CourtListener 10670756•In re S.S. CA2/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 9/12/25 In re S.S. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re S.S. et al., Persons Coming B341374
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 24CCJP01123A-B)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court Los Angeles
County, Linda L. Sun, Judge. Affirmed.
William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel and Kimberly Roura, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
C.S. (mother) challenges the juvenile court’s order
declaring her two minor children dependents under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1).1 Mother
contends that the single jurisdictional count against her—that
her children were at risk of harm because she had physically
abused S.H., a foster child under her care—was not supported by
substantial evidence because the court erroneously considered
evidence in the form of unqualified medical opinions. Mother
also argues the court erroneously shifted the burden of producing
evidence to her, rather than the Department, under section 355.1
Respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (Department) contends mother abandoned her
objections to statements of medical opinion in the Department’s
reports, and the court did not engage in burden shifting under
section 355.1. We agree with the Department, and therefore we
affirm.
1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code, unless stated otherwise.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Background and Facts Leading to Department
Investigation
Mother has two children, S.S. (born August 2012) and K.S.
(born September 2021). Mother is herself a former foster child,
and has fostered other children. In June 2023, two foster
children were removed from mother’s home after they alleged
mother had threatened them, but had not physically harmed
them.
S.H., a five-year-old described as having high functioning
autism, was placed in mother’s home in December 2023. S.H.’s
social worker since May 2021 was child social worker Bridget
McClain-Sanders. Other than the events which led to the filing
of the petition, McClain-Sanders was unaware of S.H. engaging
in any self-harming behaviors.
In early February 2024, S.H. injured her elbow jumping
from one bed to another at mother’s home. According to the
medical notes, S.H. was seen in the emergency room on
February 6, 2024, two days after the injury. X-rays showed a
fracture, and S.H. was given a long splint and referred to Dr.
Anna Acosta to discuss surgical options. Dr. Acosta saw S.H. on
February 8, 2024, and discussed the risks and benefits of surgery
with mother. McClain-Sanders was unaware of S.H.’s injury
2 Consistent with our standard of review, we state the facts
in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s findings,
resolving all conflicts and drawing all reasonable inferences to
uphold the court’s order, if possible. (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th
622, 633.)
3
until February 8, 2024, when mother informed her that S.H.’s
surgery was scheduled for February 12, 2024. McClain-Sanders
advised mother she should have contacted McClain-Sanders at
the time S.H. was injured. On February 12, 2024, medical notes
indicate the planned surgery was cancelled “due to lack of
authorization from court as patient is a foster child.” According
to Dr. Acosta, several attempts were made to reschedule the
surgery, but foster mother was not answering the phone or
returning calls.
On February 20, 2024, mother called McClain-Sanders in
the morning to report S.H was causing bruising on her own arms,
forehead, and legs. This was the first time mother had informed
the social worker of S.H. engaging in self-harm. Inglewood
Medical Center, where mother had taken S.H., also called
McClain-Sanders to report the suspicious marks and bruising.
S.H. had swelling on her face, and bruises on her forehead, both
arms, and her shins. She was not dressed appropriately for the
weather, her clothes were ripped, she wore only socks with no
shoes, and her hair was in disarray. According to physician’s
assistant Robin Garner, S.H. was not wearing a splint or cast on
her broken arm. When Garner asked mother why S.H. was not
dressed appropriately and was not wearing shoes, mother went to
the car to get shoes and clothing for the child, which Garner
interpreted as indicating mother was staying in the car, not in
the home. By the time mother returned to the clinic, McClain-
Sanders had arrived. McClain-Sanders questioned mother, who
stated the family was staying at a hotel due to S.H.’s behaviors.
McClain-Sanders asked why S.H. was not wearing the temporary
cast for her injured arm, and mother said the child got the cast
wet and took it off. McClain-Sanders took custody of S.H. and
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planned to take S.H. to an afternoon appointment to re-cast her
broken arm. The social worker asked mother for S.H.’s booster
seat, and mother provided a booster seat of exposed plastic with
no padding. Mother confirmed to McClain-Sanders that S.H.
rode in the car seat that way. The social worker used blankets
from her car to create padding for S.H. to ride in the car seat.
That afternoon, Dr. Acosta observed bruising throughout
S.H.’s body, at various stages of healing, and the bruising on
S.H.’s right forearm—the arm with the fracture—showed the
outline of a thumb and finger as if someone had grabbed S.H.’s
arm. Based on the appearance and location of S.H.’s marks and
bruises, Dr. Acosta believed the bruising was caused by another
person, was not self-inflicted, and absolutely could not have been
self-inflicted by a 5-year-old.
An investigating social worker interviewed mother on
February 27, 2024. Mother informed the social worker that S.S.
resided in Kentucky with her biological father during the school
year, and with mother during Christmas and summer breaks.
Mother also reported that K.S.’s father, G.H., was married with
many children both in and out of wedlock, his wife was unaware
of K.S.’s existence, and G.H. did not provide financial support for
K.S. but was now raising concerns about mother’s mental health
and her care of K.S. because he was trying to claim K.S. on his
taxes. Mother showed the social worker texts between mother
and G.H. that raised the social worker’s concerns that mother
communicated with G.H. about S.H.’s bruises, discussed how
G.H. “has been doing that to the children[,]” and told S.H. not to
report the contact. Mother’s home was in disarray, and she
explained she was moving due to security concerns about the
5
building, not the recent allegations concerning S.H. or G.H.’s
allegations regarding mother’s mental health and her care of K.S.
B. Petition and Hearing
On April 9, 2024, the Department filed a petition alleging
S.S. and K.S. were dependents under section 300, subdivision (b),
based on mother’s physical abuse of S.H. and her failure to
protect S.H. from physical abuse by G.H. Both children were
detained from mother; S.S. was placed with her father in
Kentucky, and K.S. was placed with a maternal aunt.
The Department filed its jurisdiction and disposition report
in May 2024, recommending a family law custody order granting
full physical custody of S.S. to her father, with monitored visits
for mother. Regarding K.S., the Department recommended
reunification services for mother and G.H., including anger
management, parenting, and conjoint counseling.
In early July, the court set the adjudication hearing for a
contest. In mid-July, mother filed two written objections to
evidence contained in the Department’s reports. The first
objected to admission of, and reliance upon, what mother
contended were the unqualified medical opinions of Garner and
Dr. Acosta. Specifically, mother sought to exclude any medical
opinions on the “cause of the marks on the child[]” based on an
argument that the witnesses were not qualified to render such
opinions. Second, mother objected to admission of, and reliance
upon, the hearsay statements of S.H. contained in the
Department’s reports.
At the August 29, 2024 adjudication hearing, the juvenile
court admitted the parties’ exhibits into evidence, including the
6
Department’s jurisdiction and disposition report, over an
objection not relevant to the current appeal. Although the
Department made Garner and Dr. Acosta available to testify,
mother elected not to examine them. After testimony from S.H.
and McClain-Sanders, mother’s counsel moved to strike all of
S.H.’s statements throughout the reports, and the court granted
the motion over the Department’s objection.
After closing arguments, the court dismissed the allegation
against G.H., expressly stating that “the only tenuous evidence”
against G.H. was the text exchange between mother and G.H.,
and mother had defended G.H. and provided an explanation for
the conversation. While the court did not find G.H. believable, it
was dismissing the allegation against him “because there is no
preponderance of the evidence against him.”
Turning to the petition allegations of physical abuse
against mother, the court found no alternative credible and
plausible explanation for how S.H. had sustained her injuries
absent abuse, and the explanation mother provided “was illogical,
unreasonable, and refuted by all the medical professionals.”
Mother had accused S.H. of inflicting the injuries on herself, and
continued to blame S.H. for dysregulated behavior, but the court
found mother’s explanation to lack credibility in light of Dr.
Acosta’s statements ruling out the possibility that S.H.’s injuries
were self-inflicted, McClain-Sanders’ testimony that S.H. had not
previously or subsequently displayed aggression or defiant
behaviors, and evidence that when mother took S.H. to Inglewood
Medical Center, S.H. was not wearing her temporary cast, her
clothing was not appropriate for the weather, and her booster
seat lacked padding. The court acknowledged it was relying on
circumstantial evidence, but found it to be more than a
7
preponderance of evidence in support of the allegation. It also
found mother “entirely not credible” and sustained the allegation
against mother. S.S. was placed with her father, and counsel was
directed to prepare and submit a juvenile custody order giving
S.S.’s father sole physical custody, joint legal custody, and
monitored visits for mother. K.S. was placed with G.H., with
family maintenance services in place, and family reunification
services for mother. Mother appealed.3
DISCUSSION
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for
substantial evidence. “ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings
and disposition, we determine if substantial evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them.’ ” (In re I.J.
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) We defer to the lower court on issues
of credibility. (In re Tania S. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 728, 733–734.)
“ ‘ “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent
judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to
support the findings of the trial court. [Citations.]” ’ ” (In re I.J.,
supra, at pp. 773–734.) “Substantial evidence must be of
3 On July 18, 2025, we invited the parties to submit letter
briefs addressing whether there was any reason why we should
not take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s orders terminating
jurisdiction over both minors and dismiss mother’s challenge to
the jurisdictional finding as moot, either fully or in part. We
agree with mother and the Department that mother’s notice of
appeal included a challenge to the order terminating jurisdiction
over S.S., and there was no reason to reach the merits of the
appeal as to one child but not the other.
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ponderable legal significance. It is not synonymous with ‘any’
evidence. [Citation.] The evidence must be reasonable in nature,
credible, and of solid value.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132
Cal.App.4th 212, 228 (Dakota H.) “ ‘ “The ultimate test is
whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in
question in light of the whole record.” [Citation.]’ ” (In re
Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992.)
The juvenile court has jurisdiction over a child if the
Department establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that
allegations made pursuant to section 300 are true. (§ 355; In re
Jonathan B. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 115, 118–119.) Section 300,
subdivision (b)(1), authorizes jurisdiction when “[t]he child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or
inability of his or her parent . . . to adequately supervise or
protect the child . . . .” The purpose of juvenile law “is to provide
maximum safety and protection for children who are currently
being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being
neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection,
and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk
of that harm.” (§ 300.2, subd. (a); see also In re Nolan W. (2009)
45 Cal.4th 1217, 1228 [the “goal of dependency proceedings is to
safeguard the welfare of California’s children”].)
A. Mother’s Failure to Renew Her Evidentiary Objection
at the Adjudication Hearing Waived That Objection
Mother contends that the court erroneously considered
expert medical opinion by Garner and Dr. Acosta in deciding to
sustain the jurisdictional allegations against her. Mother argues
9
that she filed a written objection to the statements of medical
opinion contained in the Department’s jurisdiction and
disposition report, and it was therefore error for the court to rely
on the expert medical opinions to reach the conclusion that S.H.’s
bruises were not self-inflicted.
Mother’s argument about the court’s reliance on expert
testimony is not well taken. The juvenile court never ruled on
mother’s July 17, 2024 written objections, asking the court to
strike from the Department reports medical opinion evidence
from Garner and Dr. Acosta. Mother waived her objection when
she did not renew it at the adjudication hearing more than a
month later, and opted not to question those witnesses about
their qualifications despite having both witnesses available.
“When a court has not finally ruled on an in limine
motion . . . Evidence Code section 353 requires a timely objection
during presentation of the evidence” to preserve the issue.
(Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440, 452.) “ ‘A party
forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for reversal on appeal
when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court.
[Citations.] Forfeiture, also referred to as “waiver,” applies in
juvenile dependency litigation and is intended to prevent a party
from standing by silently until the conclusion of the proceedings.’
([Dakota H., supra,] 132 Cal.App.4th [at pp.] 221–222 . . . .)” (In
re C.M. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 376, 385.)
At a July 2, 2024 hearing, counsel for mother and the
Department explained to the court that they were working on a
number of discovery issues, and when mother’s attorney stated
her intent to file an objection to qualified expert opinions by Dr.
Acosta, county counsel responded that he would subpoena Dr.
Acosta for the hearing. Mother’s written objections were filed on
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July 17, 2024. After that, county counsel advised the court he
would subpoena Dr. Acosta and have her available to testify. The
adjudication hearing did not take place until more than a month
later, on August 29, 2024. At the adjudication hearing, the court
asked counsel if there were any objections before admitting into
evidence the Department’s exhibits, including the detention and
jurisdiction/disposition reports. Mother did not bring her
evidentiary objections to the court’s attention at that time. In
fact, county counsel pointed out to the court that mother had filed
objections, and so the county arranged to have Dr. Acosta and
physician’s assistant Garner available to testify in order to
address those objections, and mother’s counsel affirmed she did
not plan to call either Dr. Acosta or Ms. Garner as witnesses.
As a counterpoint to mother’s waiver of any prior objections
to expert medical opinion, mother reiterated her written
objections to S.H.’s hearsay statements at the adjudication
hearing. The court not only sustained mother’s hearsay
objection, but also enforced its ruling during argument, even
when mother’s attorney made reference to statements by S.H.
Mother’s attorney raised no similar objections when county
counsel referred to the observations and opinions expressed by
Garner and Dr. Acosta, that “Gardner [sic] had concerns about
whether the child could have suffered these injuries in the
manner described. But Dr. Acosta was very clear in that the
injuries suffered by [S.H.] could not have occurred in the way
that [mother] was describing. And Dr. Acosta goes into
considerable detail about the reasons why and the nature and
type of the bruising and the discoloration, and that the bruising
was at various ages.” Mother also did not object when the court
11
pointed to Dr. Acosta’s opinions as the basis for its decision to
sustain the allegation against mother.
The opinions and observations of Dr. Acosta and
physician’s assistant Garner, along with the testimony of
McClain-Sanders, S.H.’s social worker, provide substantial
evidence to support the court’s determination that mother caused
the harm suffered by S.H., and was sufficient to support the
jurisdictional allegations that S.S. and K.S. were at risk of harm.
B. Section 355.1 Presumption was Not Applied Here
Mother contends the juvenile court improperly applied
section 355.1 to shift the burden of producing evidence from the
Department to mother.
Section 355.1, subdivision (a), provides: “Where the court
finds, based upon competent professional evidence, that an
injury, injuries, or detrimental condition sustained by a minor is
of a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained except as the
result of the unreasonable or neglectful acts or omissions of either
parent, the guardian, or other person who has the care or custody
of the minor, that finding shall be prima facie evidence that the
minor is a person described by subdivision (a), (b), or (d) of
[s]ection 300.” This is a “presumption affecting the burden of
producing evidence.” (§ 355.1, subd. (c).)
We agree with the Department that the trial court did not
shift the evidentiary burden to mother. The court expressly
found that the record contained a preponderance of
circumstantial evidence to support the petition allegations, and it
made no reference to section 355.1 or application of a statutory
presumption.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
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