CourtListener 10672420•People v. Johnson CA1/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 9/16/25 P. v. Johnson CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A172495
v.
TERTRON RAVSHAUGHA (San Francisco City and County
JOHNSON, Super. Ct. No. CRI-23017423)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Tertron Johnson pled guilty to one count of domestic
violence, and the trial court suspended imposition of the sentence and placed
him on probation. Several months later, the court revoked probation and
sentenced Johnson to three years in prison. He appealed, and his appellate
counsel asked this court for an independent review of the record to determine
whether there are any arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d
436 (Wende).) Johnson was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief
and did not do so.
We conclude that a criminal protective order entered under Penal Code
section 136.2, subdivision (i), was unauthorized because it barred Johnson
from contact with the victim of the incident for which his probation was
revoked, not the victim of the domestic violence of which he was convicted.
Thus, we strike the protective order.1 We also order that a clerical error in
the abstract of judgment be corrected. Otherwise, we conclude there are no
arguable issues and affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
After an October 2023 fight with his girlfriend, C.C., then 21-year-old
Johnson was charged with five felony counts: domestic violence, assault with
force likely to cause great bodily injury, false imprisonment, criminal threats,
and assault with a firearm.2 The following January, under a plea agreement,
he pled guilty to domestic violence, and the remaining charges were
dismissed. On February 5, 2024, the trial court suspended imposition of the
sentence and placed Johnson on formal probation for three years with various
terms and conditions, including that he not possess any firearms. The court
also entered a three-year protective order under section 136.2, subdivision (i),
prohibiting Johnson from having contact with C.C.
1 In the interest of judicial economy, we order the protective order
stricken without first requesting supplemental briefing. Any party wishing
to address this issue may petition for rehearing under Government Code
section 68081. All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The charges were brought under sections 273.5, subdivision (a)
(domestic violence), 245, subdivisions (a)(2) (assault with firearm) and (a)(4)
(assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury), 236 (false
imprisonment), and 422 (criminal threats). It was also alleged as to the
firearm-assault charge that Johnson personally used a firearm under
section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), and as to the criminal-threats charge that
he was personally armed with a firearm under section 12022.5,
subdivision (a). Finally, a great-violence aggravating circumstance was
alleged as to both assaults under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1),
and a weapon aggravating circumstance was alleged as to the firearm assault
under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(2).
2
Four months later, the probation department filed a motion to revoke
Johnson’s probation based on a May 2024 incident between him and a
different woman, K.K. During a contested probation-revocation hearing, K.K.
testified that she and Johnson had dated but broke up shortly before the
incident. After Johnson asked her for money during a phone call and she
indicated she had $300, the two agreed to meet in person near her residence.
K.K. testified that initially, Johnson was “bragging that he [had] . . . a
new gun” and pulled out a Glock 45 handgun to show her and her 13-year-old
brother, who was also present. Johnson then put the gun in his jacket
pocket. He asked K.K. for $300, but because he refused to apologize for a
prior incident, she told him she would give him only $40 as “gas money” for
coming to her home. Johnson became “irritated,” and he took K.K.’s cell
phone from her pocket. As she tried to get the phone back, Johnson pushed
the firearm, which was still in his pocket, against her chest a few times. K.K.
then ran back to her house and called 911. Johnson left, and K.K. never
recovered her phone.
Johnson denied most of what K.K. claimed. He testified that the two
were acquaintances but never dated or had a sexual relationship. She
volunteered that she had $500, and he agreed to meet her with the
expectation that she would give him some money. He denied ever owning or
possessing a firearm in the past several years, including during the incident
at issue. Johnson claimed that he originally paid for K.K.’s cell phone as part
of an arrangement involving unpaid bills that prevented him from getting a
phone in his own name, but he admitted that he took the phone from her and
never gave it back.
The trial court indicated that it believed K.K.’s testimony that Johnson
had a gun, even though other portions of her testimony were not fully
3
credible. The court then found by a preponderance of the evidence that
Johnson violated the terms of his probation. On December 11, 2024, the
court revoked and terminated probation and sentenced him to the midterm of
three years in prison for domestic violence, with total custody credits of 577
days. It also entered a three-year protective order under section 136.2,
subdivision (i), prohibiting Johnson from having contact with K.K.
II.
DISCUSSION
Having independently reviewed the record, we conclude the
December 2024 protective order as to K.K. was not authorized under the
governing statute.3 Under section 136.2, subdivision (i), “[w]hen a criminal
defendant has been convicted of a crime involving domestic violence, . . . the
court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining
the defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime.” (§ 136.2,
subd. (i)(1), italics added.) Similarly, a court sentencing a defendant
“convicted of a crime involving domestic violence . . . shall consider issuing an
order restraining the defendant from any contact with a percipient witness to
the crime if it can be established by clear and convincing evidence that the
witness has been harassed.” (§ 136.2, subd. (i)(2), italics added.) Thus, by
the statute’s plain terms, the protected person must be a victim or witness of
the qualifying crime of which the defendant was convicted. (People v. Walts
3 Johnson did not appeal from the February 2024 order placing him on
probation after his plea, precluding challenges to the proceedings through
that date. We are not convinced he is entitled to Wende review of the order
revoking probation, as opposed to the ultimate sentencing. (See People v.
Freeman (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 126, 133.) Nonetheless, we have considered
whether any arguable issues exist as to both the proceedings on the
revocation petition and the December 2024 sentencing. (See People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 232 [court has discretion to independently
review record in postconviction appeal].)
4
(2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 127, 143.) Since Johnson was not convicted of any
crime against K.K., the order barring him from contact with her must be
stricken.
The abstract of judgment also contains a clerical error that must be
corrected. The abstract indicates that Johnson was convicted of domestic
violence on November 4, 2024, by the trial court. In fact, that date is the date
the court found he violated probation. The abstract should instead reflect
that he was convicted by plea on January 12, 2024.
Otherwise, our independent review does not reveal any other errors or
arguable issues. Johnson was represented by counsel below, substantial
evidence supported revoking his probation, and aside from the protective
order, no error appears in the trial court’s sentencing decisions.
III.
DISPOSITION
The protective order as to K.K. is stricken. The December 11, 2024
order revoking probation and judgment are otherwise affirmed. The trial
court is directed to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that Johnson
was convicted on January 12, 2024, under a plea, and to forward a certified
copy of the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.
5
_________________________
Humes, P.J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Banke, J.
_________________________
Smiley, J.
People v. Johnson A172495
6
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