CourtListener 10676270•People v. Osteen CA2/8
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 9/23/25 P. v. Osteen CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B337586
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA499076)
v.
DARION OSTEEN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Gustavo N. Sztraicher, Judge. Affirmed.
Torres & Torres and Steven A. Torres for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Theresa A. Patterson, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Darion Osteen pled no contest to one count of
taking or driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent. The trial
court ordered Osteen to pay over $1,600 in victim restitution to
the car’s owner for damage caused to the car’s steering column
and ignition switch. Osteen contends the court erred in ordering
him to pay victim restitution, claiming he did not cause the
underlying damage to the car. We reject this argument and
affirm.
BACKGROUND
Around 8:00 p.m. on May 31, 2021, a police officer stopped
Osteen while he was driving an SUV that had been reported
stolen earlier that day. The officer noticed that the SUV’s
ignition switch was broken, and that the steering column had
been dismantled and wrapped with black electrical tape.
The officer also saw a pair of pliers in the cup holder that were
used to start the car’s ignition.
The People charged Osteen with driving or taking a vehicle
without the owner’s consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)),
alleging that he drove the vehicle with the intent to deprive the
owner of title and possession of the vehicle. The People also
alleged that Osteen suffered a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code,
§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12) and a prior vehicle theft conviction
(Pen. Code, § 666.5).
Osteen pled no contest to driving or taking a vehicle in
violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). As part
of the agreed-upon disposition, the court sentenced Osteen to
16 months in state prison, with credit for time served, and
ordered him to pay victim restitution.
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At the restitution hearing, the SUV’s owner testified that
his car was not damaged when he left it the night before he
reported it stolen. After recovering the car following Osteen’s
arrest, the owner noticed that the car’s steering column and
ignition switch had been damaged, which cost $1,625.48 to
repair. The pliers found in the cup holder did not belong to the
owner, but he used them to start the car so that he could drive it
home.
Osteen did not dispute the amount of damage claimed by
the car’s owner. Instead, Osteen argued that he should not be
required to pay victim restitution because he only drove the car
in an unlawful manner. There was no evidence, Osteen claimed,
that he stole the car or otherwise damaged its steering column
and ignition switch. The court rejected Osteen’s argument and
ordered him to pay the car’s owner $1,625.48 in victim
restitution.
Osteen appeals.
DISCUSSION
The People urge us to dismiss Osteen’s appeal because he
did not obtain a certificate of probable cause after he pled no
contest to a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851,
subdivision (a). (See Pen. Code, § 1237.5; People v. Mendez (1999)
19 Cal.4th 1084, 1096.) In the alternative, the People argue that
Osteen is estopped from challenging the restitution order because
he agreed to pay victim restitution as part of his plea agreement.
We need not address these arguments because we reject Osteen’s
challenge to the victim restitution order on its merits.
The California Constitution requires the trial court to order
victim restitution for losses suffered “as a result of criminal
activity.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A) & (B).)
3
Restitution must be ordered “in every case in which a victim has
suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct.”
(Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f).) Restitution is limited to losses
that were proximately caused by the conduct for which the
defendant was convicted. (People v. Foalima (2015)
239 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1395.) The defendant’s criminal conduct is
the proximate cause of the victim’s loss if it is “a substantial
factor in bringing about the injury.” (Id. at p. 1396.)
The standard of proof at a restitution hearing is
preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Holmberg (2011)
195 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1319 (Holmberg).) In determining the
amount of restitution owed, the court may consider the probation
report, including the victim’s statements about the value of the
damaged or stolen property. (People v. Gemelli (2008)
161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1543.)
We generally review the trial court’s restitution order for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Crisler (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th
1503, 1507.) The court does not abuse its discretion where there
is a factual and rational basis for its restitution award. (People v.
Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26.) As we explain, the court
did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Osteen to pay victim
restitution.
Contrary to Osteen’s assertion that he was convicted of
only driving a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851,
subdivision (a), he pled no contest to driving or taking a vehicle in
violation of that statute. That is, while the information alleged
that Osteen drove the stolen vehicle with the intent to deprive its
owner of title and possession, he pled no contest to a generic
violation of that statute. Indeed, when entering his plea, Osteen
4
admitted that he “committed the crime of driving or taking a
vehicle without consent.”
There was evidence from which the court could infer that
Osteen took the victim’s car and, in doing so, damaged the
steering column and ignition switch so that he could start the car
without its keys. When the victim left his car the night before
Osteen was arrested, the car was undamaged. When the police
found Osteen driving the car about 24 hours later, the car’s
steering column and ignition switch were damaged, and there
was a pair of pliers inside the car that were used to start its
ignition. There was no evidence that anyone other than Osteen
stole the car or damaged the car’s steering column and ignition
switch.
Osteen relies on Holmberg. There, the defendant pled no
contest to concealing stolen property after he received computer
equipment that had been taken during several burglaries,
including computers, hard drives, and Ethernet cables.
(Holmberg, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1313–1315.) The trial
court ordered him to pay more than $18,000 in victim restitution.
(Id. at p. 1313.) On appeal, the defendant challenged the
restitution order, arguing, among other things, that there was
insufficient evidence to support the portion of the award
attributable to the Ethernet cables, which, unlike the other stolen
items, were not found at the defendant’s home. (Id. at p. 1324.)
The appellate court agreed and reversed the portion of the
restitution award attributable to the cables, concluding there was
no evidence that the defendant ever possessed them. (Id. at
p. 1325.)
Holmberg is distinguishable. Here, it is undisputed that
Osteen possessed the stolen property—i.e., the victim’s car.
5
Further, as we just explained, there was evidence from which the
court could infer that Osteen took the car and damaged its
steering column and ignition switch so that he could start it
without keys.
In sum, the court did not abuse its discretion when it
ordered Osteen to pay $1,625.48 in victim restitution.
DISPOSITION
The victim restitution order is affirmed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
WILEY, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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