CourtListener 10670123•People v. Riley CA2/8
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 9/11/25 P. v. Riley CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B340040
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA304492-01)
v.
STEVEN LAMAR RILEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Larry P. Fidler, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Barhoma Law and Matthew Barhoma for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Lauren Sanchez, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Defendant Steven Lamar Riley appeals the denial of his
request for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.75.
In denying Riley’s request, the trial court stated, “This was
a serious case which was settled by a plea bargain. The court
sees no reason to upset the negotiated plea.” We reverse and
remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to consider
Riley’s contentions.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The underlying facts are not relevant to the issues we
address on appeal and are stated for context. On June 13, 2006,
Riley argued with victim Artie Brown at the scene of a narcotics
transaction. They had a physical altercation and Riley ended up
shooting Brown several times. He died at the scene. Brown’s
wallet, cell phone, keys and $100 in currency were taken from
him.
On November 14, 2006, the People charged Riley by
Information with a single count of murder in violation of section
187, subdivision (a). The Information also alleged that Riley had
prior strike convictions for robbery in violation of section 211 and
assault in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(2).
On March 5, 2007, Riley agreed to plead no contest to
voluntary manslaughter, a violation of section 192, subdivision
(a). He also admitted he inflicted great bodily injury, a violation
of section 12022.7, subdivision (a); used a handgun during the
crime in violation of section 12022.5; suffered a prior strike
conviction for assault with a firearm in violation of sections
1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d) and 667, subdivisions (b)
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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through (i), which also qualified as a prior serious felony under
section 667, subdivision (a)(1); and had served a prior prison term
under section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court imposed a
sentence of 41 years: 11 years for manslaughter, doubled because
of the strike; five years for the prior serious felony conviction;
three years for inflicting great bodily injury; 10 years for the use
of the firearm; and one year for his prior prison term.
On June 13, 2023, Riley filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus asking the court to resentence him in light of recent
statutory changes to the California Penal Code. He noted his
sentence included time for a prior prison term under section
667.5, subdivision (b), which was now invalid under Senate Bill
No. 483. In addition to requesting relief under Senate Bill No.
483, Riley asked the court to strike, among other things, the
firearm and great bodily injury enhanced sentences pursuant to
newly amended section 1385.
On December 14, 2023, the People filed an informal
response to the petition, conceding that the one-year term for the
prison prior should be vacated, but opposing any other relief. The
parties continued to brief the issues.
On June 7, 2024, the trial court held a hearing entitled
“Resentencing Pursuant to [Penal Code Sections]
1172(a)/1172.75(a).” Riley’s counsel brought to the attention of
the court Riley’s “excellent programing” with 16 certificates of
completion of prison programs. The prison staff attested that he
“has shown exemplary conduct and behavior and listens to the
correction officers, and he is completing his work. He has
completed his G.E.D. during his incarceration. And his discipline
is very excellent.” Besides one incident of mutual combat in the
prison, “he has very good discipline.” Counsel also argued
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mitigating factors in support of a sentence reduction—that Riley
experienced trauma as a child, attended special education classes
for which he was bullied, became unhoused with his learning
disabilities, and had worked hard in prison “to prove himself that
he can be a productive member of society.” The People
strenuously opposed a sentence reduction, citing the heinous
nature of the crime, the position of the victim’s family that Riley
should not be released, and the fact that Riley’s certificates were
dated 2017 and later, even though he had been incarcerated since
2006. The trial court took the matter under submission.
On July 8, 2024, the trial court resentenced Riley to
40 years in prison, cutting one year from his original sentence for
the prior prison term. The trial court wrote: “[Mr. Riley] requests
that the court in addition to striking his one year prior pursuant
to Penal Code section 667.5 (which the people concede) should
strike certain enhancements or eliminate the doubled base term
or the 5-year enhancement. (This matter was orally argued.) [¶]
This was a serious case which was settled by a plea bargain. The
court sees no reason to upset the negotiated plea with the
exception of striking the one year prior pursuant to Penal Code
section 667.5, reducing the total sentence to 40-years, further
relief is denied.” This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law
When Riley was sentenced in 2007, section 667.5,
subdivision (b) required trial courts to impose a one-year
sentence enhancement where the defendant had served a prior
separate prison term and had not remained free from custody for
at least five years. (People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th
4
664, 681.) Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) amended
section 667.5, subdivision (b) by limiting the one-year prior prison
term enhancement to prior terms for sexually violent offenses
only. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) In 2021, Senate Bill No. 483
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) retroactively applied Senate Bill No. 136
to all persons currently serving a term of incarceration for a prior
prison term enhancement. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.) When a
trial court has confirmed that a defendant’s current judgment
includes a prior prison term enhancement now legally invalid, it
must recall and resentence the defendant. The resentencing
“shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed .
. . unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.” (§
1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) In doing so, the court “shall apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing.” (Id., subd. (d)(2).) The trial
court is also required to consider “postconviction factors,
including but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that
reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical
condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future
violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have
changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (Id., subd.
(d)(3).) Finally, the statute guides the trial court in selecting
among the lower, middle, and upper terms on each count. (Id.,
subd. (d)(4); People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 399.)
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II. Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s decision not to strike a sentence
enhancement for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 371; People v. Mendoza (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298; People v. Cepeda (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
456, 469 (Cepeda).)
III. Analysis
The People argue that in the absence of any indication to
the contrary, “the trial court will be deemed to have considered
the relevant criteria” when sentencing a defendant. (People v.
Zamora (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1627, 1637.) That is a general
principle of sentencing review. Here, however, the trial court did
reveal an indication to the contrary. It stated it saw “no reason”
to interfere with the negotiated plea and sentence. We find that
statement can be read two ways. Either the trial court
considered Riley’s contentions and circumstances and, on
balance, found them insufficient to warrant a sentence reduction;
or, the trial court refused to consider Riley’s contentions because,
no matter what those contentions were, it was of no mind to
apply section 1172.75 to negotiated sentences per se. The latter
reading would be a clear abuse of discretion for “the general rule
in California is that plea agreements are deemed to incorporate
the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact
additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public
policy.” (Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 71 [a plea agreement
does not have the effect of insulating the parties from changes in
the law that the Legislature intended to apply to them]; People v.
Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 977 [full resentencing
procedure in section 1172.75 applies to all sentences, including
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stipulated sentences imposed as part of a plea bargain]; Cepeda,
supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 470 [subdivision (d)(1) of section
1172.75 explicitly provides that resentencing is not constrained
by the terms of a plea bargain].)
We find People v. Cepeda apt. There, in resentencing
defendant the trial court simply deferred to the original plea
agreement and sentence and did not address the resentencing
requests defendant raised in the recall. Division 4 of our court
found that in so acting, the trial court abused its discretion. It
remanded the matter for the trial court to make its own
independent ruling without being constrained by the plea
agreement. (Cepeda, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 460–461.)
We do not know the basis of the trial court’s ruling because
we cannot discern the meaning of its brief and cryptic comments.
Because we do not know, we remand to the trial court to hold a
resentencing hearing anew and make a clear record on remand as
to the basis of its exercise of discretion. We express no opinion on
how the trial court should rule other than to say the trial court
should not disqualify Riley from the section 1172.75 recall and
resentencing process solely because his original sentence was the
result of a plea agreement.
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DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated, the order is reversed, and the
matter remanded for resentencing consistent with
section 1172.75.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
VIRAMONTES, J.
*
RUBIN, J.
* Retired Presiding Justice of the California Court of Appeal,
Second District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article
VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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