CourtListener 10677568•People v. Namowics CA6
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 9/24/25 P. v. Namowics CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H052004
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C1651877)
v.
NICOLAS NAMOWICS,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury found defendant Nicolas Namowics guilty of second degree murder and
attempted murder. The jury further found that Namowics personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm in the commission of both offenses. The trial court imposed an
aggregate sentence of 15 years to life consecutive to 20 years in prison.
Namowics raises two claims on appeal. First, he contends the trial court
erroneously instructed the jury on the elements of implied malice murder. For the
reasons below, we conclude this claim is without merit.
Second, Namowics contends the abstract of judgment should be corrected to
clarify that the trial court stayed fines and fees pending a showing of his ability to pay
them. We order the abstract of judgment to be corrected accordingly, and we affirm the
judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
The prosecution charged Namowics with two counts: count 1—murder (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a))1; and count 2—attempted murder (§§ 187, 664, subd. (a)). As to
both counts, the prosecution further alleged Namowics personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm. (§ 12022.53, subds. (c) & (g).)
The jury found Namowics guilty of second degree murder on count 1 and
attempted murder on count 2. On both counts, the jury found true the firearm allegations,
and on count 2 the jury found not true the allegation that the attempted murder was
premeditated. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 15 years to life
consecutive to 20 years in state prison.
B. Facts of the Offenses
Around 2 a.m., Namowics, Jose Eduardo Perez, and Jose Maria Perez were
walking together after attending a Halloween party. Justino Ortiz and Giancarlo
Villalobos, who were also at the party, were walking in the same area. Namowics saw
Ortiz and Villalobos, and told Jose Eduardo Perez that he had “seen those fools,” and
“they’re right there,” referring to a fight that had taken place at the party. Namowics
aggressively said, “fuck you, what’s up,” to Ortiz and Villalobos.
Soon thereafter, Namowics took out a nine-millimeter semi-automatic firearm and
began firing at Ortiz and Villalobos. Namowics fired seven rounds. He missed
Villalobos and Ortiz but struck Jose Eduardo Perez. When the bullet fired by Namowics
struck Jose Eduardo Perez, Jose Eduardo Perez mistakenly thought Villalobos or Ortiz
was shooting at him, so he began shooting towards Villalobos and Ortiz. Two of the
bullets fired by Jose Eduardo Perez struck Villalobos, killing him. Namowics, Jose
Eduardo Perez, and Jose Maria Perez then ran to a nearby car and drove away.
1
Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jury Instructions on the Elements of Second Degree Murder
Namowics contends the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on one of the
elements required for implied malice murder—specifically, that the natural and probable
consequences of the act that resulted in the death were dangerous to human life “in that
the act involved a high degree of probability that it would result in death.” The Attorney
General contends the trial court properly instructed the jury on that element, and that
regardless, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
1. Legal Principles
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice
aforethought. [Citation.] Malice may be express or implied. [Citation.]” (People v.
Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 151.) “Murder is committed with implied malice when
‘the killing is proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are
dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his
conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’
[Citation.]” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes).) “To suffice for
implied malice murder, the defendant’s act must not merely be dangerous to life in some
vague or speculative sense; it must ‘ “involve[ ] a high degree of probability that it will
result in death.” ’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 989.)
“A trial court bears a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the essential elements
of an offense . . . .” (People v. Bell (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 428, 434.) “The independent
or de novo standard of review is applicable in assessing whether instructions correctly
state the law . . . .” (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) “ ‘ “[T]he correctness
of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a
consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.” ’ ” (People v.
Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1248 (Musselwhite).)
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2. Jury Instructions on Implied Malice Murder
The trial court instructed the jury on implied malice as follows: “The defendant
had implied malice if, one, he intentionally committed an act. [¶] Two, the natural and
probable consequence[s] of the act were dangerous to human life. [¶] Three, at the time
he acted he knew his act was dangerous to human life. [¶] And, four, he deliberately
acted with conscious disregard for human life. [¶] Malice aforethought does not require
hatred or ill will toward the victim. It is a mental state that must be formed before the act
that causes death is committed. It does not require deliberation or the passage of any
particular period of time. An act is dangerous to human life if there is a high degree of
probability that the act will result in death.” (Italics added.)
3. The Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury on Implied Malice
Both parties agree that under an implied malice theory of murder the jury was
required to find that the act that caused death to another person was “dangerous to human
life” in that there was “a high degree of probability” that the act would result in death. In
2023, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th
981. In 2024, following Reyes, CALCRIM No. 520 was revised in relevant part to
instruct the jury on implied malice as follows: “The natural and probable consequences
of the [act] were dangerous to human life in that the [act] involved a high degree of
probability that it would result in death.”
The trial court here instructed the jury in January 2024, after Reyes was issued but
before CALCRIM No. 520 was modified. As a result, the trial court’s instruction did not
include the modified language in the exact same form. Namowics asserts the trial court
erroneously instructed the jury only that “the natural and probable consequence[s] of the
act were dangerous to human life,” omitting the language requiring the jury to find the act
“involved a high degree of probability that it would result in death.” As the Attorney
General points out, however, the trial court did instruct the jury with this language several
sentences later. After instructing the jury on the remaining elements of implied malice,
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the court expressly instructed the jury, “An act is dangerous to human life if there is a
high degree of probability that the act will result in death.”
Namowics does not explain how this amounted to instructional error; his opening
brief simply ignores the court’s issuance of the above-quoted language. Nor does he put
forth any argument as to how the jury could have been confused or misled by the court’s
instructions simply because the court issued the required language several sentences later.
Viewing this language in the context of the instructions as a whole, we perceive no
error. “ ‘[T]he fact that the necessary elements of a jury charge are to be found in two
instructions rather than in one instruction does not, in itself, make the charge prejudicial.’
[Citation.] ‘The absence of an essential element in one instruction may be supplied by
another or cured in light of the instructions as a whole.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Burgener
(1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 538-539, disapproved on another ground by People v. Reyes
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 743.) Considering the instructions in their entirety, the trial court
properly instructed the jury on implied malice consistent with Reyes. Moreover, there
was no ambiguity in the instructional language defining “dangerous to human life” as
meaning “a high degree of probability that the act will result in death,” so there is no
reasonable probability the jury misunderstood or misapplied these instructions. (See
Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [the reviewing court determines whether it is
reasonably likely a jury misapplied an ambiguous instruction].) Accordingly, we
conclude this claim is without merit.
B. Correction of the Abstract to Clarify That the Trial Court Stayed Fines and Fees
At sentencing, the trial court imposed fines and fees including a $300 restitution
fund fine (§ 1202.4); a court security fee of $80 (§ 1465.8); and a criminal conviction
assessment of $60 (Gov. Code, § 70373). Defense counsel requested that the court waive
the fines and fees under People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157. The court then
5
stayed the restitution fund fine and the fees pending a showing by the prosecution that
Namowics had the ability to pay them.2
Section 9 of the abstract of judgment, titled “FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS,” lists
the above fines and fees, and an attached page lists other orders, including, “Fines Fees
[sic] stayed pending showing of defendant’s ability to pay by the People.”
Namowics contends the fines and fees as listed in section 9 of the abstract of
judgment should be deleted because the trial court stayed them, and they are therefore not
“financial obligations.” The Attorney General contends no corrections or deletions are
necessary because the order on the attached page states that the court stayed the fines and
fees pending the prosecution’s showing of an ability to pay them. Namowics responds
that the abstract of judgment is confusing and creates a risk that the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation will seek to enforce the stayed fines and fees regardless of
the order on the attached page.
We agree with Namowics that the abstract of judgment, viewed in its entirety,
warrants clarification. For example, notwithstanding the order on the attached page,
section 9 of the abstract indicates that the restitution fund fine is to be paid “forthwith per
PC 2085.5 if prison commitment.” (Italics added.) We will order the abstract of
judgment corrected as set forth below. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185
[courts may correct clerical errors at any time].)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended
abstract of judgment by deleting the $300 restitution fine, the $80 court operations
assessment, and the $60 conviction assessment from section 9 of the abstract of
judgment. The court shall further amend section 13, “Other orders” on “Attachment Page
Number: TWO,” to list these fines and fees and to state that the trial court imposed and
2
The court also imposed and suspended a parole revocation restitution fine of
$300 (§ 1202.45). The trial court did not order that it be stayed.
6
stayed them pending a showing by the People that Namowics has the ability to pay them.
The trial court shall send a copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
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_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________________
Grover, J.
______________________________________
Lie, J.
People v. Namowics
H052004
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