CourtListener 10672469•In re J.H. CA4/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 9/16/25 In re J.H. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re J.H., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
D084449
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. J244278)
v.
J.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Richard R. Monroy, Judge. Affirmed.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Maxine
M. Hart and Steve Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
J.H. (Appellant) admitted to two counts of oral copulation of a child
under 14 years old and stipulated to confinement in a secure youth treatment
facility in exchange for the dismissal of additional counts. The juvenile court
declared him a ward of the court and imposed a four-year baseline term of
confinement in a secure youth treatment facility under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 875, subdivision (b)(1).1 Appellant asserts the
juvenile court acted in excess of its jurisdiction under section 607, subdivision
(c) by setting a baseline term that put his anticipated release date beyond his
25th birthday. We disagree and affirm the order.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Because the sole issue on appeal is limited to the impact of the
jurisdictional limitations of section 607, subdivision (c) on the juvenile court’s
ability to set a baseline term of confinement, and because they involve
minors, we provide only a brief overview of the underlying crimes.
Appellant sexually molested two victims in two separate incidents that
occurred in October and December 2018. At the time of the offenses,
Appellant was 16 years old. The victim in the first incident did not know
Appellant, and he was not identified at the time of the crime. The second
victim identified Appellant when she first reported the crime, but child
protective services closed the investigation without any police involvement.
Several years later, the police were able to connect DNA evidence found on
the first victim’s body to Appellant, leading to his arrest in 2022. Appellant
admitted the first incident but denied the second. The police interviewed the
second victim, and she provided a statement consistent with her original
disclosure.
In June 2022, the People alleged that Appellant came within the
provisions of section 602. In an amended petition, the People asserted the
1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
following seven counts: burglary (count 1, Penal Code § 220, subd. (b)),
entering a home with intent to commit a felony (count 2; Penal Code § 459),
committing a lewd and lascivious act upon as child under the age of 14 (count
3; Penal Code § 288, subd. (b)(1)), and oral copulation by force, violence,
duress, menace, and fear (count 4; Penal Code § 287, subd. (c)(2)(a)), related
to the first incident in October 2018; and burglary (count 5, Penal Code § 220,
subd. (b)), oral copulation on a person who was unconscious (count 6; Penal
Code § 287, subd. (f)), and committing a lewd and lascivious act upon as child
under the age of 14 (count 7; Penal Code § 288, subd. (a)), related to the
second incident in December 2018.
The People moved to transfer the case to the criminal division. After a
multi-day hearing, the juvenile court denied the motion, finding that the
People had not met their burden to prove Appellant was not amenable to
rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence.
On May 6, 2024, Appellant admitted counts 3 and 7, based on an
agreement to dismiss the remaining charges. Counsel stipulated to a secure
track confinement and the juvenile court advised Appellant that the
maximum total term of confinement would be 8 years.
Appellant appeared before the juvenile court for disposition on June 14,
2024. At the outset of the hearing, the juvenile court informed the parties
that it was inclined to impose a baseline term of four years. Defense counsel
argued that the juvenile court should impose a baseline term of only two
years, and asserted, among other arguments, that Appellant was almost 23,
and that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction ended once he turned 25.2 Thus,
“the four years in that sense would not even actually be completed because
[he] will have turned 25 before those four years could be imposed, either
2 Appellant will turn 25 in September 2027.
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based on custody time or even if released on a probationary period.” The
People argued for the four-year baseline term, and asserted, based on the
severity of the charges, that the juvenile court “should use its power to
maintain jurisdiction to the last day that we can.”
The juvenile court adjudicated Appellant a ward of the court and
ordered that he be admitted to a secure track treatment facility. The court
noted that the baseline term of confinement was either two or four years, and
found, “based on the severity of the offense, the harm to the victim, and the
fact that there were two separate incidents” that the four-year term was
appropriate. The court then informed Appellant that he would have a review
every six months and that he could be awarded additional credits of up to 120
days at each review. In its written order, the court confirmed the four-year
baseline term of confinement, and the eight-year maximum term of
confinement.
II. DISCUSSION
Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court acted in
excess of its jurisdiction under section 607, subdivision (c) by setting his
baseline term of confinement to four years, because he will turn 25 before the
expiration of that four-year term. The People assert, to the contrary, that the
relevant statutes allow the juvenile court to set a baseline term of
confinement that exceeds the jurisdictional limits set forth in section 607,
subdivision (c). “Because resolution of this issue is a question of statutory
interpretation, we exercise independent review.” (In re L.H. (2025) 110
Cal.App.5th 591, 599.)
Section 607, subdivision (a) states that the juvenile court “may retain
jurisdiction over a person who is found to be a ward or dependent child of the
juvenile court until the ward or dependent child attains 21 years of age,
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except as provided in subdivisions (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f).” As relevant here,
section 607, subdivision (c) states that the juvenile court “may retain
jurisdiction over a person who is found to be a person described in Section
602 by reason of the commission of an offense listed in subdivision (b) of
Section 707 until that person attains 25 years of age, or two years from the
date of commitment to a secure youth treatment facility pursuant to Section
875, whichever occurs later, if the person, at the time of adjudication of a
crime or crimes, would, in criminal court, have faced an aggregate sentence of
seven years or more.” (Italics added.)
There is no dispute that Appellant would have faced an aggregate
sentence of seven years or more had he not been before the juvenile court.
Further, his date of commitment was in 2024. Accordingly, under section
607, subdivision (c), the juvenile court will no longer have jurisdiction over
Appellant as of his 25th birthday in September 2027, which is the later of two
years past the date of commitment (i.e., 2026) and his 25th birthday in
2027.3 Nonetheless, Appellant contends that the court should not have
imposed a four-year baseline that extended beyond his 25th birthday.
Section 875 governs the commitment of juvenile offenders to a secure
youth treatment facility. “Under section 875, the juvenile court must set a
3 The juvenile court may retain control in limited circumstances. Section
607, subdivision (i)(2) provides: “A person [falling under subdivision (c)] shall
be discharged upon the expiration of a two-year period of control, or when the
person attains 25 years of age, whichever occurs later, unless an order for
further detention has been made by the committing court pursuant to Article
6 (commencing with Section 1800) of Chapter 1 of Division 2.5.” To obtain
such an extension, the People must prove that the person “would be
physically dangerous to the public because of the person’s mental or physical
deficiency, disorder, or abnormality that causes the person to have serious
difficulty controlling his or her dangerous behavior.” (§ 1800; see §§ 1800.5,
1802 [allowing for continued “control of the authority over the person”].)
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‘baseline term of confinement,’ which ‘represent[s] the time in custody
necessary to meet the developmental and treatment needs of the ward and to
prepare the ward for discharge.’ (§ 875, subd. (b)(1).) Upon expiration of the
baseline term, the court must discharge the ward to probation supervision
absent certain findings. (Id., subd. (e)(3).)” (In re L.H., supra, 110
Cal.App.5th at p. 597.) The baseline term of confinement is “based on the
most serious recent offense for which the ward has been adjudicated,” and is
“subject to modification in progress review hearings.” (§ 875, subd. (b)(1).)
The juvenile court must also set a maximum term of confinement.
Section 875, subdivision (c)(1) provides: “In making its order of commitment,
the court shall additionally set a maximum term of confinement for the ward
based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters that brought
or continued the ward under the jurisdiction of the court and as deemed
appropriate to achieve rehabilitation. The maximum term of confinement
shall represent the longest term of confinement in a facility that the ward
may serve,” subject to certain enumerated limitations.
Recently, the court in In re L.H. considered whether the maximum
term of confinement could extend beyond the defendant’s 25th birthday. (In
re L.H., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 599.) The court noted that, in the
context of statutes governing commitments to the former Division of Juvenile
Justice, courts have interpreted the age limits set forth in section 607 “as
providing a cap on a ward’s actual confinement time separate from the
maximum term of confinement set by the juvenile court.” (Id. at p. 603,
italics added.) The court concluded that an analogous provision in section
875, subdivision (c)(1)(A)—that “the ward shall not be held in secure
confinement beyond 25 years of age, or two years from the date of
commitment, whichever occurs later”—should be interpreted similarly,
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noting that “[b]oth statutory schemes also recognize that age limits may set
an even lower ceiling on the length of a ward’s physical confinement.” (In re
L.H., at p. 603.)
We see no reason to diverge from the court’s well-reasoned opinion in
In re L.H. and further conclude that the same principles apply to the baseline
term of confinement as set forth in section 875, subdivision (b)(1). (See In re
L.H., supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 601; Absher v. AutoZone, Inc. (2008) 164
Cal.App.4th 332, 342 [statutory “provisions relating to the same subject
matter . . . should be harmonized to the extent possible”].) The basic concept
that the jurisdictional limits in section 607 provide a separate ceiling on the
length of a ward’s physical confinement should apply regardless of whether
we are considering the baseline term or the maximum term. The juvenile
court must follow the guidelines set forth in section 875 in setting both the
baseline and maximum terms of confinement, and the ward may be released
based on the jurisdictional limits set forth in section 607 even before the
expiration of either term.
Further supporting this interpretation, the court in In re L.H.
explained, “[i]f the maximum term of confinement is limited by the
jurisdictional age limits, those wards whose physical confinement will be cut
short by the age limits will receive even shorter sentences upon the
application of precommitment credits, while other wards who committed the
same offense under similar circumstances will have their precommitment
credits applied to the full confinement term simply because they were
younger at the time of sentencing. Thus, L.H.’s proposed interpretation
would produce unfair results considering the purpose of awarding
presentence custody credits is to equalize the treatment of different
7
individuals convicted of the same offense.” (In re L.H., supra, 110
Cal.App.5th at p. 605.)
The same is true for Appellant’s baseline sentence. As noted, section
875, subdivision (b)(1) permits the juvenile court to modify the baseline term
in progress review hearings as described in subdivision (e). It would be
unfair for some wards to benefit from such modifications to an already
diminished baseline term based simply on their age at the time of disposition.
Moreover, in at least some cases, like the one at hand, it is possible that the
baseline term will be diminished through such modifications to allow for the
ward’s release before the age of 25.
As the People assert, limiting the baseline term at the time of
disposition would impede the juvenile court’s ability to ensure the
developmental and treatment needs of the ward are met, as required by
section 875, subdivision (b)(1). Appellant does not contest that the imposed
four-year baseline term was necessary to meet his developmental and
treatment needs. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err, or
exceed its jurisdictional limitations, in setting that term.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
DO, J.
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