CourtListener 10676272•People v. Molina CA2/8
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Filed 9/23/25 P. v. Molina CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B335593
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No. KA127040)
HECTOR TREJO MOLINA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Victor D. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.
G. Martin Velez, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran and Megan Moine, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent
___________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Hector Trejo Molina appeals from the judgment
entered after she pled no contest to assault with a deadly
weapon.1 On appeal, Molina contends the trial court abused its
discretion by denying her motion for mental health diversion,
arguing the evidence does not support the court’s finding that she
was unsuitable for diversion because she posed an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety. We find no abuse of discretion
and affirm.
BACKGROUND
1. The assaults
Our factual summary is taken from the preliminary
hearing transcript.
On March 21, 2021, Molina threatened two passengers on a
bus by holding a folding knife to their necks. During the first
incident, Molina was sitting at the back of the bus when Gonzalo
Camacho boarded and sat in front of her. Molina then placed a
hand on Camacho’s shoulder while holding a folding knife near
his neck and yelled at him to “get out of the bus.” Camacho got
off the bus, and Molina followed him. Camacho then got back on
the bus, and the driver closed the door. When the driver later
opened the door, Molina got back on the bus, and Camacho fled.
Camacho said that Molina “seemed . . . high.”
During the second incident, Molina stood at the back of the
bus and held a knife against the neck of Roberto Cuevas. Police
1 When the trial court proceedings began, the court and
parties referred to Molina using “he/him/his” pronouns. From
October 2023 on, the court and parties started referring to Molina
using “she/her/hers” pronouns. Throughout this opinion we too
use “she/her/hers” pronouns when referring to Molina.
2
officers boarded the bus, pointed their guns at Molina, and told
her to drop the knife. One of the officers stated that Molina “may
have” been high and that her knife “was creasing [Cuevas’s]
neck.” When the officer pointed his gun at Molina, she said
“leave me alone.” The rear bus door opened, and Cuevas fled.
Molina continued to ignore police requests to drop her knife
and departed the bus “holding [her] knife to [her own neck],”
before running across a busy road. When officers asked Molina to
drop the knife, she told them to “leave [her] alone,” and ran
across the road. She tried to stab herself with the knife but was
not injured. She eventually complied with police commands,
dropped the knife, and was arrested.
2. Trial court proceedings
On September 21, 2022, the People charged Molina with
two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code,2 § 245,
subd. (a)) and one count of false imprisonment (§ 236).
On March 16, 2023, Molina filed a motion for mental health
diversion under section 1001.36, outlining how she satisfied both
the suitability and eligibility provisions of the statute. She
supported her motion with a report from Dr. Risa Grand, a
forensic psychiatrist. The report explained that Molina had a
history of mental illness, including diagnoses for bipolar disorder,
alcohol use disorder, and various substance abuse disorders.
Molina, who was 26 years old at the time she was interviewed by
Dr. Grand, started drinking alcohol, smoking marijuana, and
using “[h]eroin, PCP, mushroom[s], and molly” when she was
17 years old, and she struggled to remain sober ever since.
2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
3
The report recounted Molina’s memory of the crime.
Although “imperfect,” Molina recalled “being on the bus . . .
because ‘[a] lot of rich people live [where it was going, and] rich
people have drugs.’ ” “[V]oices told [her] that [she] would meet
rich strangers there.” Molina also recalled ‘ “being at gunpoint.’ ”
Dr. Grand stated that Molina was using methamphetamine,
fentanyl, and alcohol before and on the day of the crime.
Additionally, Molina “was on [her] second or fifth day without
sleep.”
Dr. Grand concluded that Molina was “suitable for mental
health diversion,” stating that the current circumstances were
“an excellent opportunity to offer [her] mental health diversion or
at least consider mitigation.” Dr. Grand stated that Molina
“meets diagnostic criteria for Unspecified Schizophrenia
Spectrum and Other Disorders [including Bipolar I Disorder,
Manic with Psychotic Features, and various substance abuse
disorders] . . . meaning [she] is psychotic and quite ill.”
Dr. Grand also reported that there was “a direct nexus between
symptoms of [Molina’s various disorders] . . . and the alleged
offenses.” She found that Molina’s actions at the time of the
offense were “clearly delusional and psychotic” and believed
Molina’s “Bipolar Disorder . . . and Substance Use Disorders
[were] amenable to treatment.”
Dr. Grand concluded that Molina would not be “overtly
dangerous if [she] is supervised and sober . . . [and Dr. Grand
does] not think [she was] at risk of a super strike if [she] is sober,
supervised and on medications.” However, Dr. Grand
recommended treatment for Molina in a “locked or well-
supervised program that is at least a year in length” that offers
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“12-step programming, psychotropic medications, [and]
psychoeducation.”
On October 20, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on
Molina’s diversion motion. Molina’s counsel reported that Molina
was rejected from Olive Vista, the only secured facility that met
“the court’s prior concerns.” Molina was instead accepted into a
“highly supervised” program at L.A. CADA, a facility capable of
supervising patients with a “dual diagnosis” like Molina.
The People urged the court to deny Molina’s motion,
asserting that she would be suitable for a diversion program only
if she was “sober, supervised, and medicated.” The People
emphasized that Molina had not been sober since she was
17 years old, and she was noncompliant with her medication
since her mental health diagnoses. The People asserted that
Molina’s history of substance abuse and unresolved mental
health issues, coupled with the unprovoked manner in which she
committed the charged assaults, showed that she would “do well
to be in a locked supervised facility like [the unavailable] Olive
Vista.”
The trial court denied Molina’s motion for diversion. The
court found that while Molina met the eligibility requirements for
diversion under section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(1)–(2), she was
not suitable for diversion because she posed an unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety and there were no available treatment
facilities that could provide the level of security Molina needed
for safe treatment within the community. Specifically, the court
found that if she were treated in the community under pretrial
mental health diversion, Molina would pose an unreasonable risk
of committing a super strike, such as murder, attempted murder,
or another homicide offense. Although the court assumed Molina
5
had no criminal history, it found that her actions “in this case
[were] extremely violent,” noting that the underlying incidents
did not appear to be a “one-time thing” but rather an “example[]
of somebody who is at an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety.” The Court also noted that Molina needed a locked
treatment facility, and the only suitable one could not treat her.
Following the denial of her motion for diversion, Molina
pled no contest to one count of assault with a deadly weapon in
violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1). The trial court
accepted the plea and sentenced Molina to two years in state
prison. Molina was immediately released for time served.
On October 20, 2023, Molina filed a timely appeal. The
trial court granted Molina’s request for a certificate of probable
cause to permit an appeal of its denial of her application for
mental health diversion.
DISCUSSION
In 2018, the Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and
1001.36, creating a program of pretrial diversion intended for
defendants with certain mental health disorders. (People v.
Frahs (2022) 9 Cal. 5th 618, 624.) Diversion gives trial courts
discretion to suspend criminal proceedings and can lead to
potential dismissal of charges upon a defendant’s successful
completion of a mental health treatment program. (Id. at p. 626.)
The mental health diversion statutes are to be applied as broadly
as possible. (Id. at p. 632.)
The purpose of the mental health diversion program is to:
(1) “increase[] diversion of individuals with mental disorders to
mitigate . . . reentry into the criminal justice system while
protecting public safety”; (2) allow “local discretion and flexibility
for counties in the development and implementation of diversion
6
. . . across a continuum of care settings”; and (3) “provid[e]
diversion that meets the . . . needs of individuals with mental
health disorders.” (§ 1001.35.)
In 2023, the Legislature amended section 1001.36,
redefining the criteria set forth in subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2) as
“eligibility” requirements, and the criteria set forth in
subdivision (c)(1) through (c)(4) as “suitability” requirements.
(Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891
(Sarmiento).) A court may, in its discretion, grant pretrial
diversion if the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements
under subdivision (b) and the court determines that the
defendant is suitable for diversion under subdivision (c).
(§ 1001.36, subd. (a).)
A defendant is eligible for diversion if: (1) “[t]he defendant
has been diagnosed with a mental disorder as identified in the
most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders” and (2) “[t]he defendant’s mental disorder was
a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)–(2).) The court must assume that the
defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the
commission of the charged offense, “unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, casual
factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in
the alleged offense.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).)
If a “defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements . . . in
subdivision (b),” the court then must determine “whether the
defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion.” (§ 1001.36,
subds. (a) & (c).) A defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion if:
(1) according to a “qualified mental health expert,” the
“defendant’s . . . mental disorder causing, contributing to, or
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motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental health
treatment”; (2) “[t]he defendant consents to diversion and waives
[the] right to a speedy trial”; (3) “[t]he defendant agrees to comply
with treatment as a condition of diversion”; and (4) “[t]he
defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety . . . if treated in the community.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)–(4).)
The trial court retains “residual” discretion to deny
diversion even where the defendant makes a prima facie showing
that he or she meets all the statutory requirements. (Sarmiento,
supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892.) This discretion must be
exercised “ ‘ “consistent with the principles and purpose of the
governing law.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “That purpose includes a strong
legislative preference for treatment of mental health disorders
because of the benefits of such treatment to both the offending
individual and the community. Where the court chooses to
exercise this residual discretion to deny diversion, its statement
of reasons should reflect consideration of the underlying purposes
of the statute and explain why diversion would not meet those
goals.” (Id. at pp. 892–893.)
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mental
health diversion for abuse of discretion. (People v. Moine (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448 (Moine).) An abuse of discretion occurs
when a court “makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by either
applying the wrong legal standard” or “bas[ing] its decision on . . .
factual findings . . . not supported by substantial evidence.” (Id.
at p. 449.)
The court found that Molina met the eligibility
requirements for pretrial diversion. Dr. Grand reported that
Molina was diagnosed with various mental health and substance
abuse disorders, and that those disorders played a significant role
8
in the commission of the charged offenses. (See § 1001.36,
subd. (b)(1)–(2).) The only issue on appeal is whether the court
abused its discretion in finding Molina was not suitable for
diversion because she posed an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety if treated in the community. (See id., subd. (c)(4).)
“[U]nreasonable risk of danger to public safety” is defined
by section 1170.18 subdivision (c), and it requires the court to
find that the defendant is likely to commit a super strike as
defined by section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). (§§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4); 1170.18, subd. (c); see also Moine, supra,
62 Cal.App.5th at p. 450.) Section 667 lists a series of qualifying
super strikes, including “any homicide offense . . . [and] any
attempted homicide offense.” (See § 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV).)
In determining whether a defendant poses an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety if treated within the community,
the “court may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the
defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider
the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and
criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other
factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4).) As we explain, the court did not abuse its discretion
when it found Molina posed an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety if she were treated in the community.
While Molina’s charged offenses—assault with a deadly
weapon and false imprisonment—do not qualify as super strikes
(see § 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)), the trial court found that Molina’s
conduct—holding a knife to the victims’ necks—was “extremely
violent.” Indeed, such conduct could have resulted in serious
injury, or even death, to either of the victims. Based on the
circumstances of the charged offenses, the court reasonably could
9
find that Molina posed an unreasonable risk of committing a
super strike—i.e., a homicide or attempted homicide offense—if
treated in the community. (See People v. Bunas (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 840, 861–862 [the trial court may rely solely on
the circumstances of the underlying offense in determining a
defendant’s suitability for diversion].)
Molina’s long history of unresolved mental health and
substance abuse issues, coupled with the unavailability of a
suitable secure treatment facility, also support the court’s finding
that she posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if
treated within the community. According to Dr. Grand, Molina
would not pose a risk of committing a super strike if she
remained “sober, supervised and on medications.” Molina,
however, had been abusing drugs and alcohol for nearly a decade
before the underlying assaults. During that time, Molina never
participated in a formal drug treatment program, nor did she
have any considerable periods of sobriety. Dr. Grand also
reported that Molina did not seek treatment for her mental
health disorders, even though she was “identified with ADHD
and Bipolar Disorder as an adolescent and child,” and she was
noncompliant with her psychotropic medications. Based on this
record, it was reasonable for the court to find that Molina could
not safely be treated in the community unless she were admitted
to a secure facility. Because the only secure facility that could
meet Molina’s treatment needs rejected her, the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Molina’s request for diversion.
Relying on Moine, Molina argues it was “logically
inconsistent” for the court to find she posed an unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety if treated in the community while later
releasing her on time served after she entered her no contest
10
plea. The defendant in Moine, who had no history of committing
violent crimes, fought another patient at an urgent care facility.
(Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 444.) A year later, the
defendant threatened to shoot an urgent care worker, but he
immediately and profusely apologized for making the threat. (Id.
at pp. 444–445.) The defendant was later charged with several
counts of assault and criminal threats. (Id. at p. 444.) The court
released the defendant on bond for two years, finding he was not
likely to cause great bodily harm to others if released into the
community. (Id. at p. 451.)
Before trial, the defendant requested pretrial mental
health diversion, and he submitted a report in which two
psychiatrists concluded that he posed a low risk for future
assault. (Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 446–447.)
The court denied the defendant’s request, finding he posed an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated within the
community. (Id. at p. 447.) The Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court’s order denying diversion, explaining that it was
“logically inconsistent to deny mental health diversion on the
ground that [the defendant] was likely to commit a super-strike
offense, while simultaneously finding he was not likely to inflict
great bodily injury on persons in the community.” (Id. at p. 451.)
Moine is distinguishable. Here, Molina remained in
custody from the time of her arrest for the underlying charges
through the proceedings on her request for mental health
diversion. In addition, unlike the trial court in Moine, the trial
court in this case never found that Molina was not likely to harm
others if released into the community, nor did it otherwise make
any finding that contradicts its determination that Molina posed
an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the
11
community. Further, to the extent it may appear inconsistent to
deny a defendant’s request for pretrial mental health diversion
while simultaneously allowing her to enter a plea that results in
her immediate release for time served, that is not the test for
error under the diversion statute. The trial court here was
tasked with determining whether Molina was both eligible and
suitable for diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) The court evaluated
both prongs and determined that Molina was not suitable for
diversion because she posed an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety if treated in the community. As we explained above,
that finding was supported by the record. The court, therefore,
did not abuse its discretion when it denied Molina’s request for
diversion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
WILEY, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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