People v. Koshman CA3

CourtListener 10679562Calctapp29.09.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 9/29/25 P. v. Koshman CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Placer)
----

THE PEOPLE, C102206

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 62169541A)

v.

LARRY CAMERON KOSHMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

In 2023, the Placer County District Attorney filed a consolidated first amended
information, consolidating case No. 62-187558 into this case (case No. 62-169541A).
Defendant Larry Cameron Koshman was charged with one count of conspiracy to
commit unlawful cultivation of marijuana (Pen. Code1, § 182, subd. (a)(1); Health & Saf.
Code, § 11358, subd. (c)—count one), one count of making a space available for

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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unlawfully manufacturing, storing, or distributing a controlled substance (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11366.5, subd. (a)—count two), and two counts of attempting to dissuade a
witness from attending or giving testimony at a trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by
law (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2)—counts three & four). With respect to count one, two overt
acts were alleged: (1) defendant leased two structures to unlawfully cultivate marijuana;
and (2) co-defendants Robert Smith, Artemio Silva, and Alfonso Garcia unlawfully
cultivated and distributed the marijuana. It was alleged as to counts three and four that
defendant was released from custody on bail or on his own recognizance in case No. 62-
169541 when he committed these offenses. (§ 12022.1, subd. (b).)
Defense counsel filed a section 995 motion to set aside counts two through four,
and a motion under section 17, subdivision (b) to reduce the crimes to misdemeanors.
The court denied both motions.
Before the case was submitted to the jury, defendant successfully moved pursuant
to section 1118.1 to dismiss count four. The jury convicted defendant of the remaining
counts (counts one through three), and found true that he committed count three while he
was out on bail or his own recognizance.
Defendant filed a motion for new trial and another motion under section 17,
subdivision (b) to reduce his felony convictions to misdemeanors. The court denied both
motions.
The court placed defendant on two years of formal probation subject to terms and
conditions including that he serve 180 days in county jail, 30 of which were to be served
in custody (with five days credit). The court allowed defendant to apply for alternative
sentencing with respect to the remaining 150 days.
On appeal, defendant: (1) argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his pretrial and post-trial motions; (2) argues the trial court abused its discretion by not
dismissing all charges contained in the information under section 1118.1 on its own
motion; (3) asserts ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (4) requests we review the

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record of his previously entered guilty plea and his subsequent motion to withdraw that
plea. We affirm the judgment.
I. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Set Aside Counts Two Through Four and Motions to Reduce Crimes to
Misdemeanors
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to set
aside counts two through four pursuant to section 995 and his motions to reduce his
crimes to misdemeanors pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b). “Other than a brief
mention of the argument, however, he does not expand on the issue with either argument
or citation to relevant authority.” (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 150.) We need
not address these bare assertions of error even where the People have chosen to. (Ibid.;
People v. Meyer (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 618, 635.) “To the extent [defendant] intends to
incorporate by reference all documents presented to the trial court without now urging
any legal issue based on those documents, the attempt fails.” (People v. Abilez (2007) 41
Cal.4th 472, 536.) Defendant also cannot withhold his arguments or citation to authority
until reply. (People v. Baniqued (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 13, 29.)
To the extent we deem the assertion that the trial court “abused [its] discretion by
not excluding [certain] recordings, based on this violation of [defendant]’s United States
Constitutional Rights and the case law Massiah”2 sufficient to raise this argument on
appeal, it is unpersuasive. As relevant here, in defendant’s motion to set aside counts two
through four, defense counsel argued counts two and three should be set aside for
insufficient evidence. With respect to count three, defense counsel argued the recorded
statements that were the basis for the charges were illegally obtained under Massiah.
“In Massiah . . . , the high court held that once a defendant has been charged with
any crime, any ‘government agent[]’ who elicits incriminating statements from a

2 Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201 (Massiah).

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defendant regarding that crime outside the presence of counsel violates [the Sixth
Amendment]. [Citation.] Statements made under such conditions ‘are inadmissible at a
trial on the charges to which the statements pertain.’ [Citation.] This prohibition on
government agents applies equally to law enforcement officers and private persons
enlisted by the government to elicit incriminating statements. ‘[T]he primary concern of
the Massiah line of decisions is secret interrogation by investigatory techniques that are
the equivalent of direct police interrogation.’ [Citation.]
“ ‘A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress informant testimony is essentially
a factual determination, entitled to deferential review on appeal.’ [Citation.] To prevail,
[defendant] must show ‘ “that the informant (1) was acting as a government agent, i.e.,
under the direction of the government pursuant to a preexisting arrangement, with the
expectation of some resulting benefit or advantage, and (2) deliberately elicited
incriminating statements.” ’ ” (People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1152.)
Here, defendant’s daughter-in-law recorded phone calls with defendant at the
request of law enforcement. The trial court found that defendant did not submit sufficient
evidence establishing law enforcement or his daughter-in-law took any steps beyond
merely listening, and his daughter-in-law did not take any steps to deliberately elicit
incriminating information from defendant. The transcript of the recording supports the
trial court’s findings.
Defendant has not demonstrated the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to set aside counts two through four, or his motions to reduce his crimes to
misdemeanors.
B. Section 1118.1 Motion
Defendant appears to assert the trial court abused its discretion in not dismissing
all charges contained in the information under section 1118.1 on its own motion. “In a
case tried before a jury, the court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion, at the
close of the evidence on either side and before the case is submitted to the jury for

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decision, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses
charged . . . if the evidence then before the court is insufficient to sustain a conviction of
such offense or offenses on appeal.” (§ 1118.1.)
“We review the denial of a []section 1118.1 motion using the same standard
‘employed in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction.’
[Citation.] We thus examine ‘ “the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment” ’ to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—‘ “evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value” ’—‘ “from which a reasonable trier of fact could
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ [Citation.] Our review
‘ “ ‘presume[s] in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could
reasonably have deduced from the evidence.’ ” [Citation.] Even where . . . the evidence
of guilt is largely circumstantial, our task is not to resolve credibility issues or evidentiary
conflicts, nor is it to inquire whether the evidence might “ ‘ “be reasonably reconciled
with the defendant’s innocence.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] Instead, we ask whether there is
‘ “ ‘substantial evidence of the existence of each element of the offense charged’ ” ’ such
that any rational jury may have convicted defendant.” (People v. Veamatahau (2020) 9
Cal.5th 16, 35-36.)
Defendant addresses only count three. In that count, defendant was charged with
attempting to dissuade his son, Robert Smith, from attending or giving testimony at a
trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law. (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2).) Defendant and
Smith had both been charged with conspiracy to commit unlawful cultivation of
marijuana. Defendant called Smith when he was driving to court. The jury heard the
recorded phone call and was given a transcript of the call. In it, defendant accused Smith
of getting an offer “to sell [him] out,” and Smith responded that he intended to take the
plea. Defendant urged him not to: “if you take the plea against me, . . . we’re done.”
Defendant added, “bury me and I’m coming after you.” Defendant threatened to disown
Smith and not give him a house he was planning to: “just so you know, you’re gonna

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lose hundreds of thousands of dollars yourself.” Defendant said, “If you care at all, we
go down together or we don’t go at all.”
On appeal, defendant argues he did not carry through on his threat of denying
Smith the house. Further, Smith testified that he was not intimidated by defendant’s call.
The evidence was nonetheless sufficient to sustain a conviction. The jury was not
required to believe defendant’s son’s testimony but make their own inferences from the
recorded call. Regardless, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude defendant
had attempted to dissuade his son from testifying under section 136.1, subdivision
(a)(2).3
C. Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant argues his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. “When
challenging a conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance, the defendant must
demonstrate counsel’s inadequacy. To satisfy this burden, the defendant must first show
counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Second, the defendant must show
resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. When
examining an ineffective assistance claim, a reviewing court defers to counsel’s
reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a presumption counsel acted within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance. It is particularly difficult to prevail on an
appellate claim of ineffective assistance. On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed

3 To the extent defendant suggests the trial court abused its discretion in not setting aside
count three under section 995, our conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to
support a conviction for count three precludes any assertion that defendant was
prejudiced by any error in failing to grant his motion to set aside this count on the basis of
insufficient evidence to support the commitment. (People v. Letner & Tobin (2010) 50
Cal.4th 99, 140.)

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for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a
reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.
All other claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately resolved in a habeas
corpus proceeding.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.)
Defendant argues broadly that “[d]efense counsel did not thoroughly conduct
proper cross examination of the prosecutor’s witnesses, ignored facts and the
circumstances known to him as provided by [defendant], and did not argue the case
properly to the jury. He waived opening statements, failed to call any defense witnesses,
and failed to introduce any evidence or exhibits.” These assertions are supported only by
a citation to closing arguments, and a review of counsel’s argument does not disclose any
basis to conclude defense counsel was deficient in any of the asserted ways.
Before the case was submitted to the jury, defendant successfully moved pursuant
to section 1118.1 to dismiss count four. Defendant argues his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance in not also requesting the dismissal of count three. We are
unpersuaded. “Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make frivolous or futile motions.”
(People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 122.) As we have previously explained,
moving to dismiss count three would have been futile because such a motion had no
merit.
Defendant has not demonstrated his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
D. Motion for New Trial
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a
new trial. We disagree. The motion was based on the allegedly prejudicial admission of
evidence regarding the amount ($473,000) of seized assets. The court denied the motion,
explaining that none of the grounds set forth in section 1181 had been established.
Section 1181 states that a court may grant a motion for new trial “in the following
cases only.” “Among these are trial or instructional error, or prosecutorial misconduct

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(id., subd. 5), a verdict contrary to the law or facts (id., subds. 6, 7), newly discovered
evidence (id., subd. 8), and juror misconduct (id., subds. 3, 4), including the jury’s
‘recei[pt] [of] any evidence out of court’ (id., subd. 2).” (People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th
1250, 1260.) None of these grounds apply to defendant’s motion.
“Although section 1181 states that a defendant’s new trial motion may be granted
only on the grounds stated in that section, several courts have held that new trials may
nonetheless be granted on grounds not enumerated in the statute when necessary to
protect a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41
Cal.4th 139, 158.) The admission of evidence of the amount of the seized assets does not
rise to this level.
Further, “ ‘[a] verdict may not be set aside on the basis of the erroneous admission
of evidence . . . unless the party asserting error has preserved the question by a timely and
specific objection to the admission of the evidence, or by a motion to strike or exclude
the evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he objection must be made in such a way as to alert the
trial court to the nature of the anticipated evidence and the basis on which exclusion is
sought, and to afford the People an opportunity to establish its admissibility.’ ” (People v.
Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1261.) Defendant did not object to the admission of this
evidence at trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion for new trial based on the allegedly prejudicial admission of this evidence.
E. Objections to Probation Report
Defendant asserts the trial court abused its discretion by ignoring or not granting
his objections to the probation report. The People did not respond to this argument.
Defendant’s opening brief contains no argument headings, but we have construed the first
sentence of each argument section as the equivalent. We conclude the People correctly
ignored this issue as an improper lurking argument. (Imagistics Internat., Inc. v.
Department of General Services (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 581, 593, fn. 10.)

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Moreover, defendant does not identify any legal or factual basis to conclude there
was a meritorious “objection” raised in this document. To the extent that in this
document defendant argued as mitigating factors that he lacked a serious criminal record,
his age, and lack of prior incarceration, there is no indication the trial court did not
consider these arguments. Thus, any assertion that the trial court abused its discretion by
ignoring or not granting defendant’s objections to the probation report are without merit.
F. Review of Defendant’s Earlier Guilty Plea and Motion to Withdraw Plea
Defendant “requests a review of the record of his previously entered [guilty] plea,
and his subsequent motion to withdraw that plea.” Defendant indicates the court granted
the motion. The People did not respond to this argument either. Again, the omission is
understandable as defendant offers no authority for such a request. Defendant suggests
these documents “correctly pointed out [defendant]’s statements and his position on the
case relating to his guilt or innocence.” He appears to offer these documents as support
for his other arguments. Regardless, defendant’s assertions are unavailing.
II. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/S/

RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

EARL, P. J.

/S/

FEINBERG, J.

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