Tsatryan v. Tsatryan CA2/7

CourtListener 10672534Calctapp16.09.2025

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Filed 9/16/25 Tsatryan v. Tsatryan CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

ARTHUR TSATRYAN, B335754

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC680322)
v.

POLINA TSATRYAN et al.,

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPEAL from an order of dismissal of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Robert S. Draper and Jill T. Feeney,
Judges. Affirmed; appeal dismissed in part.
Arthur Tsatryan, in pro. per., for Appellant.
No appearances for Respondents.
__________________________

In May 2015 the family court entered a judgment of
dissolution of Arthur and Polina Tsatryan’s marriage and
subsequently awarded Polina1 100 percent of their former marital
residence. Arthur then filed a civil action against Polina and
12 lawyers and real estate professionals involved in the family
law action, alleging they lied in the family court as part of a
conspiracy to defraud Arthur of his property and evict him from
his home. By late 2019 all defendants except Polina obtained
dismissals. In 2023 the trial court on its own motion issued an
order to show cause why the action should not be dismissed
under principles of claim preclusion. After a hearing on the order
to show cause, the court issued a statement of decision holding
the 2018 and 2019 dismissals were final and could not be
relitigated, and as to Arthur’s remaining causes of action against
Polina, Arthur was seeking to relitigate the family court’s
decisions that this court affirmed on appeal. On March 21, 2024
the court dismissed the civil action without prejudice.
Arthur appeals from the order of dismissal, contending the
trial court lacked authority to dismiss the civil action on its own
motion; erred in denying Arthur’s earlier motion for summary
judgment; improperly applied claim preclusion to dismiss the
action; and failed to rule on Arthur’s outstanding discovery
motions. These arguments lack merit. Arthur also contends the
trial court in 2019 erred in granting the special motion to strike
the complaint filed by Polina’s former attorney Dennis Block and
in entering a judgment of dismissal as to another former attorney
for Polina, David Kozich, on the basis Arthur failed to amend his
complaint following the court’s order sustaining Kozich’s
demurrer with leave to amend. Because we have no jurisdiction

1 We refer to Arthur and Polina by their first names to avoid
confusion.

2
to review the 2019 orders that are long since final, we dismiss
that portion of Arthur’s appeal. We otherwise affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Family Law Action2
Arthur and Polina were married on August 5, 1987. They
separated in August 2009, and Arthur filed a petition for
dissolution of marriage on September 23, 2009. After a five-day
trial, on May 21, 2015 the family court entered a judgment of
dissolution finding in relevant part that their Santa Clarita
residence (Santa Clarita property) was community property.
Arthur appealed from the judgment, and we affirmed. (In re
Marriage of Tsatryan (Feb. 13, 2018, B265467) [nonpub. opn.].)
On January 26, 2016 the family court issued an order
pursuant to Family Code section 1101, subdivision (h), awarding
Polina 100 percent of the Santa Clarita property after finding
Arthur secretly caused seven deeds of trust to be recorded against
the property in favor of Arthur’s friends and relatives, creating
total encumbrances of substantially all of the property’s value.
The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Arthur’s
breach of fiduciary duty constituted malice, oppression, or fraud
under Civil Code section 3294. The court retained jurisdiction
over the Santa Clarita property, execution of the interspousal
transfer deed, and all issues related to the encumbering deeds.

2 Our discussion of the factual and procedural history of the
family law action is taken from In re Marriage of Tsatryan
(Jan. 14, 2019, B270784 & B276299) (nonpub. opn.) and In re
Marriage of Tsatryan (Feb. 25, 2025, B332042) (nonpub. opn.).

3
Arthur appealed, and we affirmed. (In re Marriage of Tsatryan
(Jan 14, 2019, B270784 & B276299) [nonpub. opn.] (Tsatryan).)
On May 10, 2016 the family court clerk issued a writ of
possession for the Santa Clarita property based on the court’s
January 26, 2016 order. According to a declaration filed by
Polina’s attorney, Arthur failed to leave the property or pay the
mortgage, resulting in arrears of approximately $50,000. On
May 26 Arthur filed an ex parte application to quash the writ of
possession, arguing Polina had failed to follow the unlawful
detainer procedure to evict him from the property. After a
hearing, on May 31, 2016 the court denied Arthur’s request,
ruling that issuance of the writ of possession was proper under
Family Code section 290 to enforce the court’s January 26, 2016
order awarding Polina 100 percent of the property. The court
rejected Arthur’s contention Polina needed to file an unlawful
detainer action in order to obtain a writ of possession, observing
“[t]he unlawful detainer process is made in order to determine
who has the right to possession. . . . [T]hat determination has
already been made on November 3, 2015 followed up by the
court’s order after hearing granting [Polina] exclusive use and
possession of the property.” Arthur appealed, and we affirmed.
(Tsatryan, supra, B270784 & B276299.)
On August 15, 2017 Arthur filed a cross-complaint in the
dissolution action asserting causes of action for fraud, libel,
defamation, and conspiracy against Polina and Doe defendants.
Arthur alleged Polina had gifted her interest in the Santa Clarita
property to him by signing an interspousal transfer deed in 2003;
Polina submitted false declarations and evidence in the

4
dissolution action to show she had not gifted the property;3 Polina
made defamatory statements that Arthur engaged in fraud; and
Polina conspired with her divorce lawyers to deprive Arthur of
his home and take his money.
On August 18, 2021 the family court set an order to show
cause why it should not dismiss Arthur’s cross-complaint without
prejudice, on the basis that Arthur’s claims for fraud, libel, and
conspiracy were beyond the court’s retained jurisdiction over the
marital property and should therefore be pursued in a civil
action. Arthur declined to provide testimony at the hearing on
the order to show cause, and on November 15, 2021 the court
dismissed Arthur’s cross-complaint without prejudice. Arthur did
not appeal from the dismissal, but in 2023 he moved to vacate the
order of dismissal, which the court denied. Arthur appealed (his
17th appeal), and we affirmed. (In re Marriage of Tsatryan
(Feb. 25, 2025, B332042) [nonpub. opn.].)

B. The Civil Complaint
On October 20, 2017 Arthur, representing himself, filed a
civil action against Polina and Doe defendants. In his first
amended complaint filed in March 2018, Arthur named as
defendants 12 individuals involved in the family law action.
Arthur named, among others, Polina’s divorce lawyer (Steven
Fernandez);Fernandez’s colleagues (Michael Kelly, Mark Karney,
and Steven Shore); the lawyer who prepared Polina’s 2016

3 On Arthur’s appeals from the dissolution judgment and
2016 order awarding the Santa Clarita property to Polina, we
held substantial evidence supported the family court’s finding
that Polina did not gift Arthur the Santa Clarita property.
(Tsatryan, supra, B270784 & B276299.)

5
application for writ of possession (Block); a lawyer who made two
appearances for Polina in 2017 (Kozich); Arther’s divorce lawyers
from 2009 through 2012 (Michael Trope and Marshall Waller);
and a deputy public defender who represented Polina in a 2013
contempt hearing initiated by Arthur (Michael Powell). The
complaint also named two realtors: Rebecca Epstein, who
represented Arthur and Polina in their efforts in 2012 to sell a
second property in Tarzana, and Brian Melville, whom the family
court appointed to sell the Santa Clarita property in 2016.
Finally, the complaint named Katherine Camara, a superior
court clerk, who in 2016 entered the family court’s order
transferring Arthur’s interest in the Santa Clarita property to
Polina.
Arthur’s operative second amended complaint (complaint)
asserted nine causes of action, including fraud, libel, defamation,
conspiracy, wrongful eviction, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and it sought punitive damages, equitable
relief, and declaratory relief. Arthur alleged Polina conspired
with the other defendants to introduce false testimony in the
dissolution action to destroy Arthur emotionally and financially
and to defraud him of his interest in the Santa Clarita property.
Arthur alleged in his wrongful eviction cause of action that
Polina, her attorneys, and court staff wrongfully evicted Arthur
from the Santa Clarita property by submitting a false application
for issuance of a writ of possession, which the court clerk issued
on May 10, 2016.
Between June 2018 and November 2019, each of the
defendants (except Polina) prevailed on a demurrer or special

6
motion to strike.4 As relevant here, on May 1, 2019 the trial
court entered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice as to Kozich
because Arthur failed to timely amend the complaint after the
court sustained Kozich’s demurrer to the first amended complaint
with leave to amend. On May 15 the court granted Block’s
special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1),5 finding Block’s alleged conduct
was protected litigation activity under section 425.16,
subdivision (e), and Arthur was unlikely to succeed on the merits.
The court explained, “Block’s prosecution of the unlawful
detainer action against Arthur, and other filings related thereto,
fall squarely within the litigation privilege, since they are
communications by authorized participants to achieve the objects
of litigation with a logical relation thereto.”

C. Pretrial Motions and Order To Show Cause re Dismissal
On January 11, 2019 the trial court stayed the civil action
with respect to Polina pending resolution of Arthur’s 2017 cross-
complaint in the family law action. On November 17, 2021, after
the family court dismissed the cross-complaint, the trial court
lifted the stay in the civil action.
On February 16, 2022 Arthur filed a motion for summary
adjudication (styled as a motion for summary judgment) with
respect to his fifth cause of action for wrongful eviction. The trial
court denied the motion, finding the evidence cited in Arthur’s

4 Judge Joseph R. Kalin presided over the action until the
case was reassigned on July 16, 2018. Judge Robert S. Draper
presided over the case from July 16, 2018 until June 6, 2023.
5 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure.

7
moving papers established that Arthur could not prevail on the
cause of action as a matter of law. The court reasoned, “By citing
a court order in which the [family] court grants Polina 100%
ownership of the subject property, Arthur necessarily shows that
there is no triable issue of material fact regarding proper
ownership of that property but what this ‘fact’ establishes as a
matter of law [is] that Arthur cannot state a cause of action since
allowing him to pursue that claim in this action [would] result in
an impermissible collateral attack on a final judgment.”
On July 21, 2022 the trial court (Judge Draper), on its own
motion, ordered Arthur to show cause (OSC) “why this action
should not be dismissed as an improper [c]ollateral [a]ttack on a
[f]inal judgment.” After multiple continuances, at a hearing on
March 3, 2023 the court heard argument from Arthur and set a
deadline for Arthur to file a responsive brief on the OSC. The
court indicated it would take the matter under submission after
Arthur filed his brief. On March 29, 2023 a different judge6
discharged the OSC and set a trial setting conference for June 2,
2023.
In April 2023 Arthur filed a motion to strike Polina’s
answer and to enter a default judgment as a terminating
sanction under section 2023.030, subdivision (d), based on
Polina’s alleged failure to comply with a 2018 order compelling
her to provide further responses to his requests for production. A
month later Arthur filed a motion to have his 2018 requests for
admission deemed admitted under section 2030.280 based on
Polina’s failure to serve responses to the requests.

6 Judge Curtis A. Kin entered the order discharging the OSC
because the trial court where the case was pending was “dark” on
the date of the hearing.

8
On June 6, 2023 the case was reassigned to Judge Jill T.
Feeney, who had replaced Judge Draper in the department where
the case was pending. On July 27 the trial court sua sponte
entered a minute order (again) setting an OSC why the case
should not be dismissed under principles of res judicata (claim
preclusion).7 As the court explained, Polina was now the only
remaining defendant, and “[t]he gravamen of [Arthur’s] second
amended complaint is that he was wrongfully evicted from a
residence and that [Polina] and others told lies in the family
court case in order to take the property from him.” Arthur was
“seeking to challenge rulings and actions taken in the family
court case between the parties,” and “[t]he doctrine of res judicata
bars the relitigation of this previously decided matter.” The court
observed it had “inherent authority to dismiss cases that are
patently frivolous,” and it set a hearing date on the OSC and a
schedule for Arthur to file a brief. The court continued the
hearings on Arthur’s outstanding motions, including his motion
for terminating sanctions and his motion to have the requests for
admissions deemed admitted.
In his opposition brief, Arthur presented many of the
arguments he now raises on appeal. Arthur argued the trial
court “fraudulently removed” Block and Kozich from the case in
2019, and therefore Polina was not the only remaining defendant.

7 The Supreme Court has suggested courts should more
accurately “use the terms ‘claim preclusion’ to describe the
primary aspect of the res judicata doctrine and ‘issue preclusion’
to encompass the notion of collateral estoppel.” (DKN Holdings
LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824.) We therefore use the
term “claim preclusion” in describing Arthur’s and the court’s
discussion of res judicata.

9
Further, the court did not have authority to dismiss the action on
its own motion, and because the court discharged the 2022 OSC,
it was now precluded from issuing another OSC. Arthur also
argued that claim preclusion did not apply to Arthur’s civil claims
because the May 21, 2015 judgment of dissolution did not
adjudicate those claims, and the trial court was the proper forum
to resolve Arthur’s tort claims.
The trial court held a hearing on the OSC on October 26,
2023. Arthur waived oral argument and submitted a written
brief in lieu of oral argument.8 On November 22 the court issued
a six-page statement of decision dismissing Arthur’s action
without prejudice. The court explained that trial courts have
inherent authority to dismiss an action that is frivolous and
clearly barred by claim preclusion. Referring to our decisions in
Tsatryan, supra, case Nos. B270784 and B276299, which
affirmed the 2016 family court orders awarding Polina
100 percent of the Santa Clarita property and denying Arthur’s
request to quash the writ of possession, the trial court ruled that
Arthur’s claims in the civil action were based on the same
primary rights that were litigated and finally resolved in the
family court. The trial court addressed each of Arthur’s
individual arguments, including a finding that the court struck or
dismissed Arthur’s claims against Block and Kozich in 2019,
which rulings were final, and Arthur could not challenge those
rulings four years later.

8 The trial court issued a tentative decision, and Arthur filed
objections to the decision. The court’s final order largely adopted
the tentative decision and included a few additional points
addressing Arthur’s objections.

10
Arthur timely appealed from the order of dismissal.9

DISCUSSION

A. We Have No Jurisdiction To Review the Orders Dismissing
Kozich and Granting Block’s Special Motion To Strike
Arthur contends the trial court made various errors in
granting Block’s special motion to strike and entering a judgment
of dismissal with respect to Kozich after Arthur failed to amend
the complaint. However, these orders were entered in 2019 and
are not reviewable in this appeal from the court’s 2024 order
dismissing the complaint. As discussed, on May 1, 2019 the court
entered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice as to Kozich,
finding Arthur did not timely amend his allegations after the
court sustained Kozich’s demurrer to the first amended
complaint. And on May 15, 2019 the court granted Block’s
special motion to strike the first amended complaint under
section 425.16.
A judgment dismissing a party with prejudice entered after
an order sustaining a demurrer is appealable under
section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1). (Hamilton v. Green (2023)
98 Cal.App.5th 417, 423 [“‘all that is left to make the order

9 On March 18, 2024 this court notified Arthur that his
appeal was deficient because his civil case information statement
did not attach a copy of a signed order or judgment of dismissal.
(See § 581d [all dismissals ordered by the court “shall be in the
form of a written order signed by the court and filed in the
action”].) In response, Arthur obtained and filed a signed order of
dismissal dated March 21, 2024. We treat Arthur’s premature
notice of appeal as filed immediately after entry of the signed
order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(1).)

11
[sustaining the demurrer] appealable is the formality of the entry
of a dismissal order or judgment’”]; Bullock v. City of Antioch
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 407, 411, fn. 1 [an “order sustaining a
demurrer without leave to amend is not appealable, but a party
may appeal from the entry of dismissal after such order”]; see
Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning
Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1370 [“‘[a]n order
dismissing fewer than all defendants from an action is a “final
judgment” as to them, and is thus appealable’”].) Likewise, “[a]n
order granting a special motion to strike [is] appealable under
section 904.1.” (§ 425.16, subd. (i); see § 904.1, subd. (a)(13)
[authorizing appeal from an order granting or denying a motion
to strike under section 425.16]; Gumarang v. Braemer on
Raymond, LLC (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 370, 387.)
“California follows a ‘one shot’ rule under which, if an order
is appealable, appeal must be taken or the right to appellate
review is forfeited.” (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th
751, 761, fn. 8; accord, Reyes v. Kruger (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 58,
68 [“‘If the ruling is appealable, the aggrieved party must appeal
or the right to contest it is lost.’”].) Under this rule, we have no
jurisdiction to review an appealable judgment or order from
which a timely appeal was not taken. (§ 906 [“The provisions of
this section do not authorize the reviewing court to review any
decision or order from which an appeal might have been taken.”];
see Reyes, at pp. 67-68; In re Marriage of Lloyd (1997)
55 Cal.App.4th 216, 219 [“If a party fails to appeal an appealable
order within the prescribed time limit, this court is without
jurisdiction to review that order on a subsequent appeal”].)

12
Because we lack jurisdiction to consider the 2019 orders
dismissing Kozich and Block, we dismiss this portion of Arthur’s
appeal.10

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Arthur’s Motion for
Summary Adjudication with Respect to His Wrongful
Eviction Cause of Action
“‘A motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication
is properly granted only when “all the papers submitted show
that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the

10 Arthur also argues he was not properly served with notice
of the Kozich judgment and Block order. But even if service of
notice was deficient, this would only extend Arthur’s deadline to
appeal, not relieve him of that requirement. (Cal. Rules of Ct.,
rule 8.104(a)(1)(C), (e); see Kimball Avenue v. Franco (2008)
162 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1228 [“When both the court clerk and the
party submitting the judgment fail to serve the statutorily
mandated notice of entry of judgment, the sole consequence is
that a longer statutory period [of 180 days] for filing the notice of
appeal comes into play. . . . The lack of notice does not jeopardize
the judgment.”].) In any event, the record reflects Arthur had
actual notice of the orders in 2019.
Arthur also asserts the order sustaining Block’s special
motion to strike is “void.” A order that is void because of the
absence of fundamental jurisdiction is subject to collateral attack
at any time (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004)
33 Cal.4th 653, 660), but most errors of procedure, pleading,
evidence, and substantive law are not jurisdictional and do not
invite collateral attack (In re Marriage of Goddard (2004)
33 Cal.4th 49, 56). The errors asserted by Arthur do not
demonstrate an absence of fundamental jurisdiction over the
parties and subject matter.

13
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’””
(Campbell v. FPI Management, Inc. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1151,
1161; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (c) & (f); Regents of
University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607,
618.) A plaintiff moving for summary judgment or summary
adjudication bears the initial burden of “prov[ing] each element of
the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on that cause
of action.” (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1).) “[I]f a plaintiff who would bear
the burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence at trial moves
for summary judgment, he must present evidence that would
require a reasonable trier of fact to find any underlying material
fact more likely than not—otherwise, he would not be entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, but would have to present his
evidence to a trier of fact.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 851.) If the plaintiff meets that burden,
the burden then shifts to the defendant “to show that a triable
issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of
action or a defense thereto.” (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1); see Aguilar, at
p. 849.)
“‘“‘“We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering
all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers
except that to which objections were made and sustained.”’
[Citation.] We liberally construe the evidence in support of the
party opposing summary judgment [or summary adjudication]
and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that
party.”’” (Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340,
347; see Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara (2017) 3 Cal.5th 248, 273
[“a ruling on a motion for summary adjudication is reviewed de
novo”].)

14
“[A] person in peaceable possession of real property may
recover, in an action sounding in tort, damages for injuries to his
person and goods caused by the forcible entry of one who is, or
claims to be, the lawful owner or possessor.” (Daluiso v. Boone
(1969) 71 Cal.2d 484, 486; accord, Spinks v. Equity Residential
Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1039; see id.
at p. 1037, 1039 [“[s]tatutory remedies are available for forcible
entry and detainer” under §§ 1159 and 1160, but “[t]he statutory
remedies are not exclusive”].) The essential elements of a tort
cause of action for wrongful entry or eviction are (1) the plaintiff’s
“‘peaceable possession,’ of the premises” and (2) the defendant’s
“forcible entry.” (Spinks, at pp. 1040, 1042.) “By dispossessing
plaintiff without resort to judicial process, defendants expose[]
themselves to potential tort liability for wrongful eviction.” (Id.
at p. 1042, citing Daluiso, at p. 486.)
Arthur did not meet his burden to present undisputed
evidence to prove each element of his cause of action for wrongful
eviction. His declarations and separate statement do not include
any evidence he was in possession of the Santa Clarita property
when he was allegedly evicted. Instead, his motion sought to
relitigate the family court’s determination years earlier that
Polina did not deed Arthur ownership of the property in 2003 and
that the property was community property. Arthur presented no
evidence that he was locked out of the house or otherwise forcibly
evicted.11

11 Polina in her declaration in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment stated that Arthur had already vacated the
Santa Clarita house, taking the furniture and other contents and
leaving it in a filthy and damaged condition, before she had an

15
Arthur also argued in his summary adjudication motion
that Polina never obtained a valid right of entry onto the Santa
Clarita property because she did not pursue an unlawful detainer
proceeding against him. But as the family court found in
May 2016 in denying Arthur’s motion to quash the writ of
possession, the writ was warranted to enforce the trial court’s
January 26, 2016 order awarding Polina 100 percent of the
property, and an unlawful detainer proceeding was unnecessary
for Polina to obtain possession because the court had already
granted Polina “exclusive use and possession of the property.”
(Tsatryan, supra, B270784 & B276299.) We affirmed this ruling
in 2019. (Id.) The trial court correctly found that Arthur’s
summary adjudication motion was an improper attempt to
collaterally attack the family court’s final ruling. In any event,
Arthur did not meet his burden to show he was entitled to a
judgment for wrongful eviction, and the motion was properly
denied.

C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Applying Claim Preclusion
To Dismiss the Action
1. Arthur’s civil causes of action were barred by claim
preclusion
“Claim preclusion prevents relitigation of entire causes of
action. [Citations.] Claim preclusion applies only when ‘a second

opportunity to try to lock him out by executing on the writ of
possession. Arthur argues that Polina’s evidence cannot be
considered because she did not file a separate statement of
disputed material facts with her opposition. We do not reach the
admissibility of Polina’s evidence because Arthur failed to meet
his initial burden.

16
suit involves (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same
parties [or their privies] (3) after a final judgment on the merits
in the first suit.’” (Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 326-
327; accord, Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 73, 91.) “To determine whether two proceedings involve
identical causes of action for purposes of claim preclusion,
California courts have ‘consistently applied the “primary rights”
theory.’” (Boeken v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th
788, 797; accord, Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002)
28 Cal.4th 888, 904 (Mycogen).) “‘[T]he primary right is simply
the plaintiff’s right to be free from the particular injury suffered.’”
(Mycogen Corp., at p. 904; accord, Boeken, at p. 798.) “‘[T]he
“cause of action” is based upon the harm suffered, as opposed to
the particular theory asserted by the litigant. [Citation.] Even
where there are multiple legal theories upon which recovery
might be predicated, one injury gives rise to only one claim for
relief.’” (Boeken, at p. 798; accord, Hayes v. County of San Diego
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 622, 631.)
“‘The primary right must also be distinguished from the
remedy sought: “The violation of one primary right constitutes a
single cause of action, though it may entitle the injured party to
many forms of relief, and the relief is not to be confounded with
the cause of action, one not being determinative of the other.”’”
(Mycogen, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 904; accord, Crowley v.
Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 682.) “When two actions
involving the same parties seek compensation for the same harm,
they generally involve the same primary right.” (Boeken v.
Phillip Morris USA, Inc., supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 798; accord,
Ivanoff v. Bank of America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 728.)
The applicability of claim preclusion is a question of law that we

17
review de novo. (Association of Irritated Residents v. Department
of Conservation (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1202, 1218.)
The family law action and the civil action involved the
same two parties: Arthur, as petitioner and then plaintiff, and
Polina, as respondent and then defendant. As discussed, all
other defendants named in the civil complaint won judgments of
dismissal or prevailed on a motion to strike. And the family law
action resulted in a final judgment on the merits: the May 21,
2015 judgment of dissolution determined the Santa Clarita
property was community property, and the January 26, 2016
postjudgment order under Family Code section 1101,
subdivision (h), awarded 100 percent of the property to Polina.
We affirmed both orders.
Arthur’s civil claims involved the same primary rights as
the family law action. The civil complaint alleged in each cause
of action that Arthur lost ownership and possession of the Santa
Clarita property as a result of Polina’s lies and fraudulent
submissions to the family court. For example, Arthur’s fifth
cause of action for wrongful eviction alleged without detail that
Polina (with the help of the codefendants) “illegally evicted
Arthur from his residence in [Santa Clarita] by forged and
fabricated court orders.” To the extent Arthur now contends
Polina’s evidence supporting the family court’s award of a
100 percent interest in the property was fraudulent, that issue
was finally determined in the family court action.
Similarly, the complaint’s first cause of action for fraud
alleged Polina and the codefendants lied to the family court,
alleging, for example, that Polina submitted false income and
expense declarations in the dissolution proceedings to “illegally
help[] Polina . . . to acquire the [Santa Clarita property] and

18
wrongfully evict[] him.” Arthur’s second, third, and fourth causes
of action for libel, defamation, and conspiracy similarly addressed
Polina and the codefendants’ alleged lies to the court. Arthur’s
remaining cause of action (and requests for relief) for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, punitive damages, equitable
relief, and declaratory relief do not include any additional
allegations, instead seeking different forms of relief arising from
the same alleged injury. (See Mycogen, supra, 28 Cal.4th at
p. 904.)
In his appellate brief, Arthur does not address whether the
same primary rights were at issue in his causes of action in the
civil action as those that were determined by the family court in
its final judgment, notwithstanding the trial court’s reliance on
the primary rights doctrine in its order issuing the OSC and its
final statement of decision supporting the dismissal order.
Instead, he asserts he had “provided a detailed argument to the
court’s basis to dismiss under the res judicata doctrine,” citing to
his opposition to the trial court’s tentative ruling. But the only
argument Arthur presented in his opposition was that the family
court’s order awarding the Santa Clarita property was not
“listed” among the causes of action he asserted in the civil case.
Arthur does not provide any other cogent argument why claim
preclusion did not bar his civil causes of action. “[I]t is a
fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court
judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is
on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record
presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed
an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v.
Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609; accord, Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) To overcome the presumption

19
that a judgment is correct, an appellant “must affirmatively
establish prejudicial error by providing an adequate record, citing
to the record, and presenting a persuasive argument with
citations to supportive legal authorities.” (LNSU #1, LLC v. Alta
Del Mar Coastal Collection Community Assn. (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1070; accord, Lee v. Kim (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 705, 721 [appellant’s “burden on appeal ‘includes
the obligation to present argument and legal authority on each
point raised’”].) Arthur has not met that burden.

2. The trial court had authority to dismiss the action
Arthur contends the trial court had no authority to dismiss
this action on its own motion, arguing that the case relied on by
the court, Huang v. Hanks (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 179 (Huang),
did not support the court’s authority, and further, the court
improperly relied on claim preclusion in dismissing the case.
Arthur does not present any argument addressing why the
Huang decision did not support the court’s exercise of authority.
We conclude the court had inherent authority to set the OSC and
then to dismiss the case based on its finding that the surviving
causes of action against Polina were, as a matter of law, barred
by claim preclusion and frivolous.
In Huang, the trial court denied a petitioner’s requests for
civil harassment restraining orders on the pleadings as “‘patently
frivolous’” where the petition sought to restrain the former
Governor of California, the Dalai Lama, and 29 others who
allegedly controlled a Texas mental department to attack
petitioner with “nano probes.” (Huang, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at
p. 181.) The court explained, “‘From their creation by article VI,
section 1 of the California Constitution, California courts received

20
broad inherent power “not confined by or dependent on statute.”
[Citations.] This inherent power includes “fundamental inherent
equity, supervisory, and administrative powers, as well as
inherent power to control litigation.”’” (Id. at pp. 181-182; accord,
Venice Canals Resident Home Owners Assn. v. Superior Court
(1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 675, 679 [concluding superior court had
inherent authority to order petitioners to post a bond as a
condition of a stay pending final decision, explaining court had
“inherent power . . . to exercise reasonable control over litigation
before it, as well as the inherent and equitable power to achieve
justice and prevent misuse of processes lawfully issued”].)
Further, the court in Huang reasoned, “‘[b]ecause courts should
hear only actual disputes, and should prevent harassment of
defendants, California courts possess the inherent authority to
dismiss cases that are fraudulent or “vexatious.”’” (Huang, at
p. 182; see McKenna v. Elliott & Horne Co. (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d
551, 555 [trial court’s order sustaining demurrer based on claim
preclusion was supported by its “inherent power to dismiss an
action which is clearly shown to be sham and without merit”].)
Here, the trial court found, based on its examination of the
complaint, the records of the family law action, and our decisions
in Tsatryan, supra, B270784 and B276299, that Arthur was
relitigating claims and issues that had been finally decided
against him in the family court. Application of claim preclusion
may be decided on the pleadings. (See Brosterhous v. State Bar
(1995) 12 Cal.4th 315, 324 [“if all of the facts necessary to
establish that an action is barred on [claim preclusion] grounds
appear on the face of the complaint” or are subject to judicial
notice, “the complaint is subject to demurrer”]; Key v. Tyler (2019)

21
34 Cal.App.5th 505, 532 [“court may take judicial notice of court
records in ruling on an issue of res judicata”].)
Moreover, our opinions in the prior appeals reflected that
Arthur repeatedly attempted to relitigate the same issues in the
family court action, and by the time of the trial court’s OSC in the
civil action, he had filed eight appeals, none of which was
successful.12 (See In re Marriage of Tsatryan, supra, B332042.)
And, as Arthur acknowledges, in this action he spent more than
six years pursuing his claims against Polina (since 2017),
propounding discovery demands and filing a motion for summary
judgment, motions to compel, and sanctions motions, all arising
from a dispute over his right to the Santa Clarita property
adjudicated in the family court action in 2016.
Although this case does not rise to the level of the patently
frivolous allegations in Huang, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at page 181
that the defendants had planted nano probes in the petitioner’s
body, Arthur’s relitigation of the issues finally decided by the
family court and affirmed on appeal was frivolous and vexatious,
subjecting Polina, who is self-represented, to the burden of
defending the same claims over and over notwithstanding the

12 Arthur continues to prosecute his family law cross-
complaint against Polina over the same subject matter and has
filed 17 unsuccessful appeals from the family court’s orders.
Based on these and other appeals, our colleagues in Division Four
declared Arthur a vexatious litigant in Tsatryan v. Fernandez
(April 23, 2024, B326148, as mod. April 30, 2024) (nonpub. opn.).
That appeal arose from a trial court order granting the special
motion to strike filed by Polina’s attorney Fernandez in Arthur’s
second civil action against Fernandez. Arthur filed that action
after Fernandez prevailed on his special motion to strike in this
action.

22
court’s determination in her favor. Moreover, Arthur has
expanded the list of wrongdoers to include an ever-widening
circle of individuals tenuously connected to the underlying
dispute, causing a significant waste of judicial resources, with
well over a dozen superior court judges having now addressed
Arthur’s claims. Under these circumstances, as in Huang, the
trial court had inherent authority to control the litigation and
prevent abuse of the judicial process by setting an OSC, providing
Arthur an opportunity to address the issues, and ultimately
finding good cause to dismiss the action. (Id. at p. 182.)13
Finally, Arthur contends the trial court erred in dismissing
the action before ruling on Arthur’s motion to strike Polina’s
answer under section 2023.030, subdivision (d), as a terminating
sanction for her failure to provide responses to his requests for
production, and his motion to have his requests for admissions

13 The trial court also had statutory authority to dismiss
Arthur’s complaint under section 438 for failure to state a cause
of action. Section 438, subdivision (b)(2), authorizes a trial court
on “its own motion [to] grant a motion for judgment on the
pleadings,” and subdivision (c)(3)(B)(ii) provides as a basis for
granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings that “[t]he
complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against that defendant.” (See Foster v. Sexton (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 998, 1019 [trial court had authority under § 438
to bring and then grant its own motion for judgment on the
pleadings where complaint failed to allege plaintiff’s exhaustion
of administrative remedies or excuse from exhaustion
requirement]; Camacho v. Automobile Club of Southern
California (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1397 & fn. 3 [affirming
trial court’s order granting judgment on the pleadings on the
court’s own motion, observing court had statutory authority
under § 438].)

23
(RFA’s) deemed admitted under section 2030.280. After
continuing the hearing on the motions to the date of the OSC
hearing and then ordering the action dismissed without deciding
the discovery motions, the court impliedly denied the motions as
moot. Given the court’s determination that all of Arthur’s claims
against Polina were barred by claim preclusion, adjudication of
Arthur’s discovery motions would not have provided Arthur with
effective relief. (See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 277 [“A
case becomes moot when events ‘“render[] it impossible for [a]
court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant
[the plaintiff] any effect[ive] relief.”’”]; People v. Alsafar (2017)
8 Cal.App.5th 880, 886 [“‘“‘a case becomes moot when a court
ruling can have no practical effect or cannot provide the parties
with effective relief’”’”]).
The only possible relief Arthur could have obtained was an
award of sanctions. Arthur asserts on appeal in a conclusory
manner that with respect to the RFA’s, that monetary sanctions
would have been “mandatory,” but he fails to present any
argument with respect to sanctions. Further, Arthur contends
his motion should have been granted because Polina responded to
his RFA’s with a non-compliant one-page response. But the
record does not contain Polina’s response, so we have no way to
evaluate this contention. Moreover, to the extent Arthur
“believe[d] that the responses to [the RFA’s] are deficient in some
respect or that any objections thereto are not well taken, he
[could have made] a motion to compel further responses under
section 2033.290.” (St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 762, 776; see § 2033.290, subds. (a)(1) & (2) [“On
receipt of a response to requests for admissions, the party
requesting admissions may move for an order compelling a

24
further response” if the party believes “the answer to a particular
request is evasive or incomplete” or “an objection to a particular
request is without merit or too general.”].)
Arthur did not move to compel further responses before
requesting the draconian remedy of deeming the admissions
admitted. (See St. Mary v. Superior Court, supra,
223 Cal.App.4th at p. 784 [“RFAs are not to be deemed admitted
unless the party to whom RFAs are propounded fails to respond
prehearing to RFAs in a manner that is substantially code-
compliant (§ 2033.280, subd. (c)), or he or she is recalcitrant and
violates a court order compelling further responses that are
deficient (§ 2033.290, subd. (e)”].) In the absence of an adequate
record or legal argument, Arthur has forfeited his contention that
the court should have ruled on his motion to deem the RFA’s
admitted. (LNSU #1, LLC v. Alta Del Mar Coastal Collection
Community Assn., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070.)
Arthur did not seek monetary sanctions in his motion to
strike Polina’s answer and enter her default as a terminating
sanction.14 Further, even if the trial court had granted Arthur’s

14 In his motion for terminating sanctions Arthur argued
Polina failed to serve responses to Arthur’s document requests
after the trial court ordered code-compliant responses. Arthur
submitted a declaration stating that in response to the court’s
order, Polina served non-compliant “random pages of different,
unenumerated, and unrelated documents” on his residence. In
her opposition, Polina argued she served the requested
documents on Arthur. The documents served by Polina are not
attached to Arthur’s motion or otherwise in the record, and thus
we cannot evaluate whether they complied with the court’s order.
And in his appellate brief, Arthur argues only that the court

25
motion and entered a default against Polina as a terminating
sanction (albeit unlikely), that would not have provided relief for
Arthur unless he obtained a default judgment. But the defense of
claim preclusion would have barred entry of a judgment in
Arthur’s favor for failure of the complaint to allege a valid cause
of action. (Eshagian v. Cepeda (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 433, 459
[“‘If the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint do not state any
proper cause of action, the default judgment in the plaintiff’s
favor cannot stand.’”].) Thus, there was no reason for the trial
court to delay dismissal of the action in order for Arthur to first
litigate his motion for terminating sanctions.

DISPOSITION

To the extent Arthur purports to appeal the May 1, 2019
judgment of dismissal with prejudice as to Kozich and the
May 15, 2019 order granting Block’s special motion to strike the
first amended complaint, Arthur’s appeal is dismissed. In all
other respects, we affirm the March 21, 2024 order dismissing the
action without prejudice. The parties are to bear their own costs
on appeal.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J. SEGAL, J.

“swept the Motion under the carpet, bluntly aiding and abetting
Polina.”

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