CourtListener 10670135•In re D.C. CA1/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 9/11/25 In re D.C. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re D.C., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
LAKE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES, A172516
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Lake County Super. Ct.
v. No. JV320673-B)
J.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
When an unexplained adult bite mark appeared on four-year-old D.C.
(Child) after beginning an unsupervised visit with her mother (Mother), the
Lake County Department of Social Services (Department) filed a petition
under Welfare and Institutions Code2 section 388. In this appeal, Mother
We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. Jud.
1
Admin., § 8.1.) We provide a limited factual summary because our opinion is
unpublished and the parties know, or should know, “the facts of the case and
its procedural history.” (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.)
2 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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challenges the order granting that petition, in which the juvenile court found
“that it is not in the best interest of [Child] at this time to have in-person
visits with” Mother, and ordered “that contact be limited to one time per
week via Zoom until such time as [M]other’s mental health is stabilized and
the department feels it is safe to reinstate supervised visitations.” Because
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s implicit finding that
maintaining the status quo ante for visitation would be detrimental to Child,
and there was no abuse of discretion in any other respect, we will affirm.
Mother argues the juvenile court committed legal error in terminating
visitation without making a detriment finding. We disagree. Section 362.1,
subdivision (a)(1), provides that “visitation between the parent . . . shall be as
frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child,” and subject
to subparagraph (B)’s requirement that “[n]o visitation order . . . jeopardize
the safety of the child.” Thus, it “is ordinarily improper to deny visitation
absent a showing of detriment.” (In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573,
580, disapproved on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 989.) But where “the statute does not mandate explicit findings,
and where substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order, findings
may be implied.” (In re Aurora P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1166.)
Here, the juvenile court’s implicit determination that Child would
suffer detriment from continuing in-person visitation with Mother is
apparent from the court’s conclusion “that it is not in the best interest of
[C]hild at this time to have in-person visits with” Mother, its finding that
Mother had failed to comply with her mental health treatment plan in the
months leading up to an incident in which Child appeared to have been
bitten by a human, and its finding “that it is more likely than not that the
bite mark occurred while [the four-year-old C]hild was in [M]other’s care.”
2
Given that these remarks followed the presentation of numerous witnesses
including Mother, exhibits, and closing arguments during which the
Department’s counsel mentioned “detriment[s]” ten times, it would be absurd
to conclude on this record that the court did not make an implicit finding of
detriment.
“A juvenile court’s finding that visitation would be detrimental to the
child is reviewed for substantial evidence.” (In re R.M. (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 119, 135.) “Substantial evidence is evidence that is ‘of
ponderable legal significance,’ ‘reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid
value,’ and ‘ “substantial” proof of the essentials which the law requires in a
particular case.’ ” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1006.) “Our
role in conducting a review for sufficiency of the evidence is limited. We must
review the entire record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's
order and draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence that support it.
We may not resolve conflicts in the evidence, reweigh the evidence, or second
guess the juvenile court’s express or implied determinations regarding the
credibility of witnesses.” (In re R.M. at p. 135.)
Here, the risk of detriment was substantiated by the following
evidence. The social worker in Mother’s case testified that on Monday,
November 4, 2024, Mother sent her photographs of the bite mark and alleged
that Child had been bitten by the girlfriend of Child’s father—an allegation
belied by the fact that the bite mark was not there when the social worker
left Child with Mother on Friday, November 1. And although Mother had
told the social worker that Mother had not changed Child’s clothes until
Saturday (when she purportedly discovered the bite mark), Mother later
testified that she changed Child on Friday afternoon, after the social worker
left. Taken together, this evidence supports a reasonable inference that the
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bite occurred when Child was in Mother’s custody. It supports the further
inference that Child might suffer similar harm from future in-person visits.
In short, the implicit finding of detriment is supported by substantial
evidence.
Next, Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion in granting
the Department’s section 388 petition to modify visitation. This argument
comprises two contentions: first, that the Department allegedly failed to
prove a change in circumstances that was attributable to Mother; and second,
that the Department failed to prove that modifying visitation was in Child’s
best interests. We reject both.
“Under section 388, a party may petition the court to change, modify or
set aside a previous court order. The petitioning party has the burden to
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, there is a change of circumstances
or new evidence, and the proposed modification is in the child's best
interests.” (In re A.S. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 351, 357.) The determination
of whether the petitioning party has carried that burden is “committed to the
sound discretion of the juvenile court, and [that] court’s ruling should not be
disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established.” (In
re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) “ ‘The appropriate test for abuse
of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When
two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial
court.’ ” (Id. at pp. 318–319.) Here, there was no abuse of discretion. It was
eminently reasonable for the juvenile court to find a change in circumstance.3
3 In her opening brief, Mother notes that the section 388 petition
identified the bite-mark incident as the changed circumstance, but the trial
court’s order focused in this respect on Mother’s mental health instability
including a lack of compliance with her mental health treatment and
4
As we have already observed, there is substantial evidence to support the
finding that Child was bitten by a human during a visit with Mother. The
social worker and the child’s daycare did not see a mark on Minor the day she
was dropped off to Mother. Father and his girlfriend also denied seeing
marks on the child. From this, it is reasonable to infer that Mother either
caused or failed to prevent that harm when Child was under her care. In her
briefing, Mother emphasizes her positive parenting qualities and interactions
with Minor that undoubtedly contributed to the decision for unsupervised
visits. However, the sudden appearance of an adult bite mark on this four-
year-old at the start of overnight visits, raised legitimate concerns about the
child’s welfare. (Cf. In re D.P. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 898, 903 [lack of
plausible explanation for adult bite marks on infant while in mother’s care
supported jurisdictional finding that minor was at risk of suffering serious
physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by a parent].) There was no abuse of
discretion in finding a change in circumstance.4
For similar reasons, the juvenile court acted within its discretion in
finding that replacing in-person visitation with once-a-week video calls would
reported mania that impacted the court’s view of her credibility. This
discrepancy presents no difficulty on appeal because “ ‘[w]e review the trial
court’s order, not its reasoning, and affirm an order if it is correct on any
theory apparent from the record.’ ” (City of Claremont v. Kruse (2009)
177 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1164, fn. 3.)
4 We reject Mother’s argument concerning the Department’s purported
failure to prove Child was bitten because of mother; because Mother cites no
authority that proof of causation is required for a finding of changed
circumstance, we deem the argument forfeited. (See In re Vanessa (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1131.) We also note that Mother’s citations to the
various harms alleged to have occurred when Child visited Father are
invitations to reweigh the evidence—something we may not do on this
standard of review. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 319.)
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serve Child’s best interest. If in-person visitation presents a risk of
detriment to the child—and we have already concluded substantial evidence
supports that premise—then it is sensible to conclude the Child’s best
interests are served by a temporary suspension of in-person visitation in
favor of videoconference visits. And while it is reasonable to believe, as
Mother argues, that Child’s best interests could have also been advanced by
supervised or therapeutic visitation, it does not follow from this that ordering
video calls “exceeded the bounds of reason.” (In re R.M., supra,
111 Cal.App.5th at p. 135.) We “cannot substitute our judgment for that of
the juvenile court.” (Ibid.) Thus, Mother’s reliance on In re I.B. (2020)
53 Cal.App.5th 133, is misplaced: There, the appellant Social Services
Agency had to demonstrate an abuse of discretion, whereas here, it is
Mother’s burden. (Id. at p. 152.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm.
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_________________________
Smiley, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Humes, P. J.
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
In re D.C. A172516
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