In re Everleigh G.

CourtListener 10673761Calctapp18.09.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 9/18/25 In re Everleigh G.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re EVERLEIGH G., B343369

A Person Coming Under (Los Angeles County
the Juvenile Court Law, Super. Ct. No.
24CCJP02211)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JENNIFER S.,

Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the orders of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Daniel Z. Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed.

Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******
Jennifer S. (mother) appeals the trial court’s exertion of
dependency jurisdiction over her three-year-old daughter
Everleigh, asserting that it is unsupported by the evidence.
Because substantial evidence supports several of the grounds for
jurisdiction, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The family
Mother and Everett G. (father) had Everleigh in May
2022.1 Mother and father’s romantic relationship ended in 2023
and they did not live together in 2024, but they were actively
coparenting Everleigh and father often visited mother and
Everleigh at mother’s residence.

1 Mother and father each have other children, but they are
not in their custody and are not at issue in this case.

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B. Incidents giving rise to dependency jurisdiction
1. Domestic violence
On June 26, 2024, while father was visiting mother and
while mother held Everleigh in her arms, father grabbed mother
by her hair, threw a cup at her, burned her arm with a lit
cigarette, and pushed her down onto the bed.2 Father later
admitted that he had lost his temper at mother.
In addition to prior verbal altercations, the June 2024
incident was not the first incident of physical violence between
mother and father. Father had pushed mother or grabbed her by
the throat a few times before she was pregnant with Everleigh,
and father got into a physical altercation with her in February
2024. Mother did not report any of these prior incidents to law
enforcement.
Although mother reported the June 2024 incident to law
enforcement and obtained an emergency protective order against
father, she did not renew or enforce the order and immediately
thereafter permitted father to enter her residence.
2. Everleigh’s broken femur and ear infections
On July 11, 2024, mother brought Everleigh to the
California Hospital with a fractured femur and ear infections
that had gone untreated long enough for fluid to be dripping from
her ears. Mother explained that Everleigh had injured herself
tripping over the family dog the day before. Although the
treating physicians “suspected child abuse” and contacted law

2 Although father later reported that the cigarette was unlit
and the record is inconsistent regarding whether mother was
actually holding Everleigh during the incident in question, we
view the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s
ruling.

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enforcement because mother’s explanation of Everleigh’s femoral
injury was “not consistent with the injury,” subsequent doctors
opined that mother’s explanation was “plausible” and consistent
with “tripping over a dog.”
3. Father’s drug use
After proclaiming that he did not use drugs on July 12,
2024, father on the same day tested positive for
methamphetamine and amphetamines. Father then admitted
that he used methamphetamine a few times in 2024, and the
Department discovered he had been arrested several times for
possession of a controlled substance in the past. Although
mother denied knowing of father’s substance abuse, father
reported that mother was aware of it because he ingested the
drugs in her presence.
II. Procedural Background
On July 16, 2024, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition
asking the juvenile court to exert dependency jurisdiction over
Everleigh. As relevant here, in the operative, first amended
petition, the Department alleged that jurisdiction was
appropriate because (1) mother and father had “medically
neglected [Everleigh] by failing to obtain timely and necessary
medical treatment” for her fractured femur and ear infections; (2)
father “is a current user of marijuana, methamphetamines and
amphetamines” and has a “history of substance abuse” that
renders father “incapable of providing regular care for” Everleigh,
and mother “knew or reasonably should have known of father’s
substance abuse” but “continued to allow [him] to have unlimited
access” to Everleigh; and (3) father has “a history of engaging in
violent altercations in [Everleigh’s] presence,” and mother “failed

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to protect the child” by “allow[ing] . . . father to frequent the
child’s home and have unlimited contact with the child.” The
Department further alleged that this conduct “endangers the
child’s physical health and safety, creates a detrimental home
environment,” “places the child at risk of serious physical harm,
damage, danger and medical neglect,” and thereby warrants the
exercise of dependency jurisdiction under subdivision (b) of
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.3
On January 7, 2025, the trial court held the jurisdictional
and dispositional hearing. The court sustained the above-
enumerated allegations as stated, removed Everleigh from father
while placing her in mother’s custody, and ordered family
maintenance services for mother and reunification services for
father.
Mother filed this timely appeal.4
DISCUSSION
Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in exerting
dependency jurisdiction over Everleigh because all three of the
court’s asserted grounds for jurisdiction lack evidentiary support.

3 All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
The juvenile court did not sustain the Department’s
allegations that the parents had non-accidentally caused
Everleigh’s femoral injury, that mother had inflicted domestic
violence on father, and that the domestic violence allegations
warranted the exercise of jurisdiction under subdivision (a) of
section 300.

4 The Department asks us to take judicial notice of
subsequent developments in the proceedings below, including
later-filed supplemental petitions with new allegations against
both parents. We deny the Department’s request.

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Although each ground alleges conduct by mother and father and
although father has not appealed, mother can and does challenge
the evidence as to both parents in this appeal. (In re B.H. (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 469, 481-482 (B.H.); cf. In re Alysha S. (1996) 51
Cal.App.4th 393, 397 [“[A] jurisdictional finding good against one
parent is good against both”].) However, because a single ground
for jurisdiction is sufficient, we may affirm as long as any of the
grounds for jurisdiction is valid. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th
266, 283 (D.P.).) Where, as here, a parent challenges a juvenile
court’s jurisdictional findings for lack of evidentiary support, our
task is to ask whether substantial evidence supports those
findings. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) Because, as
explained below, substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s exertion of dependency jurisdiction based on the
allegations of domestic violence and substance abuse, we need not
determine whether substantial evidence also supports the
exertion of jurisdiction based on medical neglect.
I. Domestic Violence
Dependency jurisdiction may be exercised under
subdivision (b) of section 300 when a child “has suffered, or there
is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical
harm or illness, as a result of” “[t]he failure or inability of the
child’s parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.” (§
300, subd. (b)(1)(A).) Exposing a child to domestic violence can
constitute a failure to protect a child from the risk of serious
physical injury under this subdivision. (In re L.O. (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 227, 238; In re R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 930,
941.) This risk of harm must exist at the time of the
jurisdictional hearing (In re M.M. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 703,
719), so the risk arising from a child’s exposure to domestic

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violence turns in part on whether “the violence is ongoing or
likely to continue.” (In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713,
717 (Daisy H.), disapproved on other grounds by D.P., supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 278; In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1453-
1454; In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 411.) In examining
this risk, however, the juvenile court need not wait for a child to
be injured before stepping in (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th
126, 134), and a parent’s past conduct can be a reliable predictor
of future risk (R.C., at p. 942).
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that Everleigh faces a risk of physical harm based on father’s
domestic violence against mother and mother’s failure to protect
Everleigh. Mother and father have a history of domestic violence
that dates back several years and occurred as recently as
incidents in February 2024 and June 2024. These last two
incidents occurred even after mother and father ended their
romantic relationship and while they lived apart. Although the
most recent incident occurred six months before the jurisdictional
hearing in January 2025, the risk of harm remained in light of
the longstanding volatile nature of their relationship, which had
withstood longer lapses before flaring back into violence. This
pattern of conduct poses a risk of physical harm to Everleigh
because it has at times occurred in Everleigh’s presence and thus
when she was in harm’s way. Mother has also not taken steps to
protect Everleigh: Although she called law enforcement after the
June 2024 incident, she did not call them after the prior
incidents, did not renew the emergency protective order after the
June 2024 incident, and invited father back into the home in July
2024.

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Mother responds with two further arguments. First, she
argues that there is no longer any risk because she called the
police after the June 2024 incident and obtained an emergency
restraining order, the juvenile court ordered only monitored visits
going forward, and Everleigh was not injured during any of the
prior domestic violence incidents. Although mother called the
police after the latest incident and obtained a short-term
restraining order, she did not call the police after the many prior
incidents, allowed the restraining order to expire, and then
invited father back into her residence. The monitored visits
going forward do not affect the risk at the time of the
jurisdictional hearing. And the fortuity that Everleigh has not
yet been injured does not eliminate the risk of injury. Second,
mother asserts that this case is like other decisions where there
was insubstantial evidence of risk to the child—namely, In re
Jesus M. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 104; B.H., supra, 103
Cal.App.5th 469; and Daisy H., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 713. But
each of those decisions is distinguishable on their facts: The
court in Jesus M. held that there was no risk where the last
incident of physical violence was more than three years prior and
where the alleged risk of physical harm was based solely on
father’s violation of a restraining order by verbally denigrating
the mother in front of the children (Jesus M., at pp. 111-113); the
court in B.H. held that there was no risk when the last incident
of domestic violence occurred eight years prior to the
jurisdictional hearing and the parents rarely interacted (B.H., at
pp. 482-483); and the court in Daisy H. held that there was no
risk when the last incident of domestic violence occurred two or
seven years prior to the jurisdictional hearing (Daisy H., at p.
717).

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II. Substance Abuse
Dependency jurisdiction may be exercised under
subdivision (b) of section 300 when a child “has suffered, or there
is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical
harm or illness, as a result of” a parent’s “inability . . . to provide
regular care for the child due to the parent’s . . . substance
abuse.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(D).) As pertinent here, this requires
the Department to prove that “(1) substance abuse (2) makes a
parent . . . unable to provide regular care for a child and (3) this
inability . . . creates a substantial risk” “the child” may “suffer
serious physical harm or illness.” (In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th
520, 558 (M.R.).)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that Everleigh faces a risk of harm due to father’s abuse of
methamphetamine and amphetamines and mother’s failure to
protect Everleigh from his substance abuse. It is undisputed that
father was using these drugs in the summer of 2024, that he lied
to the Department about using them, and that mother denied
knowing of that use while father freely admitted mother knew.
Father’s and mother’s unwillingness to admit to father’s drug
use, in conjunction with Everleigh’s young age and father’s
volatile temper flaring into violence, creates a substantial risk of
injury due to that substance abuse and mother’s failure to protect
Everleigh from it. (In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th
1036, 1044 [“Denial is a factor often relevant to determining
whether persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future
without court supervision”]; In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283,
293 [same]; N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 558-559 [“It is
reasonable for courts to infer that very young children require a
substantial degree of close supervision”].)

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DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, J.
BAKER

_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)

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