People v. Pizzini CA4/3

CourtListener 10670783Calctapp12.09.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 9/12/25 P. v. Pizzini CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063940

v. (Super. Ct. No. M-20717)

JOHN EDWARD PIZZINI, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Claudia C. Alvarez, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
James R. Bostwick, Jr., under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Paige B. Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
John Edward Pizzini appeals from the trial court’s order denying
his petition to terminate his sex offender registration under Penal Code
section 290.5, subdivision (a) (all undesignated statutory references are to
this code). We conclude the trial court abused its discretion by improperly
placing the burden on Pizzini to prove community safety would not be
significantly enhanced by requiring continued registration. Thus, we reverse
the order and remand to the trial court for it to reconsider whether Pizzini’s
petition should be granted.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1990, Pizzini was charged with four felony counts of violating
section 288, subdivision (c), which alleged, between April and May 1990,
Pizzini committed a lewd and lascivious act upon the victim, who was 14 or
15 years old, and Pizzini was at least 10 years older than the child. Pizzini
also was charged with four misdemeanor counts of violating section 647.6,
which alleged, between April and May 1990, he annoyed and molested a child
under 18 years old. In 1990, Pizzini pleaded guilty to at least one
misdemeanor count of violating section 647.6.1
As a result of Pizzini’s conviction in 1990, he was required to
register as a sex offender, and in August 2023, Pizzini filed a petition to
terminate his registration pursuant to section 290.5. After the filing of

1 The only court document in the record on appeal from Pizzini’s

1990 case is the first amended information. On appeal, Pizzini says he
pleaded guilty to one misdemeanor count under section 647.6, and in its
opposition in the trial court, the prosecution said he pleaded guilty to one
count under section 647.6 and the remaining counts were dismissed.
However, on appeal, the Attorney General says Pizzini pleaded guilty to four
counts. We need not resolve this issue given our conclusion on this appeal the
trial court abused its discretion and the matter should be remanded.

2
Pizzini’s petition, the Costa Mesa Police Department filed a “PETITION
CHECKLIST.” The checklist noted Pizzini had four misdemeanor convictions
for failure to register (two in 1994, one in 1995, and one in 2016). The
checklist also indicated Pizzini had a 1981 misdemeanor conviction in
Michigan for indecent exposure. The checklist noted Pizzini’s minimum
registration period had been extended by 4 years (for the four misdemeanor
failure-to-register convictions) and tolled by 10 years, 4 months, and 3 days
(for subsequent incarceration, placement, or commitment, including any
subsequent civil commitment, but that time did not include arrests not
resulting in conviction, adjudication, or revocation of probation or parole).
The checklist determined the minimum time period for Pizzini’s registration
requirement to be 24 years, 4 months, and 3 days. Thus, the checklist
indicated Pizzini was eligible to have his registration requirement
terminated.
In January 2024, the prosecution objected to Pizzini’s petition,
asserting community safety would be significantly enhanced by Pizzini’s
continued registration. In support of its opposition brief, the prosecution
submitted: (1) the first amended information against Pizzini in his 1990 case;
(2) a 1990 police report regarding the 1990 case; (3) a police department case
file regarding the 1981 Michigan conviction; and (4) a newspaper article from
December 1990.
In its opposition brief, the prosecution argued “[t]he facts of the
underlying case evidence that community safety would be significantly
enhanced by [Pizzini’s] continued registration.” The police report indicated
the aunt of the victim reported her 14-year-old niece “was possibly having
sexual relations with [a] [29-year-old] male,” Pizzini. The police report also
indicated individuals had conveyed, inter alia, the following: Pizzini ran a

3
candy sales business and hired minors to sell candy; the victim, her sister,
and other minors worked for Pizzini; Pizzini had been seen kissing the victim
on the lips many times; when Pizzini was driving, he allowed female minors
to sit on his lap and steer; one person reported while sitting on Pizzini’s lap
he put his hand on her thigh and began to move it towards her vaginal area
and she pushed his hand away; another person reported, on more than one
occasion while sitting on Pizzini’s lap, he put his hand on her thigh and
stomach and she hit him to stop touching her; Pizzini said to one of his
employees he liked girls between the ages of 13 and 18; and Pizzini hosted a
slumber party at his home one night with girls who worked for him, Pizzini
and the victim slept in the same bedroom and were seen through the window
in bed together, and the next day the victim said she had been drunk and did
not remember if anything had happened.
The police report also noted, after receiving information the
victim was pregnant, Pizzini and the victim were found together by police
and Pizzini told the victim not to go with the police and that she did not have
to say anything. The police report further indicated the victim had said she
and Pizzini began seriously dating in April 1990 and began having
intercourse almost immediately after becoming serious, and when she told
Pizzini she was pregnant, he became angry because she had lied about being
on birth control pills. The police report recounted the victim had also said,
when her father learned of the pregnancy, he told Pizzini that Pizzini could
either marry the victim, leave the state, or go to jail, and Pizzini said he
would marry the victim.
Additionally, the prosecution argued Pizzini’s 1981 Michigan
conviction supported the need for continued registration. The prosecution

4
asserted, in 1981, Pizzini was found in his vehicle “naked from the waist
down, staring at the sky[,] and stroking his penis.”
The prosecution also contended Pizzini’s conduct since the
registration requirement supports the need for continued registration. The
prosecution argued Pizzini had been convicted of failing to register six times,
with the most recent failure being in 2015. The prosecution asserted Pizzini
had a voluminous non-sexual criminal history that included “21 different
convictions on a variety of cases.”2 The prosecution also said Pizzini, in 1990
after his conviction, “was reported to be still operating his candy sales
business and still employing minors.” The prosecution asserted law
enforcement was contacted, and Pizzini “apparently seemed undeterred from
contact with children despite his [1990] conviction, registration requirements,
and conditions of probation.” The prosecution appears to have relied on a
1990 newspaper article for these assertions. The newspaper article noted
Pizzini had been arrested on suspicion of violating his probation and, at the
time of his arrest, he was alone with a 14-year-old girl. The article reported
Pizzini said he had resumed his candy selling business and planned to ask
his probation officer for permission in the near future. The article claimed
Pizzini’s probation required him to stay away from minors. The article

2 The prosecution asserted these convictions “vary from multiple

convictions of felony second degree burglary under [sections 459 to 460,
subdivision (b)] to illegal ownership of a firearm under [former section 12021,
subdivision (a)(1)]—a charge which he was sentenced to 2 years of state
prison for in 08NF1128.” The prosecution further claimed Pizzini had “been
convicted of various misdemeanor forms of theft and notably, contempt of
court” and when Pizzini had “been subject to parole, it appears he violated
parole multiple times.” Based on the record on appeal, the prosecution did not
file supporting documents regarding these purported other convictions.

5
further indicated the 14-year-old girl who was the subject of the charges in
Pizzini’s prior case had run away the day before she was to testify in Pizzini’s
trial, and was now living in Mexico. The article noted Pizzini said he had
been in a relationship with that 14-year-old girl and, after she became
pregnant, they had planned to marry.
In March 2024, the trial court held a hearing as to Pizzini’s
petition to terminate his registration. The court denied the petition and ruled
Pizzini could file a new petition in three years. Prior to denying the petition,
the court orally provided its tentative. The court noted it had reviewed the
materials submitted and analyzed each of the factors under section 290.5,
subdivision (a)(3). The court said it was notable Pizzini was 29 years old and
the victim was 14 years old, and although he seemed to be running a
legitimate candy business, it gave him access to children. The court also said
it found noteworthy in the police report “there were other allegations of
similar conduct with other children, maybe not to the extent of full blown
intercourse with other children, but definitely at least attempted sexual
contact with minors of that same age.” The court stated the victim had fled to
Mexico and it was reported to law enforcement the victim was pregnant. The
court said the victim was “maybe not a full blown stranger” but “came in
contact with [Pizzini] because of that attraction of the candy business so
that’s concerning, but not a stranger.” The court also stated there was one
victim in this case, but “there were other kids where there’s questionable
behavior.”
The trial court further said “[t]he other concern is that after
[Pizzini] had been placed on probation and had been, specifically told to
register, and specifically told to stay away from minor children, with a
specific condition to not be alone with children. Soon thereafter, within

6
months of that conviction, and after having served some time in custody, he
was, in fact, found with a 14 year old alone and this was a runaway child and
it was not the same original victim.” The court noted Pizzini had engaged in
this conduct without first asking for permission from the probation officer.
The trial court stated Pizzini “on six different occasions failed to
register, the most recent one being in 2015, having risen to a felony level
because of his repeated failure to register.” The court said that was
“extremely and probably the biggest red flag that the [c]ourt is taking into
consideration, because it tells the [c]ourt that not only has he not taken the
[section] 290 registration requirements seriously, but he will continue to not
take the gravity of his conduct as—in consideration before he engages in
further contact with children.” The court added it was making its decision on
all of the evidence but the six convictions for failing to register, with the last
one being a felony, were a “major factor.”
The trial court also said Pizzini had “several probation violations,
at least one parole violation,” had “served time in custody,” and had “been
convicted for felonies involving moral turpitude and has been convicted of
contempt of court.” The court stated “Pizzini at this time has not convinced
the [c]ourt he would continue to be a law abiding citizen.” The court noted it
believed the most recent conviction was in 2015. However, the court said
“given the repeated conduct before that, the [c]ourt is not yet convinced that,
in fact, he will not pose a danger to society if the [c]ourt were to lift the
restriction on having to register as a [section] 290 registrant as required in
the original conviction.” The court further indicated it would permit Pizzini to
file a new petition in three years as that “will give at least ten years of actual
noncriminal conduct and maybe an opportunity to complete a program.”

7
Additionally, the trial court stated there was no evidence Pizzini
had completed a program, and although it could not require Pizzini to
complete a program, it thought “that would be convincing to the next judicial
officer, or this one if [the trial judge is] here doing this case, that, in fact, he
has at least tried to address the propensities he might still have with him.”
The court further said the “other concerning thing” was there was “no [State-
Authorized Risk Assessment Tool for Sex Offenders (SARATSO)] report so
the [c]ourt doesn’t have any documentation whatsoever to indicate and
convince this [c]ourt that [Pizzini] doesn’t continue to pose a grave danger to
the community with this type of conduct. So we do believe—I do believe that
the [c]ourt not lifting that requirement will enhance public safety.”
In response to the tentative, Pizzini’s counsel argued the failures
to register do not prove Pizzini was likely to reoffend, and the conviction
requiring his registration was 34 years earlier. Pizzini’s counsel further
asserted, while Pizzini continued with the candy business after his release, it
appears he was not found in violation of probation and not continuing with
the candy shop was then added as a condition of his probation. Pizzini’s
counsel underscored there has been no criminal offense of a sexual nature
since 1990, and Pizzini’s other convictions do not indicate a likelihood to
commit a sexual offense again. Pizzini’s counsel noted there was no court
ordered therapy and no SARATSO score, but it was the prosecution’s burden.
Pizzini’s counsel said the other offenses show Pizzini does not “know how to
follow the law,” but argued there have been no offenses since 1990 of a sexual
nature.
The prosecution argued the trial court’s tentative was correct.
The prosecution underscored Pizzini had a 1981 Michigan conviction, was
convicted in his 1990 case, and then continued to operate his candy selling

8
business and employ minors. The prosecution noted it was “[f]air enough to
say” Pizzini was never charged for operating the candy selling business after
his conviction in 1990. However, the prosecution highlighted Pizzini violated
his registration requirements six times and had more than 20 convictions
since the first date of registration. The court asked the prosecution about
Pizzini’s counsel’s argument it was the prosecution’s burden to prove Pizzini
is likely to reoffend, to which the prosecution underscored Pizzini’s history,
including failing to register.
The trial court ultimately stated it had looked at the totality of
the circumstances and will keep its tentative and deny the petition. The court
noted Pizzini was only convicted “for several of all the charges that were
actually posed before him at the beginning of that case” but the court “cannot
ignore the fact that the victim wasn’t available to testify and, in fact, ran
away from Orangewood and took off to Mexico.” The court also said it seemed
Pizzini had “trivialized everything that came down, and still making
statements that he was going to marry the girl and that would make it all go
away.” It stated “he was found with a [14-year-old] runaway soon thereafter
after being placed on probation.” The court added, nine years after his 1981
Michigan conviction, Pizzini was “committing much graver offenses with
children.”
The trial court further stated it cannot require Pizzini to go to
counseling but he is “welcome to do so and maybe that will be more
convincing to the next judicial officer. And whether it’s the People’s burden or
the [d]efense burden to present the [c]ourt with any evidence of his risk, I
think would serve a judicial officer, whomever it is, well to at least have that
information before taking away the restriction for him to register.” The court
found the “restriction does enhance the public safety as it relates to [Pizzini]

9
at this time regarding those issues.” In its minute order, the court indicated
it would allow Pizzini to file a new petition in three years to allow more time
between the last failure-to-register conviction and other criminal activity and
to “allow [Pizzini] time to complete sex offender program if he wishes and
SARATSO report.”
DISCUSSION
Under section 290, a person convicted of certain sex crimes is
required to register as a sex offender. (See People v. Thai (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 427, 432 (Thai).) California law previously “took a one-size-fits-
all approach to sex offender registration” such that registration was for life.
(People v. Franco (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 184, 190 (Franco).) However,
“Commencing January 1, 2021, Senate Bill No. 384 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) . . . restructured the sex offender registration requirement,
establishing three tiers of registration for sex offenders, primarily based on
the offense of conviction, for periods of at least 10 years (tier one), at least 20
years (tier two), and life (tier three).” (Thai, at p. 432.) Pizzini is a tier one
offender.
Section 290.5 provides certain procedures for tier one sex
offenders to petition the trial court to terminate their registration
requirement after the mandated minimum registration period. “If the
defendant does not ‘meet the statutory requirements’ for removal or has not
properly served or filed their petition, the trial court may summarily deny the
petition after ‘stat[ing] the reasons’ for doing so.” (Franco, supra, 99
Cal.App.5th at p. 191.) If the petition is not summarily denied and the
prosecution does not request a hearing, “the trial court must grant the
petition as long as the defendant is currently registered, has no pending
charges, and is not in custody or on parole, probation or supervised release.”

10
(Id. at pp. 191–192.) It is undisputed Pizzini is statutorily eligible to have his
registration requirement terminated.3
However, in response to a petition, “The prosecution may request
a hearing and present evidence to establish ‘community safety would be
significantly enhanced by requiring continued registration.’” (Thai, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 432.) As a panel of this court has explained, “the
prosecution must produce evidence establishing that requiring continued
registration appreciably increased society’s safety.” (Ibid.)
To make this determination, “the court shall consider” the
following: “the nature and facts of the registerable offense; the age and
number of victims; whether any victim was a stranger at the time of the
offense (known to the offender for less than 24 hours); criminal and relevant
noncriminal behavior before and after conviction for the registerable offense;
the time period during which the person has not reoffended; successful
completion, if any, of a Sex Offender Management Board-certified sex
offender treatment program; and the person’s current risk of sexual or violent
reoffense, including the person’s risk levels on SARATSO static, dynamic,

3 A tier one offender is generally subject to a minimum

registration requirement of 10 years. (§ 290, subd. (d)(1)(A).) Under section
290, subdivision (e), the minimum time period is “tolled during any period of
subsequent incarceration, placement, or commitment, including any
subsequent civil commitment, except that arrests not resulting in conviction,
adjudication, or revocation of probation or parole shall not toll the required
registration period,” and it is “extended by one year for each misdemeanor
conviction of failing to register.” Thus, Pizzini’s minimum registration
requirement was increased from the initial 10 years, and the checklist from
the Costa Mesa Police Department indicated his total minimum registration
requirement was approximately 24 years. However, even with the increased
minimum registration requirement, the parties do not dispute Pizzini has
exceeded his adjusted minimum registration requirement.

11
and violence risk assessment instruments, if available.” (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(3).)
The statute further provides “[a]ny judicial determination made pursuant to
this section may be heard and determined upon declarations, affidavits,
police reports, or any other evidence submitted by the parties which is
reliable, material, and relevant.” (Ibid.) “If the court denies the petition, it
must set the time period, one to five years, after which the petitioner can re-
petition for termination and state its reasons.” (Thai, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th
at p. 433; see § 290.5, subd. (a)(4).)
We review “the trial court’s ruling on a petition for termination
from the sex offender registry for abuse of discretion.” (Thai, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 433.) “To establish an abuse of discretion, a defendant must
demonstrate the trial court’s decision fell outside the bounds of reason, i.e.,
was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd.” (Ibid.) “‘The abuse of
discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies
according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s
findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law
are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible
only if arbitrary and capricious.’ [Citation.] A trial court abuses its discretion
when its factual findings are not supported by the evidence, or its decision is
based on an incorrect legal standard.” (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court abused its discretion because its comments
indicate it improperly placed the burden on Pizzini to establish community
safety would not be significantly enhanced by his continued registration,
instead of placing the burden on the prosecution to establish community
safety would be significantly enhanced by his continued registration. Notably,
the court’s comments indicate it weighed against Pizzini that there was no
evidence of the completion of a Sex Offender Management Board-certified sex

12
offender treatment program or a SARATSO report.4 While explaining its
tentative, the court noted it could not require Pizzini to complete a program,
but it thought “that would be convincing to the next judicial officer, or this
one if [the trial judge is] here doing this case, that, in fact, he has at least
tried to address the propensities he might still have with him.” The court
further stated the “other concerning thing” was there was “no SARATSO
report so the [c]ourt doesn’t have any documentation whatsoever to indicate
and convince this [c]ourt that [Pizzini] doesn’t continue to pose a grave
danger to the community with this type of conduct. So we do believe—I do
believe that the [c]ourt not lifting that requirement will enhance public
safety.”
The trial court’s comments imply Pizzini needed to produce
evidence he completed a Sex Offender Management Board-certified sex
offender treatment program and evidence of a SARATSO report in order for
the court to be convinced he did not pose a risk to community safety.
However, this reverses the burden; it was the prosecution’s burden to
establish Pizzini was a current risk. (See Thai, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at
p. 434 [“it was the prosecution’s burden to establish Thai was a current risk
and it could have sought a current risk assessment”].) The lack of evidence as

4 The trial court also made other comments during its tentative

suggesting it was placing the burden on Pizzini. After discussing Pizzini’s
criminal history following his registerable offense, the court stated “Pizzini at
this time has not convinced the [c]ourt he would continue to be a law abiding
citizen.” The court also said “given the repeated conduct before” his last
conviction (which the court believed was 2015), “the [c]ourt is not yet
convinced that, in fact, he will not pose a danger to society if the [c]ourt were
to lift the restriction on having to register as a [section] 290 registrant as
required in the original conviction.” The court’s comments suggest it was
Pizzini’s burden to convince the court he was not currently likely to reoffend.

13
to the completion of a Sex Offender Management Board-certified sex offender
treatment program and a SARATSO report were at most neutral factors
under the circumstances here.
The Attorney General does not dispute the lack of a SARATSO
report should not weigh against Pizzini. However, the Attorney General
argues, after Pizzini’s “counsel clarified it was the prosecution’s burden to
provide a SARATSO report and prove his risk of reoffending . . . , the court
did not weigh its absence in determining [Pizzini] poses a danger to the
community and reasonably found evidence of risk could be helpful in a future
hearing on terminating his sex offender registration requirement.” We do not
agree with the Attorney General’s characterization of what the trial court
found. The court’s comments after providing its tentative and hearing
argument did not clarify it was applying the correct burden and not weighing
the absence of the SARATSO report against Pizzini. The court never stated
after its tentative that it found the lack of a SARATSO report to be neutral
and not, as the court had initially stated in its tentative, “concerning.”
Instead, the court subsequently noted, “whether it’s the People’s burden or
the [d]efense burden to present the [c]ourt with any evidence of his risk, I
think would serve a judicial officer, whomever it is, well to at least have that
information before taking away the restriction for him to register.” The
court’s comment suggests there needs to be evidence of a current risk
assessment “before taking away the restriction for him to register.” Moreover,
the court’s order after the hearing further supports the court viewed the lack
of the SARATSO report as weighing against Pizzini because the court noted
Pizzini could file a new petition in three years in part to allow him time to
obtain a SARATSO report.

14
Regarding the “successful completion, if any, of a Sex Offender
Management Board-certified sex offender treatment program” (§ 290.5,
subd. (a)(3)), the Attorney General asserts the trial court “reasonably found
the lack of program or therapy shows he has never tried to address his sexual
misconduct and, therefore, presents a danger to public safety.” We disagree
the lack of evidence indicating Pizzini completed a Sex Offender Management
Board-certified sex offender treatment program weighs against Pizzini here.
Pizzini’s registerable offense occurred more than 30 years ago, and while
there was no evidence Pizzini completed a Sex Offender Management Board-
certified sex offender treatment program, there also was no evidence such a
program was offered to Pizzini. Again, the prosecution had the burden of
establishing community safety would be significantly enhanced by continued
registration, and on this record the lack of evidence as to this factor does not
weigh against Pizzini.
Having determined the trial court abused its discretion for
incorrectly applying the burden and under the circumstances of this case, we
will remand the matter to the trial court for it to reconsider whether Pizzini’s
registration requirement should be terminated. Pizzini argues remand is not
proper because it would give “a second bite of the apple” to the prosecution

15
and “would waste scarce judicial resources on a second hearing.”5 We
disagree. This is not simply, as Pizzini says, “a second bite of the apple” given
we have concluded the court erred by placing the burden on Pizzini. Given
the evidence of certain other factors in this case, we will leave for the trial
court in the first instance to exercise its discretion while applying the proper
burden.6

5 The only case Pizzini cites for this proposition is Hernandez v.

Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 285, which is inapposite and in the
portion cited by Pizzini discusses summary judgment procedure. (Id. at p. 299
[“‘summary judgment procedure provides the court and parties with a vehicle
to weed the judicial system of an unmeritorious case which otherwise would
consume scarce judicial resources and burden the parties with the economic
and emotional costs of protracted litigation because the lack of merit is not
apparent from the face of the complaint or answer’”].)

Pizzini also says remand “would raise questions of fairness.”
Pizzini does not cite any caselaw that “fairness” would bar remand here
where the trial court applied the wrong burden.
6 On appeal, Pizzini has raised a number of additional arguments

that he did not raise in the trial court. For example, in his reply brief on
appeal, Pizzini argues the court should not have considered the newspaper
article because it was unreliable. We need not address these arguments given
our conclusion the matter should be remanded. On remand, the parties may
introduce additional evidence and make additional arguments as to the
evidence and whether Pizzini’s registration requirement should be
terminated.

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DISPOSITION
The order is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DELANEY, J.

GOODING, J.

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