People v. Guido CA5

CourtListener 10679507Calctapp29.09.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 9/29/25 P. v. Guido CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F087784
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F23905847)
v.

RAYMOND ANGELO GUIDO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Jonathan B.
Conklin, Judge.
Joshua L. Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and
Corinne D. Heinstein, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant Raymond Angelo Guido was found guilty by a jury of first degree
special-circumstance murder, second degree robbery, and unlawful possession of a
firearm. Defendant now appeals his conviction, asserting (I) the trial court prejudicially
erred and violated his federal due process rights by (a) allowing the primary detective to
testify about the contents of surveillance footage and (b) failing to exclude evidence of
uncharged misconduct, unrelated to the charges, from hours prior to the killing.
Defendant also argues (II) the cumulative effect of these errors was prejudicial. The
People disagree in all respects.
We affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 30, 2023, the District Attorney of Fresno County filed an information
charging defendant with first degree special-circumstance murder of Luis Alberto
Castillo (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17); count 1), second degree
robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count 2), and possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code,
§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 3). The information alleged, as to counts 1 and 2, that
defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). As to all counts, the information further alleged that defendant
had suffered a prior “strike” conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law
(Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)).
On November 28, 2023, the jury found defendant guilty of all charges and found
all special allegations true. On February 8, 2024, the trial court sentenced defendant to an
aggregate term of four years, plus 25 years to life, plus life without the possibility of
parole as follows: on count 1, life without the possibility of parole, plus a term of
25 years to life for the firearm enhancement; on count 2, six years, plus 25 years to life
for the firearm enhancement, stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654; and on count 3,
four years. Defendant filed a notice of appeal on March 21, 2024.

2.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
On December 30, 2022, at about 5:55 p.m., Castillo went for a walk, taking his
wallet and phone with him. Minutes after leaving his residence in southeast Fresno, he
was shot three times at a nearby intersection. Castillo succumbed to his injuries hours
later, and his wallet and phone were not found at the scene or collected with his personal
belongings at the hospital.
Multiple witnesses testified they saw two individuals on foot in the area at the time
of the shooting, including one witness who thought one of the individuals had a gun. The
witnesses provided some descriptions of the two, but none positively identified either
individual or connected them directly with the shooting. Fresno Police Detective Mark
Yee, the primary detective assigned to the case, testified that law enforcement’s early
investigation consisted of gathering and examining surveillance footage from
neighboring homes and businesses. This included footage from a house on the southeast
corner of the intersection of the shooting (the shooting-intersection house); a house south
of the shooting, on the same north-south street as the shooting (the south house); a house
west of the shooting, on the same east-west street as the shooting (the west house); an
elementary school west of the shooting and the west house (the elementary school); a
business southwest of the shooting (the southwest business); and a house northwest of the
shooting, across from defendant’s apartment complex (defendant’s neighbor’s house).
Yee described much of the footage as “blurry” or “hard to see,” save for the footage from
defendant’s neighbor’s house. Concurrent with the prosecution’s presentation of the
footage to the jury, Yee testified about what he observed in the footage and how these
observations led him to focus his investigation on defendant.
Additionally, the prosecution introduced footage that more clearly showed
defendant in the neighborhood in the hours before the shooting; therein, defendant was
shown brandishing a knife outside his neighbor’s house and fist-fighting with an
unidentified person outside the elementary school.

3.
The prosecution also introduced defendant’s statements to law enforcement that,
on the day of the shooting, he had only left his house to go to the store in the morning,
had not been around the elementary school for any reason throughout the day, and did not
have a gun or knife at that time. The prosecution presented evidence of defendant’s
change in appearance immediately after the shooting, including: (1) defendant’s parole
officer’s testimony that defendant had long hair down to his mid-back until a few days
after the shooting when he answered the door completely bald and clean shaven; and
(2) Yee’s observation that, half an hour after the shooting, footage from defendant’s
neighbor’s house showed defendant with his dark hair in a short ponytail and with his
face clean shaven (alongside a change of clothing). Yee also discovered Castillo’s wallet
on the roof of defendant’s apartment complex while going to interview defendant’s sister
on February 28, 2023.
Defendant denied knowledge of the shooting when interviewed by law
enforcement in early 2023. At trial, defense counsel cross-examined Yee concerning
footage that showed multiple people in similar clothing in the area around the time of the
shooting; this included footage from just after the shooting that counsel argued showed
two other people entering a home near the west house. Defense counsel also highlighted
throughout the trial certain inconsistencies in witnesses’ statements, the discovery of
ammunition in a vehicle stopped by officers shortly after the shooting matching the
caliber used in Castillo’s murder, and evidence that the gun used in Castillo’s murder was
used in another shooting committed after defendant entered drug rehab in mid-
January 2023. Finally, defense counsel highlighted that a search of defendant’s residence
on January 17, 2023, revealed nothing of relevance to the investigation, including the
wallet discovered on the roof over a month later.

4.
DISCUSSION
I. Admission of Testimony Regarding Surveillance Footage and Evidence of
Uncharged Misconduct
A. Standard of Review
On appeal, the admission or exclusion of evidence is reviewed under the
deferential abuse of discretion standard. (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610,
655 (McKinnon).) When an error is one of nonstructural state law, an appellate court
follows the harmlessness standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,
836 (Watson). This standard requires affirmance of the judgment unless the court
concludes there is a reasonable probability a result more favorable would have been
reached in the absence of the error. (Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th
1040, 1050 (Richardson).)
“[T]he admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results in a due
process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair.” (People v. Partida
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 (Partida).) For the erroneous admission of evidence to render
a trial fundamentally unfair, the evidence must have been “ ‘ “sufficiently material to
provide the basis for conviction or to remove a reasonable doubt that would have existed
on the record without it.” ’ ” (People v. Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1025–
1026.)
B. Primary Detective’s Testimony About the Contents of Surveillance
Footage
Defendant’s first point on appeal is multifaceted. He argues portions of Detective
Yee’s testimony should have been excluded as (a) “oral testimony to prove the contents
of a writing” under the “secondary evidence” rule of Evidence Code section 1523,1
(b) minimally probative and highly prejudicial under section 352, and (c) fundamentally

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.

5.
unfair under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendant also
argues these issues were properly preserved for appeal or, if forfeited, defense counsel
was ineffective in failing to properly object.
The People contend the secondary evidence issue is forfeited and, regardless, all of
defendant’s arguments fail either on the merits or for lack of prejudice.
1. Additional Background
On October 27, 2023, defendant moved to prevent witnesses, including Yee, from
identifying defendant in the surveillance footage or otherwise testifying about the
contents of the footage. The trial court held a hearing on these issues on October 30,
2023.
Over multiple days of the trial, Yee was questioned about the collected footage
from the shooting-intersection house, the south house, the west house, the elementary
school, the southwest business, and defendant’s neighbor’s house. Throughout this
testimony, Yee noted the low quality of much of the footage, save for the footage from
defendant’s neighbor’s house. Yee relayed many of his observations about the footage in
the minutes during and after the shooting, including the footage from (1) the shooting-
intersection house, which Yee stated showed five flashes of light, one figure fall to the
ground, and two other figures run away; (2) the south house, which he stated “noted the
time that the gunshots were heard” but did not show anyone running by in the moments
after the shooting, and which led him to believe the two individuals did not run to the
south, “so that . . . narrowed [the] focus” of the investigation westward; (3) the west
house, which he described as “blurry” footage showing two individuals, one in light-
colored shoes and the other in darker shoes, a hood, and dark hair, run west toward the
elementary school immediately after the shooting; (4) the elementary school and the
southwest business, which he stated showed the two individuals run from the east-west
street where the shooting occurred and split up, and showed the one “dark hair[ed]”
individual in “dark shoes, with . . . a light top . . . near the [shoe]lace[s]” eventually move

6.
northward toward defendant’s neighbor’s house; and (5) defendant’s neighbor’s house,
“[e]xtremely” better quality footage which showed a person with dark hair, a hooded
sweatshirt, pants, and shoes who resembled the northbound person from the elementary
school footage, also showing the person had tattoos, long hair, a goatee, and other
features consistent with defendant. Additionally, Yee testified the footage from
defendant’s neighbor’s house captured an individual with similar characteristics exiting
the apartment complex about half an hour after the shooting in different clothes and with
his hair cut shorter and his goatee shaven. Yee also described footage from the time
before the shooting, including his observations of two individuals in similar clothing as
those he saw in the post-shooting footage leave defendant’s apartment complex about
10 minutes before the shooting, eventually run towards the north-south street where the
shooting occurred, and walk with Castillo near the shooting-intersection house a few
minutes before the shooting.
On cross-examination, Yee agreed some footage showed other activity in the
neighborhood at the time, including other people wearing dark clothing. Throughout his
trial testimony, Yee did not explicitly name defendant as any of the individuals in the
footage until there was a clear picture of defendant in his neighbor’s house footage about
six minutes after the shooting. At times throughout Yee’s testimony, the court reminded
the jurors they were “the ultimate finders of fact” as concerned the identity of the shooter.
2. Forfeiture and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
We begin with the parties’ competing arguments as to whether defense counsel
forfeited defendant’s challenges to Yee’s testimony. (See § 353 [requiring an objection
to preserve for appeal a claim concerning erroneously admitted evidence]; Quiles v.
Parent (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1013 [“ ‘Failure to raise specific challenges in the
trial court forfeits the claim on appeal.’ ”].) Defendant contends his arguments are not
forfeited, noting the specific briefing in his pretrial motion in limine on secondary
evidence, section 352 balancing, and due process, as well as defense counsel’s arguments

7.
at the in limine hearing. The People contend the secondary evidence issue is forfeited,
arguing defendant abandoned this position at the pretrial hearing and failed to make any
objections at trial on secondary evidence grounds.
Anticipating the People’s argument, defendant contends if defense counsel did not
properly preserve any issue, he was ineffective in doing so. The People dispute this
contention. A criminal defendant may claim ineffective assistance on direct appeal
where defense counsel failed to object to the admission of evidence. (See People v.
Romo (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 682, 695‒697.) This requires asking whether counsel’s
acts “ ‘ “ ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . [causing] prejudice to a
reasonable probability, that is, a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 653; see Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688–692; see also Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at
p. 1050 [discussing the similarities between the Watson “reasonable probability” standard
for state law error and the similarly-phrased Strickland prejudice prong for ineffective
assistance]; People v. Ocegueda (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1407, fn. 4 [noting
Watson’s harmless error standard is substantially the same as Strickland’s prejudice
prong].)
Because we can resolve defendant’s claims on the merits and for lack of prejudice,
we dispense with a lengthy analysis of whether defendant forfeited the secondary
evidence issue on appeal. (See People v. McDaniel (2021) 12 Cal.5th 97, 132.)
3. Analysis
a. Secondary evidence under section 1523
Defendant first contends the investigator’s testimony describing what the footage
depicted was a violation of section 1523 because it was “oral testimony . . . to prove the
contents of a writing.” We find no error and, in any event, no prejudice.
Video recordings are writings, and to be admissible into evidence, must either be
the original, or otherwise admissible secondary evidence of the content of the footage.

8.
(§§ 250, 1520–1523.) Oral testimony to prove the content of a writing is generally
inadmissible (§ 1523, subd. (a)), save for a few enumerated exceptions (id., subds. (b)–
(d)) inapplicable here. We review the trial court’s ruling concerning the admissibility of
secondary evidence for abuse of discretion and will reverse only if there is a reasonable
probability a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached in the absence
of the error. (Dart Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1059,
1069 [noting the admission of secondary evidence is “addressed to the discretion of the
trial court, and will not be disturbed on appeal absent abuse of discretion”]; Watson,
supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836; Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1050.)
Here, one of the main disputes in this trial was the identity of the shooter, as there
were no eyewitnesses to the shooting and much of the footage was low quality and only
showed blurry figures. Neither party disputes this, nor do they dispute that the footage
from defendant’s neighbor’s house was the only one of quality where defendant could be
more readily identified. The question is whether Yee was permitted to describe to the
jury details of the low-quality footage from the shooting-intersection house, the south
house, the west house, the southwest business, and the elementary school. For support,
the People point to People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th 367, 410‒411 (Gonzalez) and
People v. Son (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 689, 695‒696, wherein no abuse of discretion arose
from the trial courts’ allowance of testimony from law enforcement about the contents of
footage showing the crimes. As here, the defendants in those cases argued the testimony
should have been excluded under section 1523, but in both cases the court affirmed,
noting the footage had been admitted into evidence and the testimony only provided
context to the footage. (See Gonzalez, at pp. 410‒411; Son, at pp. 695‒696.)
Defendant is correct that his case is partially distinguishable from Gonzalez.
There, the detectives who described the footage were undercover agents with personal
knowledge of the conversations depicted, and their testimony was used to “clarify what
was being discussed” and “explain the meaning of certain slang terms.” (Gonzalez,

9.
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 410.) Conversely, the investigator here only reviewed the footage
after it was collected and testified about his observations of the footage. Despite this, our
Supreme Court in Gonzalez recognized no court has applied the secondary evidence rule
“when the writing itself was admitted into evidence.” (Ibid.) The court cited Son
approvingly for the same proposition. (Ibid.) The Gonzalez court explicitly reiterated,
“ ‘The purpose of the [secondary] evidence rule is “to minimize the possibilities of
misinterpretation of writings by requiring the production of the original writings
themselves, if available.” ’ ” (Ibid.) This court’s own research indicates this principle
has long existed under California law, stretching back to when the rule was known as the
“best evidence” rule. (People v. Sloss (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 74, 86 [finding the best
evidence rule was not violated by an officer’s testimony about the contents of a
photograph because “the original ‘writing’ [citation] was produced in evidence”].) Given
that the jury here had access to the footage in this case, Gonzalez, Son, and Sloss counsel
a finding of no error under section 1523. However, even assuming arguendo the
admission of Yee’s descriptions of the footage was error under subdivision (a) of
section 1523, we find no prejudice. (See Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439 [“Absent
fundamental unfairness [under federal due process doctrines], state law error in admitting
evidence is subject to the traditional Watson test.”].) Under the Watson standard, a
judgment may be overturned only if “it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error.”
(Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836; see also Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1050.)
No such probability exists on this record. In addition to Yee’s description of the
details of the footage, defendant made inconsistent statements to law enforcement that, on
the day of the shooting, he had only left his house to go to the store in the morning, had
not been around the elementary school for any reason throughout that day, and did not
have a gun or knife at that time. This despite footage from earlier in the day showing
defendant in the neighborhood outside the elementary school and the southwest business

10.
brandishing a knife. The prosecution introduced evidence concerning defendant’s change
in appearance immediately after the shooting, including that he shaved off his long hair
and goatee. Multiple officers testified about the discovery of Castillo’s wallet on
February 28, 2023, which Yee found on the roof of defendant’s apartment complex.
And, as defendant readily admits, the jury had access to the footage and could watch any
clip “as many times as necessary to determine what they believed was depicted in them.”
On the key issue of identity, the court repeatedly reminded the jurors they were “the
ultimate finders of fact,” and we presume the jury followed the court’s admonitions. (See
People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 217 (Gray).) Thus, we find no reasonable
probability a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached had Yee’s
descriptions of the footage been excluded. (See Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836;
Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1050.)
b. Balancing under section 352
Next, defendant contends much of Yee’s testimony should have been excluded
under section 352 as unduly time consuming, prejudicial, or confusing. We disagree and
find no prejudice.
Section 352 requires trial courts to “exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the
issues, or of misleading the jury.” The court’s decision under section 352 will not be
disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion and Watson prejudicial error.
(McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 655 [“On appeal, we review for abuse of discretion a
trial court’s ruling on whether evidence is relevant, not unduly prejudicial, and thus
admissible.”]; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
Here, we find no abuse of discretion under section 352 in the trial court’s decision
to allow Yee to testify as to the contents of the footage. (See McKinnon, supra,
52 Cal.4th at p. 655.) The testimony did not unduly consume time, as defendant argues.

11.
True, Yee was on the stand for three days of the month-long trial, adding up to over
100 pages of the reporter’s transcript. However, he did not spend all of this time
describing the contents of the footage, testifying to other aspects of the investigation,
providing foundation for the admission of the footage, and remaining on the stand while
both parties played the footage for the jury. Defendant does not argue it was improper
for Yee to take the stand at all and readily admits it was “proper to admit testimony about
the locations of the surveillance cameras.” On these facts, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion under section 352 due to an undue consumption of time. (See § 352, subd. (a);
People v. Cabrera (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 695, 706 [finding no undue consumption of
time where the witness’s testimony spanned almost 100 pages of the reporter’s transcript
but concerned a core issue in the case].)
Nor were Yee’s descriptions unduly prejudicial or confusing on the issue of
identity. While the shooter’s identity was central to the case, a review of Yee’s testimony
demonstrates he never explicitly identified defendant as any of the individuals in the
footage until there was a clear image of defendant in the footage from his neighbor’s
house, about six minutes after the shooting. Defendant argues the jury may have
unthinkingly deferred to Yee’s opinion that the shooter, a blurry figure in much of the
footage, was the same person as in the footage from the neighbor’s house, which more
clearly showed defendant.2 However, the court reminded the jurors they were “the
ultimate finders of fact” as concerned the identity of the shooter, and we presume the jury
followed the court’s instructions. (See Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 217.) The jury had
access to all the footage during deliberations, and defendant was able to present his
competing theories about the identity of the shooter during his cross-examinations of Yee

2 This argument often arises on appeal in the context of lay testimony. (See, e.g.,
Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 411‒412.) Though defendant avers at times that Yee’s
testimony may have invaded the province of the jury, he makes no explicit argument that the trial
court abused its discretion under lay opinion principles. We therefore do not consider that
question.

12.
and other witnesses. On these facts, we find no section 352 violation. (See People v.
Tran (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 171, 190 [finding no abuse of discretion under section 352
where the declarant described details in surveillance footage to “help[] the jury observe
what the videos showed,” where “[t]here was nothing sensational about his testimony,”
and where the jury could observe the footage for themselves]; People v. Thomas (2023)
14 Cal.5th 327, 363 [noting prejudicial is not synonymous with damaging for section 352
purposes, but instead refers to “ ‘ “ ‘evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional
bias against [the] defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on the
issues’ ” ’ ”].)
Further, for the same reasons as stated in the section 1523 discussion above, we
find no prejudice in the admission of Yee’s testimony. Briefly: (1) The jury was able to
view all of the footage at issue and presumably followed the court’s instructions to be the
finders of fact regarding the identity of the shooter; (2) Defendant made inconsistent
statements concerning his whereabouts on the day of the shooting—despite footage to the
contrary; (3) Defendant changed his appearance immediately after the shooting, such that
his parole officer did not recognize him; and (4) Yee discovered Castillo’s wallet on the
roof of defendant’s apartment complex. (See Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
c. Due process
Defendant also contends the trial court’s failure to exclude Yee’s descriptions of
the footage violated his federal due process rights. We disagree.
Federal due process prohibits the admission of evidence rendering the trial
fundamentally unfair. (Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439.) “ ‘Only if there are no
permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due
process.’ ” (People v. Hunt (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 811, 817 (Hunt).)
Here, Yee’s testimony did not cut off other possible inferences as to the identity of
the shooter. As noted above, Yee did not identify defendant as any of the individuals in
the footage until there was a clear picture of him in the footage from his neighbor’s

13.
house, about six minutes after the shooting. Defense counsel took advantage of his
opportunity to cross-examine Yee and other witnesses to present his competing theories
about the identity of the shooter, including that there were others in similar clothing
besides defendant outside in the neighborhood that night. The court repeatedly
admonished the jurors to be “the ultimate finders of fact” as concerned the identity of the
shooter, and we presume the jury followed the court’s instructions. (See Gray, supra,
37 Cal.4th at p. 217.) Thus, the jury was free to decide whether the blurry figure seen
shooting Castillo was not defendant but some other individual in the neighborhood at the
time. They did not. On these facts, we do not find Yee’s descriptions of the footage
rendered the trial so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it violated federal due
process. (See Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439; Hunt, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at
p. 817.)
C. Footage of Defendant from Hours Prior to the Killing
Defendant’s second argument concerns footage from hours before the shooting
showing defendant brandishing a knife outside his neighbor’s house and fighting with an
unnamed person outside the elementary school. Defendant contends these should have
been excluded as (a) irrelevant, as character and propensity evidence, and as unduly
prejudicial and confusing, and (b) fundamentally unfair under the Fourteenth Amendment
due process clause.
The People contend defendant’s arguments fail on the merits, arguing the footage
was used to prove identity and inconsistent statements. We agree and find no prejudice.
1. Additional Background
Defendant told law enforcement in early 2023 that, on the day of the shooting, he
had only left his house to go to the store in the morning, had not been around the
elementary school for any reason throughout that day, and did not have a gun or knife at
that time. The prosecution presented footage from defendant’s neighbor’s house,
recorded about three hours before the shooting, showing defendant approach that house

14.
holding a large knife. According to testimony from a resident at defendant’s neighbor’s
house, a friend of hers had gotten into an altercation with defendant on the afternoon of
the shooting near the elementary school. The prosecution introduced footage from the
elementary school showing the altercation. Yee described the footage from defendant’s
neighbor’s house from earlier in the day as “[e]xtremely” better quality footage, which
showed defendant’s tattoos and other features. The prosecution also introduced evidence
concerning defendant’s change in appearance immediately after the shooting, including
that he shaved his long hair and goatee.
2. Analysis
a. Relevance, section 1101 propensity, and section 352
balancing
Defendant contends the footage from hours before the shooting was irrelevant, as
it had nothing to do with the shooting. He also argues that because the footage shows
him fighting and brandishing a knife, it should have been excluded as impermissible
propensity evidence, and as minimally probative and unduly prejudicial. We disagree
and find no prejudice.
Only relevant evidence is admissible. (§ 350.) Evidence is relevant if it has “any
tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action.” (§ 210.) This includes “evidence relevant to the credibility
of a witness or hearsay declarant.” (Ibid.) Evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts is not
admissible to show bad character or predisposition to criminality. (§ 1101, subd. (a).)
However, such evidence is admissible if relevant to prove a material fact at issue,
including identity. (Id., subd. (b); People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 273.) Finally, a
trial court may “exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice [or] of
confusing the issues.” (§ 352.) State law evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. (McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 655; People

15.
v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 864 [“We review the admission of evidence
under . . . section 1101 for an abuse of discretion.”].) We may only reverse for
evidentiary error if, after considering the entire record, we believe there was a reasonable
probability of a different outcome in the absence of the error. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d
at p. 836.)
The identity of the shooter was a key dispute in this case. Multiple witnesses saw
two individuals on foot in the area at the time of the shooting, including one witness who
thought one of the individuals had a gun; the witnesses provided general descriptions of
the two, but none positively identified either individual or connected them directly with
the shooting. Much of the footage collected by law enforcement was “hard to see” and
showed “blurry” figures. At trial, defense counsel questioned Yee about footage showing
multiple people in similar clothing in the area around the time of the shooting, including
footage from just after the shooting that he argued showed two other people entering a
home near the west house. Defense counsel also highlighted inconsistencies in
witnesses’ statements about the descriptions of individuals in the area at that time.
Further, when defendant was interviewed by law enforcement in early 2023, he stated he
had only left his house to go to the store in the morning, had not been around the
elementary school for any reason throughout the day, and did not have a gun or knife at
that time. He also stated he shaved his long hair and goatee as a new year’s resolution.
Given this, circumstantial evidence establishing the identity of the “blurry” figures
was relevant to a key issue in the case, as well as to defendant’s credibility. The footage
from earlier in the day showing defendant in the in the neighborhood outside defendant’s
neighbor’s house and the elementary school was also relevant to establish a baseline of
his gait and appearance, including his tattoos and long hair, that the jury could compare
against the footage from these same cameras six minutes after the shooting. (See People
v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 771 [noting identity can be
shown via common distinctive features]; People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 131

16.
[finding photographs unrelated to the crime at issue not barred under section 1101
because the defendant’s tattoos and other identifying characteristics could be used to
prove identity]; People v. Peralez (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 368, 377 [noting images from a
different time from the time of the charged crime could be relevant to identity where the
defendant’s appearance changed].) The footage also called into question defendant’s
statements to law enforcement in early 2023 that he only left the house the morning of the
shooting and did not have a knife or gun, which went to defendant’s credibility. (See
People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 928 [noting section 1101 explicitly allows for
“evidence [] offered on the issue of a witness’s credibility”].) Given these alternate
permissible and relevant uses, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under
section 1101 in allowing this footage to be admitted into evidence. (People v Memro,
supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 864.)
Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this footage due to
the risk of undue prejudice or confusion of the issues. Though the jury saw defendant
with a knife and in a fight earlier on the day of the shooting, the discussion of these
instances was relatively brief in comparison to the other evidence presented at trial, and
as the court noted about the fight, defendant appeared more a victim than an aggressor.
Given the murder charge, these instances were less emotionally provoking. (See People
v. Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 363 [reminding under section 352, prejudicial refers to
“ ‘ “ ‘evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against [the] defendant
as an individual and which has very little effect on the issues’ ” ’ ”].) And, again, the
court continually admonished the jurors they were “the ultimate finders of fact” as
concerned the identity of the shooter. We presume the jury followed the court’s
instructions. (See Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 217.) On these facts, we find no abuse of
discretion under section 352. (See McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 655; People v.
Cage, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 274–275 [finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
admission of evidence over the defendant’s section 352 and 1101 objections and showing

17.
prior bad acts where evidence was relevant to motive and identity, where it was not
unduly prejudicial for lack of emotional bias and effect on the issues, and where the jury
was properly instructed on the role of this evidence].)
Finally, for the same reasons as discussed in part I.B.3.a. above, we find no
prejudice in the admission of the footage from defendant’s neighbor’s house and the
elementary school from earlier in the afternoon. Thus, there is no reasonable probability
a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached had the challenged footage
been excluded. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
b. Due process
Defendant also contends the trial court’s failure to exclude the footage from
defendant’s neighbor’s house and elementary school from the afternoon violated his
federal due process rights. We disagree.
Federal due process principles prohibit the admission of evidence rendering the
trial fundamentally unfair. (Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439.) “ ‘Only if there are no
permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due
process.’ ” (Hunt, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 817.)
Here, the footage from defendant’s neighbor’s house and the elementary school
from the afternoon did not foreclose the jury’s ability to infer another individual was the
shooter. The footage was from earlier in the day, and though defendant could be clearly
identified in the footage from his neighbor’s house, the jury was free to accept
defendant’s argument that the shooter was one of the other individuals in the area at the
time of the shooting. The jury also could have accepted that defendant’s inconsistent
statements to law enforcement had more to do with his desire to not get caught for
fighting and brandishing a knife, as defendant now argues. Thus, the jury was free to
decide the blurry figure seen shooting Castillo was not defendant but was in fact some
other individual in the neighborhood at the time. (See Hunt, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at
p. 817.)

18.
On these facts, we conclude the jury’s exposure to the footage from defendant’s
neighbor’s house and the elementary school from hours before the shooting did not
“render[] the trial so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it violated federal due
process.” (Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439.)
II. Cumulative Effect
Defendant contends that even if the errors alleged above are not in themselves
reversible, they are cumulatively prejudicial. Not so. “A predicate to a claim of
cumulative error is a finding of error.” (People v. Sedillo (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1037,
1068.) Defendant’s individual arguments fail on the merits, and even accepting error for
the sake of argument under section 1523, we found this issue not prejudicial in itself.
Thus, there is nothing to cumulate. As such, we reject defendant’s claim of cumulative
error resulting in prejudice. (See People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 479–480
[rejecting cumulative error where the defendant demonstrated few errors, and the court
found each possible error harmless when considered individually].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

HILL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

LEVY, J.

SNAUFFER, J.

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