CourtListener 10673732•People v. Richardson CA6
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 9/18/25 P. v. Richardson CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H052629
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. SC016712A)
v.
PATRICK LAMONT
RICHARDSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 1992, a jury convicted defendant Patrick Lamont Richardson of first
degree felony murder (among other crimes) and found true that Richardson
personally used a firearm. The jury also found true three felony murder
special circumstances. The trial court sentenced Richardson to life in prison
without possibility of parole.
In 2019, Richardson filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code1
section 1170.95 (now section 1172.62). The trial court denied that petition at
1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature amended section 1170.95 in
several respects. (See Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 775) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, §§ 1, 2.) The Legislature later renumbered
section 1170.95 as section 1172.6, with no change to the text of the statute
the prima facie stage after reviewing case-related documents and deciding
that the facts sufficiently established Richardson was the actual killer and a
major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
In 2024, Richardson filed another petition under section 1172.6. In
October 2024, the trial court denied that petition, again at the prima facie
stage. The court ruled that because it had previously found Richardson
ineligible for relief, the collateral estoppel doctrine precluded the court from
conducting the same analysis on the same facts. Richardson appeals from
the court’s October 2024 order denying relief.3
Richardson contends the trial court erred in denying his petition as
barred by collateral estoppel because that petition rests on new legal
authority that challenges the basis for denying his prior petition. The
Attorney General agrees with Richardson, conceding that the court’s denial of
Richardson’s current petition was premature. The Attorney General suggests
this matter should be remanded to consider whether Richardson has made a
prima facie case for relief.
The Attorney General’s concession is well taken. Accordingly, we
reverse the trial court’s order denying Richardson’s petition and remand with
directions that the trial court conduct further proceedings under section
1172.6, subdivision (c), consistent with current law.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10, eff. June 30, 2022). Unless stated otherwise,
citations refer to the current version of the statute codified in section 1172.6.
3 Richardson filed another section 1172.6 petition in November 2024.
The trial court denied that petition in December 2024, and Richardson
appealed. We resolve Richardson’s additional appeal in a decision filed this
day in case No. H052871.
2
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4
A. Trial Proceedings
In September 1991, the Monterey County District Attorney filed an
information charging Richardson and three codefendants (Lester Lamount
Polk, Eugene Leonard Ballance, and John Lewis Drayton) with nine offenses
committed on or about June 14, 1991: murder (§ 187; count 1), three counts
of robbery (§ 212.5; counts 2, 3, & 4), burglary (§ 459; count 5), two counts of
assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 6 & 7), forcible sexual
penetration with a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a); count 8), and conspiracy to
commit robbery (§§ 182, 212.5; count 9).
As to count 1, the information alleged the special circumstances of
murder during the commission of robbery, burglary, and rape by instrument
(former § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i), (vii), (xi)). As to counts 1 through 8, the
information alleged Richardson and two codefendants (Polk and Drayton)
personally used a firearm in the commission of each offense (§ 12022.5)
(firearm allegations).
At trial, the trial court instructed the jurors on, inter alia, aiding and
abetting principles (including mention of the natural and probable
consequences doctrine) (see CALJIC Nos. 3.00–3.02), first degree felony
murder (see CALJIC Nos. 8.00, 8.10, 8.21, 8.26, 8.27), felony murder special
circumstances (see CALJIC Nos. 8.80.1, 8.81.17), and personal use of a
firearm (see CALJIC No. 17.19).5
4 We omit a summary of the facts of Richardson’s offense because the
facts are not germane to our resolution of the legal claim raised in this
appeal.
5 The instant appellate record includes some reporter’s transcripts and
other documents from Richardson’s trial.
3
In October 1992, a jury convicted Richardson as charged and returned
true findings on the three special circumstances, the firearm allegations, and
each overt act alleged in the conspiracy charge.
In December 1992, after a penalty phase trial and jury
recommendation of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole
(LWOP), the trial court imposed that sentence on count 1. On the remaining
counts, and concurrent with the LWOP sentence, the trial court imposed an
aggregate determinate term of 15 years eight months in prison. Richardson
appealed.
In October 1994, a different panel of this court affirmed the judgment.
(People v. Richardson (Oct. 20, 1994, H010735) [nonpub. opn.].)
B. First Petition for Resentencing
In January 2019, Richardson filed a petition under former section
1170.95 (first petition). The trial court appointed counsel to represent
Richardson.
In April 2019, the district attorney filed an opposition to Richardson’s
petition. The district attorney argued, inter alia, that Richardson was
ineligible for relief because he was the actual killer or, alternatively, he was a
major participant in the underlying felonies of robbery and burglary and
acted with reckless disregard to human life. The district attorney attached
as exhibits to the opposition the reporter’s transcript of an August 1991
preliminary hearing held in the underlying prosecution of Richardson, the
September 1991 information, the clerk’s minute order reflecting the jury’s
verdicts at Richardson’s trial, this court’s October 1994 opinion on direct
appeal, and the 2006 decision of a federal district court denying Richardson’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus.
4
In August 2019, the trial court held a hearing on Richardson’s petition
and denied it for failing to make prima facie showing for relief.6 The court
stated that it had reviewed the district attorney’s exhibits. The court also
described the facts of the crime based on those exhibits. The court concluded
“[t]he facts in this case are sufficient to establish that . . . Richardson[] was
the actual killer” of the deceased victim and “[a]lternatively, the facts in this
case were also sufficient to establish that [Richardson] was a major
participant in the underlying felony burglary and robbery of the murder
victim and his family, and . . . Richardson, acted with reckless indifference to
human life.”
Richardson did not appeal the trial court’s denial of his first petition.
C. Second Petition for Resentencing
In October 2022, Richardson filed a second petition under section
1172.6. The instant appellate record does not indicate whether the trial court
took any action on that petition.
D. Third Petition for Resentencing
On February 5, 2024, Richardson filed another petition under section
1172.6 (third petition). The trial court appointed the public defender to
represent Richardson.
In April 2024, the district attorney filed an opposition to the third
petition contending it should be denied based on issue preclusion (also known
as collateral estoppel). The district attorney attached as an exhibit to the
opposition the reporter’s transcript of the August 2019 hearing on
Richardson’s first petition. The district attorney asserted, “All five threshold
requirements of issue preclusion apply because the exact same factual issue
was litigated by the exact same parties years ago when the petition was
6 Richardson was not present in court for this hearing.
5
denied in 2019. Since 2019 there have been no changes in the law that would
now allow an actual killer to be eligible for relief.”
Richardson’s public defender filed a reply to the district attorney’s
opposition contending the third petition should be considered on the merits.
Counsel asserted that principles of collateral estoppel should not be applied
to deny relief at the prima facie stage because the documents in the record
regarding the first petition “did not show [Richardson] was ineligible as a
matter of law.” Counsel argued that because Richardson had been tried by a
jury, the August 1991 preliminary hearing transcript “is not part of the
record of conviction” (citing People v. Houck (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 350, 356).
Counsel further argued neither the September 1991 information nor the
minute order of the jury’s trial verdict rendered Richardson ineligible for
relief as a matter of law, and the trial court’s use of the facts described in this
court’s direct appeal opinion was improper under section 1172.6 (as amended
by Senate Bill 775) and constituted inappropriate factfinding under People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis).
In June 2024, the public defender filed a declaration by Richardson in
support of the reply. The declaration principally asserted detrimental
consequences due to Richardson’s absence from the proceedings on his first
petition.
On June 20, 2024, the trial court granted Richardson’s request to
represent himself and relieved the public defender.
On August 27, 2024, the trial court appointed new defense counsel
through the alternate defender’s office.
In September 2024, defense counsel filed a supplemental reply to the
district attorney’s opposition.
6
On October 8, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Richardson’s third
petition.7 The court noted Richardson’s failure to appeal from the court’s
August 2019 ruling on his first petition. The court explained that because it
had previously determined Richardson was the actual killer and found
Richardson was ineligible for relief at the prima facie stage, that finding
precluded the court from “conducting the same analysis on the same exact
facts at the prima faci[e] stage.” The court stated that “[t]he 2019 petition
and its denial satisfies all five threshold requirements for the [c]ourt to
preclude relitigating Mr. Richardson’s eligibility for relief under his
subsequent Penal Code section 1172.6 petition.” The court explained that
“[n]o changes in the amended statute change the law that would now make
an actual killer eligible for relief,” “[t]he filing of a[] [section] 1172.6 petition
does not provide a do-over on factual disputes that have already been
resolved, and it does not entitle Mr. Richardson to relitigate issues already
decided by this [c]ourt in 2019 in the absence of any new legal authority
which challenges the basis of this [c]ourt’s ruling in 2019.”
The court concluded its ruling by stating that it “stands by” its August
2019 ruling and explaining that Richardson’s third petition, “which raises the
same exact issues litigated in 2019 and requests resentencing based on the
same issues previously denied by this [c]ourt, is barred under the [c]ollateral
[e]stoppel [d]octrine and is respectfully denied.”8
7 The bench officer who ruled on Richardson’s first petition also ruled
on his third petition.
8 Additionally, the trial court declined to respond to Richardson’s
separate request for resentencing under Assembly Bill No. 600 (2023–2024
Reg. Sess.) (amending section 1172.1 (see People v. Griggs (2025) 109
Cal.App.5th 1231, 1234)). The court also declined to consider, for lack of
jurisdiction, Richardson’s motion for relief under the Racial Justice Act
(§ 745). Richardson raises no claim in this appeal regarding those rulings.
7
Richardson appealed from the trial court’s denial of his third petition.
II. DISCUSSION
Richardson contends his third petition is not precluded because it rests
on new legal authority that challenges the trial court’s basis for denying his
first petition. He asserts that when the court denied his first petition, the
court applied an incorrect standard regarding his eligibility for relief and
engaged in impermissible factfinding contrary to Lewis. Richardson further
notes that his jury trial occurred before the California Supreme Court
decided People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63
Cal.4th 522, and that his first petition was denied before our high court
decided People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong).9 Richardson claims
that current law makes clear that the factual summary in this court’s prior
opinion in the direct appeal may not establish ineligibility at the prima facie
stage.
Additionally, Richardson contends the record of his conviction does not
conclusively preclude relief and this matter should be remanded for issuance
of an order to show cause and an evidentiary hearing because the jury’s
finding on the firearm allegation attached to the murder count does not
establish that he was “the actual shooter or harbored the requisite mens rea,”
the aiding and abetting instructions included the now invalid natural and
probable consequences doctrine, the felony murder and special circumstances
9 In Banks and Clark, our Supreme Court “provided substantial
guidance on the meaning of” major participation and reckless indifference to
human life under section 190.2, subdivision (d). (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 703.) Later, in Strong, the court concluded: “Findings issued by a jury
before Banks and Clark do not preclude a defendant from making out a prima
facie case for relief under [section 1172.6]. This is true even if the trial
evidence would have been sufficient to support the findings under Banks and
Clark.” (Id. at p. 710; see also id. at p. 721.)
8
instructions do not preclude Richardson from making the requisite prima
facie showing, and the record does not conclusively demonstrate the jury
made findings to support a murder conviction under current law.
A. Legal Principles
1. Issue Preclusion
“ ‘As traditionally understood and applied, issue preclusion bars
relitigation of issues earlier decided “only if several threshold requirements
are fulfilled. First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be
identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must
have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have
been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in
the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party
against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with,
the party to the former proceeding.” ’ [Citation.] ‘The party asserting
collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing these requirements.” ”
(People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 451–452 (Curiel).) “ ‘[T]he doctrine
will not be applied if such application would not serve its underlying
fundamental principles’ of promoting efficiency while ensuring fairness to the
parties.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 716.) Moreover, “preclusion does
not apply when there has been a significant change in the law since the
factual findings were rendered that warrants reexamination of the issue.”
(Ibid.)
2. Section 1172.6
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 1437) “ ‘amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did
9
not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ”
(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842, superseded by statute on
another ground as stated in People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869; see
also § 188, subd. (a)(3).)
Senate Bill 1437 added section 189, subdivision (e) to narrow the
application of the felony-murder rule. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3; see Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 448.) “[S]ection 189, as amended, now limits liability
under a felony-murder theory principally to ‘actual killer[s]’ [citation] and
those who, ‘with the intent to kill,’ aid or abet ‘the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree’ [citation]. Defendants who were
neither actual killers nor acted with the intent to kill can be held liable for
murder only if they were ‘major participant[s] in the underlying felony and
acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d)
of . . . [s]ection 190.2’ — that is, the statute defining the felony-murder
special circumstance.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708, quoting § 189,
subd. (e).)
“Senate Bill 1437 also created a special procedural mechanism for those
convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as
amended.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) When the trial court
receives a petition under section 1172.6 requesting vacatur of a murder
conviction and resentencing, and “containing the necessary declaration and
other required information, the court must evaluate the petition ‘to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’
[Citations.] If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that
the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.
[Citations.] If, instead, the defendant has made a prima facie showing of
10
entitlement to relief, ‘the court shall issue an order to show cause.’ ” (Ibid.,
citing Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970–972,10 § 1172.6, subd. (c); see also
Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460; People v. Hickman (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th
1262, 1268 [“A trial court may deny a section 1172.6 petition ‘at the prima
facie stage only if “the petition and record in the case establish conclusively
that the defendant is ineligible for relief” as a matter of law.’ ”].)
During the prima facie stage of review, the trial court “may look at the
record of conviction . . . to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima
facie” showing. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The prima facie inquiry
under section 1172.6, subdivision (c) is “limited.” (Ibid.) The court “ ‘ “takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her
factual allegations were proved.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘[A] court should not reject the
petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting
an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citation.] ‘However, if the record, including the
court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility determination
adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Although the court may rely on the
record of conviction in determining whether defendant has made a prima
facie showing, the court “should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Id. at p. 972; see also
People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 562–567 (Patton).)
10 When amending former section 1170.95 in Senate Bill 775, the
Legislature expressly “[c]odifie[d] the holdings of [Lewis] regarding . . . the
standard for determining the existence of a prima facie case.” (See Stats.
2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (b); see also People v. Birdsall (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
859, 865.)
11
“Where facts from the record of conviction are undisputed, accepting
them over contrary legal allegations that are merely conclusory is not
‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ”
(Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 565–566.) “But petitioners need not, at the
prima facie stage, meet an evidentiary burden of proof to establish
entitlement to relief, such as the burden of proof applicable to the People if
trying to defeat relief at the later [section 1172.6,] subdivision (d)(3) hearing.
Rather, petitioners confronting a record of conviction that demonstrates relief
is unavailable have the burden of coming forward with nonconclusory
allegations to alert the prosecution and the court to what issues an
evidentiary hearing would entail.” (Id. at pp. 566–567, fn. omitted.)
Moreover, at the prima facie stage, an allegation that the petitioner
could not currently be convicted of a homicide offense because of changes
made to homicide law by Senate Bill 1437 “is not refuted by the record unless
the record conclusively establishes every element of the offense.” (Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463; see also People v. Morales (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
1120, 1130–1131; People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.) “[A] relevant
jury finding is generally preclusive in section 1172.6 proceedings, i.e., it
‘ordinarily establish[es] a defendant’s ineligibility for resentencing under
Senate Bill 1437 and thus preclude[s] the defendant from making a prima
facie case for relief.’ ” (Curiel, at pp. 453–454.)
Nonetheless, “[b]ecause a jury’s felony-murder special-circumstance
finding made before Banks and Clark carries with it a significant risk that it
does not reflect a determination under the correct legal standard, Strong held
that those decisions ‘represent the sort of significant change that has
traditionally been thought to warrant reexamination of an earlier-litigated
issue.’ [Citation.] ‘There are many petitioners with pre-Banks and Clark
12
felony-murder special-circumstance findings who nevertheless could not be
convicted of murder today.’ [Citation.] It would therefore be inequitable to
give preclusive effect to those findings in later resentencing proceedings
under section 1172.6. ‘For petitioners with pre-Banks/Clark findings, no
judge or jury has ever found the currently required degree of culpability for a
first time. Allowing reexamination of the issue under these circumstances
does not permit “a second bite of the apple” because the changes in the law
mean there is now “a different apple.” ’ ” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
pp. 454–455.)
3. Standard of Review
“We independently review the denial of a resentencing petition at the
prima facie stage, whether the denial is based on the issue preclusion
doctrine [citation], the law of the case doctrine [citation], or, more generally,
failure by the petitioner to make a prima facie showing under section 1172.6.”
(People v. Beaudreaux (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1238–1239 (Beaudreaux);
accord, People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200.)
B. Analysis
The Attorney General acknowledges that Lewis and Strong “limited the
factfinding role of trial courts at the prima facie stage.” The Attorney
General agrees with Richardson that the trial court “erred in ruling that
collateral estoppel required it to find [Richardson] ineligible for relief as a
matter of law due to the court’s 2019 ruling on his first petition.” The
Attorney General concedes that Richardson’s “first petition did not receive
the correct analysis” under subsequently decided cases that “redefined the
legal standard for making a prima facie showing” and those decisions
“constitute a relevant change in the law.”
13
We agree that the trial court erred in denying Richardson’s third
petition by deciding that its August 2019 ruling precluded consideration of
the third petition.
There is no bar to successive petitions under section 1172.6 when “the
subsequent petition rest[s] on new legal authority which challenged the basis
for the [trial] court’s summary denial of the previous petition.” (People v.
Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 946–947 (Farfan); see also id. at pp. 950–
951; Beaudreaux, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1232; People v. Harden (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
In litigating his third petition before the trial court, Richardson cited
Lewis and Strong. Those post-August 2019 decisions defined the prima facie
inquiry under section 1172.6 and rejected the approach taken by the trial
court in 2019, which involved significant factfinding. (See Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 972 [“In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at [the
prima facie inquiry], a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving
the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ”]; Strong, supra, 13
Cal.5th at p. 720 [“Neither the jury’s pre-Banks and Clark findings nor a
court’s later sufficiency of the evidence review amounts to the determination
section 1172.6 requires, and neither set of findings supplies a basis to reject
an otherwise adequate prima facie showing and deny issuance of an order to
show cause.”].)
Additionally, Richardson cited to the trial court the 2024 Court of
Appeal decision in Beaudreaux, which concluded that a trial court may not
consider the factual summary of a prior appellate opinion at any stage of the
section 1172.6 petition process. (See Beaudreaux, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1237–1238; see also § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3) [as amended by Senate Bill 775
to state, “The court may also consider the procedural history of the case
14
recited in any prior appellate opinion.”].) When ruling in August 2019, the
trial court relied in part on the facts summarized in this court’s prior direct
appeal opinion to find Richardson ineligible for relief. That reliance is
contrary to current law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
Because the denial of Richardson’s first petition at the prima facie
stage cannot stand under subsequent authority, we conclude the trial court
erred in deciding that its August 2019 ruling barred Richardson’s third
petition in 2024. (See Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 946–947, 950–
951.)
Regarding the remedy for the trial court’s error at the prima facie
stage, the Attorney General disputes Richardson’s contention that this court
should direct the trial court to issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d). The Attorney
General suggests that we should remand with directions for the trial court to
decide whether Richardson “has established a prima facie case for relief
under Lewis and its progeny.”
We agree with the Attorney General that remanding this matter for
further prima facie stage proceedings is appropriate. Although the appellate
record includes some transcripts and documents from Richardson’s trial,
there is no indication the parties have ever attempted to present a complete
record of Richardson’s conviction for review by the trial court, so that it could
properly determine whether Richardson has made a prima facie case for
relief under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), or if he is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. Where the trial court has not had an opportunity to review the
full record of conviction, we should not undertake that review in the first
instance. (See People v. Gallardo (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 296, 302–303.)
15
Under the present circumstances, we conclude the proper remedy is
reversal of the trial court’s order denying Richardson’s third petition and
remand with directions to conduct proceedings in accordance with section
1172.6, subdivision (c) and current law. (Gallardo, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
p. 303.) We express no opinion on whether Richardson can make a prima
facie case for relief.
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s October 8, 2024 order denying Richardson’s Penal
Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing is reversed. The matter is
remanded to the trial court with directions to conduct under current law the
prima facie inquiry as required under Penal Code section 1172.6, subdivision
(c).
16
______________________________________
Danner, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
____________________________________
Bromberg, J.
H052629
People v. Richardson
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