CourtListener 10671673•Jennifer D. v. Dean D. CA2/6
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 9/15/25 Jennifer D. v. Dean D. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
JENNIFER D., 2d Civ. No. B340999
(Super. Ct. No. D412115)
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Ventura County)
v.
DEAN D.,
Defendant and Respondent.
Jennifer D. (Jennifer) appeals an order of the superior
court denying her request for a domestic violence restraining
order (DVRO) (Fam. Code, § 6320) against her husband Dean D.
(Dean). We conclude, among other things, that Jennifer has not
shown that the trial court erred by denying her request for a
DVRO. We affirm.
FACTS
Jennifer and Dean were married and they have a daughter.
Jennifer sought an ex parte temporary restraining order against
Dean. The court granted it pending a hearing on the merits. It
then set the case for trial.
Jennifer based her petition on an October 17, 2023,
incident. She testified Dean fell asleep in his car with the garage
door closed and the engine running. This was dangerous to her
safety “due to potential carbon monoxide poisoning.” When Dean
got out of his car, he slammed his car door into the door of her
vehicle which was parked next to his in the garage. Jennifer and
her daughter testified that when he backed his car out of the
garage, he was “yelling profanities” at Jennifer. Jennifer
testified Dean grabbed her wrist and “shoved her aside.” The
trial court found a video recording of this incident did not support
Jennifer’s claims and her testimony was not credible.
Jennifer testified that on October 14, 2024, the family went
to Las Vegas. During the trip Dean called her a host of
profanities and gave her “the finger.” Jennifer’s daughter
testified Dean used “the same list of profanities.” Dean admitted
he gave Jennifer the finger and told her to go to hell. He denied
using the profane language Jennifer testified about. The trial
court found Jennifer’s and her daughter’s testimony about this
incident was not credible. Dean’s testimony was credible. It
found Dean’s statement “go to hell” and giving Jennifer the finger
did not amount to domestic violence.
Jennifer testified Dean was drunk while sleeping in his
daughter’s bed on February 22, 2023. The trial court found that
Jennifer’s claims were not true and that Jennifer was “the
aggressor.” Jennifer went into the room while Dean was
attempting to sleep and began filming and “berating him.”
Dean testified that he did not physically hurt Jennifer. He
did not say or do anything to make Jennifer feel unsafe. He did
not threaten her. Jennifer’s claims that he had grabbed her and
choked her were not true. Dean admitted that in arguments with
2.
Jennifer he had used foul language. He testified Jennifer had
initiated those arguments to insult him.
The trial court found Dean was credible. Jennifer’s claim
that Dean “engaged in financial coercive control” was not true. It
found she “lied about what occurred in an effort to gain a
strategic advantage during the hearing on her request for a
DVRO.” The court denied her request for a DVRO.
DISCUSSION
The trial court may issue a domestic violence restraining
order to protect a person from abusive conduct that would “ ‘place
a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily
injury’ ” or conduct of “ ‘molesting, attacking, striking, stalking,
threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing’ ” another
person. (S.M. v. E.P. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1264.) Such
conduct includes coercive control that is a “ ‘pattern of behavior
that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s
free will and personal liberty.’ ” (Parris J. v. Christopher U.
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 108, 121.) A single event may not “rise to
the level of destruction of [the petitioner’s] mental and emotional
calm, sufficient to support the issuance of a [DVRO].” (Ibid.)
The court deciding a request for a DVRO may properly
consider who was the “aggressor” in the relationship. (In re
Marriage of G. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 773, 780.) “We may not
disturb a court’s ruling on a request for a DVRO absent an abuse
of discretion.” (Ibid.)
Substantial Evidence
Jennifer claims there is evidence to show Dean committed a
pattern of abusive conduct sufficient for the issuance of a DVRO.
But the issue is not whether some evidence supports Jennifer; it
is whether substantial evidence supports the judgment. (Katsura
3.
v. City of San Buenaventura (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 104, 107.)
We draw all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment.
We do not weigh the evidence; that is the role of the trial court.
(Ibid.) The trial court found Jennifer did not meet her burden to
show abusive conduct by Dean. The court’s findings are
presumed to be supported by substantial evidence. (Krueger v.
Bank of America (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 204, 207.) “ ‘[Appellants]
are required to set forth in their brief all the material evidence on
the point and not merely their own evidence. Unless this is done
the error is deemed to be waived.’ ” (Foreman & Clark Corp. v.
Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.)
Jennifer does not cite to Dean’s testimony where he said he
did not physically hurt her and did not say or do anything to
make her feel unsafe. Dean testified her claim that he had
grabbed her was not true. He did not threaten her. Jennifer’s
claim that he choked her was not true. The trial court could
reasonably rely on this testimony to reach its decision.
Jennifer notes that in one message to her Dean wrote, “I’m
sorry for allowing you not to feel safe and loved.” She claims this
shows the trial court erred by not granting a DVRO. But her
position is based on this ambiguous phrase in isolation and by
ignoring Dean’s testimony that he did not do anything to make
her feel unsafe. We cannot reweigh the evidence to give this
phrase controlling weight or resolve an alleged conflict between
this phrase and the remainder of Dean’s testimony. We do not
weigh the evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide
credibility. That is exclusively decided by the trial court.
(Katsura v. City of San Buenaventura, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at
p. 107.)
4.
Dean’s Use of Foul Language
Jennifer claims Dean used foul language, citing Dean’s
admissions that in messages to her he said, among other things,
“You are truly . . . a piece of shit”; “[Y]ou are truly disgusting”;
“Go to hell where you belong”; “You are rotten. Nice job asshole.”
But Dean testified he made these remarks during arguments
Jennifer initiated to insult or provoke him. He said they were not
threats to her physical or emotional state. The trial court found
Dean was credible. It found his statements did not constitute
“domestic violence.”
Jennifer cites In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 106 and claims a DVRO should issue because Dean
used foul language. But that case is distinguishable. “What
disturbs the peace of a person” sufficient to support a DVRO
“differs in each case.” (K.L. v. R.H. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 965,
981.) In F.M. & M.M., the court reversed the denial of a DVRO
because the wife’s evidence showed grounds for a DVRO.
Jennifer claims the husband in that case was subject to a DVRO
for using foul language. But he did more than that. He was the
aggressor; the wife was the victim. She was abused for two
years. The husband made multiple threats to kill her; he had
beaten her. He was arrested for pushing her. His assault left a
bruise on the wife’s hand. He removed her daughter from the
house without her permission.
There may be cases where using foul language will support
granting a DVRO, but the trial court could reasonably find this
was not such a case. From Dean’s testimony it could reasonably
infer that he made some foul remarks after being provoked by
Jennifer on a couple of occasions. The court also found Jennifer
was the “aggressor.” Dean’s conduct was not comparable to In re
5.
Marriage of F.M. & M.M. The court could find it was not the type
of conduct that would place Jennifer in fear of bodily injury,
restrict her freedom, and was not a pattern of threatening or
abusive conduct that would support a DVRO. (S.M. v. E.P.,
supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1264-1265.)
“The DVPA was not enacted to address all disputes
between former couples . . . .” (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 1, 13.) Jennifer had to show more than a few vulgar
remarks to prevail. (S.M. v. E.P., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1258, 1263-1264 [husband’s act of badgering wife and calling her
bad names–e.g., a “cold bitch”–was not sufficient for a DVRO].)
In K.L v. R.H., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at page 981, the court held
calling the other party foul names was not sufficient.
The court must make sure “the moving party has, in fact,
been victimized.” (Conness v. Satram (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th
197, 205.) Vulgar words, without more, are “not actionable per
se.” (Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38
Cal.4th 264, 273-274.) “Vulgar name-calling alone is not domestic
violence.” (R.G. v. R.G. (N.J. Super.App.Div. 2017) 156 A.3d
1074, 1085.) “While unpleasant and harsh, name calling alone
does not rise to the level of domestic abuse . . . .” (Carrie v. Jones
(La.Ct.App. 2022) 334 So.3d 834, 844, fn. 6; Thelma U. v. Miko U.
(N.Y.App.Div. 2016) 145 A.D.3d 527, 528 [mere use of foul
language could not be enjoined as harassment].) Courts properly
distinguish between mere name calling and more serious
conduct. (K.L. v. R.H., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.)
Moreover, Jennifer had to prove how Dean’s remarks “victimized”
her. (Conness, at p. 205.) A DVRO may not issue simply based
on “any act that upsets the petitioning party.” (Curcio v. Pels,
supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 13.)
6.
Here the trial court could reasonably reject Jennifer’s claim
that Dean’s remarks rose “to the level of destruction of
[Jennifer’s] mental and emotional calm, sufficient to support the
issuance of a [DVRO]” (Curcio v. Pels, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at
p. 13), because it found she “lied” about being abused. It could
find she did not show a DVRO was necessary to prevent abuse
from “occurring in the future.” (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M.,
supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 117; In re Marriage of Fajota (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1499, fn. 8.) The court found Dean
candidly took responsibility for his actions. A DVRO will not
issue to “punish” Dean for merely using some foul language in
the past. (F.M. & M.M., at p. 117.)
The trial court also found that Jennifer’s claims that Dean
grabbed her and “shoved her aside” were not credible, and that
Jennifer was “the aggressor” in the October 17 and February 22
incidents. Jennifer testified about the October 14, October 17,
and February 22 incidents. But the court found she “lied . . . on
her request for a DVRO.” It found “no coercive control was
exerted by [Dean]” over Jennifer. Jennifer has not shown the
court’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence.
(Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881.)
Statement of Decision
Jennifer contends the trial court’s statement of decision is
inadequate. She claims it did not mention all the evidence and
consider all her objections and legal arguments.
But a “statement of decision need not address all the legal
and factual issues raised by the parties.” (Muzquiz v. City of
Emeryville (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1124-1125.) “Instead, it
need do no more than state the grounds upon which the judgment
rests, without necessarily specifying the particular evidence
7.
considered by the trial court in reaching its decision.” (Id. at
p. 1125.) The court is required “ ‘to state only ultimate rather
than evidentiary facts.’ ” (Ibid.)
Here the nine-page statement of decision was a
comprehensive review of the trial, Jennifer’s claims, Dean’s
response, and the parties’ testimony. The trial court reviewed
both the ultimate issues and the evidentiary facts.
Jennifer claims the trial court’s statement of decision is
different from the earlier comments the court made at trial
regarding the parties’ credibility. But the court’s comments “may
never be used to impeach” the court’s final decision. (Burbank-
Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority v. Hensler (1991) 233
Cal.App.3d 577, 591.) “ ‘[A] court is not bound by its statement of
intended decision and may enter a wholly different judgment
than that announced.’ ” (In re Marriage of Ditto (1988) 206
Cal.App.3d 643, 646.)
Jennifer claims the trial court entered the statement of
decision prematurely and did not give her 15 days to respond to
the proposed statement of decision. But “the premature signing
of a proposed statement of decision does not constitute reversible
error unless actual prejudice is shown.” (Heaps v. Heaps (2004)
124 Cal.App.4th 286, 292.) Here there is no such showing. The
court found Jennifer’s testimony was not credible; that finding is
fatal to her claims on appeal.
8.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to
respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
9.
Michele M. Castillo, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Robert L. Schibel; Stephen Temko for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Blevans, Itzkowitz & Cantrell, Evan Craig Itzkowitz;
Garrett C. Dailey for Defendant and Respondent.
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