App.3d 469, 484 (Poché, J., concurring), appellant similarly
asserts that the revelation that he experienced unspecified
“mental health needs” outside of court constituted “compelling”
evidence of incompetency that necessitated additional inquiry.
We disagree. Even while discussing his move from general
population to mental health housing and back again, appellant
was coherent and focused on his case. He explained to the court
that he had filed a grievance, and also filed three motions
appropriate to the stage of the proceedings. Moreover,
appellant’s investigator largely corroborated appellant’s account
of the issues and timeline, and expressed no concerns about the
substance of his interactions with appellant. Appellant’s standby
counsel and the People also expressed no concern or doubt as to
appellant’s competence. While some “mental health needs” may
impact competence, others may not. The trial court had the
opportunity to engage appellant in a colloquy and observe his
behavior to determine the extent of appellant’s mental health
needs. We see no abuse of its discretion.
26
Appellant also argues that we “must remand the matter for
further proceedings” because the record suggests his mental state
was “uncertain.” As already explained, we reject this
characterization of the record. We also reject appellant’s reliance
on People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, a facially inapposite
case holding that the trial court erred and further proceedings
were necessary where the court permitted defendant to represent
himself during competency proceedings. (Id. at p. 674.)
Appellant cites no further authority supporting reversal or
remand, and we see no basis for either on this record.
II. Jury Instructions
Appellant contends that the court erred in failing to
instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 508. We disagree.
A. CALCRIM No. 508
CALCRIM No. 508 provides:
“The defendant is not guilty of (murder/[or]
manslaughter/attempted murder/[or] attempted voluntary
manslaughter) if (he/she) (killed/attempted to kill) someone while
trying to arrest him or her for a violent felony. Such (a/an)
[attempted] killing is justified, and therefore not unlawful, if:
“1. The defendant committed the [attempted] killing while
lawfully trying to arrest or detain _______<insert name of
decedent> for committing (the crime of ______ <insert forcible and
atrocious crime, i.e., felony that threatened death or great bodily
injury>/_________ <insert crime decedent was suspected of
committing, e.g., burglary>, and that crime threatened the
defendant or others with death or great bodily injury);
“2. _______ <insert name of decedent> actually committed
(the crime of ________<insert forcible and atrocious crime, i.e.,
felony that threatened death or great bodily
27
injury>/________<insert crime decedent was suspected of
committing, e.g, burglary>, and that crime threatened the
defendant or others with death or great bodily injury;
“3. The defendant had reason to believe that
________<insert name of decedent> had committed (the crime of
________<insert forcible and atrocious crime, i.e., felony that
threatened death or great bodily injury>/_________<insert crime
decedent was suspected of committing, e.g., burglary>, and that
crime threatened the defendant or others with death or great
bodily injury);
“[4. The defendant had reason to believe that _______
<insert name of decedent> posed a threat of death or great bodily
injury, either to the defendant or to others];
“AND
“5. The [attempted] killing was necessary to prevent
________’s <insert name of decedent> escape.
“A person has reason to believe that someone [poses a
threat of death or great bodily injury or] committed (the crime of
__________<insert forcible and atrocious crime, i.e., felony that
threatened death or great bodily injury>>/________<insert crime
decedent was suspected of committing, e.g, burglary>, and that
crime threated the defendant or others with great bodily injury)
when facts known to the person would persuade someone of
reasonable caution to have (that/those) belief[s].
“Great bodily injury means significant or substantial
physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or
moderate harm.
“The People have the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the [attempted] killing was not justified. If
28
the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant
not guilty of [attempted] (murder/[or] manslaughter).”
B. Additional Background
Appellant testified that he had been attempting to conduct
a citizen’s arrest of Lopez and acted in self-defense when Lopez
appeared to reach for or brandish a handgun. Near the
conclusion of trial, the court advised appellant that it would
consider whether substantial evidence supported the conclusion
that “the defendant attempted to apprehend a fleeing felon” and
therefore whether it had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury
with CALCRIM No. 508. The court provided appellant with an
appellate opinion to read and told him he would have the
opportunity to “make any arguments that he would like to make
regarding CAL CRIM 508, justifiable homicide, pursuant to
citizen’s arrest vs. CAL CRIM 505, justifiable homicide, self-
defense, or defense of another.”
During the subsequent discussion, the prosecutor argued
that “the problem” with giving CALCRIM No. 508 was a lack of
“evidence that the victim in this case actually committed a
felony.” Appellant countered that CALCRIM No. 508 “coincides
with exactly what the evidence is reflecting. It’s not conflicting
testimony or inconsistent statements. You see the defendant
talking to the rape victim and the rape assailant at the same
time,” and “then attempt to apprehend the rape suspect.” The
court and prosecutor suggested that CALCRIM No. 505,
Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another might
be more appropriate. The court further stated that it would do
more research before deciding which instruction(s) to give.
When the court revisited the issue with the parties, it
concluded that “there’s not any substantial evidence that the
29
defendant attempted to apprehend a fleeing felon.” It explained,
“The only evidence of a quote end quote [sic] citizen’s arrest is put
forth by the defendant during his testimony. There’s no evidence
presented at the time of the arrest that he made such statements.
There’s no evidence presented on the date of the attack or the
incident that there was any such conduct ongoing. As a matter of
fact, as the state of the evidence is at this time is [sic] that Mr.
Williams left the scene, did not go back to the scene, did not make
any attempts to contact law enforcement between May 18, 2022
and July 7, 2022, when he was arrested on that date. So there is
no evidence of a citizen’s arrest. CAL CRIM 508 will not be
given.” The court stated that it would give CALCRIM No. 505,
“based on the testimony and evidence presented in the matter
and based on the defendant’s request for a self-defense
instruction” and appellant’s position “that his actions were
justified as self-defense or defense of another.”
Appellant objected. The court overruled the objection but
told him that he was not precluded “from making that argument,
which you’ve already done in your testimony.” Appellant argued
both citizen’s arrest and self-defense theories during closing.
The court instructed the jury on self-defense, mutual
combat, provocation, necessity, and voluntary manslaughter
based on imperfect self-defense. The court also instructed the
jury that “The right to use force in self-defense or defense of
another continues only as long as the danger exists or reasonably
appears to exist. When the attacker withdraws or no longer
appears capable of inflicting any injury, then the right to use
force ends.”
30
C. Analysis
A defendant has a right to jury instructions “‘on any
affirmative defense for which the record contains substantial
evidence.’” (People v. Mentch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 288.) “‘In
determining whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury
instruction, the trial court does not determine the credibility of
the defense evidence, but only whether “there was evidence
which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a reasonable
doubt.”’” (Ibid.) “On appeal, we likewise ask only whether the
requested instruction was supported by substantial evidence.”
(Ibid.) We review a trial court’s failure to instruct on a defense
theory de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the defendant. (People v. Ibarra (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1070,
1081.)
Appellant argues that substantial evidence supported the
instruction. He points to Rogers’s testimony that Rogers told the
police Lopez had raped someone, his own testimony, and the
surveillance videos, which he contends showed that he “was
taking his time to confirm that the rape actually occurred before
going after Lopez to conduct a citizen’s arrest.” Appellant asserts
that “it would be illogical for the court to find substantial
evidence to support all the other defenses that stemmed from the
citizen’s arrest, and yet, found no substantial evidence to support
the main defense theory.”
“A citizen may arrest another if a felony has in fact been
committed and he has reasonable cause to believe that the person
to be arrested committed it.” (People v. Fosselman (1983) 33
Cal.3d 572, 579.) “[T]here must be established the fact that a
felony has in fact been committed. If there was no right to arrest
existent in the instant case, there can be no justification for
31
defendant to have used the force involving a deadly weapon.”
(People v. (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 324, 328.) “‘[T]he requirement
that there in fact be a felony committed can only be met if there
is evidence of the corpus delicti and it is an offense known by the
arresting party to have been committed.’” (Ibid.)
As the prosecutor pointed out below and argues now, there
was no substantial evidence that Lopez in fact committed a
felony. The surveillance video did not show the alleged rape, and
neither side introduced evidence suggesting that Lopez
perpetrated a rape. Appellant’s testimony that a person in a tent
that he had never met before and did not even fully see told him
about a rape does not establish that a crime occurred or that
Lopez committed it.
Even if it did, there is also no substantial evidence
supporting the fifth element of the instruction, that the killing
was necessary to prevent Lopez’s escape. All the testimony,
including appellant’s, indicated that Lopez fell to the ground
after a few strikes of the stick. Appellant nevertheless continued
to strike Lopez and made no effort to contact police to complete
the putative arrest or report the alleged rape. Indeed, he
acknowledges in his briefing that it “was highly likely that the
jury found . . . that Mr. Williams used more force than reasonably
necessary when he acted in self-defense.” For all these reasons,
we conclude the court did not err in refusing the instruction.
III. Cumulative Error
Appellant argues that the cumulative effect of the errors in
this case “significantly undermines the confidence in the outcome
of the trial and requires reversal.” Having concluded that
appellant’s contentions challenging his convictions are without
merit, however, we necessarily reject this claim of resultant
32
cumulative error. There was no prejudicial error to accumulate.
(People v. Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th 788, 818.)
IV. Presentence Custody Credits
Appellant contends, and respondent agrees that he should
have received 365 days of presentence custody credit rather than
364. We agree.
“‘A defendant is entitled to actual custody credit for “all
days in custody” in county jail and residential treatment
facilities, including partial days.’” (People v. Valdes (2020) 53
Cal.App.5th 953, 955.) “‘Calculation of custody credit begins on
the day of arrest and continues through the day of sentencing.’”
(Ibid.) “The day the defendant is arrested counts as a custody
day no matter how many hours or minutes the defendant was in
jail on that day”; any fraction of a day is treated as a full day for
counting purposes. (Ibid.)
Appellant was arrested on July 7, 2022 and sentenced on
July 6, 2023. He therefore was entitled to receive 365 days of
credit, not 364. We order the judgment modified to correct this
calculation error.
33
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to reflect 365 days of presentence
custody credit. The clerk of the superior court is instructed to
prepare an amended abstract of judgment including this
modification and serve a copy on the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation. The judgment is affirmed in all other
respects.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
34
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