People v. Warren CA4/1

CourtListener 10672461Calctapp16.09.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 9/16/25 P. v. Warren CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084087

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
(Super. Ct. No. SCD299435)
NICOLE KRYSTAL WARREN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Polly H. Shamoon, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Mytili G. Bala, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski and Flavio Nominati, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Nicole Krystal Warren appeals from an order of the superior court
following a probation review hearing. She asserts that at that hearing, the
trial court, the Honorable Polly H. Shamoon presiding, improperly revoked a
previous order by another superior court judge that had allowed the
probation department to begin the paperwork under the Interstate Compact
for Adult Offender Supervision (Interstate Compact or Compact) to transfer
Warren’s probation to New York; and, that Judge Shamoon improperly took
exclusive jurisdiction of the case going forward. In addition, Warren asks
this court to order that the matter be reassigned under Code of Civil
Procedure section 170.1. We conclude that the trial court exceeded its
jurisdiction by revoking a prior order and that the order purporting to retain
exclusive jurisdiction was a legal nullity, but decline to order reassignment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Underlying Crime and Plea Agreement
Warren’s teenage daughter was involved in an altercation during a
memorial service at a San Diego beach in June 2023. Upon learning of the
altercation, Warren drove to the beach and confronted two individuals.
Another altercation ensued, and Warren stabbed both individuals in the arm
with a pocketknife. One of the victims suffered a serious injury that required
surgery. The police contacted Warren and her daughter the next day. They
were packing their car, possibly to leave town. The police searched the car
and found a knife resembling the one used in the attack, and a firearm in the
glove box.
The People charged Warren with two counts of assault with a deadly
weapon, one for each victim, and one count of having a concealed weapon in a
vehicle. On August 9, 2023, Warren pled guilty to one count of assault with a
deadly weapon and admitted an allegation that she personally inflicted great
bodily injury upon a person. Judge Shamoon accepted the plea. On the
change of plea form, the parties noted that the court “indicates alternatives to
custody.” When taking the plea, the court noted that the parties had a
“lengthy” discussion off the record, and that Warren was going to receive
probation.

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B. The Sentencing Hearing
The court held the sentencing hearing on September 27, 2023. In a
victim impact statement, the primary victim said that he had a good job
before the incident but was now unsure of his future.
The People asked the court to sentence Warren to 365 days in custody.
They noted the trial court’s prior discussion but asserted a term of custody
was appropriate given the nature of the crime. Defense counsel reminded the
court that Warren was 38, had no prior criminal history, and that the court
had previously acknowledged that there was a “maternal aspect” to the
crime. Defense counsel said that Warren was the sole provider for three
children and had understood the court would sentence her to probation when
she entered the plea because custodial time, or an alternative such as work
furlough, would “take her away from her kids.”
The trial court, Judge Shamoon presiding, sentenced Warren to two
years formal probation. The court said restitution would be set at a future
hearing but noted that Warren would be “paying all the medical bills.” The
court ordered payments of $150 per month and noted that victim restitution
would be paid before any other fines and fees. The court also required
Warren to complete an eight-hour, in-person anger management course. The
court declined to require volunteer work, stating, “I think what’s more
important to the victims is that she works more and is able to pay them off.
$150 is the minimum, but the medical bills are likely going to be in the
thousands of dollars [and] I want her to be able to pay the restitution.” At
counsel’s request, the court clarified that restitution payments would start
after the restitution hearing but noted that Warren knew it was coming and
could “start saving for it.”

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The formal probation order states that all fines and restitution are to
be paid at a rate of $150 per month, and that all payments are to be applied
to victim restitution first. There is an asterisk adjacent to the dollar amount
($150) indicating that the fines and fees are “stayed pending [the] restitution
hearing.” The probation order also includes a term that requires Warren to
obtain the court’s and probation officer’s “written consent before moving out
of state.”
C. The Restitution Hearing and Related Proceedings
On November 16, 2023, the court, Judge Shamoon presiding, received
documentation from the victim evidencing a restitution amount of $7,729.21.
Warren’s normal defense attorney was unavailable. Another public defender
filled in and requested a hearing on the amount of the restitution. Judge
Shamoon set a hearing for December 8, 2023, but noted that she had
reviewed the information provided by the victim and that the burden would
be on the defense to prove that any of the charges were unreasonable or not
reasonably related to the conviction. On the minute order from the hearing,
Judge Shamoon indicated a victim restitution amount of $7,729.31, and that
a restitution hearing was set for December 8, 2023. The court subsequently
continued the matter to January 10, at the People’s request.
On January 10, 2024, the parties appeared before the Honorable

Marian F. Gaston. The court conducted a Marsden1 hearing. After the court
denied Warren’s request to relieve her counsel, Warren then accepted the
previously stated restitution amount without a hearing. The trial court
added $40 for parking that day and set the total at $7,769.21. Defense
counsel asked if Warren could have 90 days to start making payments. The
court agreed and asked, “how much per month?” Defense counsel said, “$50 a

1 See People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 124−125.

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month would be good,” and the court set payments at $50 per month, to begin
on April 15, 2024. Neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor informed
Judge Gaston that Judge Shamoon previously had issued orders as to both
the monthly amount of restitution payments and the start date for such
payments.
D. Warren’s Request to Start the Interstate Compact Process
On February 27, 2024, the parties appeared before the Honorable John
G. Pro for a very brief hearing. Defense counsel said that Warren was doing
well on probation and wanted to move back to her home state of New York.
Counsel asked that “the paperwork reflect that the interstate compact
process can begin so that probation can contact New York.” The court
confirmed that there was no objection from the district attorney or the
probation department, and “note[d] for the record that [Warren’s] interstate
compact process is to begin, and that’s to the state of New York.” There was
no further discussion on the matter. The minute order for the hearing stated,
“court will note that this Defendant’s interstate compact paperwork to New
York is authorized to begin through Probation.”
E. Hearing on March 26, 2024
On March 26, 2024, the case returned to Judge Shamoon for a
probation review hearing. Judge Shamoon began by noting she was “very
concerned about information that was gathered post-plea in this case.” She
explained, “one of the things that was discussed during the negotiations is
restitution for a young man [the victim of Warren’s assault] who was headed
to college who had serious injuries, and a mom who had to then care for him
and the financial implications for the family. Despite the fact that this court
wanted to order that Warren go to work furlough, she had indicated to the
court, through her lawyer, that she had some issues with kids at home, could

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not do work furlough, wanted to pay the maximum amount of money that she
could to make the victim whole, and we went on from there.”
Judge Shamoon went on to explain that she set restitution at $7,729.31
in September, and “Warren then thought upon herself to contest that. It
went to an evidentiary hearing.” She said that Warren “circumvented this
court’s order and the order I made and asked that judge to reduce the fines to
$50 from $150, and they would not start until April 15th. Despite the fact
that this order was made on November 16th, we learned today, for the first
time ever after I set this hearing, that Warren has made one single $150
payment.” The court also noted that Warren only provided proof of her anger
management class just before the hearing, despite previous requests from
probation. Judge Shamoon concluded, “And on top of everything I’ve
indicated, Ms. Warren then goes to Probation to ask for an Interstate
Compact to New York.”
Defense counsel explained that Judge Shamoon had not previously set
a date for restitution payments to begin, and that Warren was within her
rights to request a hearing on the amount. Defense counsel noted that the
case was sent to Judge Gaston for that hearing, and Judge Gaston ordered
that the payments begin on April 15, 2024. However, Warren made a
payment of $150 before April 15. Counsel represented that Warren had no
issue paying restitution and understood it would be $150 per month.
Judge Shamoon responded, “The whole plea in this case was so Warren
could start paying right away. That’s why she didn’t go into custody, and
that’s why she didn’t get work furlough, because she needed to maximize the
money that she was going to pay this victim.” In Judge Shamoon’s view,
Warren “went and got more time and circumvented a plea. Because if this
Court knew that she wasn’t going to pay until April . . . I never would have

6
agreed to this.” Defense counsel represented that Warren could make
payments of $200 per month.
The court then stated, “There will be no Interstate Compact. As I
indicated, probation is very concerned about that too, despite the fact that
she’s made requests. When I questioned her daughter, there’s no ties to New
York; how they would get there; when they would get there; where they
would live. But she’s going to pay a significant amount of restitution before
she leaves the State of California.” The probation officer clarified the
probation department’s only concern was that Warren had not provided an
address in New York, which was necessary to move forward.
Judge Shamoon stated, “I am revoking the ability she has to move to
New York through Interstate Compact. I’m revoking that.” She explained
that she remained concerned that Warren was going to evade paying the
restitution, and said, “if she has money to move to New York, she should pay
more victim restitution.” She continued, “she’s not allowed to leave the State
of California without this court’s approval of that. Her payments are $200 a
month beginning April 1st, and we will have a review hearing in May to
make sure she’s complied with that.”
Finally, Judge Shamoon stated, “there’s a background on this case that
seems to be piecemealed with the other people that she goes through. So I’m
going to take personal jurisdiction of this case. All matters will come to this
department.”
At the follow-up hearing in May, Judge Shamoon confirmed that
Warren had made two more payments of $200 each, and that she was
otherwise in compliance with her probation. Judge Shamoon addressed
Warren directly and stated, “as long as you keep up with the payments, it
doesn’t appear that you need to come to court again, and once a substantial

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amount of restitution has been paid at that time, if you’re going to make
another request to move, I’ll entertain it at that time.”
II. DISCUSSION
Warren appeals from the trial court’s March 26, 2024 orders. She
asserts Judge Shamoon acted in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction, or in
the alternative, abused her discretion, when she revoked the prior order
allowing the Interstate Compact paperwork to begin. In addition, Warren
asserts the order taking jurisdiction of the case and requiring that all future
hearings be set in Judge Shamoon’s department is a legal nullity, and that
the case should be reassigned to another judge.
A. The Interstate Compact Order
We begin with Judge Shamoon’s order “revoking” Judge Pro’s prior
order allowing the Interstate Compact paperwork to begin through the
probation department.
The Interstate Compact is an “ ‘agreement between member states
[including California] that seeks to promote public safety by systematically
controlling the interstate movement of certain adult offenders.’ ” (Wofford v.
Superior Court (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1029 (Wofford).) “The Compact
is overseen by the Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision [the
Commission], which is a ‘quasi-governmental administrative body vested by
the states with broad regulatory authority.’ ” (Ibid.) “The Commission
promulgates rules that ‘have the force and effect of statutory law’ and that
take precedence over any conflicting laws established in the compacting
states.” (Ibid.) The Commission also issues advisory opinions and a judicial

bench book (the Bench Book).2 (Wofford, at p. 1029.)

2 (Bench Book,<https://interstatecompact.org/bench-book> [as of Sept. 16,
2025], archived at https://perma.cc/U9GQ-5DAC>.)

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According to the Bench Book, a “supervised individual does not have a
constitutional right to transfer their supervision to another state, even if
otherwise eligible.” (Bench Book § 3.2.1.2., p. 33.) The Interstate Compact
“imposes an obligation on the receiving state to accept the individual for
supervision once the sending state has decided to transfer supervision,” but it
does not create “any constitutionally protected right for a supervised
individual to relocate.” (Ibid.) “The sending state’s decision to deny a
transfer of supervision is final and is entitled to judicial deference.” (Ibid.)
If a sending state does decide to transfer supervision of an individual,
the receiving state must accept the transfer if certain criteria are met,
including that the individual is “in substantial compliance” with a “valid plan
of supervision.” (Bench Book § 3.2.1.2., p. 33.) “Substantial Compliance
means that a supervised individual is sufficiently in compliance with the
terms and conditions of his or her supervision so as not to result in initiation
of revocation of supervision proceedings by the sending state.” (Id. at § 3.1,
p. 31.) When a sending state makes a transfer request, “the receiving state
has up to 45 days to investigate and respond.” (Id. at § 3.3.1., p. 39.)
Here, as is often the case, the formal probation order specifies that
Warren must obtain the court’s and the probation officer’s written consent
before moving out of state. Thus, in order to move to New York, Warren had
to be eligible and accepted by New York under the Interstate Compact, and
had to have the written consent of the court. Notably, here, Judge Pro never
gave Warren the court’s written consent to move out of state. He simply
“noted” that Warren’s Interstate Compact “paperwork to New York is
authorized to begin through probation.”
At oral argument, this court asked the parties to address the practical
implications of Judge Shamoon’s order purporting to revoke Judge Pro’s prior

9
order, and specifically, whether Judge Pro’s order that the Interstate
Compact process could begin amounted to written consent for Warren to
move out of state, as required by the formal probation order. Warren’s
counsel asserted that Judge Pro’s order authorizing the process to begin did
equate to authorization for Warren to move out of state because once the
process begins, it is up to the probation officers and Compact office to
determine eligibility for the move without further involvement of the court.
Warren’s counsel conceded that, had the issue come before Judge Shamoon in
the first instance, Judge Shamoon could have declined to allow the Interstate
Compact process to begin, but asserted that once Judge Pro allowed the
process to begin, “it was out of the court’s hands.” The People did not argue
otherwise but asserted that there needs to be “some form of safety valve”
when the process reveals an issue with the requested move.
We note that there is minimal legal authority addressing the issue of
whether a term of probation requiring the court’s written consent to an out-
of-state move would be satisfied by a court order that merely authorizes the
Interstate Compact paperwork process to begin. Warren’s counsel points to
Wofford, but the court there addressed the scope of the Interstate Compact,
not a term of probation requiring the court’s written consent to an out-of-
state move. The defendant in Wofford was on mandatory supervision, not
probation, and the issue was whether the trial court erred by denying her
request to apply for an Interstate Compact transfer “based on its conclusion
that offenders serving mandatory supervision sentences are ineligible” under
the Interstate Compact. (Wofford, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 1027.)
In concluding that that defendants on mandatory supervision may be
eligible for transfer under the Interstate Compact, and that such transfers do
not necessarily run afoul of the goals of mandatory supervision, the court

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noted that “a supervised offender’s request for out-of-state transfer is fully
within the discretion of the relevant California authorities.” (Wofford, supra,
230 Cal.App.4th at p. 1036.) It explained: “First, based on the mandatory
supervision condition requiring court and probation officer consent to an out-
of-state move, the superior court serves as a gatekeeper with discretion to
decline permission to pursue a transfer request with the Compact office.
Thus, Compact eligibility does not lessen the trial court’s discretionary power
to keep an offender within the state because without the court’s approval
there can be no transfer. Second, the Compact office can decline the transfer
request even if the court and probation officer consented.” (Ibid.) The court
noted further, “the Commission also requires that the offender’s supervising
agent (i.e., probation officer) first decide if the transfer plan is viable, and if
the decision is no, the application is not submitted to the Compact office.”
(Id. at p. 1036, fn. 10.)
Warren relies on this language to assert that the trial court serves only
as a “gatekeeper” to the Interstate Compact process, and that once the trial
court allows the process to begin, the rest is up to the probation officer and
Compact administrators. Thus, the trial court’s consent to begin the process
is equivalent to consent for the defendant to move out of state. But the
Wofford court did not consider or affirmatively address that question or, more
specifically, what, if any, role the court plays in providing (or withdrawing)
its consent to the move itself, as opposed to its consent to allow the Interstate
Compact to begin. Rather, the court in Wofford addressed whether the
defendant was eligible for an Interstate Compact transfer in the first
instance, and also noted, “Compact eligibility does not lessen the trial court’s
discretionary power to keep an offender within the state because without the
court’s approval there can be no transfer.” (Wofford, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th

11
at p. 1036.) Here, there was a term in Warren’s probation order, separate
from the Interstate Compact rules and procedures, that required the trial
court’s written consent to any out-of-state move.
Warren also relies on the San Diego County Probation Department,

Field Services Procedure Manual,3 but it is no more helpful in resolving the
question at hand. As Warren’s counsel conceded at oral argument, the
manual is not legal authority. The purpose of the manual is to explain the
Interstate Compact process to probation officers; it does not define the trial
court’s role or authority as it pertains to a formal condition of probation that
expressly requires the trial court’s written consent to any out-of-state move.
Warren’s counsel noted further that there is no provision in the Bench Book
or the Interstate Compact rules by which the court is able or required to
provide a final authorization for the move. But likewise, the Bench Book and
the associated Interstate Compact rules are geared towards the Interstate
Compact process, not the impact of a separate provision in a defendant’s
formal probation order that requires trial court to give written consent to any
out-of-state move. (See, e.g., Bench Book, § 3.8.1, p. 49 [“the ICAOS governs
the movement of offenders and not the terms and conditions of sentencing”].)
The Interstate Compact process, and associated paperwork, are
certainly necessary to ensure the sending and receiving state are in
agreement before any such move can take place, but we are not willing to rely
on a bench guide or a probation manual to decide whether the authorization
to begin the paperwork equates to the trial court giving written consent to
the move itself, as required by the formal probation order.

3 (San Diego County Probation Department, Field Services Procedure
Manual, Procedure 408, §§ 408.1–408.3, <https://www.sandiegocounty.gov/
content/sdc/probation/Probation_Policies.html> [as of Sept. 16, 2025],
archived at <https://perma.cc/JXM2-9265>.)

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But we need not, and expressly do not, decide that precise issue here.
Warren asserts Judge Shamoon acted in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction
by “revoking” Judge Pro’s order permitting the Interstate Compact process to
begin. At the March 26 hearing, the probation officer noted that Warren had
not provided an address and that, “we have to provide an address to get the
process going.” Thus, it appears the process had not actually begun, and that
the practical effect of Judge Shamoon’s order was to pause the process until
such time as the court was willing to consent to the transfer. By doing so,
Judge Shamoon did technically “revoke” Judge Pro’s prior order, which, at a
minimum, permitted the Interstate Compact process to begin. We agree that
Judge Shamoon did not have the jurisdictional authority to do so. (See, e.g.,
Ford v. Superior Court (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 737, 741−742 [“ ‘it is beyond
the jurisdictional authority of another department of the same court to
interfere with the exercise of the power of the department to which the
proceeding has been so assigned’ ”].)
The People assert that Judge Shamoon did not revoke Judge Pro’s
order and was instead reporting on probation’s findings. The record does not
support that contention. As noted, the probation officer said that Warren had
not provided an address in New York, and that the process could not begin
until she did. Probation did not determine that Warren did not qualify for a
move under the Interstate Compact; they simply noted that they would need
an address before they could proceed with the process that Judge Pro had
authorized.
The People assert further that Judge Shamoon had highly persuasive
reasons to reconsider Judge Pro’s order—namely, Warren’s eligibility for
transfer—but this argument fails for the same reasons. The probation
department had not begun the process, and it follows that they had not

13
determined whether Warren met the eligibility criteria for the move. Putting
aside the question of whether the trial court could ultimately withhold
consent to the move, even if it were approved through the Interstate Compact
process, Judge Shamoon’s order stopped the Interstate Compact process
itself, in contradiction to Judge Pro’s prior order that it could begin. At a
minimum, proceeding with the Interstate Compact process in the meantime
may have allowed for a faster move if and when the trial court did provide its
consent.
For these reasons, we conclude the trial court’s March 26, 2024, order
purporting to revoke the court’s prior consent for the Interstate Compact
process to begin must be vacated
B. The Jurisdiction Order
Warren next contends the trial court’s order “tak[ing] jurisdiction
regarding this case,” and requiring that “all future hearings [be set] in
department 1102” (Judge Shamoon’s department) was a legal nullity and
must be stricken. We agree.
People v. Osslo (1958) 50 Cal.2d 75 is instructive. There, our high court
explained:
“It does not appear that the trial judge had power to impose
the following terms in his probation orders: ‘that this Court
and Judge shall retain jurisdiction of this matter
throughout the said period of probation and no other
department of the Court or other Judge shall modify this
order without notice to the Judge who tried the case.’ An
individual judge (as distinguished from a court) is not
empowered to retain jurisdiction of a cause. The cause is
before the court, not the individual judge of that court, and
the jurisdiction which the judge exercises is the jurisdiction
of the court, not of the judge. Rules of court which provide
that post-trial proceedings in a cause shall be heard by the
judge who tried the matter are entirely proper, but the

14
individual judge cannot order that such proceedings must
be heard by him.” (Id. at p. 104.)

The People point to certain rules that permit a court to maintain
jurisdiction to modify restitution or enforce a plea bargain, and that require,
to the extent possible, that a restitution order be prepared by the sentencing
court. (See People v. McCune (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 648, 652−653; People
v. Collins (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 849, 863; Penal Code § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).)
Warren does not dispute these authorities, and neither do we. However, as
Warren points out, they do not give a particular judge the authority to retain
jurisdiction over all future proceedings.
For these reasons, we conclude the trial court’s order purporting to
maintain exclusive jurisdiction over all future proceedings must be stricken.
C. Reassignment
As a final matter, Warren asserts that based on Judge Shamoon’s
actions and comments on the record, we should reassign the matter to
another judge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (c),
which provides: “At the request of a party or on its own motion an appellate
court shall consider whether in the interests of justice it should direct that
further proceedings be heard before a trial judge other than the judge whose
judgment or order was reviewed by the appellate court.”
“An appellate court must exercise its power to disqualify a judge under
that statute sparingly, and only when the interests of justice require it.”
(People v. LeBlanc (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1079 (LeBlanc).) “The court
may order disqualification when necessary to dispel the appearance of bias,
for example, when the record shows the trial judge became embroiled or
personally invested in the outcome of the proceedings.” (Ibid.) “Proper
grounds for disqualification under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1,
subdivision (c), ‘include “where a reasonable person might doubt whether the

15
trial judge was impartial [citation], or where the court’s rulings suggest the
‘whimsical disregard’ of a statutory scheme.” ’ ” (LeBlanc, at p. 1079.) “Mere
judicial error does not establish bias and normally is not a proper ground for
disqualification.” (Ibid.)
Here, Warren asserts that Judge Shamoon’s statements at the March
26, 2024 hearing, along with her improper assertion of exclusive jurisdiction,
suggest that she had an undue personal stake in the case.
As discussed, while Warren was not legally required to start making
payments until April under Judge Gaston’s January order, Judge Shamoon
had suggested, from the start, that Warren would pay at a rate of $150 per
month, and that Warren was aware of her obligations and could start saving
while awaiting a decision as to the amount of the final restitution award.
There is also no dispute that she had paid only a small fraction of the victim
restitution at the time of the March 26, 2024, hearing.
Judge Shamoon did acknowledge counsel’s assertion that payments
were not due until April 15, but also reiterated the importance the court
placed on restitution, including when making its sentencing order, which
included restitution as a formal term of probation, and expressed frustration
at Warren’s subsequent requests to reduce the payment amount and extend
the time to start payments. Judge Shamoon also expressed concerns as to
whether Warren’s self-employment was sufficient to allow her to pay
restitution in a timely manner given that the court had agreed not to impose
custody time or work furlough so that Warren could “maximize the money
that she was going to pay this victim.”
Although we agree that Judge Shamoon exceeded the court’s
jurisdiction when she revoked Judge Pro’s order, and that her purported
attempt to maintain exclusive jurisdiction over the matter was a legal nullity,

16
we do not find that her comments on the record went so far as to demonstrate
that she was improperly “embroiled or personally invested in the outcome of
the proceedings.” (LeBlanc, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1079; see also In re
Wagner (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 138, 147 [record demonstrated “precipitous
order remanding petitioner to custody, without affording him an opportunity
to respond to the charges . . . was motivated by anger”].) Rather, Judge
Shamoon was interested in ensuring that neither the trial court nor the
parties lost sight of the key components of the negotiated plea bargain in this
unique case. (See Hernandez v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 285,
303 [“The trial court’s orders . . . do not suggest bias or whimsy on behalf of
the court, only frustration and a desire to manage a complex case”].)
III. DISPOSITION
The portions of the trial court’s order of March 26, 2024, that
(1) purported to take jurisdiction of the case, and (2) revoked the Interstate
Compact authorization are stricken.

KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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