People v. Blanco CA4/1

CourtListener 10673168Calctapp17.09.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 9/17/25 P. v. Blanco CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084539

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
(Super. Ct. No. SCD303505)
JOSE PINEIRO BLANCO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Polly H. Shamoon, Judge. Affirmed; remanded for correction to Protective
Order (form CR-160).
Stephanie L. Gunther, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene
A. Sevidal and Randall D. Einhorn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Jose Blanco appeals certain conditions of probation imposed on him by
the trial court following his guilty plea. We conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in imposing reasonable probation conditions, and we
accordingly affirm the judgment. We remand for the limited purpose of
correcting the terms of the Protective Order to allow for peaceful exchange of
the children for visitation, as pronounced by the court at sentencing.

BACKGROUND
After an incident of domestic violence involving his ex-spouse, Blanco
pled guilty to violating the personal liberty of another, in violation of Penal

Code sections 236 and 237.1 At the sentencing hearing, the trial court
sentenced Blanco to a three-year term of formal probation with 179 days of
custody and allowed him to serve the custody time through work furlough.
In addition to his sentence, the court imposed a three-year protective order,
directing Blanco to stay away from his ex-spouse, the victim of the offense to
which he pled.
The order granting probation included a requirement that Blanco
“[s]ubmit [his] person, vehicle, residence, property, personal effects,
computers, and recordable media to search at any time with or without a
warrant, and with or without reasonable cause, when required by P.O. or law
enforcement officer.” The order also included a requirement that Blanco
“[f]ulfill California Child Support payments”.
The Probation Report noted that the primary concern of the victim was
that Blanco continue to pay his monthly child support obligation because she
relied upon his financial support. At the sentencing hearing, the court
emphasized the importance of Blanco paying his child support obligations,
noting that the “reason . . .this [work furlough] deal was negotiated for you is
so that you could continue to support your children while you rehabilitate.”
At sentencing, Blanco objected to the support conditions, stating that
issues of child support should be heard in the family court; but the court
stated that to remain law-abiding as required by his probationary sentence,

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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Blanco needed to pay the court-ordered support. “The whole point of sending
him to Work Furlough instead of there is so he gets a job and pays.” Blanco
further objected that there was not a nexus between the criminal case for
domestic violence and a child support condition for probation. The court
explained that the nexus was the permission to serve his custody in work
furlough “so that he continues to help with the children.”
Blanco timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
Blanco challenges two conditions of probation, which were imposed over
defense counsel’s objection. As we will explain, the probation conditions were
warranted.

A. Standard of Review
“We review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion.” (People
v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379 (Olguin).) “As with any exercise of
discretion, the sentencing court violates this standard when its determination
is arbitrary or capricious or ‘ “ ‘exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the
circumstances being considered.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th
1114, 1121.)

B. Applicable Law
In making a probation determination, the court may, in the interests of
justice, impose reasonable conditions, such “ ‘that amends may be made to
society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting
from that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and
rehabilitation of the probationer . . . .’ ” (§ 1203.1, subd. (j).) The trial court’s
discretion in ordering probation conditions is broad but “must serve a purpose
specified in Penal Code section 1203.1.” (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 379).
As explained in Olguin, a condition of probation will not be held invalid

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unless (1) it has no relationship to the crime of conviction, (2) it relates to
conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) it requires or forbids conduct
which is not reasonably related to future criminality. (Ibid.) “[A]ll three
prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation
term. [Citations.] As such, even if a condition of probation has no
relationship to the crime of which a defendant was convicted and involves
conduct that is not itself criminal, the condition is valid as long as the
condition is reasonably related to preventing future criminality.” (Olguin,
supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 379–380.)

C. The Search Condition Was Reasonable To Ensure Blanco’s
Compliance with the Protective Order.
Blanco argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the
search condition on his electronic devices, because the condition does not
relate to the crime of false imprisonment, for which he was convicted; nor
does it relate to criminal conduct; nor does it relate to future criminality. We
disagree.
Blanco was originally charged with corporal injury to a spouse and
assault on her by means likely to produce great bodily injury. As noted
above, he pled guilty to an amended count of violating her personal liberty.
The court entered a protective order to ensure her safety. The probation
condition was a reasonable means to ensure that Blanco did not endeavor to
contact the victim in violation of that order.
Blanco cites In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 in support of his
contention that the electronic search term was unreasonable. Ricardo P., a
juvenile, had been convicted of burglaries for entering two residences. At
sentencing, the juvenile court imposed probation conditions including the
requirement that he submit the passwords for his electronic devices for
search by probation or the police. (Id. at pp. 1116–1117). The court imposed

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the condition “solely to enable probation officers to monitor whether Ricardo
is communicating about drugs or with people associated with drugs.” (Id. at
p. 1119.) The Supreme Court held that the record was insufficient “to justify
the substantial burdens imposed by [the] electronics search condition”
because there was no evidence that the defendant had used or would use
electronic devices in connection with drugs or other illegal activity. (Ricardo
P., 7 Cal.5th at p. 1116.) The court concluded that the burden on the
defendant’s privacy was “substantially disproportionate” to the goal of
monitoring and deterring drug use, (id. at p. 1120), and the condition
“imposes a very heavy burden on privacy with a very limited justification,”
and is therefore not reasonably related to future criminality. (Id. at p. 1124).
In contrast, here, unlike Ricardo P., the search condition was intended
to ensure compliance with the no-contact order protecting the victim of the
crime of conviction. Electronic devices and social media use are common
means by which a restrained person could violate a no-contact order. Thus,
both the relationship to the crime of conviction and the concern of future
criminality related directly and reasonably to the search condition, unlike the
situation in Ricardo P., in which the trial court’s concern about possible
illegal drug use by the minor had only a tenuous connection to the crime of
conviction (burglary). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in imposing the
search condition of Blanco’s electronic devices.

D. The Child Support Condition Was Reasonable in Light of
the Offense and Sentence.
As noted above, the trial court emphasized that Blanco’s plea deal,
which incorporated a work furlough means to satisfy his custody time, was
entirely based on the necessity of child support for the victim, who was the
mother of his children.

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Blanco argues that failure to pay child support is not necessarily
criminal conduct and thus, the support condition is invalid. Here, too, we
disagree.
In imposing a probation condition, a “trial court may properly go
beyond the exact confines of the current offense to consider all the relevant
circumstances regarding the probationer.” (People v. Patillo (1992)
4 Cal.App.4th 1576, 1580.) A “condition . . . ‘reasonably related to future
criminality’ . . . may not be held invalid whether or not it has any
‘relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted.’ ” (People
v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57, 65.) “[T]he entire circumstances of [the
defendant’s] background and the crime for which he was convicted, must be
carefully scrutinized.” (In re Martinez (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 577, 584.)
Here, the victim of the crime is the mother of Blanco’s children. She
supported the plea deal, notwithstanding the injuries she sustained at his
hands, because she relied on Blanco’s financial support in the form of court-
ordered child support payments. A key probation condition was that Blanco
remain law-abiding. As pointed out by respondent, failing to pay child
support could support a criminal contempt prosecution. (See People v. Dilday
(1993) 20 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1; Lyons v. Municipal Court (1977) 75
Cal.App.3d 829, 840 [“[t]he law is well settled that orders for spousal support
and child support may be enforced by contempt proceedings, and that a jail
sentence imposed pursuant to such proceedings does not constitute
imprisonment for debt”].)

E. The Protective Order (Form CR 160) Must Be Amended To
Allow for Peaceful Exchange of Children for Court-
Ordered Visitation.
On appeal, Blanco asks us to correct the terms of the protective order to
include the court’s oral statement at sentencing that it was ordering an

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exception to the no-contact order, namely, an exception for peaceful exchange
of the children. The People have no objection to this correction. Accordingly,
we will remand the matter for the limited purpose of correcting the court’s
order on form CR-160, at paragraph 14 and 14(a), to reflect the court’s oral
pronouncement making an exception to the no-contact order to allow for
peaceful exchange of children, so that the information entered into CLETS
will reflect the complete order of the court.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed; remanded for correction to Protective Order
(form CR-160).

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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